[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Attorneys of Jihyang Law Firm, Kim Myo-hee and 9 others, for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant] Head of Seoul Gangnam Branch Office, Seoul Regional Employment and Labor Office
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2017Nu80815 decided May 23, 2018
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Outline of the Case and the Issue
A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the following facts can be known.
1) While working at Korea Fujitsu Co., Ltd., the Plaintiff gave birth to a child on October 21, 2014, and took childcare leave from December 30, 2014 to December 29, 2015.
2) On February 24, 2017, the Plaintiff applied to the Defendant for childcare leave benefits for the above leave period.
3) On March 8, 2017, the Defendant issued a disposition refusing to pay childcare leave benefits (hereinafter “the instant disposition”) on the ground that the Plaintiff had applied for childcare leave benefits after 12 months had passed from the end date of childcare leave as set forth in Article 70(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법) (before amendment by Act No. 16269 on January 15, 2019; hereinafter the same shall apply) (hereinafter “the instant provision”).
B. The court below determined that the instant disposition was unlawful, on the ground that, since a separate three-year extinctive prescription period is provided for the right to claim childcare leave benefits under Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, a person is entitled to receive childcare leave benefits as long as the claim is made within that prescription period, and that the instant provision, which sets a period for applying for childcare leave benefits, should be regarded as a directory provision meant merely to encourage early application.
Regarding this, the Defendant argues that the instant provision is a mandatory provision, and therefore the instant disposition, which refused payment of benefits with respect to an application for childcare leave benefits made after the application period set forth in the instant provision had elapsed, is lawful, and that the court below's determination regarding the instant provision as a directory provision contains an error in the interpretation of law.
C. The issue in this case is whether the instant provision should be regarded as a mandatory provision or a directory provision. In order to resolve this, it is necessary to examine the legal nature of the period for exercising the right to claim childcare leave benefits from the perspective of the right to social security benefits, and then to ascertain the normative meaning of the instant provision through legal interpretation.
2. The Special Characteristics of the Right to Social Security Benefits and the Legislative Types Concerning the Period for Exercising Such Right
A. Various types of claims for benefits under public law can be divided into cases where a concrete right arises directly under the provisions of statutes without the intervention of the administrative agency's examination and decision, and cases where a concrete right arises only upon the examination and approval decision of the competent administrative agency. Which of these two types applies is determined comprehensively by considering whether the relevant statutes clearly provide for the existence or scope of the concrete right, whether there is an appeal procedure available against the administrative agency's refusal decision, and so forth.
Among these, in the case of the right to social security benefits, it is generally the case that while the statutes provide for the substantive requirements, the administrative agency is set to make the primary determination as to whether a person qualifies as a beneficiary, the scope of the benefit amount, and so forth. The right to claim childcare leave benefits at issue in this case also falls under the latter type described above, in which a concrete right to claim benefits arises only when the head of the competent administrative agency, i.e., the employment security office, examines the matter and makes a payment decision. The precedents of the Supreme Court also regard most cases as falling under the latter type with respect to the right to social security benefits, with the exception of a few cases such as compensation under the former Act on Compensation, etc. for Persons Related to the Gwangju Democratization Movement (광주민주화운동 관련자 보상 등에 관한 법률) (before the title of the Act was amended to the Act on Compensation, etc. for Persons Related to the May 18 Democratization Movement by Act No. 7911 on March 24, 2006; hereinafter the same shall apply) (Supreme Court Decision 92Nu3335 delivered on December 24, 1992) and disaster consolation benefits under the Coal Industry Act (석탄산업법) (Supreme Court Decision 97Nu5046 delivered on December 23, 1998, Supreme Court Decision 98Du12598 delivered on January 26, 1999, etc.). The following discussion is limited to the latter type, i.e., the general case.
B. The right to social security benefits arises in the form of an abstract claim for benefits when objective circumstances satisfying the substantive requirements set forth in the relevant statutes occur, and is converted into a concrete right to receive benefits only when a payment application is made to the competent administrative agency in accordance with the procedures, methods, and standards set forth in the relevant statutes, and the competent administrative agency makes a payment decision (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2018Du46780 delivered on December 27, 2019). A person who seeks to receive benefits must first apply to the administrative agency for payment in accordance with the relevant statutes, and if the administrative agency refuses the application or decides to pay only a partial amount, the person must file an appeal litigation against such decision, obtain a judgment revoking the decision or confirming its invalidity, and have a concrete right recognized through a re-disposition made in accordance with the binding force of such judgment. Therefore, in the case of the right to social security benefits, it is not permitted to directly demand payment of the benefit through a party litigation or civil litigation against the State, local government, etc. to which the administrative agency belongs, in a state where a concrete right has not yet arisen (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2017Da277986, 277993 delivered on June 13, 2019).
C. As described above, the right to social security benefits is divided into rights in abstract form and rights in concrete form, and the purpose and method of exercising each of these rights differ from one another. Individual statutes provide in various ways for the method of exercising such rights, and the period for exercising each right is a matter to be determined by the legislature as a matter of policy. The legislative forms found in various individual statutes can be broadly classified into the following four types.
First, there is the case where the periods for exercising each right are provided for concurrently. In general, in the field of administrative law, considering that the method of exercising an abstract right differs from the method of exercising a concrete right, it is common to provide for an exclusion period with respect to the exercise of the abstract right, and an extinctive prescription period with respect to the exercise of the concrete right (see Articles 26-2 and 27 of the Framework Act on National Taxes (국세기본법), Articles 38 and 39 of the Framework Act on Local Taxes (지방세기본법), and Articles 15 and 19 of the Act on the Regulation of Violations of Public Order (질서위반행위규제법)). In the case of the right to social security benefits as well, unless otherwise provided in the relevant statutes, it is natural to understand that the period concerning the beneficiary's exercise of the abstract right vis-à-vis the competent administrative agency (application for payment of benefits) is an exclusion period, while the period concerning the beneficiary's exercise of the concrete right (claim, filing of party litigation) after a payment decision by the competent administrative agency is an extinctive prescription period (see Articles 8(2) and 16 of the Special Act on Support for Landmine Victims (지뢰피해자 지원에 관한 특별법)).
Second, there is the case where a period is provided only with respect to the exercise of the abstract right (see Article 9(4) of the Asbestos Injury Relief Act (석면피해구제법)). In such a case, it is reasonable to regard the period for exercising the abstract right as an exclusion period, unless there is an express provision stating that it is an extinctive prescription period, and even if there is no separate provision within the same statute concerning the period for exercising the concrete right, it should not be recognized as unlimited, but rather it should be understood that an extinctive prescription period applies in accordance with the general provisions concerning extinctive prescription (e.g., Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act (국가재정법)).
Third, there is the case where no period at all is provided with respect to the exercise of the abstract right (see Articles 9(2) and 15, etc. of the Act on the Honorable Treatment of and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (국가유공자 등 예우 및 지원에 관한 법률)). Such a case can be further divided into a case where a separate period for exercising the abstract right is not provided for the purpose of permitting, without any period restriction, the exercise of the right to convert the abstract right into a concrete right, while recognizing the concrete right determined by such exercise of the right only prospectively from the point of exercise of the right, and a case where no separate period is provided on the premise that the extinctive prescription provisions under the general provisions apply to the abstract right as well, from the time such right arose. Which of these applies is to be determined according to the provisions of the individual statute and the nature of the right in question.
Fourth, there is the case where the period for exercising the right is provided by a single provision without distinguishing between the respective stages of the right (see Article 112(1)(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법)). In such a case, the same period provision is applied, with the time when each right arose as the starting point, to both the exercise of the right for the purpose of converting the abstract right into a concrete right and the exercise of the right for the purpose of realizing the concrete right.
D. The purpose of an exclusion period is to promptly settle legal relationships centered on the right in question by requiring the right holder to exercise the right promptly, and unlike extinctive prescription, whose effect arises from the circumstances of the lapse of a certain period and the non-exercise of the right, the mere lapse of the period itself, absent special circumstances such as the recognition of justifiable grounds under the relevant statutes, immediately gives rise to the effect of extinguishing the right. Accordingly, an exclusion period concerning the exercise of an abstract right does not take into account whether the right holder was negligent in exercising the right, and since the abstract right is realized solely by the application of the party concerned, it is difficult to conceive of an interruption or suspension of the running of the period. In this respect, an exclusion period is fundamentally different from extinctive prescription.
Among the legislative types described above, the first type, in which provisions on the exclusion period and provisions on extinctive prescription coexist, can be said to well embody the periods for exercising each right in the context of the right to social security benefits. In such a case, each provision has its own significance for existing, and it cannot be said that they conflict with or contravene one another. Moreover, an exclusion period may be set with a specific date as its end point, or may be set as a period having both a starting point and an end point. Article 8(2) of the aforementioned Special Act on Support for Landmine Victims provides that the period for exercising the right to claim consolation money (application for payment of consolation money) at the abstract right stage is "until May 31, 2021," while Article 16 thereof provides that the period for exercising the right to claim consolation money at the concrete right stage, after a payment decision on the consolation money has been made, is "three years from the date of service of the original of the payment decision document." In this case, the former should be regarded as an exclusion period provision, since it is difficult to conceive of an interruption or suspension of the running of the period, while the latter should be regarded, in accordance with the literal wording, as an extinctive prescription provision under which the failure of the right holder to exercise the concrete right results in the extinction of the right.
The former Employment Insurance Act provides for an application period in the instant provision with respect to the exercise of the right to claim childcare leave benefits, and separately provides, in Article 107(1), for the extinctive prescription period of the right to claim childcare leave benefits. The instant provision is drafted in the form typical of a provision concerning an "exclusion period," whereas Article 107(1) expressly states that it concerns extinctive prescription. In light of these points, the instant provision and Article 107(1) correspond to the first type among the legislative types concerning the period for exercising the right to social security benefits, and, as will be seen below, it is reasonable to regard the application period set forth in the instant provision as an "exclusion period" concerning the exercise of the abstract right.
3. The Proper Legal Interpretation of the Instant Provision
A. In principle, law is a socially universal and valid norm that has the same binding force on an unspecified number of people, and therefore must be interpreted so as to clarify the standard meaning of the law and to ensure objective validity, and must be interpreted so as to maintain, as far as possible, a consistency that everyone can accept, in order not to undermine legal stability. Since positive law is inevitably drafted with universal and typical cases in mind, it is also required to interpret and apply the law so as to reach the most reasonable solution suited to the specific case among the diverse cases arising in social reality. In short, the goal of legal interpretation must always be to seek concrete validity within a scope that does not undermine legal stability. Furthermore, in order to achieve this, the principle should be to interpret the law faithfully to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute as far as possible, while additionally employing systematic and logical interpretation methods that take into account the legislative purpose and objective of the statute, the history of its enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, the relationship with other statutes, and so forth, thereby arriving at a reasonable interpretation that meets the above-mentioned requirements of legal interpretation.
Meanwhile, if the text of a statute itself is composed of relatively clear concepts, then in principle there is no further need to resort to other interpretation methods, or their use must be limited; and even where one attempts to interpret a term used in a certain statutory provision differently from its ordinary meaning by placing emphasis on the legislative purpose and objective of the statute and the provision, one cannot disregard the systematic relationship with other provisions within the same statute and with other statutes, or the harmony with the legal system as a whole, and therefore there are inevitably certain limits to such an interpretation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035 delivered on April 23, 2009).
B. Article 70 of the former Employment Insurance Act provides, in paragraph (1), for the substantive requirements for childcare leave benefits, while paragraph (2) (the instant provision) provides as follows: "A person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits under paragraph (1) shall apply therefor within the period from one month after the commencement date of childcare leave to 12 months after the end date of childcare leave: Provided, That a person who was unable to apply for childcare leave benefits during the said period due to a cause prescribed by Presidential Decree shall apply within 30 days after such cause ceases to exist." Pursuant to the delegation thereunder, Article 94 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법 시행령) provides that the "cause prescribed by Presidential Decree" referred to in the proviso of the instant provision means a natural disaster (subparagraph 1), illness or injury of the person concerned or his/her spouse (subparagraph 2), illness or injury of a lineal ascendant or descendant of the person concerned or his/her spouse (subparagraph 3), mandatory military service under the Military Service Act (병역법) (subparagraph 4), and detention or execution of a sentence due to suspicion of a crime (subparagraph 5).
The instant provision is a mandatory provision intended to promptly settle legal relationships concerning childcare leave benefits. In order for a worker to receive childcare leave benefits, the worker must apply for payment of benefits to the head of the competent employment security office within the application period set forth in the instant provision. In other words, the instant provision, which sets the application period for childcare leave benefits, cannot be regarded as a directory provision. The specific reasons therefor are as follows.
1) The instant provision, in both its main text and its proviso, provides that a person "shall apply" for childcare leave benefits within a certain period. It is an interpretation faithful to the statutory language to understand the instant provision as imposing on a person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits an obligation to comply with a certain period. In particular, the proviso of the instant provision and Article 94 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act enacted pursuant to the delegation thereunder extend the application period where there exists an objective cause that makes it difficult for a person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits to apply for such benefits within the application period set forth in the main text of the instant provision, thereby, on the one hand, preventing unreasonable results that could arise from the mechanical and formalistic application of the application period set forth in the main text of the instant provision, while, on the other hand, providing that the person may apply for childcare leave benefits until 30 days after such cause ceases to exist, so as to ensure the prompt exercise of the right.
Considering the structure of the instant provision, consisting of a main text and a proviso, and its legislative purpose, it should be understood that a person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits must exercise the right to claim childcare leave benefits by applying for payment of benefits to the head of the competent employment security office within the application period set forth in the main text and proviso of the instant provision, and that once such application period has lapsed, the right is lost. Understanding the application period set forth in the main text and proviso of the instant provision as merely encouraging an application for childcare leave benefits to be made, as far as possible, within one year from the end date of childcare leave, is contrary to the legislative purpose for which the legislature specifically enacted the main text and proviso of the instant provision as separate provisions, in order to promptly settle legal relationships concerning childcare leave benefits.
2) The former Employment Insurance Act, before amendment by Act No. 10895 on July 21, 2011 (hereinafter "the pre-2011 amendment Act"), provided for the requirements for childcare leave benefits in the subparagraphs of Article 70(1), and subparagraph 3 thereof provided as follows: "The person shall apply within the period from one month after the commencement date of childcare leave to 12 months after the end date thereof: Provided, That a person who was unable to apply for childcare leave benefits during the said period due to a cause prescribed by Presidential Decree shall apply within 30 days after such cause ceases to exist." In the amendment Act of July 21, 2011, the content provided for in Article 70(1)(3) was moved, without modification, to paragraph (2), thereby becoming the instant provision.
Examining the legislative discussions concerning the amendment by Act No. 10895 of July 21, 2011, it can be seen that the above amendment was made merely for the purpose of reorganizing the provisions so as to separately distinguish the substantive requirements and the procedural requirements for childcare leave benefits, which had been provided for together in the subparagraphs of Article 70(1) of the pre-2011 amendment Act, and that there was no intention to eliminate or relax the restriction on the application period for childcare leave benefits under the pre-2011 amendment Act. If the amendment had been made for the purpose of eliminating or relaxing the restriction on the application period for childcare leave benefits, Article 70(1)(3) of the pre-2011 amendment Act would have been entirely deleted, or its wording would have been substantially revised, rather than merely relocating the provision.
3) As noted above, it is well established that, with respect to national taxes, etc., the period for exercising the right of assessment is governed by an exclusion period, while the period for exercising the right of collection is governed by an extinctive prescription period. This system of distinguishing the periods for exercising rights into two categories has also influenced the setting of periods for exercising other rights under public law, and the period for exercising the right to social security benefits, which is converted into a concrete right upon the examination and decision of the administrative agency, can be regarded as one such instance. That is, since the "right to apply," exercised for the purpose of having the right to social security benefits converted into a right in concrete form, and the "right to claim," exercised for the purpose of having the benefit amount that has been converted into a right in concrete form paid, are not identical in nature, regulating them differently is consistent with the system of provisions concerning periods for exercising rights under public law.
Comprehensively considering the relevant provisions of the former Employment Insurance Act, the right to receive childcare leave benefits under the Employment Insurance Act does not arise directly under the statute, but rather is converted into a concrete right when a person who wishes to receive benefits submits an application for childcare leave benefits, together with the prescribed documents attached thereto, to the head of the competent employment security office, and the head of the employment security office reviews whether the requirements for childcare leave benefits under Article 70(1) are satisfied, whether there exists a cause for restricting payment of benefits under Article 73, and so forth, and thereafter makes a payment decision. If it is understood that the application period (exclusion period) set forth in the instant provision applies to the exercise of the abstract right to childcare leave benefits, while the three-year extinctive prescription period set forth in Article 107(1) applies to the exercise of the concrete right, from the time of receipt of notice of the payment decision after the head of the competent employment security office has made such a decision, then no situation arises in which the exclusion period and the extinctive prescription period concerning childcare leave benefits overlap and conflict with one another.
Meanwhile, payment of childcare leave benefits is made by the head of the competent employment security office remitting the funds, without delay after making the payment decision, to the financial account stated in the application for payment. Due to the fact that the time interval between the payment decision on childcare leave benefits and the actual payment of the benefit amount is short, and instances of non-payment following a payment decision are rare, confusion has arisen in administrative practice as to whether the 12-month application period set forth in the instant provision applies to an application for childcare leave benefits, or whether the three-year extinctive prescription period applies. Such confusion arose because the relationship between the application period and the extinctive prescription period was not properly understood; since, even after a payment decision has been made, there remains room for the extinctive prescription provisions to still apply to the exercise of the beneficiary's concrete right in exceptional cases, such as where remittance is omitted or is erroneously made, the application period and the extinctive prescription period each have a reason for existing, and are not mutually contradictory or in conflict. Nevertheless, in order to make it clearer that the application period set forth in the instant provision applies to an application for childcare leave benefits, and thereby to avoid misunderstanding or confusion in administrative practice, when the Employment Insurance Act was amended by Act No. 16269 on January 15, 2019, the right to receive childcare leave benefits was deleted from the types of rights to which the three-year extinctive prescription period under Article 107(1) applies. This history of the amendment of Article 107(1) makes it even clearer that the instant provision is not a directory provision. However, even with this statutory amendment, it is not that the application of extinctive prescription to the right to claim after a payment decision is excluded; rather, the five-year extinctive prescription period under Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act applies, and this falls under the second type among the legislative types described above.
4) In the field of administrative law, application periods are provided for in various forms of administrative statutes and regulations, such as Acts, Enforcement Decrees, and Enforcement Rules. If a provision on an application period is intended to impose a substantial restriction on the exercise of a right for the purpose of promptly settling legal relationships, then, in accordance with the "principle of statutory reservation for restriction of fundamental rights," it must be directly provided for in the Act itself, or provided for in subordinate statutes pursuant to delegation under the Act. Accordingly, an application period set forth in a subordinate statute without delegation under the parent statute has no binding effect vis-à-vis the public and the courts, and therefore cannot be regarded as an exclusion period (see Supreme Court Decision 89Nu2493 delivered on September 28, 1990).
Article 116(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법 시행규칙) provides as follows: "Benefits such as childcare leave benefits shall be applied for on a monthly basis. In this case, an application for payment of childcare leave benefits, etc. for the portion of childcare leave or reduced working hours during the child-rearing period implemented during the relevant month shall be made by the last day of the following month." Although Article 70(4) of the former Employment Insurance Act provides that "matters necessary for the application for and payment of childcare leave benefits shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor," this cannot be regarded as having delegated the authority to modify or alter the content of the statutory provision by additionally restricting, in the Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, the application period already clearly prescribed in the instant provision; subordinate statutes must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the parent statute. Accordingly, Article 116(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act should be understood as follows: while a beneficiary may, within the application period set forth in the instant provision, apply for childcare leave benefits for the entire period of childcare leave all at once, or may apply in several installments, since it would be cumbersome to calculate and pay childcare leave benefits on a daily basis if the beneficiary were to apply for payment excessively frequently by splitting the benefits into overly small portions, the provision is intended to encourage, for the sake of administrative convenience, application for payment on a monthly basis as far as possible, in the same manner as the ordinary method of payment of wages (monthly salary) in an employment relationship; it is not intended to restrict the beneficiary from exercising the right to claim childcare leave benefits for the relevant month once the last day of the following month has passed. That is, since the instant provision is a provision of the Act, the legal nature of the instant provision must be derived from the interpretation of the Act itself, and it cannot be said that the legal nature of the instant provision changes depending on the content of the provisions of a subordinate statute.
C. Nevertheless, the court below determined that the instant disposition was unlawful, on the ground that the instant provision was merely a directory provision. Such determination by the court below contains an error that affected the judgment, by misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the interpretation and application of the instant provision.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Heung-koo, the opinions of the Justices who participated in the adjudication are unanimous, and there is a concurring opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang with respect to the majority opinion.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Heung-koo
A. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion
The issue in this case is a matter of "legal interpretation" concerning the meaning of the provision in the main text of the instant provision, "a person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits shall apply within 12 months after the end date of childcare leave," and the legal effect of an application for childcare leave benefits made after the lapse of the said period.
The dissenting opinion is as follows.
[Reasoning]
The provision at issue in this case (hereinafter "the instant provision"), under the current system in which the "grant of childcare leave" and "payment of childcare leave benefits" are bifurcated, serves as a procedural provision reminding the beneficiary that the process will not proceed unless he or she files an application for childcare leave benefits with the head of the employment security agency, and urging the beneficiary to file the application within the 12-month period so that the purpose of the system—support for livelihood during the period of childcare leave—may be achieved; even if that period elapses, the right to receive childcare leave benefits does not extinguish.
Accordingly, the instant provision is a directory (hortatory) provision. The right to claim childcare leave benefits is extinguished by prescription not upon expiration of the period set forth in the instant provision, but upon expiration of the period set forth in Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법), which concerns extinctive prescription.
Below, I set forth my views on the legislative history of the relevant statutes including the instant provision, on a comparison with other statutes concerning the nature of social security benefit rights and the period for exercising such rights, and on a harmonious interpretation with the provisions on childcare leave benefits under the Employment Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes. I then specifically rebut the grounds relied upon by the majority opinion.
나. Basic Principles of Interpretation for Provisions Setting an Application Period Vis-à-Vis Administrative Agencies
1) Principles of Interpretation
가) The instant provision sets the period for applying for childcare leave benefits, but does not expressly state the legal nature of that period, nor does it provide for the effect of the period's expiration.
나) There are cases in the Employment Insurance Act and various other administrative statutes that provide for a period for exercising rights. Where the relevant statute provides for the legal meaning of the period or the effect of its expiration, the matter should be interpreted and applied accordingly; however, in many cases administrative statutes and regulations do not provide for this. Where a statute does not expressly state the nature of the period or the effect of its expiration, as here, the matter is left to judicial interpretation.
다) A provision setting a period is ordinarily established with the intent of expecting and requiring the party to exercise the right within that period; however, in order to impose a disadvantageous effect on the ground that the party failed to meet that expectation or requirement, it must be the case that the party could clearly foresee in advance, from the content of the provision, the period for exercising the right, that there is no room for confusion regarding the content of the provision, and that the setting of such period is premised on being reasonable for the exercise of the right. The greater the degree of disadvantage, such as extinction of the right, the more strictly this premise must be examined.
In the case of a provision, as here, that sets a period for a private person to exercise a public-law right against an administrative agency, if such a provision is interpreted as a preclusive period even though there is no express or implied stipulation to that effect, the result is that the party's substantive right, which he or she held, is denied by being extinguished on the ground of the lapse of the period. Therefore, in such a case, the provision concerning the period should be interpreted as having been set forth in the statute for the purpose of urging the party to take a specific action within the period set by that provision.
라) This principle of interpretation is also justified in light of the precedent holding that "even where a statute does not provide for the effect of an act in violation of a prohibitory provision under administrative law, whether to deny its validity must be determined prudently, and in making that determination, both the party or interest protected by the prohibitory provision and, conversely, the party or interest whose activity is restricted by that provision must all be considered" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Da75119, decided December 23, 2010).
Looking more broadly, reference may be made to the purport of the legal principle that it cannot be readily concluded that the public interest necessity to be achieved through revocation of a beneficial administrative act outweighs the disadvantage to be suffered by the beneficiary (Supreme Court Decision 2014Du39012, decided June 29, 2017).
마) Accordingly, taken together, where a period is set for a private person to exercise a right against an administrative agency but the statute does not provide for its legal nature or the effect of its expiration, one should not hastily conclude that it is to be interpreted as a preclusive period that extinguishes the effect of the exercise of the right after the period has lapsed. In interpreting such a provision, comprehensive consideration must be given to the legislative history of the relevant statutes, the legislative intent behind setting the period and the statutory scheme, the administrative purpose protected by limiting the period for claims, conversely the interest of the private person whose right is restricted by the provision, and the manner in which other statutes concerning similar rights are drafted.
Furthermore, where requiring the party to foresee in advance and comply with the provision on the period for exercising a right, among the various procedural provisions set forth in the relevant statute, would be excessively harsh, or where, due to the enactment or amendment of relevant statutes, multiple overlapping systems have been established and diversely operated such that, unlike at the time the period provision was first enacted, the party now has various options for systems to achieve the same effect, yet compliance with the period for exercising a right is required only with respect to a specific act—resulting in an outcome that undermines the diversity and flexibility of the system—the court, to the extent that legal stability is not undermined, should adopt an interpretation that achieves concrete justice.
2) Nature as a Social Security Benefit Right and as a Property Right
가) Childcare leave benefits are paid through employment insurance, a form of social insurance, and constitute a social insurance benefit right for the purpose of dispersing, at the level of social solidarity, the burden of childcare costs arising from childcare leave; in this respect, they basically constitute a social security benefit right, which is a right under social security law (see Article 3, Subparagraphs 1 and 2 of the Framework Act on Social Security (사회보장기본법)).
Under the Framework Act on Social Security, a person seeking to receive a social security benefit must apply to the State or a local government as prescribed by the relevant statutes, and a social security benefit right may not, in principle, be restricted or suspended (Article 11 and Article 13(1) of the Framework Act on Social Security).
나) In addition, the right to receive childcare leave benefits also has the character of a property right.
Childcare leave benefits are paid from the account for unemployment benefits within the Employment Insurance Fund, and the unemployment benefits account is funded on the basis of insurance premiums paid in equal shares by the employer and the employee (Article 6 of the Employment Insurance Act; Article 13 of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (고용보험 및 산업재해보상보험의 보험료징수 등에 관한 법률)). Moreover, in order to receive childcare leave benefits, a certain degree of self-contribution by the employee is required (as a requirement for applying for payment of childcare leave benefits, it is required that "the insured unit period must total 180 days or more prior to the date on which childcare leave began"). By contrast, the head of the employment security agency, which is the entity that pays childcare leave benefits, makes no particular contribution to raising the funds for childcare leave benefits, and merely manages the funds raised on the basis of insurance premiums paid in equal shares by employers and employees.
It must be borne in mind that, in altering or restrictively interpreting the statutory provisions concerning the right to receive childcare leave benefits, which also has the character of a property right, there is a risk of violating not only Article 32 and Article 36(2) of the Constitution (헌법), but also the constitutional provisions guaranteeing property rights.
다. Legislative History of the Childcare Leave and Childcare Leave Benefit Systems
1) The childcare leave benefit system was introduced on the premise of the childcare leave system, based on the legislative purpose of supporting the constitutional requirement of maternal protection (Article 36(2) of the Constitution) and supporting the reconciliation of work and family life so as to contribute to improving quality of life. Thereafter, through repeated amendments, the scope of beneficiaries was expanded, the amount of benefits was raised, and related systems, such as the system for splitting the use of leave and the system of benefits for reduced working hours during the childcare period, were diversified.
가) The childcare leave system was introduced together with the enactment of the former Act on Equal Employment (남녀고용평등법) (enacted as Act No. 3989 on December 4, 1987, and effective from April 1, 1988); at the time of its introduction, only an unpaid childcare leave system was legally guaranteed.
나) As a result of childcare leave being operated without pay in private workplaces, employees bore an economic burden during the period of childcare leave, which intensified the phenomenon of avoiding childbirth and led the country into an ultra-low birthrate. In response, a consensus formed that, rather than producing childbirth encouragement policies of uncertain policy effect, a policy alleviating the burden of childcare costs was necessary. Accordingly, the childcare leave benefit system, which was essential to the success of the childcare leave system and to raising the birthrate, was legislated. With the amendment of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법) by Act No. 6509 on August 14, 2001, a provision was newly established providing the basis for paying childcare leave benefits funded by the Employment Insurance Fund.
다) At the time the childcare leave benefit system was introduced, the amount of childcare leave benefits was a fixed sum of KRW 200,000 per month; this was changed to a proportional system paying 40% of ordinary wages (with an upper limit of KRW 1,000,000) by the amendment of Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act No. 22603 on December 31, 2010. Thereafter, by the amendment of Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act No. 28256 on August 29, 2017, the childcare leave benefit amount for the first three months was increased to 80% of ordinary wages (with an upper limit of KRW 1,500,000), and the benefit amount for the remaining period was increased to 40% of ordinary wages (with an upper limit of KRW 1,000,000); and, through a further subsequent amendment, the upper limit of the benefit amount for the remaining period has now been increased to KRW 1,200,000.
라) In addition, the scope of persons entitled to apply for childcare leave benefits was expanded. At the time of the initial enactment, the persons entitled to apply for childcare leave benefits under the Act on Equal Employment were "female employees with an infant under one year of age"; this was subsequently expanded, by the amendment by Act No. 7822 on December 30, 2005, to "employees with an infant or young child under three years of age," by the amendment by Act No. 9998 on February 4, 2010, to "employees with a child (including an adopted child) aged six or under who has not yet entered elementary school," and by the amendment by Act No. 12244 on January 14, 2014, to "employees with a child (including an adopted child) aged eight or under, or in the second grade of elementary school or below."
마) As the Act on Equal Employment was renamed, by Act No. 8781 on December 21, 2007, as the "Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation" (남녀고용평등과 일ㆍ가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률) (hereinafter, regardless of the change in the name of the Act, referred to as the "Act on Equal Employment"), a system for splitting the use of childcare leave (Article 19-4) was newly established. Under Article 19-4 of the Act on Equal Employment, as newly established by the above amendment, an employee became able to split the use of childcare leave into units of six months within the one-year period of childcare leave; subsequently to the case at hand, as of the present, by the amendment by Act No. 17602 on December 8, 2020, splitting into up to two occasions of at least three months each is now permitted (under which the one-year period of childcare leave may be split into up to three occasions).
바) As the Act on Equal Employment was amended by Act No. 8781 on December 21, 2007, a system for reduced working hours during the childcare period (Article 19-2) was newly established. At the time of its introduction, this was a system whereby an employee could work reduced hours "instead of" taking childcare leave; subsequently to the case at hand, as of the present, by the amendment by Act No. 16558 on August 27, 2019, the requirement of "instead of" was deleted, and in addition, any unused portion of the childcare leave period may now be added to and used together with the period of reduced working hours during the childcare period (proviso to Article 19-2(4) of the Act on Equal Employment). Meanwhile, Article 73-2 of the Employment Insurance Act recognizes, for an employee who uses the above system, the right to claim benefits for reduced working hours during the childcare period.
2) Taken together, it can be seen that the childcare leave system has developed in the direction of expanding the scope of its application and strengthening flexibility.
That is, in the early period following the introduction of the childcare leave system, an employee could take childcare leave only once, while the child was under one year of age. Since the maximum period of childcare leave was one year, once that maximum period was used in a single instance, the childcare leave period ended.
However, as a result of the statutory amendments discussed above, an employee may now take the one-year period of childcare leave in up to three installments of four months each, over a period of up to eight years until the child reaches age eight or the second grade of elementary school, and may furthermore use childcare leave interchangeably with reduced working hours during the childcare period. For an employee with multiple children, the available options and periods for choosing among the systems relating to childcare leave become even more diverse.
3) In addition, the instant provision, concerning the period for applying for childcare leave benefits, has changed in terms of its form of regulation. Article 70(1) of the pre-2011 amendment Act provided that an application must be filed "from one month after the date childcare leave began to within 12 months after the date it ended," thereby stipulating compliance with the application period as a requirement for applying for childcare leave benefits (Subparagraph 3). By contrast, the 2011 statutory amendment deleted Subparagraph 3 from Paragraph (1), which concerns the requirements for benefits, and instead placed the application period in a separate provision, namely the instant provision. Through this amendment, the period for applying for childcare leave benefits ceased to be a statutory requirement for the application and is no longer modified by the phrase in Article 70(1), "childcare leave benefits shall be paid where all of the following requirements are met"; accordingly, its legal nature became a matter for judicial interpretation.
4) Given that, through repeated amendments to the childcare leave system, the persons eligible for childcare leave benefits and the amount of benefits have expanded, and the manner in which the childcare leave system is operated has also diversified, thereby broadening the beneficiary's range of choice, the system concerning the childcare leave benefit period for application by the beneficiary—essential to the effectiveness of the childcare leave benefit system, which is itself indispensable to the effectiveness of the childcare leave system—should likewise function as a system responsive to the beneficiary's range of choice.
It appears that, at the time the childcare leave system and the childcare leave benefit system were first established, the legislature could have sufficiently anticipated that, amid socio-economic changes in the working and childcare environment and changing social perceptions regarding the reconciliation of work and family life, the scope of each system would need to expand and be operated more flexibly in the future.
Nevertheless, to interpret operation of the application period set forth in the instant provision as a preclusive period, on the theory that this was the legislature's intent, would mean that the legislature itself intended a result that would impede flexible responses to future statutory amendments—which is unreasonable. The interpretation of the period as a preclusive period is not what the legislature intended, and produces a result inconsistent with the original purpose for which the childcare leave system was introduced, and is therefore incorrect.
5) The instant provision provides that an application must be filed "within 12 months after the date childcare leave ended," thereby calculating the application period based on the "date childcare leave ended." At the time the instant provision was newly established, childcare leave could be used only once, within a period of up to one year, so that the "date childcare leave ended" could be clearly identified and the application period for childcare leave benefits calculated on that basis. However, as a result of repeated statutory amendments allowing childcare leave to be split into installments and, further, to be used interchangeably with reduced working hours during the childcare period, where an employee has split the one-year period of childcare leave and used it on several occasions, it has become unclear whether the "date childcare leave ended" in the instant provision should be interpreted as the date on which one particular installment of the employee's split use of childcare leave ended, or as the date on which the entirety of the one-year childcare leave was finally completed and thus ended as a whole.
In this situation, operating the application period set forth in the instant provision as a preclusive period, as the majority opinion does, creates difficulty in foreseeing and interpreting legal relationships.
The majority opinion appears to interpret the "date childcare leave ended" as the date on which the employee completed the full one year of childcare leave, even where the employee used childcare leave in installments. Under the majority opinion's approach, an employee who completed the one year of childcare leave early would be given a short application period, while an employee who split the leave and used it over a long period would be given a long application period, resulting in the unreasonable outcome of differential treatment among employees as to the period for exercising their rights; moreover, since an application for childcare leave benefits could in fact be filed as late as up to eight years later, the very purpose that the majority opinion's interpretation seeks to achieve—early finality of legal relationships—would be undermined.
Accordingly, at this point in time, interpreting the application period set forth in the instant provision as a preclusive period would only bring about instability in legal relationships.
라. Relationship with the Extinctive Prescription Provision
The former Employment Insurance Act applicable to this case provides, in Article 107(1), that "the right to receive childcare leave benefits shall be extinguished by prescription if not exercised for three years." The relationship between the instant provision and the above extinctive prescription provision must be interpreted harmoniously, without contradiction.
To state the conclusion first: since Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, concerning extinctive prescription, expressly provides that the right to receive childcare leave benefits is extinguished by a three-year period of prescription, the period during which the right to apply for benefits may be exercised is the three-year extinctive prescription period. However, if the instant provision is interpreted as a preclusive period, the 12-month preclusive period and the three-year extinctive prescription period would apply cumulatively, resulting in the express three-year extinctive prescription provision becoming a dead letter. Accordingly, the instant provision must be interpreted so as not to conflict with Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act concerning the extinctive prescription period. The reasons therefor are explained in detail below.
1) A person seeking to receive childcare leave benefits must apply to the head of the competent employment security agency, and upon receiving the application for childcare leave benefits, the head of the competent employment security agency must confirm the applicant's childbirth ex officio through the administrative computer network (latter part of Article 116(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법 시행규칙)), and must confirm, through materials such as the childcare leave confirmation document attached by the applicant together with the application, matters such as whether the applicant applied for childcare leave and the amount of ordinary wages for the purpose of calculating childcare leave benefits (each item of Subparagraph 1 of the main text of the same paragraph).
Moreover, upon receiving an application for childcare leave benefits, if the requirements under Article 70(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act are met and there is no ground for restricting payment, the head of the competent employment security agency notifies the applicant of the payment by way of a payment decision notice and pays the childcare leave benefits by depositing them into the account, designated by the insured person, at a financial institution (Article 117(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act). In addition, the childcare leave benefit payment decision document, which is Form No. 101 attached to the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act, includes preprinted language to the effect that "the benefits will be immediately deposited into the account number entered by the applicant in the application."
That is, with respect to childcare leave benefits, under the Employment Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes, the procedure by which an employee is recognized as a beneficiary of childcare leave benefits and the procedure by which the employee receives payment of childcare leave benefits are unified into a single procedure. It suffices for the employee to substantiate his or her status as a beneficiary through the documents attached to the application for childcare leave benefits filed under the instant provision. Likewise, the head of the employment security agency does not distinguish between the procedure for recognizing a beneficiary of childcare leave benefits and the procedure for payment of benefits; rather, so long as there is no disqualifying ground, based on a comprehensive consideration of the employee's application, the attached materials, and the information confirmed through the computer network, the agency pays the amount calculated by applying the prescribed rate to the ordinary wage stated in the documents attached to the employee's application, such that the recognition and payment procedures are carried out together at once.
As a result, the application period under the instant provision—"12 months after the date childcare leave ended"—merely overlaps with a portion of the extinctive prescription period under Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act—"three years, being the period for exercising the right to receive childcare leave benefits."
2) Where there appears to be a contradiction or conflict between related statutes, it is the inherent duty of the Supreme Court, which is vested with the ultimate authority to interpret statutes, to present a statutory interpretation that resolves such contradiction or conflict (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Du48655, decided June 21, 2018). This principle likewise applies where there is a contradiction or conflict between provisions within a single statute, and the Supreme Court should therefore adopt an interpretation resolving such conflict.
As discussed above, since a contradiction or conflict arises between the instant provision and Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, the two must be interpreted harmoniously. Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act expressly states that the three-year period is an extinctive prescription period, and thus the legal nature of that period is that of an extinctive prescription period. Meanwhile, the instant provision does not provide for the legal nature of its period; if it were interpreted as a preclusive period, an employee would be barred from applying for benefits after the lapse of one year even though the extinctive prescription period has not yet run, such that Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, concerning the extinctive prescription period, would become a dead letter, and the expectation interest of an employee who relied on that provision would be deprived.
In response to the requirement that the application period under the instant provision be interpreted harmoniously with the extinctive prescription provision under Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, taking into account the purpose of the childcare leave system, the form and content of the provisions, and the related statutes and regulations, it is appropriate to interpret the instant provision as a directory (hortatory) provision urging the party to file the application promptly within the stated period.
Once an employee applies for childcare leave benefits, the extinctive prescription period for the right to receive childcare leave benefits is interrupted pursuant to Article 113 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), as applied mutatis mutandis under Article 107(2) of the former Employment Insurance Act; the significance of urging the application, therefore, lies in protecting the employee from extinctive prescription. Furthermore, since, under the structure of the childcare leave benefit system, the head of the competent employment security agency may only make payment upon application by the beneficiary, this may be interpreted as having the significance of encouraging the prompt commencement of the procedure through early application.
3) Although, subsequently to the case at hand, the Employment Insurance Act was amended by Act No. 16269 on January 15, 2019, deleting the phrase "the right to receive childcare leave benefits" from the subjects of extinctive prescription under Article 107(1), the amended Act cannot, of course, be applied to this case, and moreover, the fact that the amendment eliminates the problem of contradiction or conflict does not mean that the matter should be treated lightly. From the time the childcare leave benefit system was first established in 2001 until the 2019 amendment, for approximately 18 years, the two provisions coexisted continuously, causing confusion, and the amendment of Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act does not eliminate the need to protect employees who, during that time, relied on the extinctive prescription provision.
Furthermore, the latter part of Article 116(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act provides that "an application for payment of benefits for childcare leave taken during a given month shall be filed by the last day of the following month," and as a result of the head of the competent employment security agency operating payment practices based on the above Enforcement Rule, a problem arose whereby the application period for childcare leave benefits was drastically reduced to a mere one month; if the instant provision is interpreted as a directory (hortatory) provision, then the latter part of Article 116(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act may likewise be interpreted as a directory provision, allowing for a unified interpretation and operation of the instant provision together with Article 116(2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Employment Insurance Act, which is based on Article 70(4) of the former Employment Insurance Act.
마. Other Considerations
1) Comparison with the Provision on the Period for Applying for Childcare Leave
가) Pursuant to the delegation under Article 19(6) of the Act on Equal Employment, Article 11 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation (남녀고용평등과 일ㆍ가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률 시행령) (hereinafter the "Enforcement Decree of the Act on Equal Employment") sets forth provisions concerning the procedure for applying for childcare leave. Article 11(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Equal Employment requires an employee wishing to apply for childcare leave to submit to the employer an application stating matters such as the name of the infant or young child who is the subject of the childcare leave, by no later than 30 days before the scheduled commencement date of the leave, while Paragraph (2) provides that, in exceptional cases, an application for childcare leave may be filed by no later than 7 days before the scheduled commencement date of the leave. It can be seen that these provisions take the same form as the instant provision concerning the period for applying for childcare leave benefits, which, in its main text, sets a one-year application period, while its proviso states, "a person who was unable to apply for childcare leave benefits during that period due to a cause prescribed by Presidential Decree shall apply within 30 days after the cause ceases to exist," thereby expressly allowing, in the main text, an application for childcare leave benefits to be filed in certain cases even after the one-year period has elapsed.
[Reasoning] (continued)
나) However, Article 11(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation (남녀고용평등법, hereinafter "Equal Employment Act") provides that "where an employee applies for childcare leave after the expiration of the period set forth in paragraph (1), the employer shall permit the childcare leave by designating the commencement date thereof within 30 days from the date of application, and where an employee applies for childcare leave after the expiration of the period set forth in paragraph (2), the employer shall permit the childcare leave by designating the commencement date thereof within 7 days from the date of application." In light of this provision, which allows an application filed after the periods set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) to be treated as lawful and to result in the actual implementation of childcare leave, Article 11(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Equal Employment Act may be regarded as directory provisions, and the provision at issue in this case, which takes the same form, may be interpreted in the same vein.
That is, just as an employee who applies for childcare leave after the application period has elapsed may still lawfully take childcare leave, it would be consistent with the balance between the two to interpret that an application for childcare leave benefits filed after the application period set forth in the provision at issue should likewise not be refused.
It should also be considered, in determining the legal nature of the provision at issue, that an employee, at the stage of applying for childcare leave, would have recognized that an application filed after the application period is still permitted, and that, having recognized this, it would be difficult for the employee to expect that, at the subsequent stage of applying for benefits after taking childcare leave, benefits would be denied due to the expiration of the application period under a provision of the same structure.
2) Comparison with the Childcare Leave Allowance System for Public Officials
가) If the application period for childcare leave benefits is interpreted as an exclusion period (제척기간), a stark disparity would arise as compared to public officials, which raises concerns of an essential discrimination in the guarantee of rights.
나) In the private sector, the Equal Employment Act was enacted on December 4, 1987, introducing the childcare leave system. The State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) introduced the childcare leave system through the amendment by Act No. 4829 on December 22, 1994; the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법) did so through the amendment by Act No. 4797 on the same date; and the Military Personnel Management Act (군인사법) did so through the amendment by Act No. 5703 on January 29, 1999.
However, although both the private and public sectors transitioned to a paid childcare leave system at a similar time (2001), the childcare leave allowance for public officials, unlike childcare leave benefits in the private sector, was institutionalized so as to be paid without a separate application procedure.
While requiring a separate application for private-sector employees is unavoidable because the entity permitting childcare leave (the employer) and the entity managing the source of funds for childcare leave benefits (the State, the Ministry of Employment and Labor) are different, it should nonetheless be ensured that there is no essential discrimination, in terms of the existence or the requirements for exercising the right, between a private-sector employee's right to claim childcare leave benefits and a public official's right to receive the childcare leave allowance, so that an employee taking childcare leave is not placed in a position markedly inferior to that of a public official.
다) What we should ultimately aim for is to guarantee that employees in the private sector, too, can enjoy the childcare leave system as a universal right at a level equivalent to that of public officials.
3) The Responsibility of the Institution Administering Employment Insurance
Childcare leave benefits are financed mainly by insurance premiums paid by employers and employees, and are managed and operated by the State.
Whether to take childcare leave is left to the employee's choice, but once an employee has taken childcare leave, paying childcare leave benefits to that employee should be regarded as the responsibility of the institution administering employment insurance (the head of the employment security office). This is all the more so when compared to the case of public officials, who receive the allowance for childcare leave without even needing to apply.
An employee taking childcare leave must leave the workplace and remain at home, spending the entire day caring for a pre-school-age child. Even after the childcare leave period ends, the employee's difficulty in balancing work and childcare persists. Where an employee misses the application period due to such circumstances, operating the system so that the right to claim childcare leave benefits is extinguished due to an incidental mistake amounts to nothing other than the head of the employment security office failing to fulfill its responsibility while shifting the resulting loss onto the employee.
Rather, going forward, there is a need to overhaul the provisions on application periods not only for childcare leave benefits but also for related benefits with similar legislative purposes, such as maternity leave benefits and reduced working hours during the childcare period benefits, so as to make clear that the head of the employment security office shall pay the relevant benefits to employees who have taken childcare leave, etc. From this perspective, it is not implausible to interpret that, at the time of the 2019 amendment to the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법), the right to claim childcare leave benefits was excluded from the subjects of extinctive prescription (소멸시효).
4) Weighing of Legal Interests
The majority opinion is a view that gives priority to the early finalization of legal relations and the fiscal stability of the employment insurance fund.
However, it is difficult to conclude that the interest in early finalization of legal relations, which the majority opinion seeks to prioritize, outweighs the disadvantage suffered by an employee who actually took childcare leave but is denied childcare leave benefits. Moreover, depending on the interpretation of "the date childcare leave ended" under the provision at issue and the extension of the period under the proviso of the provision at issue, the legal relations concerning the application for childcare leave benefits may not be finalized early but may instead extend over a long period, meaning that the majority opinion's approach cannot achieve the goal of early finalization of legal relations either. Above all, the majority opinion raises the fundamental question of how much effect on reducing fiscal expenditure could be achieved merely by denying the childcare leave benefit applications of some employees who missed the period due to incidental mistakes or circumstances, and, if such fiscal frugality was the intent, why the childcare leave benefit system was introduced in the first place.
The childcare leave system is a critically necessary system for the reproduction and maintenance of society in an era of low birth rates and a super-aged society, and it ought to be interpreted and operated actively so that all eligible recipients can enjoy its benefits. At a time when various bold proposals are being explored and put forward to encourage childbirth, if the childcare leave benefit system, which has been introduced at least to some extent, is to be interpreted as restrictively as possible as the majority opinion does, it will be difficult to avoid the criticism of being anachronistic.
바. Specific Criticism of the Majority Opinion's Reasoning
1) The Problem of Categorizing Rights into Abstract Rights and Concrete Rights
가) The majority opinion, after premising that a social security benefit right generally transforms from an abstract right to claim benefits into a concrete benefit right through the administrative agency's decision to pay, classifies the legislative forms concerning the period for exercising each of the two types of rights into four categories, and takes the view that the provision at issue falls under the category that separately prescribes the period for exercising the abstract right and the period for exercising the concrete right.
The majority opinion appears to intend, in order to avoid the problem of overlapping with the three-year extinctive prescription period expressly set forth in Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act, to artificially divide the right to claim childcare leave benefits into an abstract right and a concrete right and to apply the above provisions differently to each.
나) There is no basis for holding that social security benefit rights are generally divided into abstract rights and concrete rights, and moreover, the interpretive method of dividing rights into abstract and concrete rights and applying an exclusion period to the former and an extinctive prescription period to the latter is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, the right to claim childcare leave benefits is not divided into such stages as described above.
다) The majority opinion cites the Framework Act on National Taxes (국세기본법), the Framework Act on Local Taxes (지방세기본법), and the Act on the Regulation of Violations of Public Order (질서위반행위규제법) as examples of statutes that prescribe an exclusion period for the exercise of an abstract right and an extinctive prescription period for the exercise of a concrete right.
However, these statutes concern the imposition and collection of taxes or administrative fines by administrative agencies, and are provisions that strictly regulate the exercise of authority by administrative agencies in accordance with the fundamental principle of statutory taxation, requiring uniform, standardized, and formalistic application, and reflecting the demand for the prompt finalization of rights and obligations. These provisions are far removed from the statutes that may be invoked in the present case, which concerns a citizen's exercise of a social security benefit right against an administrative agency.
Moreover, the Framework Act on National Taxes, from its enactment on December 21, 1974, provided only for the extinctive prescription of the right to collect taxes, and it was only through the amendment of August 7, 1984, which newly inserted Article 26-2, that it came to have its current structure of separately providing for an exclusion period and an extinctive prescription period.
Furthermore, a provision on the assessment period is not always interpreted as an exclusion period. With respect to Article 14(1) of the former Restitution of Development Gains Act (개발이익환수에 관한 법률) (before the amendment by Act No. 5285 of January 13, 1997), which provided that "the Minister of Construction shall determine and impose the development charge within three months from the assessment end point," the Supreme Court, in its decision of September 21, 1999, 97Nu1211, held, considering the purpose of the development charge system, the form and content of the provision, and related statutes comprehensively, that the above period provision was a directory provision concerning the administrative agency's official duty. The Supreme Court decision of December 24, 2009, 2009Du5305, concerning Article 11(1) of the former Act on Impact Fees for Infrastructure (기반시설부담금에 관한 법률) (before the amendment by Act No. 8852 of February 29, 2008), is to the same effect.
That is, with respect to other statutory provisions very similar to the provisions the majority opinion characterizes as exclusion periods for abstract rights, the Supreme Court has interpreted them differently in each case. As stated in the above Supreme Court decisions, this is because the legislative purpose of the charge system, the form and content of the provision, and the related provisions all differ depending on the particular statute, and thus the mere fact that separate provisions exist for "assessment" and "collection" cannot, by itself, justify interpreting the period provision concerning the power of assessment as an exclusion period.
라) The same holds true for social security benefit rights, and this part of the majority opinion's view is contrary to the provisions of statutes relating to social security benefit rights and to Supreme Court precedent.
Since individual statutes concerning social security benefit rights provide for the substantive requirements of the benefit right and the payment procedure, the recognition of the benefit right and the specific payment procedure must both be governed by what is prescribed in the statute serving as the basis for payment, and this is a matter of statutory interpretation. Therefore, an application period prescribed by statute cannot unconditionally be interpreted as an exclusion period for the exercise of an abstract right.
The Special Act on Support for Landmine Victims (지뢰피해자 지원에 관한 특별법), which the majority opinion cites as an example, as well as the Act on Compensation for Persons who Performed Special Duties (특수임무수행자 보상에 관한 법률), the Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to Democratization Movements (민주화운동 관련자 명예회복 및 보상 등에 관한 법률), and the Act on Compensation for Persons Related to the May 18 Democratization Movement (5·18민주화운동 관련자 보상 등에 관한 법률), are cases in which the statute adopted a bifurcated structure. These statutes generally establish a deliberation committee to compensate for specific historical events that occurred in the past, and distinguish between the procedure for recognizing the existence of the right to receive compensation and the procedure for claiming and receiving the recognized compensation.
Taking the Act on Compensation for Persons who Performed Special Duties as an example, this Act, enacted to compensate persons who belonged to military intelligence units and performed prescribed special duties from August 15, 1948 to December 31, 2002, prescribes the procedure for recognizing compensation in Articles 10 through 14. Article 10(2) of this Act provides for the application period for compensation, etc.; at the time of enactment it provided "within one year from the enforcement date of the Act," but this period has been continuously extended through five amendments. Article 20 of this Act provides that "the right to receive payment of compensation, etc. shall be extinguished by prescription if not exercised within three years from the date the original copy of the decision on payment is served on the applicant," thereby making clear that the exercise of the right to claim compensation presupposes a decision by the Deliberation Committee on Compensation for Special Duty Performers recognizing the person as a special duty performer, and that the extinctive prescription likewise runs from that point.
The reason the above-mentioned statutes provide for different periods by distinguishing between the procedure for recognizing rights such as compensation and the procedure for applying for compensation, etc., is that, in light of each statute's legislative purpose, there is a policy need to set an application period for the recognition of rights, while at the same time there is a need to separately operate the specific payment procedure for persons who have had their right to compensation, etc. recognized within the period prescribed by the statute.
마) The majority opinion's interpretation that the right to claim childcare leave benefits under the provision at issue is divided into an abstract right and a concrete right is not only without basis, as discussed above in general terms, but is also improper because it clearly conflicts with the Employment Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes.
With respect to the application for childcare leave benefits, the Employment Insurance Act provides only for the provision at issue. Yet the majority opinion, through the provision at issue—the sole provision concerning application—artificially divides the right to claim childcare leave benefits into an abstract right and a concrete right, and further assigns different effects to each, namely an exclusion period and an extinctive prescription period, respectively. This is contrary to the intent of the legislature, which established only a single provision for the realization of the right to claim childcare leave benefits, and is difficult to adopt as a matter of interpretation.
As discussed above, with respect to childcare leave benefits, under the Employment Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes, the procedure by which an employee is recognized as a person eligible to receive childcare leave benefits and the procedure by which the recognized childcare leave benefits are applied for are not distinguished but are unified into one. That is, when an employee applies for childcare leave benefits, the head of the employment security office confirms, through the benefit application form and other materials submitted by the employee, whether the employee's application satisfies the substantive requirements, and processes everything at once, up to and including paying the employee-applicant the amount of childcare leave benefits calculated based on the prescribed rate applied to the ordinary wage stated in the application form. In this way, the Employment Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes provide for the procedure for recognizing a person eligible for childcare leave benefits and the procedure for paying the benefits as a single procedure, and administrative practice is conducted accordingly.
바) The majority opinion states that the specific exercise of the right by an eligible recipient is a public-law party litigation (당사자소송). This appears to be intended, in order to support the dualistic theory of rights, to distinguish even the form of litigation into appeal litigation (항고소송) and party litigation. However, this part of the view, too, clearly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court previously held, in cases concerning claims for compensation under the former Act on Compensation for Persons Related to the Gwangju Democratization Movement (광주민주화운동 관련자 보상 등에 관한 법률) (Supreme Court Decision 92Nu3335, delivered December 24, 1992) and claims for disaster relief allowances under the Coal Industry Act (석탄산업법) (Supreme Court Decision 98Du12598, delivered January 26, 1999), that the administrative agency's expression of refusal in response to a party's application for payment merely stated a factual or legal opinion and could not be regarded as a disposition, and thus held that the claimant should seek performance through party litigation.
However, as the disadvantages of party litigation to citizens in litigation practice, among other things, came to be emphasized in favor of the principle of appeal litigation, the Supreme Court, in its en banc decision of April 17, 2008, 2005Du16185, held that the deliberation and decision of the Deliberation Committee for the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to Democratization Movements under the former Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to Democratization Movements (before the amendment by Act No. 13289 of May 18, 2015) constitutes an administrative disposition, and that litigation concerning the payment of compensation, etc. is litigation seeking to challenge the Committee's decision refusing payment of compensation, and is therefore a revocation suit (an appeal litigation).
As the Supreme Court precedent thus recognizes different forms of litigation concerning the payment of compensation depending on the particular statute, the majority opinion's view that litigation disputing a concrete benefit right is uniformly a public-law party litigation directly conflicts with precedent.
사) The same is true of litigation concerning childcare leave benefits. Current litigation relating to claims for childcare leave benefits is divided into cases, such as the present one, where an application for childcare leave benefits is filed for the first time more than one year after taking childcare leave, and cases where an employee received childcare leave benefits based on the ordinary wage at the time within one year after childcare leave ended, and subsequently, following a new Supreme Court ruling on the scope of ordinary wages, additionally applies for childcare leave benefits based on a recalculated ordinary wage. All of the parties involved applied for benefits to the competent head of the employment security office based on the provision at issue, received a disposition of refusal, and filed appeal litigation against it, with the litigation proceeding through the lower courts without dispute over the form of litigation, and is currently pending before this Court on final appeal. If the majority opinion maintains this part of its view, the latter type of case would have to be treated as party litigation.
Meanwhile, the head of the employment security office may refuse an employee's application for childcare leave benefits on the ground that the substantive requirements are not satisfied. In such a case, the employee disputes the refusal disposition of the competent head of the employment security office by way of appeal litigation, on the premise that the employee has been granted a concrete right to receive childcare leave benefits. If so, it should naturally follow that even in an appeal litigation seeking revocation of a refusal disposition arising from a dispute over the requirements for the concrete right to claim childcare leave benefits, the 90-day filing period under Article 20(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act (행정소송법) must be observed. Nonetheless, requiring, as the majority opinion does, that disputes concerning the "concrete right" be resolved through party litigation, to which the three-year extinctive prescription period applies, circumvents the filing period for appeal litigation and creates a contradiction in the system of administrative litigation.
아) The majority opinion states that Article 9(4) of the Act on Relief for Asbestos-related Injury (석면피해구제법), which provides that "an application for payment of medical care benefits may not be filed after three years have passed," is a provision concerning an abstract right and constitutes an exclusion period (with the concrete right being subject to the extinctive prescription period under the National Finance Act (국가재정법)). The majority opinion also states that Article 112(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), which provides that "the right to receive insurance benefits shall be extinguished by prescription if not exercised for three years," applies to both the period for exercising the abstract right and the period for exercising the concrete right, and that the period for exercising each right runs from the time each right arises.
This part of the majority opinion's view, too, does not accord with the text of the respective statutes and conflicts with Supreme Court precedent on the interpretation of similar statutory provisions.
First, Article 9(4) of the Act on Relief for Asbestos-related Injury provides for "an application for payment of medical care benefits," making it clear from the text that it refers to an application for payment of a concrete medical care benefit. There is no room whatsoever to view this, as the majority opinion does, as an "abstract right relating to medical care benefits." Moreover, given that the period for filing an application for payment of a concrete medical care benefit is thus three years, it is unclear what kind of benefit application right of a different content could exist, and whether the extinctive prescription period under the National Finance Act would apply thereto (furthermore, Article 50 of the said Act provides that "with respect to the calculation of periods prescribed in this Act, the provisions of the Civil Act (민법) concerning periods shall apply mutatis mutandis, except as otherwise provided in this Act").
Article 36(1) and (2) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides that each type of insurance benefit under the Act shall be paid upon the claim of a person eligible to receive insurance benefits prescribed by the Act, that is, an eligible recipient, and Article 112(1)(1) provides that "the right to receive insurance benefits shall be extinguished by prescription if not exercised for three or five years." Accordingly, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act does not require a separate procedure for recognizing the right to receive insurance benefits under the Act, but merely sets a three-year extinctive prescription period for the eligible recipient's right to receive insurance benefits.
Supreme Court precedent likewise holds that the extinctive prescription of the right to claim disability benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act runs from the time the cause for payment of the benefit arises (Supreme Court Decision 97Nu6544, delivered August 22, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2020Du31774, delivered June 4, 2020), thereby applying the extinctive prescription provision by treating the right uniformly as "the right to claim insurance benefits under the Act," without distinguishing between an abstract right and a concrete right.
자) Meanwhile, the Supreme Court Decision 2018Du46780, delivered December 27, 2019, which the majority opinion cites as a basis for the distinction between abstract rights and concrete rights, held that a concrete bereaved family pension right, unlike a monthly benefit right that arises each month, is independently not subject to the extinctive prescription prescribed in Article 8(1) of the former Military Pension Act (군인연금법) (before the amendment by Act No. 11632 of March 22, 2013), which is a holding limiting the scope within which the bereaved family pension right is extinguished by prescription. This decision, rather, accords with the purport of the dissenting opinion, and cannot be said to signify that social security benefit rights are uniformly divided into the stages of abstract benefit right and concrete benefit right.
2) The Problem Concerning the Point in Time at Which the Exclusion Period Elapses
가) The majority opinion takes the view that once the application periods prescribed in the main clause and proviso of the provision at issue have elapsed, the right to claim childcare leave benefits is forfeited.
나) The provision at issue provides: "A person who wishes to receive childcare leave benefits shall apply therefor from one month after the commencement date of childcare leave to within twelve months after the date childcare leave ended: Provided, That a person who was unable to apply for childcare leave benefits during the said period due to a cause prescribed by Presidential Decree shall apply within thirty days after the cause ceases to exist." Article 94, subparagraphs 1 through 5, of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법 시행령) enumerates such causes.
The date on which the causes prescribed in the proviso of the provision at issue and each subparagraph of Article 94 of the said Enforcement Decree cease to exist is an unspecified point in time. In particular, subparagraphs 2 and 3 include cases where the applicant is unable to apply for benefits not only due to the applicant's own illness or injury but also that of the applicant's spouse, lineal ascendant, or lineal descendant, and such circumstances are extremely indeterminate and uncertain matters that are not externally apparent, such that the competent head of the employment security office cannot know whether such circumstances exist until twelve months have elapsed from the date childcare leave ended.
다) The majority opinion ultimately interprets the provision to mean that, even where twelve months have elapsed since the end of childcare leave, the right to receive childcare leave benefits is not extinguished, and that the right is extinguished only when the objective cause that made it difficult for the employee to apply for childcare leave benefits until that point has ceased to exist and thirty days have elapsed thereafter—that is, on an "indeterminate date that cannot be foreseen in advance and is not externally apparent."
It is the position of Supreme Court precedent that, because an exclusion period brings about the effect of extinguishing a right by the mere passage of the period itself, the relevant claim right is definitively extinguished by the passage of the exclusion period (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Da215947, delivered June 15, 2018). This is also expressed as meaning that the relevant claim right is naturally extinguished by the passage of the period (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da65399, delivered April 12, 2012). Accordingly, exclusion periods are generally prescribed as fixed periods, such as "a certain number of years from" a specific point.
The majority opinion's interpretation results in making the timing of the extinction of the right dependent on indeterminate and subjective factors, thereby rendering legal relations uncertain.
라) The majority opinion itself interprets the above provision as one "established for the purpose of preventing unreasonable results that could arise from the mechanical application of the application period prescribed in the main clause, by extending the application period where there is an objective cause making it difficult to apply for benefits within twelve months after the end of childcare leave." Following this purport, it would be natural to interpret the causes listed in each subparagraph of Article 94 of the Enforcement Decree as "examples" of objective causes making it difficult to apply for benefits within twelve months. In the end, combining the main clause and the proviso of the provision at issue, the purport would be that, while employees are in principle urged to apply for benefits within twelve months after the end of childcare leave, where there are circumstances making it difficult to comply with the period, it suffices to file a claim within thirty days from the date such circumstances cease to exist.
마) Given that subjective and personal circumstances of the employee or a third party are also recognized as exceptional grounds permitting an application after the period has elapsed, and further that there is substantial room to interpret the provisions of each subparagraph of the Enforcement Decree as illustrative provisions, whether benefits may be paid even after the period prescribed in the main clause of the provision at issue has elapsed comes to depend on the discretion of the head of the employment security office. This is because, where the head of the employment security office recognizes that a payment application filed after the period prescribed in the main clause has elapsed falls under the circumstances prescribed in the proviso and pays the benefit accordingly, this cannot be disputed.
Nevertheless, if the provision is interpreted as an exclusion period in accordance with the majority opinion, the effect is a one-sided restriction on the exercise of rights whereby only the employee side is barred from applying for benefits, and there is a risk that whether benefits are paid comes to depend on the discretion of the head of the employment security office, placing the employee in an unstable position.
바) Meanwhile, where the head of an employment security agency issues a disposition of refusal on the ground of the lapse of the period under the main clause of the provision at issue, and the beneficiary files an appeal litigation disputing this, the burden of proving the fact of the lapse of the period lies with the head of the employment security agency. Following this, the head of the employment security agency would bear the responsibility of proving even the absence of objective circumstances that made it difficult for the worker to apply for the benefit within 12 months after the end of childcare leave, and the court would also have to examine this.
3) Remarks on other grounds
가) The purport of excluding the provision on the application period from the requirements pursuant to the 2011 amendment of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법) has already been explained in item 3) of 다. above, and further explanation thereof is omitted.
나) The Supreme Court Decision 2011Da10266, decided October 13, 2011, cited by the Majority Opinion in explaining that the existence of a statute of limitations provision does not preclude the existence of an exclusion period, along with other provisions of the Civil Act (민법) and other statutes, merely concern the principle that statutes of limitations and exclusion periods are provided for according to different legislative purposes and may apply competitively to a specific claim; it should be made clear that this does not constitute a basis for interpreting the provision at issue as an exclusion period. This case concerns a situation where the Act does not expressly designate the period as an exclusion period and separately establishes a statute of limitations period, and yet, if interpreted as an exclusion period, that exclusion period would fall within the statute of limitations period, thereby rendering the statute of limitations period expressly set forth by the Act a dead letter.
사. Conclusion
Therefore, it is proper that the court below, in the above vein, upheld the first instance judgment which granted the Plaintiff's claim. The Defendant's appeal should be dismissed.
6. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang to the Majority Opinion
가. The Effect of Law
1) The issue in this case is the effect of the provision at issue, that is, whether it has binding force. The Majority Opinion holds that the provision at issue is a mandatory provision, while the Dissenting Opinion holds that it is a directory (hortatory) provision. In short, the core of the issue in this case is a matter concerning the general theory of law.
Law has various characteristics, the first of which is coerciveness. Law lacking coercive force is, as Rudolf von Jhering stated, a "sword without an edge," and it is difficult to say that it is law in its complete sense. For the judiciary to declare a statutory provision, to which the legislature has clearly given coercive force, to be a directory provision is, like the repeal of a statute, beyond the scope of judicial authority; and even where the result of interpreting and applying the provision as literally worded lacks reasonableness and is utterly unacceptable in light of the overall legal order, it is our constitutional order that such a matter must be corrected through a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court.
2) Of course, where there is a possibility of multiple interpretations of a statutory provision enacted by the legislature, it is possible for the judiciary to adopt a narrowing or restrictive interpretation. However, where the meaning of a statutory provision is clearly and unambiguously expressed, leaving no room for multiple interpretations, it is not proper to adopt such a narrowing or restrictive interpretation. For a judge to distort or transform the intent of the legislator through a method of statutory interpretation that exceeds the possible meaning of the statutory text results in the adverse effect of creating new rules through statutory interpretation, and this runs contrary to the principle of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution.
The Dissenting Opinion asserts that the provision at issue is a directory provision, citing as its main grounds the nature of the childcare leave system and the childcare leave benefit claim right. There is no need to dispute that, in today's welfare state, the claim right to childcare leave benefits should be guaranteed as fully as possible. Even so, the guarantee of a claim right is fundamentally a matter of the substance of the right, and the effect of the provision on the application period, which sets forth the procedure therefor, must be interpreted consistently and uniformly with the many administrative law provisions that contain similar provisions. According to the text and structural scheme of the provision at issue, the meaning of the provision at issue is clear. Nor can any precedent be found in Supreme Court case law holding that a statutory provision setting the application period for an ordinary person's claim right to a benefit under public law is a directory provision.
3) In order to prevent statutory provisions governing matters where legal effect may be at issue from being interpreted in various directions, one can readily find legislative examples in which the legislator has drafted the statutory text so as to be unambiguous in itself, while separately providing exception clauses to supplement cases where concrete reasonableness is disregarded due to this legislative direction (Article 814(1) of the Commercial Act (상법), Articles 9(1) and 10 of the Customs Act (관세법), etc.). In other words, because the legislator provides exception clauses to supplement the harm resulting from the unambiguous interpretation and application of a mandatory provision, the very existence of provisions concerning principle and exception can be regarded as strong grounds for concluding that the provision in question is a mandatory provision.
As stated in the Majority Opinion, the fact that the provision at issue is composed of a main clause and a proviso is because, while the main clause literally limits the application period to a certain time, the proviso was established to prevent unreasonable results that could arise from mechanically applying it. In particular, the proviso to the provision at issue and Article 94 of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법 시행령), enacted pursuant to the delegation thereunder, regard the grounds set forth in each subparagraph as grounds attributable to no fault of the beneficiary for failing to comply with the application period for childcare leave benefits under the main clause of the provision at issue, and provide for them as grounds for extending the exclusion period. Given that the provision at issue is thus structured as a main clause and a proviso, this too should be regarded as indicating that it is a mandatory provision.
4) The Dissenting Opinion argues, based on Article 11(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation (남녀고용평등법 시행령), that Article 11(1) and (2) of the said Enforcement Decree are directory provisions, and that this should be taken into account in determining the nature of the provision at issue.
Article 11 of the said Enforcement Decree is not a statute but a Presidential Decree, and moreover, it is a provision setting the period within which a person wishing to take childcare leave must submit an application in order to be permitted to take leave, that is, a provision setting the procedure for applying for leave. This is entirely different in meaning and content from the provision at issue, which is a statutory provision setting the application period for various claim rights to benefits under public law, and is not a matter to be discussed on the same level. Furthermore, even if the relationship between paragraphs (1) and (2) and paragraph (3) of Article 11 of the said Enforcement Decree may be seen as similar to the relationship between the main clause and the proviso of the provision at issue, paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 11 should not be regarded as directory provisions in relation to paragraph (3).
나. The Right to Receive Social Security Benefits
1) Social security benefits, unlike, for example, public official salaries or unjust enrichment under public law, are not paid as the performance of an obligation that the State etc. itself bears, but are paid as the execution of law, in accordance with benefits meeting the requirements set forth by statute. Accordingly, in most cases, the right to receive social security benefits is structured so that the administrative agency first examines and determines whether the substantive requirements set forth by statute are met. Except for the few cases examined in the Majority Opinion, Supreme Court precedent has also held that a claim for benefits must go through the administrative agency's examination and determination. Moreover, there is academic opinion questioning, on the basis of the nature of the right, the position taken in the above precedent that a concrete right arises directly from the statutory provision; in particular, in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du16185, decided April 17, 2008, concerning compensation for persons related to democratization movements, similar to compensation for persons related to the May 18 Democratic Uprising, it was held that the person entitled to receive compensation, etc. under the Act cannot be determined solely by the statutory provision, and is determined as the person entitled to receive compensation only upon deliberation and decision by the deliberation committee.
Accordingly, it can generally be said that a person entitled to social security benefits acquires an abstract right immediately upon meeting the substantive requirements set forth by statute, but acquires a concrete right only when the administrative agency makes a decision to pay benefits following an application for payment made in compliance with the method, procedure, and standards set forth by statute. In order for the beneficiary to ultimately receive payment of the benefit amount through this procedure, an application must first be made to the administrative agency to convert the abstract right into a concrete right.
2) The Dissenting Opinion states that, if the Majority Opinion interprets the 12-month period set forth in the provision at issue as an exclusion period, this appears to be an attempt to artificially divide the childcare leave benefit claim right into an abstract right and a concrete right and to differentiate the scope of application of the aforementioned provisions, in order to avoid the problem of overlap with the three-year statute of limitations period expressly set forth in Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act.
However, the division of the right to receive social security benefits into an abstract right and a concrete right is widely known in academia, and Supreme Court precedent has long held to the same effect (see Supreme Court Decision 93Nu18532, decided September 15, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 97Da42250, decided November 26, 1999, etc.), and, as already noted in the Majority Opinion, has recently held to the same effect as well. Moreover, individual statutes also contain provisions that distinguish between and treat these differently, and the provision at issue is one such example. However, with respect to rights of an administrative entity such as the State, as in the case of the right to tax, the term "exclusion period" is used to refer to the period for exercising the abstract right, calling it the "exclusion period for taxation," whereas such terminology is not used for an individual's right under public law, so that some question may be raised as to calling the period for exercising an abstract right an "exclusion period."
Insofar as it is the same in that it is the period for exercising an abstract right under public law, it cannot be said to be erroneous to use the same term whether it be a right of an administrative entity against an individual or a right of an individual against an administrative entity. Furthermore, the statute of limitations runs from the time the right can be exercised (Article 166 of the Civil Act). However, by its nature, the right to receive social security benefits cannot be exercised while it remains an abstract right absent the administrative agency's examination and decision, so that the time for performance cannot arrive, and there is no room for delay liability such as damages for delay to arise. Also, while the right remains abstract, there is no starting point for the running of the statute of limitations, so the limitations period cannot run, and interruption of the statute of limitations cannot be contemplated either. Ultimately, where the period for exercising such an abstract right is set forth by statute, it is proper to regard it as an exclusion period, in contradistinction to the statute of limitations.
The exclusion period for an abstract right under public law was not originally part of our legal conception. Since the adoption of the exclusion period for taxation assessment (부과제척기간) in the Framework Act on National Taxes (국세기본법), it has expanded to local taxes, administrative fines, and so forth. In other words, it can be said that, with the development of legal scholarship and the improvement of legal institutions, the concept of the exclusion period is being introduced and expanded even in the field of public law. However, one can find cases where, because individual statutes were enacted at a time when the concept of the exclusion period did not exist, the term "statute of limitations" is used even for the period for exercising an abstract right. This corresponds to some of the third and fourth types of legislative examples noted in the Majority Opinion. In such cases, although the nature of the period differs from that of a statute of limitations, insofar as the statutory text refers to it as a "statute of limitations," there is no choice but to interpret it differently from an ordinary statute of limitations, such as by treating it as a statute of limitations period for which interruption cannot be contemplated, or by interpreting it as one to which the statute of limitations does not apply while the right remains abstract. However, such a state of affairs cannot be said to be desirable, and there is a need to reorganize such provisions going forward.
In this way, the exclusion period under public law is useful as a period for exercising an abstract right. This may be said to have adopted the exclusion period system of the Civil Act, but the question arises as to whether it must necessarily be viewed identically to the exclusion period under the Civil Act. I believe that, in light of the independent character of public law, there may be aspects that should be viewed differently from the Civil Act.
3) It goes without saying that, where a social security benefit has undergone examination by the administrative agency and, as a result thereof, has reached the stage of a concrete right through a decision to pay benefits, but the administrative agency fails to pay the same to the beneficiary, the beneficiary may resolve the matter by directly claiming payment of the benefit amount or by filing a party litigation (당사자소송). Of course, where the administrative agency has made a decision to deny payment, that decision must be disputed through an appeal litigation (항고소송), and it is not permissible to directly seek relief through party litigation.
It is in this vein that the Majority Opinion clarifies that, where there has been an administrative agency's decision recognizing a concrete right that nevertheless remains unperformed, the exercise of that concrete right is possible in the form of filing a party litigation. However, the Dissenting Opinion rebuts the purport of the Majority Opinion by citing precedent to the effect that, where an administrative agency denies an application seeking recognition as a concrete right, the form of litigation may vary between appeal litigation and party litigation depending on the content of the relevant provisions, etc.; but it is not appropriate to criticize the Majority Opinion by citing precedent concerning cases where a concrete right arises directly from a statutory provision, in contrast to cases where the right arises through the administrative agency's examination and decision to pay.
4) In this way, unless it falls under the exceptional case where a concrete right is recognized solely by the statutory provision without the administrative agency's intervention, in accordance with the intent of the legislator, it is generally the case that the right to receive social security benefits is divided into an abstract right and a concrete right based on the administrative agency's examination and decision.
Where the right to receive social security benefits remains merely an abstract right, the beneficiary cannot directly exercise the right against the State or a local government, whereas once converted into a concrete right, the beneficiary may directly exercise the right against the State, etc.; thus, the abstract right and the concrete right differ in legal character. Accordingly, it can be said that separately establishing provisions concerning the periods for exercising the abstract right and the concrete right, respectively, accords with the dual character of the right to receive social security benefits, and in this respect, the first type of legislative example noted above, which separately provides for the periods for exercising each right, can be said to be the most typical form for provisions concerning the period for exercising the right to receive social security benefits.
The Dissenting Opinion argues, citing the fact that the procedure for recognition as a beneficiary of childcare leave benefits and the procedure for applying for recognized childcare leave benefits are not distinguished but unified into one, that it is improper to divide the childcare leave benefit claim right into an abstract right and a concrete right. However, the unification of the childcare leave benefit procedure in this manner is merely the provision of one-stop administrative service for the convenience of the public, and it cannot be said that the nature of the right changes as a result thereof.
5) In this way, where a statute concerning social security establishes multiple provisions regarding the period for exercising the right to receive social security benefits, and some of those provisions concern the application period for converting an abstract right into a concrete right while the remainder concern the period for realizing the concrete right, such that there is room for these to be distinguished and applied separately, it accords with the legal character of the right and the legal system to interpret the former as the period for exercising the abstract right and the latter as the period for exercising the concrete right, in keeping with the dual character of the right to receive social security benefits.
The provision at issue and Article 107(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act form, within a single statute, a scheme that separately provides for the periods for exercising the abstract right and the concrete right, respectively, with respect to the childcare leave benefit claim right, and thus can be cited as an example of the first type of legislative example distinguished in the Majority Opinion. Among these, the provision at issue sets forth the period for exercising the abstract right to the childcare leave benefit claim right, and it can be sufficiently discerned even from the text that the legislator enacted the provision at issue with the period set forth therein in mind as an exclusion period. However, as noted in the Majority Opinion, with the deletion of the provision applying the statute of limitations to the childcare leave benefit claim right in the amendment to the Employment Insurance Act by Act No. 16269 on January 15, 2019, the provision at issue now falls under the second type of legislative example noted above.
다. The Childcare Leave Benefit Claim Right
1) Payment of childcare leave benefits is funded from the unemployment benefits portion of the Employment Insurance Fund, which is composed of insurance premium revenues, etc. (proviso to Article 6(2) and Article 78(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act); workers are obligated to pay half of the employment insurance premiums (Article 13(1)(1) and (2) of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (고용보험 및 산업재해보상보험의 보험료징수 등에 관한 법률)); and in order to receive childcare leave benefits, the insured unit period prior to the commencement date of childcare leave must total 180 days or more (Article 70(1) of the former Employment Insurance Act); accordingly, given that there is a certain degree of self-contribution by the beneficiary, it cannot be denied that the childcare leave benefit claim right has, in part, the character of property rights under the Constitution.
Unlike other provisions on fundamental rights, the provision on property rights under our Constitution takes the form of a rights-formative legislative reservation whereby the content and limits thereof are concretely formed by statute; accordingly, the concrete shape of a property right is formed by the statute setting the content and limits of the property right, and that statute has the meaning not of restricting the property right but of forming the property right (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 92Heonba20, decided July 29, 1993). Accordingly, so long as it does not conflict with the essence of the guarantee of the private property system, legislative discretion is granted in forming the content and limits of property rights.
In particular, the childcare leave benefit claim right is distinguished from ordinary property rights in that it acquires the character of a property right on the condition of the actual occurrence of a socially foreseeable risk that may arise in the future; and since the childcare leave benefit claim right itself is a social insurance benefit derived from the principle of a social state, formed not only for the individual beneficiary's livelihood security but also for the social security of all present and future insured persons, and thus has a strong social relevance, it must be said that the legislator is granted broader legislative discretion in forming this right than for any other property right. Accordingly, it is difficult to view the legislator's decision to recognize or form the childcare leave benefit claim right as a property right only on the premise of application within a certain period as undermining the essence of the guarantee of the private property system.
2) As described above, the childcare leave benefit claim right has the character of property rights under the Constitution intermixed inseparably with the character of the right to receive social security benefits.
In forming the concrete content of the right to receive social security benefits, the legislator may comprehensively consider a wide array of complex factors—such as the State's financial capacity, the income and living standards of the population as a whole, socio-political considerations such as the overall level of social security and public sentiment, and the conflicting interests of various strata of the population—and determine matters at a reasonable level appropriate to achieving the legislative purpose; the policy judgments and decisions necessary therefor are primarily entrusted to the broad discretion of the legislator (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Heonba107, decided May 28, 2009, etc.). The question of what character to give to the period for exercising the childcare leave benefit claim right, and how long or short to set it, is also a matter to be determined by the legislator by comprehensively considering complex and diverse factors, together with the legislative purpose of encouraging workers' childbirth and childcare, such as the prompt settlement of the administrative legal relationship between the worker and the competent administrative agency, and the reasonable and efficient allocation of public resources. Accordingly, the mere fact that the childcare leave benefit claim right is recognized as having the character of a property right does not mean that the legislative discretion regarding the period for its exercise is to be strictly limited.
3) The Dissenting Opinion characterizes the Majority Opinion as taking the position that prioritizes the prompt settlement of legal relationships and the financial stability of the Employment Insurance Fund, but this is not appropriate. First, the prompt stabilization of legal relationships under public law is a general principle belonging to public law relationships generally, and must be applied uniformly to all public law relationships; it does not apply only to the childcare leave benefit claim right. Furthermore, the issue of the financial stability of the Employment Insurance Fund has not been raised in the Majority Opinion at all, and the Majority Opinion also takes no issue with the proposition that the childcare leave benefit claim right must be guaranteed to the fullest extent possible in light of the spirit of the Constitution, which is oriented toward a welfare state. It merely emphasizes that the provision at issue must be interpreted consistently and uniformly with other provisions of administrative law.
4) The childcare leave allowance recognized for public officials does not include, as a substantive requirement, a certain period of prior service before the commencement date of the public official's childcare leave, and, moreover, is recognized without requiring a separate application for the childcare leave allowance apart from applying for childcare leave itself. In this respect, it is difficult to deny that, with respect to benefits or allowances arising from childcare leave, ordinary workers are somewhat disadvantaged compared to public officials.
However, in light of the circumstances set forth below, there are reasonable grounds for the legislator to have formed the childcare leave benefit claim right of workers differently from the childcare leave allowance of public officials. In other words, given that the worker's application and the employer's cooperation are necessary to confirm the requirements for payment of childcare leave benefits, and considering the reasonable allocation of administrative resources needed for this purpose, it can be reasonably accepted that the worker's childcare leave benefit claim right is limited by an application period, etc.
가) For public officials, working conditions are set by statute, whereas for ordinary workers, working conditions are basically determined through agreement with the employer. Moreover, the childcare leave allowance for public officials is based on the social security responsibility of the State and local governments toward public officials and the corresponding right of public officials, whereas the childcare leave benefit of ordinary workers is based on a social security responsibility that borrows from the legal principles of private insurance.
나) In the case of public officials, since the mode of appointment and the form of work are set by statute and subordinate regulations, there is little need to examine whether a person is a legitimate beneficiary. However, in the case of ordinary workers, since the mode of employment and the form of work are diverse, there is a great need for the administrative agency, as a third party, to examine whether a person is a legitimate beneficiary.
다) Since the childcare leave allowance for public officials is paid as a type of "allowance," the paying entity is the administrative agency at which the public official in question works. Accordingly, when a public official applies for childcare leave, the administrative agency at which that public official works immediately becomes aware of the fact of childcare leave, so there is no need to require the public official to make a separate application for the childcare leave allowance. However, with respect to childcare leave benefits for ordinary workers, since the party receiving the application is the employer while the party paying the childcare leave benefits is the head of the competent employment security agency, a separate application by the worker concerned is naturally required for the payment of childcare leave benefits.
5) The Dissenting Opinion notes that the starting date for the application period for childcare leave benefits is "the date on which childcare leave ends," but that since the introduction of the system of dividing childcare leave and the system of reduced working hours during the childcare period, the "date of ending" is not fixed, which may give rise to problems, and that this may, in some cases, result in the unreasonable outcome of discriminatory treatment among workers with respect to the period for exercising the right.
On this point, if I may offer an opinion: where childcare leave is permitted pursuant to a single application, a single right is established for the entire permitted period. However, in order to accommodate workers, childcare leave benefits are made payable on a monthly basis. Even where childcare leave is used in divided portions, so long as the divided portions of childcare leave do not constitute leave pursuant to a new application, the rights before and after division should be regarded as one, and thus compliance with the application period for childcare leave benefits should be determined based on the date on which the divided childcare leave finally ends. Likewise, even where childcare leave is used in combination with reduced working hours during the childcare period, this should similarly be determined based on the date on which the childcare leave finally ends. Interpreting the matter in this way cannot be said to be disadvantageous to the worker, and since the introduction of the system of dividing childcare leave, etc. is itself intended to provide convenience to workers, even if there is a difference between workers who make use of the system and those who do not, so long as there is no discrimination in providing the opportunity to make use of the system, it cannot be said that this constitutes discrimination against workers.
This issue is not directly related to the case at hand and thus was not addressed in the Majority Opinion, but it is anticipated that a ruling will be forthcoming in a future case in which this becomes an issue.
라. Concluding Remarks
Adjudication is the work of weighing conflicting values on the scale of law to find balance. The balance of the scale must be such that, based on the historicity and reality we have experienced in living our lives, and taking into consideration the impact to be exerted on the members living within that context, the social system functions in an optimal state and operates at the highest efficiency (see Supreme Court Decision 2018O2, decided March 11, 2021).
In this case, it is important to find the correct point of balance by weighing the values in conflict, based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the consistency and uniformity of interpretation of statutory provisions, the comparative weighing of public and private interests, and the prompt stabilization of legal relationships under public law. In this regard, the scale of substance and the scale of procedure may each pursue different purposes or directions, and it is undesirable for one side of the procedural scale to be tipped on the grounds of substance, as this raises concerns of causing confusion in the legal system as a whole.
The foregoing supplements the grounds of the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook (Justice in Charge), Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hui, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu