[Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees] As stated in Nos. 1 through 97 of the attached "List of Plaintiffs." (Attorneys Kim Sang-eun and 1 other, Counsel for the Plaintiffs)
[Plaintiffs, Appellees] As stated in Nos. 98 through 105 of the attached "List of Plaintiffs."
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Hankook Tire Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Son Ji-yeol and 4 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2014Na13769, 13790, 13776, 13783 dated January 14, 2016
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daejeon High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal
A. First ground of appeal
The court below determined that the regular bonus paid by the Defendant, pursuant to the collective agreement and salary regulations, etc., only to production-line workers who remained employed as of the payment date, lacked fixedness and thus did not constitute ordinary wages, and accordingly rejected the Plaintiffs' argument on this point.
Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the judgment below, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning ordinary wages that affected the judgment.
B. Second ground of appeal
(1) For a certain wage to fall under ordinary wages, it must have the character of being paid "uniformly." Payment "uniformly" includes not only payment to "all employees" but also payment to "all employees who meet a certain condition or standard." Here, the "certain condition" must be a fixed condition, in light of the concept of ordinary wages, which is intended to calculate a fixed and average wage. Furthermore, since ordinary wages are a concept that evaluates the value of prescribed work, the "certain condition or standard," which serves as the criterion for determining whether a wage paid to all employees within a certain scope satisfies uniformity, must be a condition related to the evaluation of the value of prescribed work, such as the content of the work, skill, or experience (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399 delivered on December 18, 2013, etc.).
(2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be ascertained.
(A) The Defendant's production-line workers are divided into a day shift and a rotating shift working four groups on a three-shift rotation system. In the case of rotating-shift workers, even without separate overtime work, they work an average of 42 hours per week, resulting in 2 hours of overtime work per week.
(B) Article 12, Item 2 of the Defendant's employment rules provides: "In consideration of the 42-hour weekly work of shift-system workers, overtime allowance may be paid, or paid leave may be granted in lieu thereof." In fact, the Defendant grants 13 days of paid leave each year (4/3-group compensatory leave) to rotating-shift workers, and pays a 4/3-group compensatory allowance for any unused 4/3-group compensatory leave.
(C) Separately from the 4/3-group compensatory leave and 4/3-group compensatory allowance, the Defendant pays all rotating-shift workers a monthly amount equivalent to three times the basic daily wage as a "4/3-group allowance." The 4/3-group allowance is an allowance that the Defendant began paying around the year 2000, when it changed the work pattern of its employees from a three-group, three-shift system to a four-group, three-shift system, in order to compensate for the decrease in overtime allowances resulting from the reduction in overtime hours of workers belonging to the rotating shift, compared to before.
(D) A worker who worked on a rotating shift and was subsequently changed to the day shift was paid the 4/3-group allowance in proportion to the number of days worked on the rotating shift.
(E) Article 15 of the Defendant's employment rules provides: "As a general rule, on-site work for daily-wage employees in production positions shall be performed on a shift-work basis."
(3) Examining these facts, together with the following circumstances ascertainable from the record, in light of the legal principles set forth above, it is reasonable to view that the 4/3-group allowance satisfies the requirement of uniformity.
(A) The mere fact that the allowance was introduced to compensate for the decrease in overtime allowance resulting from the change in work pattern does not by itself allow the conclusion that the 4/3-group allowance is a wage paid irrespective of the evaluation of the value of the rotating-shift workers' prescribed work. Rather, in light of the payment criteria, payment form, and payment amount of the 4/3-group allowance, it appears that, unlike the 4/3-group compensatory leave or 4/3-group compensatory allowance granted in relation to the rotating-shift workers' average two hours of weekly overtime work, the 4/3-group allowance was paid as consideration for the prescribed work itself of the rotating-shift workers.
(B) At the Defendant's place of business, shift work is the general rule for production-line workers, and it appears that workers assigned to the rotating shift continued to work on the rotating shift unless their assignment was adjusted to the day shift. Accordingly, the condition for payment of the 4/3-group allowance, namely, working on the rotating shift, must be regarded as a fixed condition rather than a temporary or fluctuating one.
(4) Nevertheless, the court below determined, for reasons including that payment varied depending on the non-fixed work-group form and that the allowance could not be regarded as consideration for prescribed work, that the 4/3-group allowance lacked uniformity and thus did not constitute ordinary wages. This determination by the court below contains an error that misunderstands the legal principles concerning ordinary wages, or that violates the rules of logic and experience, thereby exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, and this error affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
C. Third ground of appeal
Under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (before amendment by Act No. 15513 on March 20, 2018; hereinafter "the former Labor Standards Act"), holiday work for which at least 50% of ordinary wages must be added and paid as holiday work allowance includes not only work on the weekly holiday under Article 55 of the same Act but also work on statutory public holidays, etc., designated as holidays by collective agreement or employment rules (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da14089 delivered on May 14, 1991, etc.).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be ascertained that, where an employee actually provided work on a weekly holiday or a paid holiday designated in a collective agreement, etc., the Defendant paid an amount equal to 1.5 times the ordinary hourly wage multiplied by the holiday working hours as a "basic holiday work allowance." Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the basic holiday work allowance paid by the Defendant constitutes wages with an additional 50% of ordinary wages for holiday work pursuant to Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act.
Nevertheless, the court below, without any particular basis, concluded that the basic holiday work allowance constituted a contractual allowance, and on that basis rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that the difference in the basic holiday work allowance should be paid in accordance with the recalculated ordinary wages. This determination by the court below contains an error that misunderstands the legal principles concerning holiday work allowances, or that violates the rules of logic and experience, thereby exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, and this error affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
D. Fourth ground of appeal
Where, in calculating an allowance for which the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) sets no standard, labor and management agree to use, as a means for calculating such allowance, an ordinary wage that differs from the concept or scope of ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act, there is from the outset no risk that the purpose of requiring payment of statutory allowances under the Labor Standards Act would be undermined; therefore, such an agreement is valid (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81523 delivered on November 29, 2007).
The court below determined that the 4/3-group compensatory allowance, whereby leave is granted for the rotating-shift workers' overtime work and an allowance is paid if the leave is not used, has the character of a contractual allowance, and accordingly determined that the agreement between labor and management to calculate the 4/3-group compensatory allowance based on the contractual basic hourly wage was valid, thereby rejecting the Plaintiffs' argument that there was an obligation to pay the difference in the 4/3-group compensatory allowance in accordance with the recalculated ordinary wages.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, although there are some inappropriate points in the reasoning set forth by the court below, there is no error in the court below's determination that the 4/3-group compensatory allowance constitutes a contractual allowance, such as, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the scope of application of ordinary wages resulting in a failure to conduct the necessary examination, or a violation of the rules of logic and experience exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, that affected the judgment.
2. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. Second ground of appeal
Considering comprehensively the content, structure, and purpose of the provisions of Article 50(1), Article 53(1), Article 55, and Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act and Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 29010 on June 29, 2018), the history of enactment and amendment of the statutory provisions and the legislative intent and purpose ascertainable therefrom, and the perceptions of the parties to the employment relationship and existing labor practices, it is reasonable to view that holiday work hours are not included in the "40-hour weekly standard working hours" under Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act or the "12-hour weekly overtime hours" under Article 53(1) thereof. Accordingly, for holiday work performed in excess of the weekly standard working hours, additional wages for overtime work cannot be paid in duplication with additional wages for holiday work (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da112391 delivered on June 21, 2018).
Nevertheless, the court below determined, to the effect that holiday work performed in excess of the weekly standard working hours also constituted overtime work, that additional wages for overtime work must be paid in duplication with additional wages for holiday work. This determination by the court below contains an error that misunderstands the legal principles concerning the payment of additional wages for holiday work and overtime work under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, and this error affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. Third ground of appeal
The court below determined that the length-of-service allowance and production incentive allowance paid by the Defendant could be regarded as being fixed for payment merely upon the provision of prescribed work, and thus constituted ordinary wages, being fixed wages paid regularly and uniformly.
Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, this determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning ordinary wages that affected the judgment.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This Decision is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in this case.
[[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted]
Justice Kim So-young (Presiding Justice), Park Sang-ok, Cho Jae-yeon (Justice in charge), Noh Jeong-hee