[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 62 others, Litigation Counsel: Attorneys Kim Je-hyeong, Hwang In-cheol
[Defendant, Appellee] Dong-A Ilbo Co., Ltd., Litigation Counsel: Attorneys Park Seung-seo, Lee Jae-seong
[Original Decision] Seoul High Court Decision 76Na2374, dated January 9, 1978
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
The Court determines the first ground of appeal raised by the Plaintiffs' litigation counsel.
According to the reasoning of the original decision, the court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: the Defendant Company's business performance deteriorated starting in 1970, and it continued to operate at a loss in 1973 and 1974; in late December 1974 (the reference to 1972 appears to be a clerical error), the Defendant Company faced a crisis threatening its very existence due to a wave of advertisement cancellations; accordingly, it reduced its executive staff and, as a first step, closed the one office and three departments referenced in the original judgment, whose business performance or necessity was minimal among the Defendant Company's various departments, and decided to reduce and dismiss the staff belonging thereto; pursuant to this, Plaintiff 1 and seven others were dismissed. The court below further found that the proposals by some employees for salary reductions or the proposal by outside social organizations to bear salary costs were merely temporary and idealistic measures that could not continue for a substantial period and could not serve as a fundamental solution to improve the Defendant Company's financial condition, and that the number of persons belonging to the abolished departments who were labor union branch officers or members of the Free Press Practice Special Committee was extremely small, as found in the original judgment; therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendant Company abolished the organizational units for the purpose of dismissing the above Plaintiffs, and the court below lawfully rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments on this basis.
We find no error in the original decision such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the Plaintiffs' arguments or "justifiable cause," incomplete deliberation, insufficiency of reasoning, or omission of judgment. Therefore, this argument is without merit.
The Court determines the second ground of appeal.
Upon comparing and comprehensively examining the evidence adopted by the court below against the record, it can be found that, as recognized in the original judgment, the Plaintiffs in question made insulting remarks against superiors, including the Defendant Company's chief editorial writer, Non-party, and others, at the editorial department assembly on March 12, 1975, resolved to refuse to produce broadcasts and newspapers, occupied the main broadcasting control room to render broadcasting impossible, occupied the broadcasting room to obstruct broadcasting, and staged sit-ins in the editorial department or the technical department to obstruct newspaper production. Examining the process of evidence selection undertaken in making these findings, it is lawful, and there is no error of misapprehension of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence, whether from lack of evidence or erroneous selection of evidence.
This argument amounts to no more than a challenge to the court below's exclusive authority over the selection of evidence and fact-finding, and is therefore without merit.
The Court determines the third ground of appeal.
Even granting that where an employer establishes or amends work rules (취업규칙), it must hear the opinion of the labor union organized by a majority of the workers at the relevant workplace, or, where there is no such labor union, of a person representing a majority of the workers, and that work rules established or amended without such consent must be regarded as invalid, if, as found by the court below, the disciplinary action in this case was taken because the production of newspapers and broadcasts—the very lifeblood of the Defendant Company—was refused and obstructed, the company building and facilities were occupied by a large group exercising collective force, superiors were insulted, insubordination was rampant, management order was thrown into disarray, and the company faced an imminent crisis threatening its very survival and existence, then such disciplinary action cannot be controlled by the validity or invalidity of the so-called work rules. Although the original judgment's explanation on this point is somewhat insufficient, its conclusion is justified, and there is no illegality of incomplete deliberation due to misapprehension of the legal principles. Therefore, this argument is without merit.
The Court determines the fourth ground of appeal.
The court below held that, while it would ideally be desirable for the exercise of disciplinary authority to follow a structure akin to a trial, this is not an indispensable requirement that must invariably be observed; however, if procedures for sanctions are prescribed in the work rules or the like, then, absent evidence to the contrary, such procedures are required by fairness and constitute a requirement for validity. The court below further held that, since it is undisputed between the parties that the Defendant Company's disciplinary regulations do not prescribe procedures such as notice of the facts subject to disciplinary suspicion or provision of an opportunity to explain or defend, the fact that such procedures were not followed presents no defect whatsoever in the Defendant's disciplinary action in this case; moreover, it held that, in a situation where a large number of employees were engaged in assemblies, sit-ins, and other acts of defiance against the Defendant Company, it would have been impossible to follow such procedures. This determination is justified in light of the undisputed fact between the parties that the Defendant Company's disciplinary regulations do not prescribe procedures such as notice of the facts subject to disciplinary suspicion or provision of an opportunity to explain or defend, and there is no illegality due to misapprehension of the legal principles.
The Court determines the fifth ground of appeal.
It is clear from the evidence relied upon that the court below found that the Defendant Company persuaded, in various ways, the employees who refused to produce content or refused to report to work to return to normal duties, and took disciplinary action only against those employees who ultimately refused to do so, while imposing no sanction whatsoever on employees who reversed their refusal to produce content and returned to the Defendant Company. Although the court below's determination—that the Plaintiffs' argument that the Defendant's disciplinary action in this case violates the principle of equity or the principle of equal treatment is without merit—may be somewhat insufficient standing alone, it cannot be said that this determination fails to also encompass the meaning that no other employees who violated the rules to the same degree as the Plaintiffs in question could be identified; therefore, the conclusion is justified. Even if there were instances in which the Defendant Company failed to identify other employees who engaged in conduct more egregious than that of the above Plaintiffs and thus excluded them from disciplinary action, this alone cannot be concluded to constitute a violation of the principle of equity or the principle of equal treatment in disciplinary matters.
The argument on this point is accordingly without merit.
The Court determines the sixth ground of appeal.
Upon comparing and comprehensively examining the evidence adopted by the court below against the record, it can be found, as recognized in the original judgment with respect to the relevant Plaintiffs, that many of the Plaintiff employees held unauthorized assemblies in the editorial department office during working hours without the Defendant Company's permission, produced and distributed unauthorized leaflets in violation of the Defendant Company's internal rules, ran for and assumed the presidency of the Korea Journalists Association in violation of the Defendant Company's internal rules and directives, refused to produce newspapers and broadcasts, occupied the office and facilities and staged sit-ins constituting acts detrimental to the company, and refused the Defendant Company's requests to report to work. There is no error of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, nor any error of incomplete deliberation.
Given these facts, it would be arbitrary to characterize such conduct as legitimate acts of a worker or as acts violating unjust prohibitions. Even granting, as argued, that press freedom must be protected and developed, it cannot be denied that the Plaintiffs, as employees of the Defendant Company, must be subject to sanctions for engaging in extreme struggle under the guise of the so-called free press practice movement, in disregard of and in transcendence of the Defendant Company's internal rules and order.
The determination of the court below rejecting the Plaintiffs' arguments on the same grounds is justified, and there is no illegality in mistakenly treating legitimate acts or acts violating unjust prohibitions as grounds for disciplinary action, nor any illegality due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the degree of disciplinary action or abuse of disciplinary authority.
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing parties. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Supreme Court Justice Im Hang-jun (Presiding Judge), Ju Jae-hwang, Yang Byeong-ho, Ra Gil-jo