[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 1 other
[Appellant] Defendants and Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kim Young-jin and 1 other
[Original Judgment] Seoul High Court Decision 2020No81 Decided March 26, 2020
[Order]
The part of the original judgment concerning Defendant 1 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. Both the Prosecutor's appeal against Defendant 2 and Defendant 2's appeal are dismissed.
[Reasoning] The Court determines the grounds of appeal.
1. Regarding the prosecutor's argument of misapplication of law with respect to Defendant 1
A. Overview of the Case and the Issue
1) Overview of the Case
The Juvenile Act (소년법) provides that when an indeterminate sentence is imposed on a juvenile under 19 years of age, the maximum term shall not exceed 10 years and the minimum term shall not exceed 5 years (Article 2, proviso of Article 60(1)). The Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes (특정강력범죄의 처벌에 관한 특례법, hereinafter the "Specific Violent Crimes Act") provides that, notwithstanding the aforementioned provision of the Juvenile Act, when an indeterminate sentence is imposed on a juvenile who has committed a specific violent crime such as murder, the maximum term shall not exceed 15 years and the minimum term shall not exceed 7 years (Article 4(2)).
Defendant 1 was indicted for murder and abandonment of a corpse. The first instance court found all of the charges guilty and, on the ground that Defendant 1, who was 18 years old at the time, fell within the category of a "juvenile," imposed the maximum possible indeterminate sentence under Article 4(2) of the Specific Violent Crimes Act—which constitutes a special provision superseding the proviso of Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act—namely, imprisonment with a maximum term of 15 years and a minimum term of 7 years. Only Defendant 1 appealed against this judgment, and the prosecutor did not appeal. However, Defendant 1 turned 19 before the rendering of the appellate court's judgment.
2) Judgment of the Court Below
The court below, like the first instance court, found all of the charges against Defendant 1 guilty. However, on the ground that Defendant 1 no longer fell within the category of a "juvenile" by the time of the appellate court's judgment, the court below, acting ex officio, reversed the first instance judgment. Since only Defendant 1 had appealed, the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment (불이익변경금지 원칙) applied. Following the purport of prior Supreme Court decisions (Supreme Court Decision 2006Do734, decided April 14, 2006, etc.), which hold that when comparing the severity of an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be compared with the determinate sentence, the court below held that it could not impose a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 7 years—the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court—and accordingly sentenced Defendant 1 to 7 years of imprisonment.
3) The Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal
The prosecutor argues that, in applying the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence, it is proper to compare the severity of the determinate sentence based on the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, and therefore the court below should have determined the sentence with 15 years—the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court—as the upper limit.
4) The Issue in This Case
As in this case, where a defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence at the first instance because he fell within the category of a "juvenile" at the time of the first instance judgment, and only the defendant appealed, and in the appellate proceedings the defendant reached the age of majority such that a determinate sentence must now be imposed, the appellate court, in accordance with the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, may not impose a determinate sentence heavier than the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court. The issue is how to set the upper limit of the determinate sentence that the appellate court may impose in such a case. In other words, the issue in this case is how to establish the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment when the appellate court must convert the first instance court's indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence.
B. The Standard for Determining Whether There Has Been a Violation of the Principle Prohibiting a More Unfavorable Modification of Judgment in the Case of an Indeterminate Sentence
1) In a case where only the defendant has appealed, the appellate court may not impose a sentence heavier than that of the first instance judgment (Article 368 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법)). Since it is clear from the text of the statute that the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment is a principle prohibiting a heavier sentence with respect to the sentence imposed, whether a sentence is unfavorable must be objectively compared and determined based on the sentence imposed (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do3776, decided November 26, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2004Do6784, decided November 11, 2004, etc.). Furthermore, whether the sentence imposed has been modified unfavorably to the defendant should be determined based on the severity of the sentence under the Criminal Act (형법), not by an individual and formalistic examination, but by considering the sentencing order as a whole and determining whether it is substantively unfavorable to the defendant (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 97Do1716, decided March 26, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 2004Do6784, decided November 11, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2010Do16939, 2010Jeondo159, decided April 14, 2011, etc.).
Considering that a juvenile is in the process of forming his or her character and thus possesses abundant potential for reform, and is in a special state of mental fluctuation accompanying physical and mental development, the Juvenile Act, in Article 60(1), provides for the imposition of an indeterminate sentence on a juvenile as a special measure regarding criminal disposition designed to assist in the juvenile's sound growth, taking into account the special characteristics of juveniles (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Do11586, decided November 13, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016, etc.). However, since "juvenile," as provided in Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act, means a person under 19 years of age as defined in Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, and whether a person falls within this category must be determined as of the time the fact-finding court renders its judgment, a determinate sentence must be imposed where a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence at the first instance reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do2682, 2009Jeondo7, decided May 28, 2009; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016, etc.). In such a case, if only the defendant has appealed or an appeal has been filed on behalf of the defendant, the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment prescribed in Article 368 of the Criminal Procedure Act applies, and the appellate court may not impose a determinate sentence heavier than the indeterminate sentence of the first instance judgment.
However, since an indeterminate sentence is a sentencing measure that takes the form of a "range" consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term, whereas a determinate sentence is a sentencing measure that takes the form of a "point," a special situation arises in relation to the application of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, in which the severity of the two cannot simply be compared. Ultimately, when a defendant reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment and the indeterminate sentence must be converted into a determinate sentence, determining a determinate sentence that does not violate the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment comes down to the issue of specifying at which point between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence lies the determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to the indeterminate sentence. This is not simply a matter of alternatively choosing either the maximum or minimum term of the indeterminate sentence as the upper limit of the determinate sentence, but rather a matter of "degree"—that is, determining what level of sentence, among the numerous possible sentences ranging from the minimum to the maximum term, should be set as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment. Accordingly, in determining a determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to an indeterminate sentence, the factors arising from the special characteristic that a sentence has both a maximum and a minimum term must be comprehensively considered—namely, whether there is a risk that the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal may be discouraged in the process of converting an indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence, the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, and the principle of culpability.
Comprehensively considering these legal principles, it is appropriate to regard the determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to an indeterminate sentence as the sentence corresponding to the exact midpoint between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence (for example, in the case of an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of 4 years and a minimum term of 2 years of imprisonment, this would be 3 years of imprisonment; hereinafter referred to as the "intermediate sentence"). Therefore, where a defendant reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment such that the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court must be reversed and a determinate sentence must be imposed, the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment should be the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence. The detailed reasons are as follows.
A) An indeterminate sentence is imposed by determining a maximum term and a minimum term (main text of Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act). An indeterminate sentence means that there is a "range" in the term of the sentence, from the minimum to the maximum; the imposition of an indeterminate sentence alone merely determines that the sentence that may be finalized as the term of execution in the future will be somewhere between the minimum and the maximum term.
Meanwhile, Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act provides: "The head of an institution executing an indeterminate sentence on a juvenile may, upon the direction of the prosecutor of the competent public prosecutor's office, terminate the execution of the sentence where it is recognized that the juvenile offender's record of conduct is favorable after the minimum term of the sentence has elapsed and that the purpose of correction has been achieved." A defendant who has received an indeterminate sentence is placed in a position where, from the time the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence has elapsed until the maximum term arrives, there is a possibility that the execution of the sentence may be terminated. Accordingly, considering that there is a possibility that a sentence lower than the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence may be executed, a determinate sentence equal to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is clearly a heavier sentence than the indeterminate sentence; and considering that there is a possibility that a sentence higher than the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence may be executed, a determinate sentence equal to the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is clearly a lighter sentence than the indeterminate sentence. Given this, it must be understood that there exists, somewhere between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence, a point that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to the indeterminate sentence.
Ultimately, an indeterminate sentence takes the form of a "range," while a determinate sentence represents a "point." In order to compare the severity of an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence, which have these contrasting characteristics, there is no choice but to select some point within the range of the indeterminate sentence as the standard and compare that point with the determinate sentence. In this way, the issue of establishing the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, when a defendant reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment such that the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court must be reversed and a new determinate sentence determined, is the issue of specifying at which point between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence lies the determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to the indeterminate sentence.
The principle of culpability, which holds that punishment must be based on and proportionate to culpability, and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, which was adopted to prevent the exercise of the right of appeal from being discouraged by concern that a substantively unfavorable sentence might be imposed at the appellate level, are fundamental principles of criminal law. The issue in this case is a matter of "degree"—that is, determining what level of sentence, among the numerous possible sentences ranging from the minimum to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, may serve as an appropriate standard that harmonizes the principle of culpability and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment. In other words, it is a matter of determining a standard that prevents the appellate court from unduly restricting the exercise of its sentencing discretion in accordance with the principle of culpability with respect to a defendant who is no longer subject to the Juvenile Act, thereby granting the defendant an unwarranted benefit, while at the same time preventing the exercise of the right of appeal from being discouraged, in a case where only the defendant has appealed, by the risk that a sentence heavier than the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court might be imposed. It is not a matter of alternatively selecting either the maximum or the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence as the upper limit of the determinate sentence. The notion that one must select one of the two extremes of the "range" from the minimum to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence fails to accurately grasp the essence of the problem, being skewed toward clarity and convenience of legal construction rather than the rationality and soundness of the underlying logic.
B) The principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment is a system adopted to prevent the exercise of the right of appeal from being discouraged by the risk of receiving an unfavorable outcome at the appellate level; it is merely a principle that the appellate court may not impose a sentence that is substantively more unfavorable than the sentence already imposed, and is not a principle that guarantees the defendant the most favorable outcome possible despite changes in circumstances occurring after the filing of the appeal (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Do5822, decided October 28, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2007Do3448, decided July 13, 2007, etc.).
The special measures regarding criminal disposition provided under the Juvenile Act were established to assist juveniles in growing up soundly, giving weight to the status of being a "juvenile," and were not established on the basis of treating age as an element of culpability, or treating the characteristics of juveniles as a matter of culpability (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do2393, decided December 10, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016, etc.). In light of the purpose for which the Juvenile Act, giving weight to the status of being a "juvenile" separately from the issue of culpability, provides for special measures regarding criminal disposition such as the indeterminate sentencing system and the upper limits of its maximum and minimum terms (Article 60(1)) and the mitigation of sentence (Article 60(2)), it is proper to view that the special measures regarding criminal disposition provided under the Juvenile Act, including the indeterminate sentencing system, were established so that the status of being a "juvenile" could be reflected within the principle of culpability in a direction favorable to the defendant.
A defendant who received an indeterminate sentence at the first instance before turning 19 can fully recognize that, upon reaching the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment, he or she will no longer be subject to the Juvenile Act, which provides special measures regarding criminal disposition in consideration of the status of being a "juvenile." Accordingly, a defendant who is about to turn 19 can fully anticipate that, by exercising the right of appeal, he or she may be sentenced to a term heavier than the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence, which would be the most favorable outcome for the defendant. Moreover, the mere fact that the defendant may receive a sentence heavier than the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence cannot be said to discourage the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal. This is because, even if the indeterminate sentence imposed at the first instance were to become final and conclusive as is, there remains a possibility that the sentence could be executed up to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, unless the execution of the sentence is terminated pursuant to Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act.
Ultimately, even if the determinate sentence that may be imposed at the appellate level is heavier than the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence, so long as that determinate sentence falls within the range of the term of execution that the defendant could reasonably anticipate as a result of the finalization of the indeterminate sentence, it is proper to view that the defendant may exercise the right of appeal based on rational judgment without concern over substantive disadvantage. In this regard, since a defendant who has received an indeterminate sentence may, from the time the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence has elapsed until the maximum term arrives, expect with equal likelihood that the execution of the sentence may be terminated pursuant to the direction of the prosecutor under Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act, the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence may be said to correspond to the period of execution that a defendant who received the indeterminate sentence could reasonably anticipate.
If the appellate court may impose a determinate sentence only within the range of the period of execution that the defendant could reasonably anticipate as a result of the finalization of the indeterminate sentence—namely, the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence—then the defendant may exercise the right of appeal based on rational judgment without concern over substantive disadvantage. Furthermore, the appellate court may, within the scope that does not discourage the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal, exercise appropriate sentencing discretion by taking into account the circumstance that the Juvenile Act, which provides special measures regarding criminal disposition in consideration of the status of being a "juvenile," no longer applies. Given this, comprehensively considering the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, the principle of culpability, and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, it is proper to view that the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence corresponds to the determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantively equivalent to the indeterminate sentence.
C) On the other hand, adopting either the maximum or the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, with respect to an indeterminate sentence, is improper for the following reasons.
(1) The maximum or minimum term of an indeterminate sentence does not serve as an appropriate standard for objectively comparing and determining, based on the severity of the sentence, whether the sentence imposed has been substantively modified unfavorably.
Establishing the standard for determining the severity of a sentence imposed is not itself the ultimate purpose, but rather a means for objectively comparing and determining whether the modified sentence is heavier; therefore, one may not adopt, as a standard, a means that is inappropriate for objectively comparing and determining the severity of sentences, merely because it appears distinct and clear, at the expense of the rationality and soundness of the underlying logic. However, if one considers the following scenarios, it becomes evident that, although the maximum and minimum terms of an indeterminate sentence are clearly specified, using either the maximum or the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence as the standard renders it impossible to objectively compare and determine the severity of sentences.
(A) Defendants Gap and Eul, both juveniles, were jointly indicted as co-offenders. Defendant Gap was sentenced at the first instance to imprisonment with a maximum term of 5 years and a minimum term of 3 years, while Defendant Eul was sentenced at the first instance to imprisonment with a maximum term of 5 years and a minimum term of 1 year. Only Defendants Gap and Eul appealed, and both reached the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment. In this case, it is objectively clear that the sentence imposed on Defendant Gap by the first instance court is heavier than that imposed on Defendant Eul. However, if the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining the severity of the sentence, the appellate court would use 5 years of imprisonment as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment with respect to both Defendant Gap and Defendant Eul. As a result, Defendants Gap and Eul, whom the first instance court treated differently in terms of the severity of the sentence, would be treated identically at the appellate level. Given this, using the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence as the standard cannot be regarded as an appropriate means for objectively comparing and determining the severity of sentences.
(B) Defendants Gap and Eul, both juveniles, were jointly indicted as co-offenders. Defendant Gap was sentenced at the first instance to imprisonment with a maximum term of 5 years and a minimum term of 1 year, while Defendant Eul was sentenced at the first instance to imprisonment with a maximum term of 3 years and a minimum term of 1 year. Only Defendants Gap and Eul appealed, and both reached the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment. In this case, it is objectively clear that the sentence imposed on Defendant Gap by the first instance court is heavier than that imposed on Defendant Eul. However, if the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining the severity of the sentence, the appellate court would use 1 year of imprisonment as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment with respect to both Defendant Gap and Defendant Eul. As a result, Defendants Gap and Eul, whom the first instance court treated differently in terms of the severity of the sentence, would be treated identically at the appellate level. Given this, using the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence as the standard likewise cannot be regarded as an appropriate means for objectively comparing and determining the severity of sentences.
Rather, as examined above, using the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence as the standard would allow for an objective comparison and determination of the severity of sentences in the same scenarios.
In scenario (A) above, since it is objectively clear that the sentence imposed on Defendant Gap by the first instance court is heavier than that imposed on Defendant Eul, there should likewise be a difference in severity in the standards used by the appellate court to determine whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment with respect to Defendants Gap and Eul. If the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard, the appellate court would use 4 years of imprisonment [= (5 + 3)/2] as the standard for Defendant Gap and 3 years of imprisonment [= (5 + 1)/2] as the standard for Defendant Eul, respectively, for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment.
In scenario (B) above as well, since it is objectively clear that the sentence imposed on Defendant Gap by the first instance court is heavier than that imposed on Defendant Eul, there should likewise be a difference in severity in the standards used by the appellate court. If the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard, the appellate court would use 3 years of imprisonment [= (5 + 1)/2] as the standard for Defendant Gap and 2 years of imprisonment [= (3 + 1)/2] as the standard for Defendant Eul, respectively, for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment.
Ultimately, using the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence as the standard results in Defendants Gap and Eul, whom the first instance court treated differently in terms of the severity of the sentence, being treated at the appellate level in a manner consistent with that difference. Given this, using the intermediate sentence between the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence as the standard may be regarded as an appropriate means for objectively comparing and determining the severity of sentences.
(2) If the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal would be discouraged, this would not conform to the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, and an appropriate harmony between the principle of culpability and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment could not be achieved.
A defendant who is about to turn 19 may, if the indeterminate sentence imposed at the first instance becomes final and conclusive as is, have the execution of the sentence terminated pursuant to Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act before the maximum term of the sentence arrives. In such circumstances, if the appellate court could impose a determinate sentence equal to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, the defendant would find it difficult to exercise the right of appeal, even upon determining that there is a reasonable need to appeal, out of concern over substantive disadvantage. Considering a scenario identical to the present case, if a defendant who received, at the first instance, an indeterminate sentence with a broad "range" of a maximum term of 15 years and a minimum term of 7 years of imprisonment could possibly be sentenced at the appellate level to as much as 15 years of imprisonment—8 years longer than the minimum term—the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal would inevitably be discouraged.
In a case where only the defendant has appealed, and the defendant reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment such that a determinate sentence must be imposed, even taking into account the circumstance that the Juvenile Act, which provides special measures regarding criminal disposition in consideration of the status of being a "juvenile," no longer applies, the appellate court may not impose a sentence heavier than the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court. Nevertheless, if, in a case where only the defendant has appealed, the appellate court could impose a determinate sentence equal to the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence—which is clearly a sentence heavier than the indeterminate sentence—this would mean that a sentence exceeding the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court is being imposed at the appellate level. This would clearly violate the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment.
(3) If the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining whether there has been a violation of the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment, there would rather be a risk that the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal would be abused, this would not conform to the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, and an appropriate harmony between the principle of culpability and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment could not be achieved.
A defendant who is about to turn 19 may, if the indeterminate sentence imposed at the first instance becomes final and conclusive as is, have the sentence executed beyond the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence, unless the execution of the sentence is terminated pursuant to Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act. In such circumstances, if the appellate court could impose only up to a determinate sentence equal to the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence, the defendant would find it advantageous to exercise the right of appeal in any event, even upon determining that there is no reasonable need to appeal.
In a case where the defendant reaches the age of 19 before the appellate court's judgment such that a determinate sentence must be imposed, since the defendant is no longer subject to the Juvenile Act, which provides special measures regarding criminal disposition in consideration of the status of being a "juvenile," there is a need to grant the appellate court appropriate sentencing discretion to make a reasonable sentencing determination taking these circumstances into account. Nevertheless, if the appellate court could impose only up to a determinate sentence equal to the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence—which is clearly a sentence lighter than the indeterminate sentence—the sentence imposed at the appellate level would inevitably fall short of even the indeterminate sentence imposed by the first instance court. This would not conform to the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, and would result in a failure to achieve an appropriate harmony between the principle of culpability and the principle prohibiting a more unfavorable modification of judgment.
이에 대하여 부정기형의 단기를 불이익변경금지 원칙 위반 여부를 판단하는 기준으로 삼는 경우 발생할 수 있는 위와 같은 문제 상황들은 검사의 상소 제기를 통해 보완될 수 있다는 반론이 제기될 수 있다. In response, a counterargument may be raised that the problematic situations described above, which may arise when the short-term of an indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated, can be remedied through the prosecutor's filing of an appeal. This, however, is not persuasive, as it attempts to resolve a deficiency in reasoning—when establishing the standard for the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, which was adopted to prevent the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal from being chilled—by removing the defendant from the scope of application of that very principle. Moreover, whether the prosecutor files an appeal is a matter determined entirely by the prosecutor's own discretion, over which the court has no room to intervene; therefore, this is not a matter that the court may invoke when establishing the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated. Article 368 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) provides that "the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration applies only to cases in which the defendant has appealed and cases in which an appeal has been filed on the defendant's behalf," and therefore, where the prosecutor files an appeal on the ground that the sentencing of the first-instance judgment was unjust, the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration set forth in Article 368 of the Criminal Procedure Act no longer applies. The issue in this case is a problem that arises, on the premise that the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration applies, from the particular situation in which, when converting an indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence, a result must be derived that both conforms to the purpose for which the Juvenile Act (소년법) adopted the indeterminate sentencing system and achieves harmony between the principle of responsibility and the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration. In order to resolve this problem, it is the role of the court to determine, among the numerous possible sentences ranging from the short-term to the long-term of the indeterminate sentence, which degree of sentence appropriately harmonizes the principle of responsibility with the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration; it is not appropriate to attempt to remedy the problem by relying on the prosecutor's decision on whether to file an appeal. Moreover, the argument that the short-term of the indeterminate sentence should be set as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated shares the same direction as the logic that "in a case in which only the defendant has appealed, the most favorable result possible must be guaranteed"; however, where the prosecutor files an appeal on the ground that the sentencing of the first-instance judgment was unjust, the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration does not apply, and thus the appellate court may impose a determinate sentence exceeding the long-term of the indeterminate sentence pronounced by the first-instance court. For example, where a defendant who committed a crime for which the statutory range of punishment is imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than 15 years was sentenced by the first-instance court to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a long-term of five years and a short-term of three years, and the prosecutor appealed therefrom, the appellate court would be able to impose a sentence exceeding that long-term, for example, imprisonment for eight years—and it is self-evident that such a result would be disadvantageous to the defendant. Ultimately, the argument that the problem arising from the logic that "in a case in which only the defendant has appealed, the most favorable result possible must be guaranteed" can be remedied through "the prosecutor's appeal, which carries a very high risk of producing a result disadvantageous to the defendant," lacks logical consistency.
2) In the end, the question of identifying a determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantially equivalent to an indeterminate sentence is not a matter that can be clearly demonstrated arithmetically, but rather a matter of comprehensively considering the principle of responsibility, the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, and the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, in order to evaluate which degree of sentence, among the numerous possible sentences ranging from the short-term to the long-term of the indeterminate sentence, has relative superiority as an appropriate standard for appellate sentencing—one that prevents excessive restriction on the exercise of sentencing discretion appropriate to the principle of responsibility, which is a fundamental principle of criminal responsibility, while simultaneously preventing the chilling of the exercise of the right to appeal. This is a matter of "degree"—determining which degree of sentence between the short-term and the long-term of the indeterminate sentence constitutes an appropriate standard—and is by no means a matter of selecting either the long-term or the short-term of the indeterminate sentence and setting it as the upper limit of the determinate sentence. From this perspective, considering comprehensively the various circumstances examined above, it is clear that, when converting an indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence, using the median between the long-term and the short-term of the indeterminate sentence as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated may be evaluated as a relatively superior standard compared to using either the long-term or the short-term of the indeterminate sentence.
3) To the extent they conflict with the views expressed in this judgment, the Supreme Court precedents holding, to the effect that when applying the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration to compare the severity between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence, the short-term portion of the indeterminate sentence should be compared with the determinate sentence—including Supreme Court Decision 4286Hyeongsang14, decided November 10, 1953; Supreme Court Decision 4292Hyeongsang242, decided August 21, 1959; Supreme Court Decision 69Do114, decided March 18, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 2006Do734, decided April 14, 2006; and other Supreme Court decisions to the same effect—shall all be modified.
C. Determination as to This Case
The court below reversed the first-instance judgment, which had sentenced Defendant 1—who was a juvenile at the time the first-instance judgment was pronounced but had become an adult by the time of the appellate proceedings—to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a long-term of 15 years and a short-term of 7 years, and, following the previous Supreme Court precedents, held that since only Defendant 1 had appealed and the prosecutor had not appealed, the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration precluded imposing a sentence of imprisonment exceeding the short-term of the indeterminate sentence pronounced by the first-instance court, namely 7 years, and accordingly sentenced Defendant 1 to imprisonment for 7 years.
However, in light of the legal principles set forth above, in imposing a determinate sentence in place of the indeterminate sentence of imprisonment with a long-term of 15 years and a short-term of 7 years pronounced by the first-instance court, the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated should be the median between the long-term of 15 years and the short-term of 7 years of the indeterminate sentence, namely, imprisonment for 11 years [= (15 + 7)/2].
Accordingly, the judgment below, which determined whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration had been violated based on the short-term of the indeterminate sentence pronounced by the first-instance court, namely, imprisonment for 7 years, contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, which affected the judgment. The prosecutor's ground of appeal pointing out this error has merit.
2. As to the Prosecutor's Ground of Appeal Concerning Defendant 2
Even where a defendant has been sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without labor for ten years or more, under the interpretation of Article 383, Subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the prosecutor may not assert as a ground of final appeal that the sentence rendered by the court below is too lenient, nor may the prosecutor assert as a ground of final appeal that the court below's determination of the underlying facts relevant to sentencing, made against the defendant's interest, violated the rules of evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Do15035, decided November 29, 2018).
Accordingly, in this case, in which the court below sentenced Defendant 2 to imprisonment for ten years, the prosecutor's grounds of appeal asserting that the court below's sentencing was unduly lenient, or that there was an error in violating the rules of evidence, misapprehending the applicable legal principles, or misapprehending the facts in determining the underlying facts relevant to sentencing, cannot be accepted.
3. As to Defendant 1's Grounds of Appeal Concerning Misapprehension of Facts and Misapprehension of Legal Principles
The court below found Defendant 1 guilty of the charges against him for the reasons stated in its judgment. Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below in violating the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or in misapprehending the legal principles concerning intent for the crime of murder, among other matters.
4. As to Defendant 2's Grounds of Appeal
Examining the various circumstances constituting conditions for sentencing appearing in the record, including the defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, relationship with the victim, motive, means, and results of each of the crimes in this case, and the circumstances following the crimes, it cannot be said that the court below's sentencing of Defendant 2 to imprisonment for ten years is unduly unreasonable, even taking into account the circumstances asserted in the grounds of appeal.
5. Conclusion
Therefore, without rendering a determination on the prosecutor's assertion of unjust sentencing as to Defendant 1 and Defendant 1's assertion of unjust sentencing, the portion of the judgment below concerning Defendant 1 is reversed, and this portion is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the prosecutor's final appeal concerning Defendant 2 and Defendant 2's final appeal are both dismissed. It is so ordered as set forth in the Order. This judgment is unanimous among the participating Justices, except for the separate opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Min Yu-sook, and Justice Lee Dong-won, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Jung-hwa and Justice Kim Seon-su as to the issue in this case, and there is a supplementary opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek supporting the majority opinion.
6. Separate Opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Min Yu-sook, and Justice Lee Dong-won Concerning the Issue in This Case
A. The majority opinion holds that, where a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the pronouncement of the first-instance judgment was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, and only the defendant appealed, and the defendant reached the age of 19 before the appellate judgment was pronounced, such that the first-instance court's indeterminate sentence must be reversed and a determinate sentence imposed, it is proper to regard the determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantially equivalent to the indeterminate sentence as the exact midpoint—that is, the "median"—between the long-term and the short-term of the indeterminate sentence, and therefore the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated should be the median between the long-term and short-term of the indeterminate sentence.
However, in such a case, it is proper to determine whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated based on the long-term, rather than the median, of the indeterminate sentence, and accordingly, the upper limit of the determinate sentence that the appellate court may impose should be deemed to be the long-term of the indeterminate sentence pronounced by the first-instance court. The reasons therefor are as follows.
B. Special Measures Concerning Criminal Disposition of Juveniles
The Juvenile Act, in consideration of the characteristics of juveniles—who, being in the process of personality formation, have abundant potential for reform and are in a state of particular mental instability accompanying their physical and mental development—provides for special measures concerning criminal disposition, among other things, in order to help juveniles grow up soundly (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016, and others).
The Juvenile Act provides that where a juvenile commits a crime for which the statutory penalty is imprisonment for a fixed term with a long-term of two years or more, an indeterminate sentence shall be imposed by determining a long-term and a short-term within that range of punishment (Article 60, Paragraph 1). It also provides that where deemed appropriate in light of the characteristics of the juvenile, the sentence may be mitigated (Article 60, Paragraph 2). Under the Juvenile Act, once the short-term of the indeterminate sentence has elapsed, a decision to terminate execution of the sentence may be made by the sentence-executing authority (Article 60, Paragraph 4), and parole may be granted once one-third of the short-term has elapsed (Article 65). Furthermore, the Juvenile Act provides that where an indeterminate sentence is imposed on a juvenile, the long-term may not exceed ten years and the short-term may not exceed five years (Article 60, Paragraph 1, proviso). Where a defendant has committed a specified violent crime such as murder, the Act on the Punishment of Specific Crimes of Violence (특정강력범죄의 처벌에 관한 특례법, "특정강력범죄법") applies, but even in such cases, the long-term of the indeterminate sentence may not exceed 15 years and the short-term may not exceed 7 years (Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Punishment of Specific Crimes of Violence).
However, the above special measures concerning criminal disposition under the Juvenile Act are provisions that place importance on the defendant's current status as a juvenile; they are not provisions that regard age as an element of responsibility, or that treat the characteristics of juveniles as a matter of responsibility. Therefore, in order for a defendant to receive the benefit of such flexible and favorable provisions, the defendant must be a juvenile at the time of adjudication. Even if the defendant was a juvenile at the time the first-instance judgment was pronounced, if the defendant is no longer a juvenile by the time of the appellate proceedings, the defendant can no longer receive the benefit of the above provisions, and the appellate court has no choice but to reverse the first-instance judgment, which imposed an indeterminate sentence, and newly determine and impose a determinate sentence (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Do2935, decided April 25, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016; and others).
The issue of comparing the severity between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence thus arises in the particular situation where the Juvenile Act, which applied at the time of the first-instance judgment, can no longer apply, requiring the appellate court to convert the first-instance court's indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence ex officio, while, because only the defendant has appealed, the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration applies, precluding the imposition of a determinate sentence heavier than the first-instance indeterminate sentence. In such cases, it is necessary to adopt an interpretation that can harmonize the legislative purpose of the Juvenile Act with the policy purpose of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration. It must also be considered that a defendant who was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence at the first instance, but who is scheduled to reach adulthood during the course of the appellate proceedings, can anticipate that the provisions of the Juvenile Act will no longer apply to him or her at the appellate stage.
C. The Relationship Between Indeterminate Sentencing and the Principle of Proportionality Between Crime and Punishment, and the Principle of Responsibility
The principle of proportionality between crime and punishment, which requires that an appropriate balance be struck between the crime and the punishment, and the principle of responsibility, which requires that punishment be based on, and proportionate to, responsibility, are fundamental principles of criminal responsibility (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Do8438, decided October 12, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2020Do8358, decided September 3, 2020; and others). Imposing on a defendant a punishment exceeding his or her responsibility is not permissible under the principle of responsibility.
A question may arise as to how the indeterminate sentence—which, unlike a determinate sentence, is imposed by determining a long-term and a short-term in consideration of the characteristics of juveniles, who have abundant potential for reform—correlates with the defendant's responsibility. However, even though the indeterminate sentencing system was introduced in consideration not only of the punishment of juveniles but also of educational effects, the essential nature of the indeterminate sentence remains punishment. Under the principle of responsibility, punishment exceeding responsibility may not be imposed, and to regard the sentence corresponding to the defendant's responsibility as falling short of the long-term when an indeterminate sentence has been imposed would amount to accepting that, for the purpose of correction, a punishment exceeding responsibility may be imposed on a juvenile—which cannot be accepted. Accordingly, it must be considered that the sentence up to the long-term of the indeterminate sentence corresponds to the sentence commensurate with the defendant's responsibility.
From this perspective, the long-term has the significance of corresponding to the upper limit of responsibility. Therefore, it is reasonable that the long-term should also serve as the standard when comparing the severity between indeterminate sentences. The majority opinion states that it would be improper, where Defendant A was sentenced to imprisonment with a long-term of 5 years and a short-term of 3 years, and Defendant B was sentenced to imprisonment with a long-term of 5 years and a short-term of 1 year, to apply the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration using 5 years as the standard for both, on the ground that Defendant A, though sentenced to a heavier punishment, is nonetheless treated identically to Defendant B. However, if we add the example of Defendant C, who was sentenced to imprisonment with a long-term of 4 years and a short-term of 2 years, and compare the severity of the sentence with that of Defendant B, it becomes evident that, rather than treating the sentences imposed on Defendants B and C as equivalent merely because their medians are the same, it is proper to evaluate the sentence imposed on Defendant B—whose long-term, corresponding to the upper limit of responsibility, was set higher—as the heavier sentence.
D. The Manner of Applying the Principle of Prohibition of Disadvantageous Alteration When Converting an Indeterminate Sentence into a Determinate Sentence
The principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration is a system derived from policy considerations aimed at allowing the defendant to exercise the right to appeal with peace of mind (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do3448, decided July 13, 2007). In applying the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, the determination as to whether the sentence pronounced has been disadvantageously altered against the defendant should be based on the severity of the punishment under the Criminal Act (형법), but this should not be examined individually and formalistically; rather, it should be determined by considering the order of judgment as a whole to assess whether the alteration is substantially disadvantageous to the defendant (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do12967, decided February 11, 2010, and others), and consideration must be given to whether the possibility of such an alteration of sentence would substantially chill the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal. Furthermore, this principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration should be interpreted and applied in a manner that harmonizes with the legislative purpose of the Juvenile Act's provision requiring the imposition of indeterminate sentences on juveniles, as well as with the principle of responsibility.
An indeterminate sentence is imposed by determining a long-term and a short-term (main text of Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Juvenile Act). The mere pronouncement of an indeterminate sentence determines only that the sentence that may ultimately be confirmed as the sentence to be executed will fall somewhere between the short-term and the long-term. Because of this characteristic of the indeterminate sentence, a simple comparison of severity between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence is not possible.
The majority opinion, relying on the fact that under Article 60, Paragraph 4 of the Juvenile Act, once the short-term of the indeterminate sentence has elapsed, a decision to terminate execution of the sentence may be made by the sentence-executing authority, attaches significance to the circumstance that, where an indeterminate sentence has been imposed, there is a possibility that execution of the sentence may terminate before the long-term arrives, and on this basis states that a determinate sentence equal to the long-term is clearly a heavier sentence than the indeterminate sentence. Based on this logic, the majority opinion holds that there exists, between the short-term and the long-term of the indeterminate sentence, a determinate sentence that may be evaluated as equivalent to the indeterminate sentence, and that the median corresponds to that determinate sentence, such that whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated should be determined by comparing the severity between the median and the determinate sentence. However, Article 60, Paragraph 4 of the Juvenile Act is merely a discretionary provision granting discretion to the sentence-executing authority. The possibility, under this provision, that execution of the sentence may terminate before the long-term arrives is merely an unconfirmed special circumstance, and absent such special circumstances, the defendant will undergo execution of the sentence up to the long-term. Nevertheless, the majority opinion, in effect, proceeds on the premise—treated as a given—that where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, execution of the sentence will terminate before the long-term arrives, leaving unresolved only the question of when that point will occur; this is no different from proceeding on an unwarranted premise, and is therefore not persuasive.
If, as under the majority opinion, a simple comparison between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence is not possible, then the question of applying the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration when converting an indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence is not so much a matter of identifying a determinate sentence that may be evaluated as substantially equivalent to the indeterminate sentence, but rather a matter of establishing a reasonable standard, consistent with the purpose of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, so that the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal is not chilled, and thereby determining the upper limit of the sentence that the appellate court may impose. And given the characteristic of the indeterminate sentence, under which only a long-term and a short-term are determined and pronounced, that reference point can only be either the long-term or the short-term.
E. The Propriety of Determining Whether the Principle of Prohibition of Disadvantageous Alteration Has Been Violated Based on the Long-Term
The Juvenile Act, as originally enacted on July 24, 1958, provided that, where an indeterminate sentence is imposed on a juvenile, the long-term may not exceed 10 years and the short-term may not exceed 5 years, and this content has continued through to the current Act. Even where the Act on the Punishment of Specific Crimes of Violence applies to certain crimes, the upper limits of the long-term and short-term are 15 years and 7 years, respectively. In the intervening period, however, our society has experienced many changes and serious crimes, and various laws have been amended in order to impose punishments commensurate with responsibility for such crimes. The Criminal Act was amended on April 15, 2010 to raise the upper limit of a fixed-term sentence to 30 years, and to 50 years where the sentence is aggravated. Special statutes have also been enacted for serious crimes, raising the statutory range of punishment.
As a result, where a juvenile who has committed a serious crime is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence with a long-term and short-term at the upper limits under the Juvenile Act or the Act on the Punishment of Specific Crimes of Violence, the problem arises that the gap between the long-term and the short-term becomes excessively wide. There also arises the problem of sentencing disparity among co-offenders, where, among defendants of similar age who committed the crime together, only some are deemed juveniles and thus receive the benefit of the Juvenile Act. In such circumstances, where a defendant who was a juvenile at the first instance reaches adulthood by the time of the appellate proceedings, it is proper, in principle, that at the appellate stage, co-offenders who are now subject to the same law be sentenced according to the same standard, in a manner commensurate with each defendant's own responsibility. As discussed above, this consideration must also be taken into account even where only the defendant has appealed and the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration applies.
In this respect, we agree with the majority opinion's observation that, if the short-term of the indeterminate sentence is used as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated, filing an appeal would unconditionally benefit the defendant, creating a risk that the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal may be abused, that this would not conform to the purpose for which the Juvenile Act adopted the indeterminate sentencing system, and that it would be impossible to achieve an appropriate harmony between the principle of responsibility and the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.
Furthermore, we also agree with the purport of the majority opinion that whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated should be determined based on whether the determinate sentence that the appellate court may impose falls within the range of the period of execution that a defendant sentenced to an indeterminate sentence could reasonably anticipate, such that there is no possibility of chilling the exercise of the right to appeal, and on whether the sentence conforms to the defendant's responsibility. However, we differ from the majority opinion in that, applying this standard, it is rather the long-term, and not the median, that should properly serve as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated, for the following reasons.
The period of execution that a defendant sentenced to an indeterminate sentence may reasonably anticipate corresponds to the long-term. According to statistical data for the ten-year period from 2009 to 2018, decisions to terminate execution of the sentence during that period appear to have been made only rarely. Moreover, among juvenile prisoners, the proportion who actually served their sentence up to the long-term reaches 60.21%. Even where a prisoner is paroled before actually serving the sentence up to the long-term, absent special circumstances, this does not shorten the sentence to be executed itself, and is no different from the case of an adult prisoner sentenced to a determinate sentence equal to the long-term being paroled (see Article 66 of the Juvenile Act). In light of these circumstances, it may be said that the period of execution that a defendant sentenced to an indeterminate sentence should reasonably anticipate is, in fact, closer to the long-term.
Meanwhile, Article 65, Paragraph 1 of the Military Service Act (병역법) provides that "a person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment as prescribed by Presidential Decree" is among those eligible for assignment to supplementary service or wartime labor service, and Article 136, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1, Item (a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Military Service Act specifies the meaning of such a "sentenced person" as "a person who has been sentenced to actual imprisonment or imprisonment without labor for not less than six months and less than one year and six months," while providing that "in this case, where the sentence imposed is an indeterminate sentence determining a long-term and a short-term, the long-term shall apply." This also confirms that, generally, where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, execution up to the long-term is anticipated.
As stated above, where an indeterminate sentence is imposed by determining a long-term and a short-term, it conforms to the principle of responsibility to regard the sentence up to the long-term as corresponding to the sentence commensurate with responsibility, and the long-term, corresponding to the upper limit of responsibility, is a suitable standard for comparing severity.
Furthermore, a defendant who is scheduled to reach adulthood by the time of the appellate proceedings will decide whether to file an appeal by taking into account both the fact that the Juvenile Act can no longer apply at the appellate stage, and the fact that the sentence up to the long-term of the indeterminate sentence corresponds to the sentence commensurate with responsibility, and that, if the indeterminate sentence becomes final, execution up to the long-term may occur.
Accordingly, where a defendant who was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence as a juvenile at the first instance must be sentenced to a determinate sentence at the appellate stage upon reaching adulthood, it is proper to use the long-term—which corresponds to the sentence commensurate with responsibility and to the period of execution that the defendant may reasonably anticipate—as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated, thereby allowing the appellate court, within the range up to the long-term of the indeterminate sentence, to exercise its sentencing discretion to the fullest extent, taking into account the characteristics of the indeterminate sentence and both the long-term and the short-term, in order to newly determine an appropriate sentence commensurate with the defendant's responsibility.
In light of the purpose of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, the standard for determining disadvantageous alteration, the purpose and specific content of the Juvenile Act's provisions establishing the indeterminate sentencing system, and the relationship with the principle of responsibility, among other circumstances, this conclusion cannot be said to violate the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.
F. Sub-conclusion
When comparing the severity of an indefinite-term sentence and a definite-term sentence for purposes of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence [불이익변경금지 원칙], it is proper to compare the maximum term of the indefinite-term sentence with the definite-term sentence in determining whether the principle has been violated. Accordingly, the judgment below, which determined whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence had been violated based on the minimum term, rather than the maximum term, of the indefinite-term sentence imposed by the first instance court, contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence and thereby affected the judgment. While I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the part of the judgment below concerning Defendant 1 should be reversed, I set forth this separate opinion because my reasoning differs.
7. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Park Jeong-hwa and Justice Kim Seon-su on the Issue in This Case
A. The majority opinion holds that, in a case where the defendant was a juvenile at the time the first instance judgment was pronounced and was accordingly sentenced to an indefinite term, and only the defendant appealed, and the defendant turned 19 before the appellate court's judgment was pronounced such that the indefinite-term sentence imposed by the first instance court must be vacated and a definite-term sentence imposed instead, the standard for determining whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence has been violated should be the midpoint—i.e., the average—between the maximum and minimum terms of the indefinite-term sentence. On this basis, the majority opinion holds that the judgment below, which determined whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence had been violated based on the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence imposed by the first instance court, contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence and thereby affected the judgment.
However, in applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence to determine relative severity between an indefinite-term sentence and a definite-term sentence, the consistent position of the Supreme Court for nearly 70 years since 1953 has been that the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence should be compared with the definite-term sentence, such that the appellate court may not impose a sentence exceeding the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence (see Supreme Court Decision 4286Hyeongsang14, decided November 10, 1953; Supreme Court Decision 4292Hyeongsang242, decided August 21, 1959; Supreme Court Decision 69Do114, decided March 18, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 2006Do734, decided April 14, 2006, etc.). Since this position is correct, I cannot agree with the reasoning or conclusion of the majority opinion. The reasons are as follows.
B. Grounds for Determining Whether the Principle Prohibiting Disadvantageous Alteration of Sentence Has Been Violated Based on the Minimum Term of the Indefinite-Term Sentence
1) In a case where the defendant appeals or an appeal is filed on behalf of the defendant, the appellate court may not impose a sentence heavier than that imposed in the judgment below (Articles 368 and 396(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법)). This principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is a system born of the policy consideration of allowing the defendant to exercise the right of appeal without concern (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do3448, decided July 13, 2007). In applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, whether the sentence pronounced has been disadvantageously altered against the defendant must be determined based on the relative severity of sentences under the Criminal Act (형법), not by an individualized, formalistic examination, but by considering the entirety of the disposition and assessing whether it is substantively disadvantageous to the defendant (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do12967, decided February 11, 2010, etc.). The principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is not a principle that objectively ranks the relative favorability or unfavorability between two sentences; rather, it is a principle that defines the scope of sentences the appellate court may impose in a case where only the defendant appeals or an appeal is filed only on behalf of the defendant. Accordingly, when comparing the sentence before and after alteration to determine whether it has been disadvantageously altered against the defendant, if the effect of the pronounced sentence is not singular but varies according to changes in certain conditions, the pre-alteration sentence should be assessed based on the most favorable scenario for the defendant, while the post-alteration sentence should be assessed based on the least favorable scenario for the defendant. This approach not only accords with the purpose of determining "whether it is substantively disadvantageous to the defendant," but is also a clear and simple method, and is an interpretation faithful to the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, whose purpose is to guarantee the defendant's right of appeal.
2) The Juvenile Act (소년법), in consideration of the characteristics of juveniles—who, being in the process of forming their personalities, have abundant potential for rehabilitation and are in a state of particular psychological instability accompanying their physical and mental development—provides special measures concerning criminal disposition, among other things, in order to help juveniles grow soundly (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do7112, decided July 27, 2016, etc.). Accordingly, the Juvenile Act provides that where a juvenile commits an offense for which the statutory penalty is imprisonment for a fixed term of two years or more, the court shall pronounce an indefinite-term sentence by setting a maximum and minimum term within the range of that penalty (main text of Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act).
Where an indefinite-term sentence is pronounced, the possibility of the defendant's release or termination of sentence execution begins upon the expiration of the minimum term. The head of the institution executing an indefinite-term sentence against a juvenile may, upon the direction of the prosecutor of the competent public prosecutor's office, terminate the execution of the sentence where the juvenile offender's performance record has been good after the expiration of the minimum term of the sentence and it is recognized that the purpose of correction has been achieved (Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act); parole may be permitted after one-third of the minimum term has elapsed (Article 65 of the Juvenile Act); and while the parole period, in principle, ends either when a period equal to the period served before parole has elapsed, or upon expiration of the maximum term (Article 66 of the Juvenile Act), if the minimum term has elapsed and it is recognized that the purpose of probation has been achieved, the Probation Review Committee may, upon application by the head of the probation office or on its own authority, decide to deem the execution of the sentence terminated even before the expiration of the parole period (Article 50(1) of the Act on Probation, etc. (보호관찰 등에 관한 법률)).
Where the defendant, having been a juvenile at the first instance, was sentenced to an indefinite term, the defendant was thereby granted the possibility of release or termination of sentence execution beginning from the minimum term, as described above. In such a case, where only the defendant appeals, thereby triggering application of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, and the defendant becomes an adult during the appeal such that the indefinite-term sentence imposed by the first instance court must be vacated and a definite-term sentence imposed, if the defendant is sentenced to a definite term exceeding the minimum term imposed at first instance, the aforementioned possibility of release or termination of sentence execution is deprived, which is disadvantageous to the defendant. Accordingly, in applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence to determine relative severity between an indefinite-term sentence and a definite-term sentence, it is proper to interpret the principle as meaning that the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence should be compared with the definite-term sentence, such that the appellate court may not impose a sentence exceeding the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence.
3) This has been the firmly established position of the Supreme Court for nearly 70 years, and it is difficult to find sufficiently reasonable grounds to now alter, in a direction disadvantageous to the defendant, the method of comparison established by such long-standing precedent, which has served as a standard considered by defendants sentenced to indefinite terms and by prosecutors in deciding whether to appeal. Accordingly, neither the majority opinion, which would use the midpoint of the indefinite-term sentence as the standard, nor the separate opinion, which would use the maximum term as the standard, is correct. The separate opinion, being an interpretation even more disadvantageous to the defendant than the majority opinion, further undermines the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence and the purpose of the Juvenile Act.
4) The majority opinion and the separate opinion assert that if the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence is used as the standard for determining whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence has been violated, this would unconditionally favor the defendant, creating a risk that the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal would be abused. The majority opinion and the separate opinion acknowledge that the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is a fundamental principle of criminal law intended to prevent the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal from being discouraged. Nevertheless, the majority opinion and the separate opinion argue that, in order to prevent the risk of abuse of the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal, the fundamental principle of criminal law prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence should be interpreted in a direction disadvantageous to the defendant—this runs contrary to the basic purpose of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence. Moreover, it cannot be concluded, merely because the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence is used as the standard for determining violation of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, that the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal will necessarily be abused, as feared by the majority opinion and the separate opinion. Once the defendant appeals, the first instance judgment does not become final and is transferred to the appellate court, in the course of which the prosecutor is also likely to appeal. If the prosecutor appeals, the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence itself does not apply, and a sentence heavier even than the maximum term of the indefinite-term sentence could be imposed at the appellate court. For this reason, the defendant, in deciding whether to appeal, would also consider the circumstance that if the defendant appeals, the likelihood that the prosecutor will also appeal increases. Accordingly, the concern that the defendant will abuse the exercise of the right of appeal lacks sufficient grounds and is exaggerated. Furthermore, the defendant's right of appeal is an important right under criminal law intended to protect the defendant's interests and to correct erroneous judgments of the lower courts, and it is doubtful whether it is appropriate to characterize the exercise of such a right as "abuse."
C. Problems with the Method of Comparison Adopted by the Majority Opinion and the Separate Opinion
1) The majority opinion asserts that the minimum term of an indefinite-term sentence is not an appropriate standard for objectively comparing and determining whether a sentence has been disadvantageously altered based on relative severity, and that the midpoint—i.e., the average—between the maximum and minimum terms of the indefinite-term sentence corresponds to the definite-term sentence that can be evaluated as substantively equivalent to the indefinite-term sentence, and that a method of comparing relative severity based on this midpoint should therefore be adopted. However, the objective weight of every indefinite-term sentence cannot necessarily be mechanically calculated, and there is no sufficient basis for concluding that the midpoint must be recognized as the definite-term sentence substantively equivalent to the indefinite-term sentence. It is difficult to say that a method of arbitrarily setting a point between the maximum and minimum terms of an indefinite-term sentence and calling it the point representing the weight of the indefinite-term sentence is superior to the method of the existing precedent.
2) The separate opinion asserts that, since execution up to the maximum term is generally to be expected where an indefinite-term sentence is pronounced, the maximum term should be used as the standard for comparing relative severity. The separate opinion presents, as grounds, statistical data based on sentence execution practice, including the fact that decisions to terminate sentence execution are rarely made with respect to juvenile inmates. However, such data alone do not confirm that the generally expected period of execution for a defendant sentenced to an indefinite term reaches the maximum term. Even so, comparison based on the maximum term is the method most disadvantageous to the defendant. Even if such execution practice is indeed occurring, this merely means that the practice of sentence execution is being operated in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of the Juvenile Act, which requires that both the maximum and minimum terms be set and considered in execution; it cannot serve as valid grounds for applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence based on the maximum term. The separate opinion emphasizes the possibility of execution up to the maximum term, but disregards the fact that there is also a possibility of release and termination of sentence execution upon serving only the minimum term, and it is difficult to accept the view that depriving a defendant of such a possibility should not be evaluated as a disadvantage. The separate opinion cites, as grounds, the fact that the Military Service Act (병역법) and its Enforcement Decree apply the maximum term of an indefinite-term sentence as the standard for determining whether an inmate falls within the category of a person subject to assignment to supplementary service or wartime labor service. However, the provisions of the Military Service Act and its subordinate regulations serve an entirely different institutional purpose from the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, and there is no need to treat them identically. There is also an aspect in which, under the Military Service Act and its subordinate regulations, using the maximum term as the standard can be seen as most favorable to a juvenile inmate. In applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, using the minimum term as the standard is most favorable to the defendant; accordingly, it can rather be said that using the minimum term as the standard in applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is also consistent with the aforementioned provisions of the Military Service Act and its subordinate regulations.
3) The method of comparison adopted by the majority opinion and the separate opinion is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's consistent position on applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence in cases involving suspended execution of sentence. With respect to the application of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence between an actual sentence and a suspended sentence, the Supreme Court has consistently held that reducing the principal sentence of a suspended-execution judgment while excluding the suspension of execution constitutes a disadvantageous alteration (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do1131, decided March 24, 2016, etc.), while at the same time holding that increasing the principal sentence of an actual (unsuspended) sentence while attaching a suspension of execution likewise constitutes a disadvantageous alteration (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 66Do1319, decided December 8, 1966; Supreme Court Decision 2011Do11700, decided April 13, 2012; Supreme Court Decision 2018Do9342, decided July 24, 2019, etc.). For example, it is the Supreme Court's firmly established position that changing an actual sentence of one year's imprisonment to a sentence of one year and six months' imprisonment with three years' suspension of execution, or vice versa, is not permissible in either direction, as it violates the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence.
The above position of the Supreme Court may, on its face, appear contradictory. This is because, between an actual sentence of one year's imprisonment and a sentence of one year and six months' imprisonment with three years' suspension of execution, it would seem that which is disadvantageous to the defendant should be determinable in a singular manner, yet the Supreme Court's position may be seen as holding that this cannot be determined. However, viewing the Supreme Court's position as contradictory is merely the result of misunderstanding the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence as a principle that objectively ranks the relative favorability or unfavorability between two sentences. Which of the actual sentence of one year's imprisonment and the sentence of one year and six months' imprisonment with three years' suspension of execution is objectively more disadvantageous is a matter that cannot be determined in a singular manner, and the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence does not provide an answer to this question either. If the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is understood as a principle requiring the appellate court, in determining the sentence to be pronounced, to judge from the standpoint of "whether it is substantively disadvantageous to the defendant," the above Supreme Court decisions are fully comprehensible. Where a suspended sentence is changed to an actual sentence, if the suspension is not revoked or invalidated, the defendant may end up serving no time at all; from this perspective, even the shortest actual sentence can be evaluated as substantively more disadvantageous to the defendant than a suspended sentence. Conversely, if the suspension of execution is invalidated or revoked during the suspension period, the defendant must serve the period pronounced as the principal sentence; accordingly, an increase in the principal sentence attached to a suspended sentence, as compared to an actual sentence pronounced, can likewise be evaluated as substantively disadvantageous to the defendant. This consistent position of the Supreme Court confirms that, in applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, the premise is that the pre-alteration sentence should be assessed based on the scenario most favorable to the defendant, and the post-alteration sentence should be assessed based on the scenario least favorable to the defendant.
This is consistent with the context of the existing Supreme Court position of determining whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence has been violated based on the minimum term of an indefinite-term sentence, in consideration of the possibility of disadvantage to the defendant, and the methods adopted by the majority opinion and the separate opinion do not conform to this consistent direction.
4) Understanding the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence solely as a principle concerning the standard for objectively comparing and determining relative severity of sentences may lead to situations that are difficult to resolve. Consider: ① an indefinite-term sentence of imprisonment with a maximum term of 5 years and a minimum term of 3 years, versus ② an indefinite-term sentence of imprisonment with a maximum term of 4 years and 6 months and a minimum term of 3 years and 6 months—which is heavier and thus disadvantageous to the defendant? Under the majority opinion's method of comparison based on the midpoint, since the midpoint is 4 years in both cases, changing sentence ① to sentence ② or sentence ② to sentence ① would not violate the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence in either direction. Under the separate opinion's method of comparison based on the maximum term, since sentence ①, with the longer maximum term, is heavier than sentence ②, changing sentence ① to sentence ② would conform to the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, but changing sentence ② to sentence ① would violate it. If the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is viewed as a principle defining the scope of sentences the appellate court may impose, then if either the maximum term or the minimum term is altered disadvantageously to the defendant, this is deemed to violate the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence. In the above example, changing sentence ① to sentence ② or changing sentence ② to sentence ① would both violate the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence and would not be permitted. This interpretation conforms to the consistent position of the Supreme Court.
D. Relationship with the Principle of Culpability
1) The principle of proportionality between crime and punishment, requiring an appropriate balance between the offense and the penalty, and the principle of culpability, requiring that punishment be based on and proportionate to culpability, are fundamental principles of criminal responsibility (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Do8438, decided October 12, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2020Do8358, decided September 3, 2020, etc.).
2) Where an indefinite-term sentence is pronounced, the entire range of sentence from the minimum to the maximum term should be regarded as falling within the range of sentence corresponding to culpability. If this were not so, and only a single point were regarded as the sentence corresponding to culpability, this would mean that the entire remaining range, excluding that particular point, would be a sentence not corresponding to culpability. This would mean that pronouncing an indefinite-term sentence itself amounts to pronouncing a sentence within a range not corresponding to culpability, which would itself violate the principle of proportionality between crime and punishment and the principle of culpability. Since the minimum term of an indefinite-term sentence also falls within the range of sentence proportionate to culpability, there is no problem whatsoever, in relation to the principle of culpability, in using the minimum term as the standard when applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence.
3) It cannot be said that the result of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence—namely, that only a definite-term sentence with the minimum term as its upper limit may be pronounced against the defendant—is an unreasonable result unforeseen by the Criminal Procedure Act, in relation to the principle of culpability. While it is impermissible under the principle of culpability to impose a punishment exceeding the defendant's culpability, there will inevitably be cases where the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence constrains the imposition of a heavier sentence corresponding to culpability. This should be regarded as a natural consequence of adopting the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence. Even where, in a case in which only the defendant appeals, the indictment is amended at the appellate court to add facts constituting a comprehensive single offense, or where the amendment results in a more serious charge because a victim who had suffered a fatal injury later dies, thereby increasing the defendant's culpability, the appellate court, by application of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, may not impose a sentence heavier than that imposed by the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 79Do2105, decided March 25, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 2014Do6472, decided August 20, 2014, etc.). Likewise, even where the first instance court mistakenly imposed a sentence lighter than the statutory minimum for the applicable punishment range, if only the defendant appeals, the appellate court may not alter this to a heavier sentence conforming to the law. In light of this as well, it cannot be said that a change of precedent is necessarily required in order to impose upon the defendant a definite-term sentence exceeding the minimum term imposed by the first instance court.
E. Possibility of Appeal by the Prosecutor
The principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence does not apply in every case where the defendant appeals; it applies only where the defendant alone appeals, or where an appeal is filed only on behalf of the defendant. Where the prosecutor files an appeal disadvantageous to the defendant, the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence does not apply, and it is possible for the appellate court to alter the sentence to one heavier than that of the first instance. In this respect, it is not appropriate to discuss whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence is a factor impeding the proper operation of criminal justice procedure without considering the possibility of appeal by the prosecutor.
In the example cases discussed above, the prosecutor may file an appeal so as to exclude application of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, correct the error of the first instance, and ensure that a sentence corresponding to the defendant's culpability is pronounced. The Criminal Procedure Act is designed in such a manner that, while guaranteeing the defendant's exercise of the right of appeal through the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, it also allows, through the prosecutor's judgment, for a sentence corresponding to culpability to be pronounced against the defendant even at the appellate court.
Since it was the established position of the Supreme Court to apply the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence based on the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence, and the defendant would decide whether to appeal accordingly, if a case is one in which it would only be proper for the defendant to be sentenced at the appellate court to a definite term exceeding the minimum term, the prosecutor may review the matter and appeal accordingly. In this case, the fact that the prosecutor did not appeal appears to be either because the prosecutor was willing to accept the appellate court's pronouncement of a definite-term sentence equivalent to the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence, or because the prosecutor, by mistake, failed to recognize the Supreme Court's firmly established precedent. However, in either case, it is self-evident that this cannot constitute a circumstance justifying a change to the firmly established position of the Supreme Court for the benefit of the defendant. Nevertheless, the majority opinion's attempt to punish the defendant more severely, even by changing established precedent, seriously infringes upon the defendant's procedural status—namely, having been granted, upon being sentenced to an indefinite term at first instance, the possibility of release and termination of sentence execution beginning from the minimum term, and having such favorable treatment arising from the first instance judgment maintained by virtue of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence where only the defendant appeals—and, as a result, also disregards the purpose of the Juvenile Act, which permits the pronouncement of indefinite-term sentences in consideration of the particular characteristics of juveniles.
F. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below, which determined the sentencing for Defendant 1 by applying the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence based on the minimum term of the indefinite-term sentence imposed by the first instance court, is proper, and there is no error therein based on a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence.
With respect to the issue in this case, I cannot agree with the majority opinion, which, by employing artful reasoning, retreats from the legal principles established by the Supreme Court for nearly 70 years regarding the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence—one of the important principles for protecting the defendant's rights—and undermines the purpose of the Juvenile Act. For the foregoing reasons, I state that I cannot agree with the majority opinion.
8. Concurring Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek to the Majority Opinion
A. The mere fact that comparing the minimum term of an indefinite-term sentence with a definite-term sentence, in determining whether the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence has been violated between an indefinite-term sentence and a definite-term sentence, has been the position of the Supreme Court for nearly 70 years does not conclusively establish that this position of the Supreme Court is a valid legal principle appropriate for governing the social circumstances of the present time. In order for a position long maintained by the Supreme Court to continue to be recognized as a valid legal principle at present, it is necessary, as social structures change and public consciousness accordingly changes, to undergo a continuous process of verification through analysis and re-examination of its validity. Only a determination of the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed through such a process can be evaluated as "a valid, consistent legal principle maintained over a long period." However, the Supreme Court's position concerning the standard for determining violation of the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence with respect to indefinite-term sentences has not undergone verification of its validity through a process of in-depth criticism and counter-argument in academia or practice. This being so, this Court, as the court forming the legal order not of 70 years ago but of the present time, should not simply follow the Supreme Court's past determination merely because it has been maintained unchanged for a long period, but should examine whether that determination is valid as a legal principle appropriate for governing the changed circumstances of the present time. From this perspective, the majority opinion has placed the maximum and minimum terms of the indefinite-term sentence, and indeed the numerous possible sentences ranging from the minimum to the maximum term of the indefinite-term sentence, all on the same plane, and evaluated which degree of sentence among them could serve, relatively speaking, as a superior standard for harmonizing the principle of culpability with the principle prohibiting disadvantageous alteration of sentence, concluding as a result that the midpoint between the maximum and minimum terms of the indefinite-term sentence could serve as the relatively superior standard.
[Order]
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[Reasoning]
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Na. The more we face a situation in which a harmonious legal order must be formed among numerous interests or norms, the more deeply we must reflect on the fundamental nature of the problem, returning to basic principles. In practice, there is a tendency to approach such matters—without such reflection—as a simple either/or choice, focusing solely on the clarity of the doctrinal argument, even though the issue is actually one of degree. This tendency is undesirable. If the issue in this case were viewed as a matter of either/or choice, its resolution might be relatively simple, and the Majority Opinion's position—that the median between the long term and the short term of an indeterminate sentence should serve as the standard—might seem awkward. However, where interests or norms intersect and are intertwined at multiple levels, there will inevitably be diverse perspectives and evaluations depending on the method of approach or analysis, and there cannot be an answer that says one side is "absolutely right" or "absolutely wrong." The Majority Opinion has accepted the essential nature of this problem without bias and has sought not the sole answer, but a better answer.
Da. In the past, there have been instances in which, in response to positions seeking to approach as a simple either/or choice the essential nature of a problem requiring the formation of a harmonious legal order among numerous interests, a view similar to the Majority Opinion—recognizing the matter as one of degree—was presented. In the process of enacting the Civil Execution Act (민사집행법), the issue arose as to whether priority should be granted to an attaching creditor in determining the distribution ratio among general creditors. This gave rise to a conflict between the position of priority (the view that a right to receive distribution with priority should be granted to the attaching creditor) and the position of equality (the view that no such priority right should be granted to the attaching creditor), positions already well known through academic theory and foreign law. However, this too, similar to the issue in this case, is not a matter in which one extreme position can be found to be absolutely correct. Approached from the standpoint of the ratio by which the attaching creditor is given priority in distribution, the position of priority would grant a 100% priority right, while the position of equality would grant a 0% priority right; yet there is no reasonable ground for excluding from consideration other figures existing between 0% and 100%, such as 30%, 50%, 60%, or 90%. Ultimately, this issue too is a matter of degree—determining which of the numerous figures ranging from 0% to 100% can produce a harmonious result among the interests of general creditors. Pointing out the essential nature of this problem, the following view was presented: "Rather than dealing with this matter as a question of the position of priority or the position of equality, focusing solely on the clarity of the doctrinal argument, one should recognize that this is a matter of degree for deriving a harmonious result in the monetary distribution among creditors, and should approach it in a direction that acknowledges that ratios existing between 0% and 100% may also be considered." [Points for Amendment of the Civil Procedure Act (Compulsory Execution Part), Court Administration Office (1996)].
Ra. As to the specific reasons why, in the process of evaluating the relative superiority among the long term of an indeterminate sentence, the short term thereof, and the median between the long term and short term of an indeterminate sentence, the median between the long term and short term of an indeterminate sentence is judged to be relatively superior to the long term or short term of an indeterminate sentence, these have already been set forth in detail in the Majority Opinion; accordingly, this Concurring Opinion will additionally rebut only the following points raised in the Dissenting Opinion and the Separate Opinion. In addition, each of the arguments asserted respectively in the Dissenting Opinion and the Separate Opinion can, on the one hand, serve as grounds that it would be inappropriate to set the long term or short term of an indeterminate sentence as the standard, which can serve as yet another ground that it is inappropriate to simply select either extreme of the "range" from the short term to the long term of an indeterminate sentence as the standard.
1) The principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration (불이익변경금지 원칙) is intended to objectively compare the severity of the sentence rendered in the lower court with that rendered on appeal, in order to determine whether the sentence rendered on appeal is a heavier sentence; accordingly, objectively comparing the severity of the sentences rendered in the lower court and on appeal is a task that must necessarily accompany the application of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration. The position taken by the Dissenting Opinion and the Separate Opinion regarding the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration is, in effect, that there is no correlation between comparing the objective severity of sentences as between an indeterminate sentence and a determinate sentence and the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration; however, this is contrary to the wording of Article 368 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), which provides for the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.
2) The Dissenting Opinion points to prior Supreme Court precedents that determined whether a change between a sentence of actual imprisonment and a suspended sentence constitutes a disadvantageous alteration, and asserts that the Majority Opinion fails to harmonize with these Supreme Court positions. However, whether a change is disadvantageous must be determined on the basis of the sentence actually pronounced, and not on the basis of unpredictable future circumstances that the appellate court has not adjudicated upon. Where a sentence of actual imprisonment becomes final, the defendant, in principle, has his or her personal liberty deprived by the pronounced sentence, whereas where a suspended sentence becomes final, the defendant, in principle, does not have his or her personal liberty deprived by the pronounced sentence. Ultimately, when judged on the basis of the sentence pronounced, actual imprisonment must be regarded as a substantially heavier sentence disadvantageous to the defendant compared to a suspended sentence. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a defendant who received a suspended sentence in the first instance would file an appeal on the ground that the suspended sentence imposed was excessive because actual imprisonment should have been imposed instead. Moreover, all of the grounds that the Criminal Act (형법) sets forth as grounds for the revocation or invalidation of a suspended sentence are wrongful acts for which the defendant must bear responsibility. From this perspective, including in the criteria for determining the severity of a sentence the results arising from the defendant's own wrongful conduct must be regarded as the court granting the defendant an unwarranted benefit. Therefore, there is doubt as to the validity of the Supreme Court precedents pointed to by the Dissenting Opinion, and the assertion that the Majority Opinion is erroneous on that basis cannot be accepted.
Ma. To explain by way of example using the facts of this case: among the sentences existing between the long term of 15 years and the short term of 7 years of the indeterminate sentence pronounced by the court of first instance, it is not the case that only the median thereof, namely 11 years, can be set as the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated with respect to an indeterminate sentence. If it can be evaluated as appropriate for deriving a harmonious result in response to the problem situation that the standard is intended to resolve, then 8, 9, or 10 years, or 12, 13, or 14 years, could also be set as the standard. However, considering the period of sentence execution that a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence in the first instance could reasonably expect, it is difficult to evaluate 8, 9, or 10 years, or 12, 13, or 14 years as relatively superior to the median of 11 years, and it is likewise difficult to find any other reasonable and valid ground.
For the execution of a sentence against a defendant who has received an indeterminate sentence to be terminated, the prosecutor's determination that the record of conduct during imprisonment has been good and that the purpose of correction has been achieved is required (Article 60(4) of the Juvenile Act (소년법)). The Majority Opinion, premised on the assumption that the system of decisions terminating sentence execution provided for under the Juvenile Act is being operated in accordance with its purpose, evaluated that, by giving balanced consideration to each of the factors involved in a decision terminating sentence execution, it is appropriate to regard the period of sentence execution that a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence could reasonably expect as corresponding to the median between the long term and short term of the indeterminate sentence.
The Separate Opinion asserts, based on statistical data from 2009 to 2018, that decisions terminating sentence execution have hardly ever been made with respect to juvenile inmates, and that since the average proportion of juvenile inmates who served up to the long term without parole reaches 60.21%, the period of sentence execution that a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence should reasonably expect can be said to be close to the long term. However, such practice in the execution of sentences does not conform to the legislative purpose of the Juvenile Act, which establishes special measures concerning criminal disposition in order to assist the sound growth of juveniles. The courts, which form the legal order relating to the Juvenile Act, must consider whether the practice of sentence execution is being operated in a direction suitable for achieving the legislative purpose of the Juvenile Act, and if not, what measures could bring about a change in the practice of sentence execution, and must seek a better standard on that basis. From this perspective, the assertion that, in setting the standard for determining whether the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration has been violated with respect to an indeterminate sentence, the practice of sentence execution—which is at odds with the legislative intent of the Juvenile Act provisions relating to sentence execution—should be taken into consideration is difficult to accept.
Ultimately, the period of sentence execution that a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence can reasonably expect must be evaluated by giving balanced consideration to the factors of "the defendant's record of conduct during imprisonment" and "the prosecutor's discretionary judgment," both of which are future circumstances that are very difficult to predict. From this perspective, it is more appropriate to evaluate that a defendant who received an indeterminate sentence can expect that, from the time the short term of the indeterminate sentence has elapsed until the long term thereof arrives, the execution of the sentence will be terminated by the prosecutor's discretionary judgment with equal likelihood throughout that period.
Ba. Even though the educational element is strong, the essential nature of an indeterminate sentence is nonetheless punishment. Moreover, in light of the malleability of juveniles, the purpose of correction—improvement and rehabilitation through education—concerns circumstances that will arise in the future, and it is impossible for the fact-finding court that pronounces the indeterminate sentence to accurately predict this at the time of sentencing. The fact-finding court pronouncing an indeterminate sentence must be wary of excessively setting the "range" from the short term to the long term of the indeterminate sentence by placing excessive weight on the factor of the purpose of correction. In the same vein, when legislation governing the upper limits of the long term and short term of an indeterminate sentence is enacted or amended, it is appropriate for the legislature, in exercising its legislative discretion, to ensure that by setting an excessive "range" between the upper limits of the long term and short term of an indeterminate sentence, the fact-finding court is not made to face difficulty in determining an appropriate sentence within the limits of the principle of responsibility, which is a fundamental principle of criminal justice. The Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes (특정강력범죄의 처벌에 관한 특례법, hereinafter the "Specific Violent Crimes Act"), which applies in this case, sets the "range" between the upper limits of the long term and short term (long term of 15 years, short term of 7 years) of an indeterminate sentence for a juvenile who has committed a specific violent crime such as murder at 8 years. This is not only longer than the upper limit of the short term, which is 7 years, but is also significantly longer than the 5-year "range" between the upper limits of the long term and short term (long term of 10 years, short term of 5 years) set forth in the Juvenile Act. Even taking legislative discretion into account, there is doubt as to whether it is appropriate to have set such a long period as the "range."
Sa. Meanwhile, although not directly related to the facts of this case, we wish to point out an instance in which, in another context where the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration applies, that principle fails to function properly.
The Majority Opinion in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Chogi318, dated June 16, 2016, held that "where, among several offenses committed by an ordinary citizen, an offense falling under any subparagraph of Article 1(4) of the Military Criminal Act (군형법) (hereinafter referred to as a 'specific military offense,' with other offenses referred to as 'ordinary offenses') and an ordinary offense are in a concurrent crime relationship under the first clause of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, the military court has jurisdiction over the specific military offense, while the ordinary court has jurisdiction over the ordinary offense." That is, where a defendant who is a soldier commits a specific military offense and an ordinary offense and is indicted for concurrent crimes in the military court of first instance pursuant to Article 2 of the Military Court Act (군사법원법) and receives a sentence, and only the defendant appeals, if during the pendency of the appeal the defendant is discharged from military service and thereby ceases to hold military status, the military court still retains jurisdiction over the specific military offense, but no longer has jurisdiction over the ordinary offense, which must therefore be transferred to an ordinary court. However, the above en banc Decision, which divides several offenses committed by a single person into separate spheres of criminal jurisdiction, gives rise to the following various doubts in connection with the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration.
For example, suppose that in the above scenario, the panel military court of first instance sentenced the defendant to one year of imprisonment, only the defendant appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal the defendant was discharged from military service. According to the above en banc Decision, the military court of the second instance would pronounce judgment on the specific military offense, while the ordinary court of the second instance, having received the transferred case, would pronounce judgment on the ordinary offense. Now, if the military court first sentences the defendant to 8 months of imprisonment for the specific military offense and that judgment becomes final as is, must the ordinary court, in connection with the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, pronounce a sentence within the remainder obtained by subtracting the sentence already pronounced by the second-instance military court from the sentence of the first instance, namely within 4 months (= 1 year − 8 months)? If the military court first sentences the defendant to 1 year of imprisonment and that judgment becomes final as is, must the ordinary court exempt the defendant from punishment (= 1 year − 1 year) for the corresponding ordinary offense, even though the Criminal Act contains no provision for exemption from punishment for that offense?
Furthermore, if the military court first sentences the defendant to 8 months of imprisonment but that judgment has not yet become final, must the ordinary court pronounce a sentence within the entire scope of the first-instance sentence, namely within 1 year, without being bound by the military court's judgment, or must it pronounce a sentence within 4 months (= 1 year − 8 months)? In this case as well, if the ordinary court is bound by the judgment of the court that rendered its decision first, does this mean that, notwithstanding that the two courts hold equal status vis-à-vis each other, the court that first pronounces judgment preempts a superior position? What answer can the above en banc Decision give to these various questions in relation to the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration? However much we consider the matter, it does not appear that a proper answer can be given.
Regrettably, the above en banc Decision has, as described above, caused great confusion in the application of the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, and as a result has lowered the predictability of the sentence to be pronounced by the second-instance court, thereby bringing about a result that may chill the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal. This cannot escape criticism for infringing upon the right to trial guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, according to the above en banc Decision, a single first-instance judgment may, in the appellate stage, be split into two judgments rendered by the military court and the ordinary court—separate organizational bodies with no organizational or operational connection to one another—a scenario entirely unanticipated by criminal procedure. Because of this, there may be various other scenarios, beyond the principle of prohibition of disadvantageous alteration, in which conflicts arise with other fundamental principles of criminal justice that have not yet been contemplated.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Sun-soo (Justice in Charge), Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu