[Defendant]
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Oh Byung-ju and two others
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Decision 2016No562, decided September 13, 2016
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for appeal (including the descriptions in defense counsel's supplemental grounds for appeal, etc., submitted after the deadline for submission of the grounds for appeal, to the extent they supplement the grounds for appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Whether the statute of limitations for prosecution has expired
Article 253(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) provides: "The statute of limitations shall be suspended upon the institution of a public prosecution, and shall resume running from the time when a decision of dismissal of the prosecution or a decision on lack of jurisdiction becomes final." Even if a public prosecution was instituted before the defendant was physically secured, this fact alone does not render the institution of the prosecution unlawful, and once a public prosecution is instituted, the running of the statute of limitations is suspended pursuant to the above provision.
The first instance court determined that the running of the statute of limitations was suspended because the instant prosecution was instituted on December 22, 2011, before the statute of limitations for this case expired, and the lower court found the first instance court's determination to be justified and did not accept the defendant's argument on this point in the grounds of appeal.
The lower court's determination is justified as it follows the legal principles set forth above. There is no error in the lower court's determination in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the statute of limitations, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
2. Whether there was an abuse of the power to prosecute
According to the record, it can be seen that on April 26, 1997, the prosecutor indicted Non-Indicted 1 for "murder" and the defendant for "violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc. (폭력행위 등 처벌에 관한 법률) (habitual offender likely to commit crime) and destruction of evidence" (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc.") in connection with the instant crime (this is referred to as the "preceding case"). In the preceding case, the defendant was found guilty (Seoul High Court Decision 97No2396, decided January 26, 1998), but Non-Indicted 1 was found not guilty (Supreme Court Decision 98Do421, decided April 24, 1998).
The first instance court determined, in light of the fact that a large amount of evidence had been collected with respect to the facts charged against the defendant in the preceding case, and that after the acquittal of Non-Indicted 1 in the preceding case became final, supplementary investigation was conducted and additional new evidence was collected, that the prosecutor did not institute the instant prosecution by abusing the power to prosecute despite insufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt. The lower court also found the first instance court's determination to be justified and did not accept the defendant's argument on this point in the grounds of appeal.
The lower court's determination is justified in light of the legal principles concerning abuse of the power to prosecute, and there is no error in misapprehending the legal principles as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
3. Whether the effect of the final and conclusive judgment extends to the facts charged in this case
In criminal procedure, whether there is identity between the facts charged or the criminal facts of two offenses must be determined based on whether the basic factual relationships are identical. This cannot be grasped solely from the perspective of pure factual identity, but must be determined based on whether the basic factual relationships are substantially identical, taking into consideration normative elements in addition to the defendant's conduct and the natural and social factual relationships (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Do2080, decided March 22, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do9678, decided March 23, 2006, etc.).
The gist of the facts charged in the instant murder case, which the lower court found guilty, is as follows: "The defendant, at around 21:50 on April 3, 1997, at the restroom of the ○○○ Hamburger shop located in Itaewon-dong, Yongsan-gu, Seoul (hereinafter referred to as the "○○○ Restroom"), stabbed the victim with a knife and murdered the victim in conspiracy with Non-Indicted 1." The gist of the criminal facts of "the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc." for which the defendant was found guilty and the conviction became final in the preceding case is as follows: "The defendant, from early February 1997 to around 22:00 on April 3, 1997, possessed a portable knife, a dangerous object likely to be used for a crime, without justifiable reason, and at around 23:00 on April 3, 1997, picked up the knife that Non-Indicted 1 had discarded in the ○○○ Restroom after committing the crime, and discarded it in a sewer within the U.S. Army Garrison in Yongsan, thereby destroying evidence relating to another person's criminal case."
The instant murder offense, which the lower court found guilty, and the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc., for which the conviction became final in the preceding case, differ from each other in the date, time, place, and manner of the act; furthermore, murder differs from the offense of violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc. (habitual offender likely to commit crime) or the destruction-of-evidence offense in terms of the protected legal interest, and there is also a significant difference in the nature of the offense. Accordingly, identity of the basic factual relationships between the facts charged in the instant murder case and the criminal facts of the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc., cannot be recognized.
The lower court's measure of maintaining the first instance judgment, which determined, in the same vein, that the res judicata effect of the final and conclusive judgment on the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc., does not extend to the facts charged in the instant murder case, is justified. There is no error in the lower court's determination in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the res judicata effect of a final and conclusive judgment or the principle of ne bis in idem, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
4. Whether there was a material mistake of fact
A. In criminal trials, a finding of guilt must be based on evidence with probative value sufficient to allow the judge to be convinced that the facts charged are true beyond a reasonable doubt. "Reasonable doubt" as used herein does not refer to every doubt or suspicion, but means a reasonable doubt regarding the probability of facts incompatible with the fact to be proven, based on logic and the rules of experience. Accordingly, a doubt based on a mere conceptual suspicion or abstract possibility is not included in reasonable doubt (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Do4172, decided June 27, 2013, etc.). A judge is not necessarily required to determine whether there is proof of the criminal facts solely by direct evidence, but may determine that there is proof of the criminal facts by comprehensively examining direct and circumstantial evidence in accordance with logic and the rules of experience.
B. The lower court, comprehensively considering the evidence lawfully adopted, determined that it was proven, to the extent that there was no room for reasonable doubt, that the defendant stabbed and killed the victim with a knife, citing the following circumstances.
(1) The victim died after being stabbed with a knife in the ○○○ Restroom, where only the defendant and Non-Indicted 1 were present, and the defendant and Non-Indicted 1 each claim that the other party stabbed the victim with the knife and that he himself merely happened to witness the scene.
First, the defendant claims regarding the circumstances at the time of the crime as follows: "The defendant followed Non-Indicted 1 into the restroom and stood leaning against the space between the right side of the sink and the left wall, when Non-Indicted 1 stabbed the victim, who was urinating, in the right side of the neck with a knife. When the victim turned around covering the wound with his left hand, Non-Indicted 1 stabbed the victim in the chest and the left side of the neck, then threw the knife on the floor and left the restroom. Thereafter, the victim approached the defendant, and the defendant, leaning his back against the right side of the sink, pushed the victim away with both hands, then picked up the knife that had fallen to the floor and left the restroom."
On the other hand, Non-Indicted 1 claims as follows: "While washing his hands in front of the restroom sink and looking in the mirror, the defendant suddenly stabbed the victim in the right side of the neck with a knife. When Non-Indicted 1 turned to the right and looked, the victim turned around and, at the moment he tried to hit the defendant, the defendant avoided this and continued to stab the victim's body and the left side of his neck. Thereafter, the defendant pushed Non-Indicted 1 aside and left the restroom, and when the victim collapsed in the corner, Non-Indicted 1 also left the restroom."
(2) However, in light of the bloodstains, etc., remaining at the scene of the crime, no particular contradiction is found in Non-Indicted 1's claim, whereas the defendant's claim gives rise to the following logical contradictions that are not easily resolved.
(A) In light of the amount and traces of blood found on the upper right and inner parts of the sink, it appears that the victim, after being stabbed with the knife, bled while holding onto the right side of the sink before collapsing in the left corner of the restroom. However, if, as the defendant states, the defendant had been standing between the right side of the sink and the wall while witnessing the crime, and then leaned against the right side of the sink to push away the victim who approached him, it seems unlikely that such a large amount of blood would have adhered to the upper right and inner parts of the sink.
(B) Furthermore, if, as the defendant states, the defendant was standing between the right side of the sink and the wall at the time of the crime, there should be a portion where no blood adhered due to being blocked by the defendant's body; however, in fact, the bloodstains continue without interruption on the wall from the urinal on the left all the way to the sink.
(C) For there to be no contradiction between the defendant's statement and the bloodstains at the scene of the crime, the victim would have had to approach the sink again and hold onto it after the defendant pushed him away and left the spot. At that time, the victim, who was intoxicated to the extent that his blood alcohol level reached 0.14%, had been stabbed nine times in vital areas and had suffered massive blood loss; it does not appear likely that the victim could have gotten up again and reached the sink after being pushed away by the defendant.
(3) The following circumstances found in the situation after the crime also support the credibility of Non-Indicted 1's statement that he witnessed the defendant stabbing the victim.
(A) A large amount of the victim's blood adhered all over the defendant's body, including both hands, head, upper garment, and lower garment, whereas Non-Indicted 1 had blood on his upper garment only, and none elsewhere. The defendant claims that a large amount of blood adhered to him in the process of pushing away the victim who approached him, but, as seen above, in light of the bloodstains remaining at the scene of the crime, the defendant's above claim is difficult to accept.
(B) The defendant, upon leaving the ○○○ Restroom, immediately went up to the restroom of △△△△△ on the 4th floor, washed the blood off his head, face, and hands, changed into a different shirt after removing the blood-stained one, and even borrowed a hat to wear before going outside the building, and did not converse with other people in that process. Such conduct can be seen as the conduct that would be expected of a person who had just stabbed and killed the victim nine times with a knife.
On the other hand, Non-Indicted 1 did not attempt to wipe off the victim's blood on his upper garment, but rather boasted of the crime to Non-Indicted 2 and others, showing them his upper garment, and did not show any inclination to leave the building until Non-Indicted 2, upon hearing Non-Indicted 1's words, went down to the 1st floor ○○○ Restroom, the scene of the crime, to check on the victim, and then went back up to the 4th floor △△△△△ to confront Non-Indicted 1; such conduct does not appear to be the attitude of a person who had just stabbed and killed the victim nine times with a knife.
(C) The defendant let Non-Indicted 3 burn his blood-stained shirt and discarded the knife, the tool used in the crime, in a sewer ditch, and other conduct that can be understood as an offender destroying evidence after committing a crime.
On the other hand, Non-Indicted 1, without even changing his clothes, went to meet Non-Indicted 4, and thereafter went home and took off his clothes for his mother to wash, and other than that, he has not engaged in any conduct that could be evaluated as destruction of evidence after the crime.
(D) The defendant, at △△△△△, asked his girlfriend, Non-Indicted 5, to go with him, but was refused on the ground that he smelled of blood, yet did not explain his innocence. Even after confirming the victim's death, the defendant made no particular effort to deny his responsibility to the friends who were with him, and even when questioned by his girlfriend, Non-Indicted 5, or his closest friend, Non-Indicted 3, did not offer the excuse that Non-Indicted 1 was the offender. If the person who stabbed the victim with the knife was Non-Indicted 1, the defendant, who was present at the scene together with him, would inevitably be under suspicion; nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why the defendant adopted such an attitude.
On the other hand, Non-Indicted 1, upon confirming the scene of the crime at △△△△△ and being confronted by Non-Indicted 2, denied the crime, saying that it was not something he had done, and immediately went to Non-Indicted 4 and told him that the defendant had stabbed the victim with the knife.
(4) Meanwhile, according to the results of a polygraph examination, no unusual response indicating deception was found with respect to the defendant's statement, whereas a significant response indicating deception was found with respect to Non-Indicted 1's statement. However, the results of a polygraph examination cannot always be assumed to conform to the truth, and they merely function as circumstantial evidence for gauging the credibility of the statement of the person examined; therefore, such examination results alone cannot negate the credibility of Non-Indicted 1's statement, which is consistent with the circumstances at the time of the crime and thereafter.
C. Examining the record in light of the legal principles set forth above and the evidence lawfully adopted by the lower court, the lower court's above fact-finding and determination are justified. There is no illegality in the lower court's determination due to insufficient deliberation or violation of the rules of evidence resulting in a material mistake of fact affecting the judgment, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
5. Whether the sentencing is unfair
A. The first instance court selected life imprisonment for the defendant and, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Specific Violent Crimes (특정강력범죄의 처벌에 관한 특례법), mitigated the sentence and imposed a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. The lower court, even considering that the defendant was a juvenile under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, that he committed the crime impulsively at the instigation of Non-Indicted 1, and that he had previously served more than one year in prison for the destruction-of-evidence offense, etc., and had been detained for more than four years in the process of being extradited from the United States, determined that the first instance court's sentencing was not unfair, considering the following circumstances.
The victim, at a young age, lost his precious and irreplaceable life, and it can easily be inferred that the victim's family suffered enormous mental shock and have lived in suffering for nearly 20 years to this day. The defendant brutally murdered the victim, a complete stranger, for no reason whatsoever. Although the defendant had several opportunities to confess to the crime and seek forgiveness from the victim's family, he has instead persisted in an attitude of merely asserting his own innocence while attempting to shift responsibility for the crime onto Non-Indicted 1. The defendant has taken no measures whatsoever, from the time of the crime to the present, to restore even a small part of the damage suffered by the victim and his bereaved family.
B. Examining the various circumstances constituting the conditions for sentencing recognized by the record and evidence, such as the defendant's age, character and conduct, intelligence and environment, relationship with the victim, motive, means, and result of the crime, and circumstances after the crime, the lower court's determination to maintain the first instance court's sentencing determination and to maintain the first instance judgment sentencing the defendant to 20 years' imprisonment is justified as being in accordance with Article 51 of the Criminal Act (형법). This ground for appeal is also without merit.
6. Conclusion
Since the defendant's grounds for appeal are without merit, the appeal is dismissed, and it is so decided by the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Park Bo-young (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Byung-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Kim Jae-hyung (Justice in charge)