[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Counsel: Attorney Jeong Tae-ryu)
[Defendant, Appellant] Dongyang Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Counsel: Hanmi Joint Law Office, Attorneys Yu Kyung-hee and 3 others)
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Judgment 91Na12709, decided October 1, 1991
[Order]
The part of the lower court judgment against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court determined, as an undisputed fact between the parties, that the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company on February 4, 1963 and worked there, and on July 25, 1980, submitted a letter of resignation and was dismissed by employer's acceptance of resignation (uiwon myeonjik). Based on the evidence it adopted, the lower court found the following facts: the Defendant company is a corporation whose principal purpose is the non-life insurance business and related ancillary businesses; the National Security Emergency Countermeasure Committee (Gukga Bowi Bisang Daechaek Wiwonhoe) instructed the various government ministries, state-run enterprises, financial institutions, and insurance companies, in the name of "social purification," to purge corrupt and incompetent public officials and employees, and pursuant to this, the Minister of Finance instructed each insurance company under its jurisdiction to compulsorily dismiss a certain number of employees; at the time, Nonparty 1, who was the representative director of the Defendant company, was allocated a quota of 5 employees to be dismissed by the Ministry of Finance authorities, but pleaded with the authorities and obtained approval to dismiss only 3, and decided to give priority to dismissing long-serving employees among the Defendant company's staff, instructing Nonparty 2, who was the head of the general affairs department of the Defendant company, to properly persuade the Plaintiff, who was the second longest-serving employee at the Defendant company, to submit a letter of resignation; accordingly, when the above Nonparty 2 explained the company's difficult circumstances to the Plaintiff and told him to submit a letter of resignation, the Plaintiff resisted, whereupon Nonparty 2 pleaded, "Someone has to be let go in any case, so please submit your resignation for the sake of the company," and the Plaintiff, although he had no intention of resigning, after several days of deliberation, had no choice but to submit a letter of resignation, and the Defendant company accepted it and dismissed the Plaintiff by acceptance of resignation. In light of the record, such factual findings by the lower court can be accepted, and there is no illegality of violating the rules of evidence in the process of making such factual findings, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
Even where an employer terminates an employment contract relationship by taking the form of accepting a resignation submitted by an employee, if the employer causes an employee who has no intention of resigning to have no choice but to prepare and submit a letter of resignation, this is, in substance, a termination of the employment contract relationship by the employer's unilateral intention, and therefore constitutes a dismissal, and a dismissal without justifiable cause is no different from a wrongful dismissal (see this Court's Decisions 92Da3809, decided July 10, 1992; 91Da29811, decided August 14, 1992, etc.).
As determined by the lower court, if Nonparty 1, who was the representative director of the Defendant company, upon receiving an instruction from the Minister of Finance to compulsorily dismiss a certain number of employees, singled out the Plaintiff through Nonparty 2, the head of the general affairs department of the Defendant company, without any grounds for disciplinary action, and pressed him to submit a letter of resignation, and the Plaintiff, having no intention of resigning but being intimidated by the social atmosphere of that time, had no choice but to submit a letter of resignation, and the Defendant company accepted it and dismissed the Plaintiff by acceptance of resignation, then this is, in substance, a wrongful dismissal that terminated the employment contract relationship with the Plaintiff by the Defendant company's unilateral intention without justifiable cause, and is therefore void. The lower court's determination to the same effect is correct, and there is no illegality therein of any kind. The arguments on this point are all without merit.
However, if an employee dismissed by an employer received retirement allowance and other payments without raising any objection or reservation, then, absent special circumstances, it shall be deemed that the employee acknowledged the validity of the dismissal, and therefore, filing a lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal a long time thereafter may constitute a case that is impermissible as violating the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel (see Decisions 91Da39085, decided March 13, 1992; 92Da3670, decided May 26, 1992; 92Da3809, decided July 10, 1992; 91Da29811, decided August 14, 1992, etc.).
However, according to the Defendant's brief dated October 8, 1990, it can be seen that the Defendant is asserting, in effect, that even if the Plaintiff's declaration of intent to resign was a defective declaration of intent, since 10 years have passed from that time, or 3 years have passed from the time the defect was removed, the Plaintiff cannot now raise objection to it. Such an assertion by the Defendant cannot be regarded as excluding an argument to the effect that the Plaintiff's filing of this lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal a long time after the dismissal violates the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel, and yet the lower court judgment contains no reasoning whatsoever on this point.
According to the record, it can be seen that the Plaintiff admitted, at the fifth date for pleading in the first instance, that he received retirement allowance from the Defendant without objection at the time of his retirement, and that the Plaintiff did not raise any particular objection to the Defendant company thereafter, but only filed this lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal on July 24, 1990, 10 years after that. If, as such, the Plaintiff received retirement allowance from the Defendant without any objection at the time of the dismissal, and thereafter did not raise any particular objection to the Defendant company, but filed this lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal only after 10 years had passed (even if the dismissal lacked justifiable cause), this may constitute a case that is impermissible as violating the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel.
The lower court judgment contains an illegality of having failed to render a judgment on the Defendant's argument to the effect that this lawsuit is impermissible as violating the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel, and the arguments on this point are found to have merit.
Therefore, the part of the lower court judgment against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and determination. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Kim Ju-han (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho (Justice in charge), Yun Kwan, Kim Yong-jun