[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Kukdo Industrial Safety Co., Ltd.
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2014Nu12695, decided April 2, 2015
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. All costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. On the legality of the disciplinary procedure
A. Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) provides that where an employer intends to dismiss a worker, the dismissal shall not be effective unless the reasons for and timing of the dismissal are notified "in writing." The purpose of this provision is to require the employer to notify the reasons for dismissal, etc. in writing so that the employer may decide more carefully whether to dismiss the worker, and to clarify the existence, timing, and reasons of the dismissal so that any dispute arising thereafter may be resolved properly and easily, and so that the worker may respond appropriately to the dismissal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da42324, decided October 27, 2011).
Here, "writing" means a document setting forth certain content, which is distinguished from electronic documents such as e-mails; however, considering the following points: ① Article 3 of the Framework Act on Electronic Documents and Transactions (전자문서 및 전자거래 기본법, hereinafter the "Electronic Documents Act") provides that "this Act shall apply to all electronic documents and electronic transactions, except where otherwise specifically provided by other statutes," and Article 4(1) of the same Act provides that "an electronic document shall not be denied the effect of a document merely because it is in electronic form, except where otherwise specifically provided by other statutes"; ② an electronic document that is in a state capable of being printed out immediately is, in practice, no different from a paper document, and may even be more assured of continuity and accuracy in terms of storage and preservation; and ③ if, in light of the form and circumstances of preparation of the e-mail, the employer's intent to dismiss can be clearly confirmed, the reasons for and timing of the dismissal are specifically stated in the e-mail, there is no impediment to the worker's ability to respond appropriately to the dismissal, and the e-mail thus sufficiently fulfills the role and function of a written notice of dismissal, then the notice should not be regarded as failing to constitute a written notice merely because it was given by e-mail or other electronic document — taking these points into consideration, as long as the worker has come to know the content of the e-mail, such as by receiving it, there may be cases in which, depending on the specific facts, a notice of dismissal by e-mail should be deemed valid as a written notice of dismissal, within the scope that does not undermine the legislative purpose of Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act requiring written notice of the reasons for dismissal, etc., as discussed above.
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found: ① the Plaintiff appeared before the disciplinary committee convened by the Intervenor, the Plaintiff's employer, was notified of the specific misconduct, and was given an opportunity to make statements in his defense thereon; ② the Intervenor decided to dismiss the Plaintiff in accordance with the resolution of the disciplinary committee; ③ after the disciplinary committee concluded, the Plaintiff told the Intervenor that he had been unfairly dismissed and intended to definitely file an application for relief, and requested that all CCTV materials related to the misconduct not be sent to the Plaintiff himself but to the labor consultant who was the Plaintiff's agent; ④ the Intervenor sent, by e-mail, to the said labor consultant a copied file of the notice of disciplinary result bearing the seal of the Intervenor's representative director, together with materials related to the CCTV, and telephoned the labor consultant to confirm receipt of the e-mail; and ⑤ the Plaintiff was informed of the content of the notice of disciplinary result by the said labor consultant, and filed an application for relief with the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission in response to the dismissal.
In light of the legal principles set forth above, these facts show that the notice of dismissal by e-mail in this case is lawful as a written notice of dismissal under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act, and the judgment below, having decided to the same effect, is not erroneous in its understanding of the law as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. Meanwhile, Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act merely provides that the dismissal shall be effective only if the reasons for and timing of the dismissal are notified in writing, without separately specifying the form of such writing. Since the "Notice of Disciplinary Result" that the Intervenor sent to the Plaintiff by e-mail specifically and clearly stated the reasons for and timing of the dismissal, and the Plaintiff was given the opportunity to respond appropriately thereto, it constitutes a writing as provided in Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act, and it cannot be said not to fall under such a writing merely because its title is "Notice of Disciplinary Result" rather than "Notice of Dismissal." The ground of appeal disputing this point is also without merit.
2. On the existence of grounds for discipline
The grounds of appeal on this point are, in the end, merely an assertion disputing the selection and evaluation of evidence and the fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below as the fact-finding court, and thus are difficult to regard as legitimate grounds of appeal. Furthermore, upon examination of the judgment below in light of the record, it cannot be found that the court below erred by misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence or by misunderstanding the relevant legal principles.
3. On the appropriateness of the disciplinary measure
The court below determined, on the grounds stated in its judgment, that it is difficult to view the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff as having exceeded or abused the scope of the employer's discretion in disciplinary matters as generally accepted in society.
Upon examination in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, it cannot be found that the above determination of the court below erred by misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the appropriateness of disciplinary measures or by misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This Decision is rendered as set forth in the Order with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices.
Justice Min Il-young (Presiding Justice), Park Bo-young, Kim Shin (Justice in Charge), Kwon Soon-il