[Plaintiff, Appellant] ○○○ Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Jeon Jae-jung and 2 others, Counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor]
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 94Gu5771 rendered on May 12, 1995
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiff's attorneys (including, to the extent supplementary, the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal submitted after the statutory period) are examined.
Where an employee has drafted and submitted a letter of resignation to the employer, unless there are special circumstances such that the letter of resignation is found to contain only a mere joke that cannot be regarded as an expression of intent to resign, the letter of resignation shall be deemed to contain an expression of intent to terminate the employment relationship with the employer. Accordingly, unless it falls under a case where the employee's submission of the letter of resignation is invalid, such as constituting a declaration of intent not reflecting the employee's true intent, so that the employer's acceptance thereof can be substantively regarded as a dismissal terminating the employment relationship by the employer's unilateral intent—as, for example, where the employer forces an employee who has no intention to resign to nevertheless draft and submit a letter of resignation, and then terminates the employment relationship by taking the form of a so-called voluntary retirement through acceptance of that resignation (see this Court's Decisions 90Da11554 rendered on July 12, 1991; 92Da3670 rendered on May 26, 1992; 92Da3809 rendered on July 10, 1992; 92Da21036 rendered on August 14, 1992; 91Da38686 rendered on January 26, 1993; and 91Da41750 rendered on May 25, 1993, among others)—the employment relationship between the parties is terminated either when the employer accepts the employee's expression of intent to resign contained in the submitted letter of resignation, thereby establishing a mutual rescission (voluntary retirement), or when the effect of termination arising from the submission of the letter of resignation occurs upon the lapse of the period prescribed in Article 660 of the Civil Code (민법). In such a case, the employer's notice to the employee of the extinguishment of the employment relationship is nothing more than a notice of a fact already established (관념의 통지), and cannot be deemed a dismissal under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).
Turning to examine the present case, the record shows the following. The Defendant's Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as "the Intervenor") joined the Plaintiff company, which operates a non-life insurance business, on July 12, 1971, and worked there. On March 22, 1993, the Plaintiff, for managerial reasons, carried out a reassignment of 216 executive-level employees, including the Intervenor, whereby the Intervenor was transferred from the position of Manager of Compensation Section 1 at the Seoul Southern Branch to the position of Manager of the Non-Life Insurance Sales Team at the Gwangju Branch, and the Intervenor reported to the new post of assignment. However, since items such as a desk were not provided and the Intervenor was thus unable to properly perform his duties, the Intervenor, claiming that the reassignment order was intended to force the retirement of himself and certain other executive-level employees, did not report for work at the newly assigned post, and around March 28 of the same year left the post and went up to Seoul. There, together with approximately 40 other executive-level employees who had likewise received reassignment orders, he discussed countermeasures and continued to refuse to return to work at the assigned post. On April 20 of the same year, he drafted and submitted to the Plaintiff a letter of resignation that did not state a retirement date (the Intervenor later received this letter of resignation back from the Plaintiff). On June 1 of the same year, he again met with Managing Director Non-party 1 and Director Non-party 2 of the Plaintiff company to appeal for lenient treatment, but was refused. Then, on June 10 of the same year, stating that the Plaintiff had, in the meantime, unlawfully and unfairly urged him to retire in order to force him out, and that he was in a situation where he had to submit this letter of resignation, setting the retirement date as May 31, 1993, and leave the Plaintiff company, he made the following four requests to the Plaintiff: (1) if the circumstances of the submission of this letter of resignation as stated herein differ from the facts, please notify the same in writing; (2) please notify the Company's official position regarding the fact that the Intervenor was excluded from the couples' training program and was transferred to the Gwangju Branch; (3) please provide appropriate compensation in accordance with the applicable regulations for the Intervenor's inevitable early retirement due to the Plaintiff's urging of retirement; and (4) please, in consideration of the Intervenor's faithful service to the Plaintiff company, restore, to an objectively reasonable degree, the dishonor of having been selected as an early retiree. The letter of resignation (Exhibit A No. 4-2) further stated that if the Company failed to take sincere measures with respect to these four requests, the Intervenor would take measures in accordance with law to restore his honor and exercise his rights against the disadvantage suffered, and expressed hope that the Company would flourish and prosper as a foundation for the livelihood of junior employees. It is found that the Intervenor drafted and submitted this letter of resignation.
In response, on June 14 of the same year, the Plaintiff notified the Intervenor that the expression of intent to resign contained in the letter of resignation was unclear, and that it was unclear whether it was based on the Intervenor's free will, and therefore requested the Intervenor to clarify in writing his true intent; and further stated that since the Intervenor was obligated to perform his labor duties until the employment relationship was terminated, the Plaintiff had urged him to report to work since June 10 of the same year, but the Intervenor had continued not to report to work, and requested that the Intervenor clarify in writing the special reasons for his failure to report to work (see Exhibit A No. 4-3). It is found that this notice was given.
In response, on June 17 of the same year, the Intervenor again replied to the Plaintiff that, as to whether the submission of the letter of resignation dated June 10 was made under the Company's pressure or urging, or based on the Intervenor's own free will, the Plaintiff would well know the Intervenor's own position in light of the contents stated in the letter of resignation and the Company's conduct that had, in substance, urged his retirement; and stated that the Company had refused to accept the labor which the Intervenor sought to provide pursuant to the reassignment order and had deprived him of his right to provide labor; that the reassignment order was intended as a workforce reduction measure targeting those excluded from the couples' training program; that the Company had also urged him to remain on standby at home, and had paid him his salary normally during that period, so that his failure to report to work during that time did not constitute unauthorized absence; and that he hoped measures would be taken to allow him to work starting June 11 of the same year. In response, upon being informed of the Company's position that he should either work in accordance with the reassignment order or re-draft and submit a letter of resignation, he again delivered a letter of resignation on June 11 of the same year. It is found that the Intervenor sent a notice (Exhibit A No. 4-4) stating, in closing, that he wished for the prosperity of the workplace where he had served faithfully for over 21 years and of his senior and junior colleagues with whom he had formed bonds, and hoping that his retirement would be processed in conjunction with sincere measures regarding the matters requested in the June 10 letter of resignation.
In response, on June 29 of the same year, the Plaintiff again notified the Intervenor that, since the content of the June 10 letter of resignation left the true intent to resign unclear and contained assertions that differed from the facts, the Plaintiff could not accept the letter of resignation, and urged the Intervenor to report to the assigned post and resume his duties in accordance with the reassignment order, stating that in case of unauthorized absence, the matter would have to be handled in accordance with the company's internal regulations (see Exhibit A No. 4-5). It is found that this notice was given.
On July 3 of the same year, in response to the Plaintiff's notice of June 29, the Intervenor stated that he could not understand why he was being asked to report again for duty when Non-party 3, the head of the Plaintiff company's personnel department, had notified him that the letter of resignation had been accepted effective May 31 of the same year; and stated in particular that the reassignment order to the position of Manager of the Non-Life Insurance Sales Team was harsh, amounting to an assignment to a "ghost position." He requested that, if the notice to report again for duty was intended to permit reinstatement to work, the Plaintiff provide a written promise as to the scheduled date of reinstatement and position that would be given to the Intervenor with respect to a managerial post, and that the Plaintiff cease unfair conduct forcing retirement—such as disciplinary action on grounds such as unfair performance evaluation, successive reassignments to locations with no personal ties, and imposition of unrealistic sales targets combined with deprivation of managerial responsibilities that made it impossible to work—and provide a written promise guaranteeing employment until statutory retirement age. He further requested that, if the Plaintiff refused these requests of the Intervenor or determined that the circumstances of the submission of the letter of resignation differed from the facts, the Plaintiff notify the reasons or circumstances in writing; and requested that, following retirement processing pursuant to the June 10 letter of resignation, the Plaintiff properly calculate and pay the retirement allowance for his period of service within the statutory deadline, and notified that he would abide by the legal determination as to whether his rights had been infringed (see Exhibit A No. 4-6). These facts can be acknowledged.
In particular, even according to the June 10 letter of resignation, which the Intervenor asserts truthfully recorded the circumstances up to that point, it is stated therein that the Intervenor appealed the unfairness of the reassignment order in this case around April 20 of the same year; that around May 30 of the same year he received and refused an urging to retire from the executives and the head of the personnel department; that on June 1 of the same year he again pointed out to the executives and the head of the personnel department the unfairness of paying a retirement consolation allowance against the wishes of the person concerned; that around June 9 of the same year, the executives and the head of the personnel department, showing him that a 600% retirement consolation allowance had been paid to prior retirees, tried to persuade him that it would be advantageous for him to draft a letter of resignation effective May 31 of the same year, to which he continued to appeal the unfairness; and that on June 10 of the same year, upon receiving a telephone call from the head of the personnel department urging his retirement, he was inevitably placed in the situation of having to submit the June 10 letter of resignation and leave the Plaintiff company. In light of these statements, it cannot be found that, up to the time the Intervenor submitted the June 10 letter of resignation, the Plaintiff had coerced the Intervenor into submitting the letter of resignation, or that any executive or employee of the Plaintiff company had threatened the Intervenor in order to compel him to submit the letter of resignation, such that the Intervenor was in a state of duress at the time of submitting the June 10 letter of resignation.
Given these circumstances, it is clear, in light of the contents stated therein, that the Intervenor's June 10 letter of resignation contains an expression of intent to resign; and the fact that the June 10 letter of resignation contains an expression of intent to resign is also sufficiently supported by the subsequent notices, etc. that the Intervenor sent to the Plaintiff. Even though the June 10 letter of resignation contains the requests described above, requests (1) and (2) above merely ask the Plaintiff to confirm in writing whether the facts regarding the circumstances of the submission of the letter of resignation as stated therein are true, and to clarify the circumstances under which the Intervenor was excluded from the couples' training program and transferred to the Gwangju Branch; the mere presence of such statements does not mean that the letter of resignation fails to contain an expression of intent to resign. Requests (3) and (4) above consist of a request to the Plaintiff for appropriate compensation in accordance with law and objectively reasonable restoration of honor in preparation for the event that the Intervenor's retirement is processed pursuant to the submission of the letter of resignation; this rather makes clear that the letter of resignation was not, as the Intervenor merely asserts, submitted simply as a protest against the unfairness of the Plaintiff's reassignment order or other unfair treatment such as the urging of retirement. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the June 10 letter of resignation constitutes a conditional expression of intent to resign, to the effect that the Plaintiff must not process the Intervenor's retirement unless the above four requests are fulfilled. Moreover, setting aside the question of whether the Intervenor's assertions are well-founded—namely, that the Plaintiff's reassignment order against the Intervenor was unfair, that the Plaintiff had engaged in the unfair treatment alleged by the Intervenor, and that executives or employees of the Plaintiff company had urged the Intervenor to retire—even if the Intervenor's drafting and submission of the June 10 letter of resignation to the Plaintiff resulted, as the Intervenor asserts, from the unfairness of the Plaintiff's reassignment order against the Intervenor and the unfair treatment alleged by the Intervenor, and was due to the urging of retirement by executives or employees of the Plaintiff company, it cannot be concluded, considering comprehensively the contents stated in the June 10 letter of resignation and the attitude subsequently taken by the Intervenor in connection with the June 10 letter of resignation, that the drafting and submission of the letter of resignation did not reflect the Intervenor's true intent. Nor, as noted above, can it be regarded as having been made inevitably due to coercion or duress by the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, even assuming that the submission of the June 10 letter of resignation constitutes, as the Intervenor asserts, a declaration of intent not reflecting his true intent, made without any actual intention to resign in his heart, it can be seen from the record that on June 14, 1993, the Plaintiff notified the Intervenor, in connection with the June 10 letter of resignation, that it was unclear whether the Intervenor's expressed intent to resign was voluntary or reflected his true intent, and requested that this be clarified, and further, since the Intervenor remained obligated under the employment contract to perform labor duties until the employment relationship was terminated through, for example, acceptance of the June 10 letter of resignation, urged him to report to work at the assigned post; that the Plaintiff thereafter continued to give notice to the same effect, urging the Intervenor, who still retained his status as an employee, to report to the assigned post and return to work; that nevertheless the Intervenor continued not to report to the assigned post or return to work, and did not clearly express his intent by, for example, retrieving the June 10 letter of resignation or clearly indicating to the Plaintiff that he had no intention to resign; and that, on the contrary, on July 3 of the same year, in response to the Plaintiff's June 29 notice concerning reinstatement, the Intervenor requested that, if the notice to report again for duty was intended to permit reinstatement to work, the Plaintiff provide written promises regarding the various matters described above, and requested that, if the Plaintiff refused these requests of the Intervenor or determined that the circumstances of the submission of the letter of resignation differed from the facts, the Plaintiff notify the reasons or circumstances in writing, and requested that, following retirement processing pursuant to the June 10 letter of resignation, the Plaintiff properly calculate and pay the retirement allowance for his period of service within the statutory deadline, notifying that he would abide by the legal determination as to whether his rights had been infringed. There is nothing in the record indicating that, up until the time the Plaintiff subsequently notified the Intervenor that the employment relationship had been extinguished effective August 1, 1993, the Intervenor withdrew the expression of intent to resign contained in the June 10 letter of resignation. Given this, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff knew or could have known that the Intervenor's submission of the June 10 letter of resignation did not reflect his true intent, either at the time the Plaintiff first saw the June 10 letter of resignation and thereby learned of the Intervenor's intent to resign, or up to the point in time when the effect of termination of the employment relationship arising from the June 10 letter of resignation occurred. Accordingly, the expression of intent to resign contained in the submission of the June 10 letter of resignation took effect as termination upon the lapse of the period prescribed in Article 660, Paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, and the employment relationship between the Intervenor and the Plaintiff was thereby validly extinguished.
Nevertheless, the court below determined otherwise, holding that, judging from its wording, the Intervenor's June 10 letter of resignation could not be regarded as notifying the Plaintiff of the Intervenor's termination of the employment contract, and that therefore the Plaintiff's notification of the termination of the employment contract based on that letter of resignation should be regarded as a dismissal under the Labor Standards Act; and further held that, even if this were not the case, where an employer forces an employee who has no intention to resign to nevertheless submit a letter of resignation and terminates the employment relationship by taking the form of accepting it, this in substance terminates the employment relationship against the employee's will, and thus constitutes a dismissal regardless of whether the employee's expression of intent constitutes a declaration not reflecting his true intent. On this basis, the court below determined that, in the present case, the Plaintiff, with the intention of causing the Intervenor to resign, engaged in the various acts set forth in its findings so as to make the situation unbearable for the Intervenor, and thereafter urged the Intervenor to resign, thereby causing the Intervenor to inevitably submit the letter of resignation, and that the Plaintiff's notification, based on that letter of resignation, that the employment relationship had been extinguished constituted, notwithstanding its form, a substantive dismissal of the Intervenor. In so holding, the judgment below erred in the legal principles concerning the termination of an employment relationship by an employee's unilateral expression of intent and the legal principles concerning dismissal, and further erred, in violation of the rules of evidence, in misapprehending the facts concerning the existence of the Intervenor's expression of intent to resign and whether that expression of intent reflected his true intent. The portion of the grounds of appeal pointing out these errors is therefore well-founded.
Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below, this decision being rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices as set forth in the Order.
Justice Cheon Gyeong-song (Presiding Justice), An Yong-deuk, Ji Chang-gwon (Justice in Charge), Shin Seong-taek