[Plaintiffs, Appellants]
[Defendant, Appellee] Daehan Textile Co., Ltd., Attorneys Park Heon-gi and 1 other, Counsel for the Defendant
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 91Na1432 rendered on January 30, 1992
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
As to the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs' Attorney
1. Where a collective agreement or work rules contain an express provision requiring that notice of the date, time, and place of a disciplinary committee meeting be given to the person subject to disciplinary action, or that such person be given an opportunity to state his or her case before the disciplinary committee, such provisions exist to secure the objectivity and fairness of the disciplinary action, and a disciplinary measure taken without following such procedures cannot, in principle, be recognized as valid. In this case, Article 8 of the Operating Regulations of the Personnel Committee of the Defendant Company's Daegu Plant (Defendant's Exhibit No. 5) provides that the Committee shall notify the employee subject to discipline of the date and time of the disciplinary committee meeting and shall give the employee a sufficient opportunity to state his or her case. According to the record, Plaintiff 2 appears to have been notified of the holding of the disciplinary committee meeting by a supervisor while working on site on the morning of the day the meeting was held, and Plaintiff 1, who was on the night shift at the time and sleeping in the dormitory, appears to have been notified of the holding of the disciplinary committee meeting through an indoor broadcast.
If so, it cannot be said that the Defendant's Personnel Committee, in conducting the disciplinary procedure against the Plaintiffs who were subject to discipline, gave the Plaintiffs a reasonably sufficient period of time to prepare their defense and supporting materials.
However, even if there was such a procedural defect, it is clear from the record that the Plaintiffs themselves appeared before the Personnel Committee and made sufficient statements in their defense without raising any objection to the effect that the notice of attendance was given on short notice and was therefore improper. Accordingly, such procedural defect must be deemed to have been cured thereby, and ultimately the disciplinary dismissal in this case cannot be said to be unlawful on procedural grounds (see this Court's Decision 92Nu6563 rendered on July 24, 1992).
The judgment below, which is to the same effect, is justified, and there is no error of mistaking the facts, misapprehending the law, or failing to exhaust deliberation as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is without merit.
2. The facts found by the court below based on the evidence adopted are as follows.
That is, although Plaintiff 1 dropped out during his first year at ○○ Junior College and Plaintiff 2 dropped out during his second year at ○○ University, they each falsified their educational background as high school graduates in order to be hired by the Defendant Company, and after joining the company, they had become close, through the △△△ Church and the □□□□□ Council (abbreviated as "□□ Council"), with persons using false names—Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, Nonparty 3, and Nonparty 4—who had likewise deceived the Defendant regarding their names, educational backgrounds, and work histories in order to obtain employment under false pretenses; that the Defendant Company, through labor-management consultation with the labor union on December 19, 1988, decided that operations would proceed normally on New Year's Day 1989 and that there would be a three-day holiday for the Lunar New Year, and that the labor union accordingly announced this labor-management consultation agreement at the year-end party on December 23, 1988; that Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, Nonparty 3, Nonparty 4, the Plaintiffs, and Nonparty 5 and Nonparty 6, among others, took the lead and conspired to launch an illegal strike using the New Year's Day holiday issue as a pretext, and that at around 05:55 on December 31, 1988, Nonparty 1 blocked employees from reporting to work in the corridor at the entrance to the spinning department worksite, while Nonparty 5 and Nonparty 6 stopped machines in the spinning department, and thereby attempted a strike for about 15 minutes, but the attempt failed because other workers did not join in; that they then conspired to attempt another strike the following day; that at around 05:45 on January 1, 1989, Plaintiff 2, despite being on duty at the time, left his post at the weaving department and entered Spinning Frame Factory No. 1 of the spinning department and shouted at the workers on duty there, "Turn off the switches, please cooperate"; that Plaintiff 1, at around 05:50 on the same day, instead of reporting to his post at the weaving department, was heading toward the spinning department to incite a strike, and when blocked by management staff in the corridor in front of the administration section, shouted "Please cooperate" while lying down in the corridor; and that Nonparty 5, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 2 also, at around 05:50 on the same day, while heading toward the spinning department to incite a strike, shouted "Do not go to work, please cooperate" when blocked by management staff in the corridor beside the office and in the corridor at the entrance to the spinning department worksite, thereby delaying the employees' arrival for work; that as a result of the above attempted strikes, operations of 21 carding machines and 162 spinning frames were suspended for approximately 10 minutes from around 05:55 to around 06:10 on December 31, 1988, and operations of 13 winder machines, 3 auto-winder machines, and 189 spinning frames were suspended for approximately 10 minutes from around 05:50 to around 06:10 on January 1, 1989, each causing damages of KRW 1 million or more to the Defendant Company; and that, meanwhile, Article 69 of the Defendant's Work Rules, in providing for grounds for disciplinary action, lists in item 14 "a person who, intentionally or through gross negligence, causes damage to the Company or destroys or damages Company property, or attempts to do so," and in item 21 "a person who, without permission, engages in assembly, collective action, demonstrations, riotous conduct, or the like within the Company premises, or incites others to engage in such conduct, or attempts to do so"; and that Article 68 of the Defendant Company's Work Rules classifies types of disciplinary action into reprimand, wage reduction, suspension from work, demotion, and dismissal, and provides that a person whose circumstances are extremely grave and who has a significant impact on others shall be dismissed.
The court below held, with respect to the Plaintiffs' above conduct, that it was appropriate to find that such conduct not only constituted grounds for discipline under items 14 and 21 of Article 69 of the Defendant Company's Work Rules, but also fell within the case of circumstances being extremely grave and having a significant impact on others, and thereby upheld the disciplinary dismissal in this case.
The above fact-finding and determination by the court below are acceptable, and there is no error of mistaking the facts due to violation of the rules of evidence or of failing to exhaust deliberation, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as set forth in the Order.