[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Attorneys at Law, DLG et al., 6 others, Counsel for the Plaintiffs)
[Defendant, Appellee] Republic of Korea (Government Legal Service, Attorney Lee San-hae et al., 3 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2022Na2009024 dated October 6, 2022
[Order]
Of the judgment below, the portions ordering payment as set forth below with respect to the claims for State compensation by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 are each reversed, and the portions of the first instance judgment corresponding thereto, in which Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 lost, are each vacated. The Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 each 100,000 won, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from November 3, 2018 to December 19, 2024, and at the rate of 12% per annum from the following day until the date of full payment. The remaining appeals of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and the appeal of Plaintiff 3, are all dismissed. The total costs of the litigation incurred between Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, and the Defendant shall be borne by each party respectively, and the costs of the appeal incurred between Plaintiff 3 and the Defendant shall be borne by Plaintiff 3.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found.
A. Article 7 of the Act on the Guarantee of Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, the Aged, Pregnant Women, etc. (hereinafter the "Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc.") provides that the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install facilities and equipment for the convenience of persons with disabilities, etc. in moving about and using facilities in daily life (hereinafter "convenience facilities") shall be determined by Presidential Decree.
B. Pursuant to that delegation, Article 3 [Attached Table 1] Item 2(a)(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Guarantee of Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, the Aged, Pregnant Women, etc. (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 32607 of April 27, 2022; hereinafter the "former Enforcement Decree of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc.") (hereinafter "the provision at issue in this case") provided that, among facilities used by the public, "supermarkets and retail stores of daily necessities (referring to food, sundries, clothing, toys, books, construction materials, medicines, medical devices, etc.)" (hereinafter "small-scale retail stores") were excluded from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities where their floor area was less than 300㎡.
C. Since the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and its Enforcement Decree came into force on April 11, 1998, the content of the provision at issue in this case remained unchanged for more than 24 years. However, on February 10, 2022, the court of first instance rendered a judgment to the effect that the provision at issue in this case, by excluding an excessively broad scope of small-scale retail stores from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities, failed to substantially guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities, thereby exceeding the scope of delegation under Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and rendering it invalid. On April 27, 2022, the Defendant amended the provision at issue in this case by Presidential Decree No. 32607, reducing the floor area standard for small-scale retail stores excluded from the obligation to install convenience facilities from the previous "less than 300㎡" to "less than 50㎡."
2. Failure to Perform the Administrative Legislative Duty to Guarantee the Access Rights of Persons with Disabilities
A. The Content of the Administrative Legislative Duty Borne by Administrative Agencies to Guarantee the Access Rights of Persons with Disabilities
1) The Content of the Constitution, Statutes, and Treaties Providing for the Access Rights of Persons with Disabilities
A) All citizens have dignity and value as human beings and the right to pursue happiness, and the State has a duty to guarantee the inviolable, fundamental human rights of individuals (Article 10 of the Constitution). Human dignity and value refer to the noble personhood regarded as the essence of humanity, and on that basis, human beings, as persons capable of self-responsibility, have the freedom to act freely in accordance with their own decisions and the right to pursue happiness. Since the Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the law (Article 11 of the Constitution), it is self-evident that persons with disabilities, equally with non-disabled persons, possess the constitutionally guaranteed dignity and value as human beings and the right to pursue happiness, and that the State has a duty to guarantee these rights.
However, most facilities and equipment used in daily life are established based on the standards of non-disabled persons, so that persons with disabilities find it difficult to freely use them according to their own decisions without the assistance of others. The freedom to make one's own decisions and to act freely in accordance therewith constitutes the core of human dignity, which our Constitution regards as the highest value. In order for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed, equally with non-disabled persons, the right to pursue human dignity, value, and happiness, the right of persons with disabilities to access, through their own capabilities, the facilities and equipment used in daily life—that is, the right of access—must be guaranteed.
Furthermore, Article 34(1) of the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to lead a life worthy of human beings, and Article 34(5) of the same Article provides that physically disabled persons shall be protected by the State as prescribed by law, thereby requiring the State to give special consideration and support to socially vulnerable persons (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Du50907, decided October 31, 2019).
As such, the right of access of persons with disabilities equally guarantees to persons with disabilities the constitutional right to human dignity, value, and the pursuit of happiness, and constitutes an essential precondition for persons with disabilities, who are socially vulnerable, to lead a life worthy of human beings. Although not expressly stated in the Constitution, it holds the status of a fundamental right derived from the constitutional provisions examined above.
B) However, in order for the access rights of persons with disabilities to be concretized beyond the passive, defensive level of demanding the prohibition of obstruction of access, into a right that can actively demand that the State or private persons install specific facilities and equipment capable of guaranteeing access at a level equal to that of non-disabled persons, legislation is necessary for this purpose, and the State bears a duty to take necessary measures so that the access rights of persons with disabilities are appropriately guaranteed, taking into account limited fiscal capacity and the level of social and economic development.
C) In order to fulfill the State's constitutional duty to protect persons with disabilities, the National Assembly enacted the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. on April 10, 1997, and it came into force on April 11, 1998. The Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. has as its purpose ensuring that persons with disabilities can safely and conveniently use facilities and equipment in daily life (Article 1 of the same Act), and expressly provides that in order to be guaranteed the right to human dignity, value, and the pursuit of happiness, persons with disabilities also have the right to use, on an equal basis, the facilities and equipment used by non-disabled persons, that is, the right of access (Article 4 of the same Act), and provides that the State and local governments have a duty to formulate various policies to ensure that persons with disabilities, etc. can safely and conveniently use facilities and equipment in daily life (Article 6 of the same Act).
D) The National Assembly further enacted the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities and Remedies for Infringement of Their Rights, etc. (hereinafter the "Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities") on April 10, 2007, which came into force on April 11, 2008. The Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities has as its purpose realizing the dignity and value of persons with disabilities as human beings through the full social participation and realization of the right to equality of persons with disabilities (Article 1 of the same Act). The scope of discrimination prohibited under the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities includes the act of refusing, without justifiable grounds, to provide "all human and material means and measures, including convenience facilities, equipment, tools, and services, that take into account the gender, type and degree of disability, and characteristics of persons with disabilities so that they may participate equally with non-disabled persons in the same activities" (hereinafter "provision of reasonable accommodation") (Article 4(1)(3) and (2) of the same Act; the duty not to refuse, without justifiable grounds, the provision of reasonable accommodation as described above shall hereinafter be referred to as the "duty to provide reasonable accommodation"). The Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities imposes on the State a duty to prevent all discrimination against persons with disabilities and to take affirmative measures to remedy such discrimination (Article 8 of the same Act).
E) In addition, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter the "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"), reflecting the international community's common efforts and consensus to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities, entered into force domestically on January 10, 2009. Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities imposes on States Parties the duty to ensure and promote the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability. Furthermore, Article 9(1) of the same Convention provides that States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to facilities and services open or provided to the public.
2) The Administrative Agency's Discretion and Its Limits in Setting the Scope of Facilities Subject to the Obligation to Install Convenience Facilities
A) Where the National Assembly has delegated a specific matter to an administrative agency by statute but the administrative agency fails, without justifiable grounds, to perform this, it violates the principle of separation of powers and the principle of a law-governed state or administration by law, thereby being unlawful and, at the same time, unconstitutional (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da3561, decided November 29, 2007), and this applies equally not only where the administrative agency has entirely failed to legislate on a matter delegated by statute to be prescribed by Presidential Decree, but also where it has failed to properly perform its administrative legislative duty by insufficiently prescribing the matter delegated by the statute.
B) Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. delegates to Presidential Decree the determination of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities. Meanwhile, Article 18(4) of the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities also delegates to Presidential Decree the phased scope of facilities subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities, and pursuant to that delegation, Article 11 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, as enacted, provides that the facilities subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation shall be limited to those facilities, among the facilities subject to Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., that were newly constructed, extended, or reconstructed on or after April 11, 2009. As a result, the scope of facilities subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities was also limited to the scope prescribed by the Presidential Decree enacted pursuant to the delegation under Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc.
C) The access rights of persons with disabilities constitute a type of constitutional fundamental right that serves as a cornerstone for persons with disabilities to be substantially guaranteed human dignity, which is the supreme value of the Constitution, and the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities repeatedly impose on the Defendant a duty to substantially guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities. Accordingly, even if the administrative agency has discretion to determine, through administrative legislation pursuant to the delegation under Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities, that discretion is subject to an inherent limitation in that it must be exercised in a direction that progressively expands and realizes the access rights of persons with disabilities so that, as required under Article 4, etc. of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., persons with disabilities can be guaranteed dignity, value as human beings, and the right to equality by being enabled to use facilities and equipment equally with non-disabled persons.
D) Accordingly, if the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities as set forth in the provision at issue in this case is excessively narrow and fails to keep pace with the degree of social and economic development and the social consensus regarding the installation of convenience facilities for persons with disabilities, such a provision may be evaluated as infringing upon the access rights of persons with disabilities that the statute sought to guarantee, or as disregarding the delegating intent of the parent statute, which sought to progressively expand the access rights of persons with disabilities. In such a case, a specific duty arises for the administrative agency to amend the relevant administrative legislation in a manner that substantially improves the access rights of persons with disabilities by expanding the scope of facilities subject to the mandatory installation of convenience facilities for persons with disabilities, and if the administrative agency fails, without justifiable grounds, to perform this duty to enact improving legislation, such legislative omission shall be deemed unlawful.
B. Unlawful Failure to Perform the Duty to Enact Improving Legislation with respect to the Provision at Issue in This Case
1) Facts Found
According to the record, the following facts may be found.
A) According to the "Korean Statistical Information Service," the proportion of chain convenience stores nationwide with a floor area of 300㎡ or more—which are subject to the mandatory installation of convenience facilities under the provision at issue in this case—among all chain convenience stores was only 0.1% (rounded down below one decimal place; the same applies hereinafter) as of 2006, and only 1.8% as of 2019, while food and tobacco retail stores accounted for only 2.2% of the total as of 2019.
B) According to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea's 2016 "Survey on the Actual State of Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities to Facilities Used by the Public Below a Certain Standard," among small-scale facilities used by the public that were excluded from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities pursuant to Article 3 [Attached Table 1] Item 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., which includes the provision at issue in this case, 82.3% of the total had a height difference at the main entrance due to a threshold or step of 2cm or more, of which 65% had not installed a ramp, and even where a ramp had been installed, 57.1% failed to meet the legal standards. That is, it is estimated that even in 2016, more than two-thirds of the small-scale retail stores excluded from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities under the provision at issue in this case restricted the access rights of persons with disabilities.
2) Specific Determination
A) Around April 11, 1998, when the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. first came into force, it may be seen that there was a policy need to initially set a narrow scope for facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities, in order to prevent unforeseen harm to owners and managers of small-scale retail stores and to reduce the social and economic shock resulting from abrupt change.
B) Subsequently, the National Assembly, deeming that the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. alone had limitations in guaranteeing the access rights and right to equality of persons with disabilities, enacted the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which came into force on April 11, 2008. However, as noted above, the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities and its Enforcement Decree limited the scope of small-scale retail stores subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to the facilities prescribed under Article 7 of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., with the result that the scope of small-scale retail stores subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities was also limited to the scope prescribed in the provision at issue in this case.
C) Even though the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities came into force in order to further strengthen the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities already provided for under the existing Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., if the scope of small-scale retail stores subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation remained limited to the scope prescribed in the provision at issue in this case at the time the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. first came into force, then it may be said that the administrative agency, in consideration of the purpose for which the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities was enacted, bore an administrative legislative duty to amend the provision at issue in this case so as to expand the scope of small-scale retail stores subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities and thereby substantially improve the access rights of persons with disabilities, at least from around April 11, 2008, when that Act came into force.
In particular, April 11, 2008, when the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities came into force, marked the tenth anniversary of April 11, 1998, when the provision at issue in this case first came into force, and even though the social and economic conditions surrounding the installation of convenience facilities had changed considerably during that period, the provision at issue in this case, which excluded more than 95% of small-scale retail stores from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities, still remained unamended. Moreover, the Defendant signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on March 30, 2007, and, as that Convention entered into force domestically on January 10, 2009, came to bear obligations under international law regarding the guarantee of the access rights of persons with disabilities around the time the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities came into force. As such, it is reasonable to view that, around April 11, 2008, when the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities came into force, a social consensus had already formed that the use of and access to small-scale retail stores by persons with disabilities should be substantially guaranteed, and thus the administrative agency should be deemed to have borne the duty to enact improving legislation with respect to the provision at issue in this case from no later than April 11, 2008.
D) The Defendant failed to amend the provision at issue in this case for a period exceeding 14 years from around the time it came to bear the duty to enact improving legislation as described above, far exceeding the period that would actually be required for such improving legislation. Of course, even if the Defendant did not amend the provision at issue in this case, if the Defendant had actively implemented policies to induce voluntary installation of convenience facilities by small-scale retail stores exempted from the obligation to install convenience facilities under the provision at issue in this case, such that the rate of installation of convenience facilities among small-scale retail stores reached a substantial level, there would be room to view that the Defendant had justifiable grounds for its failure to perform the duty to enact improving legislation with respect to the provision at issue in this case. However, not only is there no confirmation that the Defendant continuously implemented policies commensurate with guaranteeing the access rights of persons with disabilities separately from the performance of the duty to enact improving legislation, but also, in light of the circumstances noted above—namely, that as of 2016, more than two-thirds of small-scale retail stores did not have adequate convenience facilities to guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities—it is difficult to find that the Defendant had justifiable grounds for its failure to perform the administrative legislative duty.
E) The principal content of the convenience facilities that the Plaintiffs demand be installed to guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities to small-scale retail stores is the removal of level differences at the main entrance or the installation of ramps. Such convenience facilities, unlike the installation of elevators or restrooms for persons with disabilities, do not require major changes to the structure of a building or occupy a significant separate space. They do not impose any restriction on non-disabled persons' use of the relevant facility, and can be installed at a relatively low cost. Even taking into account social and economic disruption or cost, it is difficult to find that the Defendant had justifiable grounds for withholding the amendment of the provision at issue in this case so as to expand the scope of small-scale retail stores subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities.
F) In conclusion, as a result of the Defendant's omission in failing to perform the administrative legislative duty with respect to the provision at issue in this case for more than 14 years, the legislative purpose and content of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which are intended to ensure that persons with disabilities can use facilities and equipment equally with non-disabled persons, remained unrealized for a lengthy period, and the degree of that failure to perform was so severe that the access rights of persons with physical disabilities, which the statutes sought to guarantee, became nominal and void. Accordingly, such omission is unlawful.
3. Determination on the State Compensation Claims of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2
A. Loss of Objective Legitimacy and Intent or Negligence
1) Relevant Legal Principles
Even if an act or omission by an administrative agency is subsequently determined to be unlawful, this alone cannot be deemed conclusively to constitute a tort due to the intent or negligence of a public official (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Da249219, decided June 30, 2021, etc.). State compensation liability under Article 2 of the State Compensation Act (국가배상법) may be established where, measured against the standard of an ordinary public official in general, a public official has neglected the objective duty of care in performing his or her duties, and as a result, the performance of such duties can be deemed to have lost objective legitimacy. Whether the performance of duties by a public official has lost objective legitimacy is to be determined comprehensively in consideration of various circumstances, including the manner and purpose of the act, whether and to what extent the victim was involved, the type of interest infringed, and the degree of damage, while also considering whether there is a substantive reason for the State to bear the liability to compensate for such damage (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da212610, decided August 30, 2022, etc.).
Meanwhile, even where a statute has granted an administrative agency discretion to enact administrative legislation, if, in light of the purpose and intent underlying the grant of such discretion, the administrative agency's failure to exercise its administrative legislative authority is so markedly unreasonable as to lack social propriety, such omission may be deemed to have lost objective legitimacy, and where objective legitimacy is found to have been lost, negligence on the part of the public official as provided under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act is also to be recognized, absent special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da77795, decided September 9, 2010).
2) Determination as to This Case
In light of the following circumstances found from the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the Defendant's omission in failing, for more than 14 years, to perform the duty to enact improving legislation with respect to the provision at issue in this case departed markedly from the purpose, intent, and content of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which granted discretion to determine, through administrative legislation, the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities, and thus constitutes an act lacking social propriety due to a marked loss of reasonableness, and may be deemed to have lost objective legitimacy. Accordingly, this constitutes an act "in violation of laws due to intent or negligence" of a public official as provided under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act.
A) The provision at issue in this case, by excluding more than 95% of small-scale retail stores from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities, resulted in rendering the legislative purpose and content of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities nominal and void. In light of the fact that the provision at issue in this case exempted most small-scale retail stores from the obligation to install convenience facilities, it would have been relatively clear, even measured against the standard of an ordinary public official in general, that the provision at issue in this case failed entirely to reflect the legislative purpose and content of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc. and the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities.
B) Organizations of persons with disabilities, as the victims of the unlawful administrative legislative omission concerning the provision at issue in this case, pointed out from the time the provision at issue in this case was first enacted that the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for small-scale retail stores as prescribed by the provision at issue in this case was excessively narrow. In particular, during the process of enacting the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, when Article 11 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities limited the scope of facilities subject to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to the facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities as prescribed in the provision at issue in this case, organizations of persons with disabilities repeatedly pointed out that, in order to fully realize the legislative purpose of the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., including the provision at issue in this case, needed to be amended.
C) The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which reviews the implementation status of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, expressed concern on October 29, 2014, that Korea's accessibility standards for buildings were limited by the size, volume, or date of construction of the building, and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, on December 14, 2017, recommended to the Minister of Health and Welfare that the provision at issue in this case be amended so as to guarantee accessibility of persons with disabilities to small-scale retail stores. Accordingly, it appears that public officials belonging to the Defendant could have fully recognized, through such observations by international organizations and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea regarding the provision at issue in this case, no later than the mid-2010s, that leaving the provision at issue in this case unamended for a lengthy period constituted an unlawful failure to perform the State's duty to guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities.
D) It is difficult to find any reasonable justification for the Defendant's failure to perform, over a lengthy period, the duty to enact improving legislation with respect to the provision at issue in this case, notwithstanding that the Defendant was fully capable of recognizing that duty. As a result of the Defendant's prolonged neglect of the duty to substantially guarantee the access rights of persons with disabilities under the Act on Promotion of Convenience of Persons with Disabilities, etc., the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, persons with disabilities suffered the harm of having to live their daily lives without enjoying the dignity and value as human beings (Article 10), the right to lead a life worthy of human beings (Article 34(1)), and the right to equality (Article 11) guaranteed by our Constitution.
E) As such, insofar as the State has severely neglected, over a lengthy period, its duty—repeatedly imposed through statutes and treaties—to guarantee the fundamental rights of its citizens, the failure to perform the duty to enact improving legislation with respect to the provision at issue in this case may be evaluated as markedly lacking in reasonableness and social propriety. Furthermore, if persons with disabilities suffered damage as a result of such omission, imposing liability for compensation on the State would allow the State's duty to guarantee fundamental rights to be fulfilled, even if only retrospectively, and thus there is a substantive reason to impose on the State the liability to compensate for such damage (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da212610, decided August 30, 2022).
B. Whether and to What Extent Mental Damages Are Recognized as Arising from the Unlawful Administrative Legislative Omission
1) Whether Solatium Is to Be Recognized
A) Relevant Legal Principles
Even though Article 3(5) of the State Compensation Act merely provides for the payment of solatium arising from the infringement of life or body, this cannot be deemed to exclude the duty to pay solatium arising from the infringement of rights other than life or body (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da6033, 6040, 6057, decided December 21, 1990, etc.). Even where the access rights of persons with disabilities have been infringed, the State's duty to pay solatium for the mental damage thereby suffered by persons with disabilities is not excluded.
[Reasoning] (continued)
Where the legislature has imposed on an administrative agency a duty to enact administrative legislation, and the administrative agency fails to perform this duty without justifiable cause or delays its performance for a long period, thereby infringing an individual's rights, whether this has caused the individual mental damage compensable by consolation money must be determined by comprehensively considering: the purpose and intent of the statute delegating the administrative legislation; the constitutional status or importance of the right infringed by the unlawful omission of administrative legislation; the degree and duration of the infringement; the circumstances under which the duty to enact administrative legislation went unfulfilled; and, even if the duty to enact administrative legislation was belatedly fulfilled, whether it can still be assessed that mental damage remains unremedied despite such belated fulfillment. It must also be taken into account that, in our legal system where no easy judicial remedy exists for the failure to perform a duty to enact administrative legislation, a claim for State compensation has significance as the most effective means of normative control and, practically speaking, the only remedy available.
나) Specific Determination
(1) The provision at issue in this case (이 사건 쟁점규정) excluded more than 95% of small retail stores, the overwhelming majority of such stores, from the facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities, and it was never amended even once in the more than 24 years since its enforcement date. Small retail stores are facilities used by the public that enable most citizens to conveniently purchase daily necessities close by whenever needed in their daily lives; they are closely related to the daily lives of citizens and play an essential role in sustaining citizens' daily lives by serving as suppliers of essential daily necessities. Consequently, where persons with disabilities' access to small retail stores is restricted, persons with disabilities are unable to freely use small retail stores on their own, and as a result they must continuously endure a situation in which their human dignity and worth are routinely infringed.
(2) The Defendant argues that, under the Act on Activity Support for Persons with Disabilities (장애인활동 지원에 관한 법률), enacted on January 4, 2011, persons with disabilities can access small retail stores lacking convenience facilities with the mobility assistance of activity assistants, and therefore the mere failure to perform the duty to improve the provision at issue cannot be deemed to have infringed the access rights of persons with disabilities. However, the access right of persons with disabilities is a right that serves as a precondition for realizing the human dignity and worth of making one's own decisions and acting freely accordingly. Therefore, even if persons with disabilities can access small retail stores with the help of others, such as activity assistants, under the relevant statutes, it is self-evident that the access right of persons with disabilities cannot be evaluated as fully guaranteed if persons with disabilities cannot access small retail stores by their own effort.
(3) During the 24 years since the provision at issue took effect, the National Assembly repeatedly expressed its intent to guarantee the access right of persons with disabilities as protected by the Constitution, through the enactment of the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities and Remedies for Infringement of Their Rights, etc. (장애인차별금지법, hereinafter the "Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act") and the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (장애인권리협약), and our society achieved rapid social, economic, and cultural growth, while public consensus that persons with disabilities should have equal rights with non-disabled persons also expanded. Nevertheless, the provision at issue, which restricts the access right of persons with disabilities to small retail stores, was left entirely unimproved, and as a result the suffering of persons with disabilities, whose human dignity and worth were routinely denied, inevitably continued for a long period. The mere fact that the provision at issue was amended on April 27, 2022 does not mean that all the suffering persons with disabilities have experienced in their daily lives during that time has been remedied, nor can it be evaluated that such suffering did not exist.
(4) The State has a duty under the Constitution, statutes, and treaties to protect persons with disabilities, who are socially vulnerable, and to guarantee them dignity and worth equal to that of non-disabled persons. This is also the responsibility of every State organ to achieve genuine social integration by removing physical barriers that block the full social participation of persons with disabilities and the realization of their equal rights, and by enabling persons with disabilities and non-disabled persons to coexist as equal members of society without discrimination, anywhere and at any time. Compensating for the suffering that persons with disabilities would have experienced due to the unlawful omission of administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue is not an act of sympathy or charity toward persons with disabilities, but rather has significance as a means of clarifying the State's responsibility for the unlawful omission of administrative legislation while at the same time urging the State to timely and appropriately fulfill its duty to enact administrative legislation and to implement active policies for the protection of persons with disabilities.
(5) Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay consolation money to Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, who are persons with physical disabilities.
2) Scope of Recognized Consolation Money
가) In cases of State compensation for failure to fulfill a duty to enact administrative legislation, there are the following special circumstances that must be considered in calculating consolation money. That is, since administrative legislation does not by itself directly change the rights and obligations of citizens unless a separate act of enforcement intervenes, the infringement of rights caused by the failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation remains at an abstract level. Furthermore, unlike other administrative acts, administrative legislation does not have a specifically identified counterparty but takes the entire citizenry as its addressee; therefore, compared to administrative acts that specifically target a particular group or individual, the degree of blameworthiness for a breach of the duty of office to protect the safety and interests of individual members of society is relatively lower, while the scope of persons as against whom State compensation liability may be recognized could be excessively expanded. Furthermore, it must also be considered that a judgment declaring the unlawfulness of the failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation can substantially remedy the victim's mental damage and can also sufficiently achieve judicial control over the State's unlawful act.
When a court calculates consolation money for the failure to fulfill a duty to enact administrative legislation, it must comprehensively consider, in addition to the factors for recognizing mental damage due to the failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation discussed above, whether the infringement of rights resulting therefrom is ordinarily of a nature that appears uniformly among a large number of victims, and the need for sanctioning and preventing the State's unlawful act, and must determine the amount of consolation money within its discretion.
나) According to the record, it appears that the main purpose for which Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, who are persons with physical disabilities, filed this lawsuit was to obtain a confirmation of the unlawfulness of the provision at issue. Furthermore, the manner and degree of the infringement of the access right of persons with disabilities caused by the unlawful failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation, and the inconvenience and suffering that persons with disabilities would have experienced, appear to be uniform among the persons with disabilities who will be protected by the amendment of the provision at issue, and there do not appear to be circumstances warranting a different view. Considering this, the Supreme Court in this case can sufficiently calculate the appropriate amount of consolation money for the above Plaintiffs based on the facts established by the court below.
다) Let us examine the appropriate amount of consolation money. It cannot be said that the disadvantage suffered by persons with physical disabilities from not having their access right guaranteed in their daily lives due to the long-term omission of administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue is minor. However, considering that the scope of victims who may assert this disadvantage is broad, and that the Defendant itself appears to have made efforts to resolve the unlawfulness resulting from the failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation, including by continuing to make further amendments since it amended the provision at issue on April 27, 2022, the appropriate amount of consolation money to compensate for the mental damage suffered by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, who are persons with physical disabilities, due to the unlawful omission of improvement legislation regarding the provision at issue is KRW 100,000 each.
3) Propriety of the Judgment Below
Nevertheless, the court below determined that, even though the Defendant's failure to fulfill the duty to enact administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue was unlawful, State compensation liability toward Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 could not be recognized on the ground that intent or negligence on the part of the Defendant was difficult to acknowledge. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the intent or negligence of public officials and the loss of objective legitimacy, which are prerequisites for the establishment of State compensation liability, and this error affected the judgment. The grounds of appeal by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 pointing this out are well-founded to the extent recognized above.
4. Determination on Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2's Claim for Damages under the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act
가. Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 argue that the Defendant's omission violated the State's duty to prevent and remedy discrimination against persons with disabilities as set forth in Article 8 of the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act, and accordingly also claim damages against the Defendant under Article 46(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act.
나. In this regard, the court below rejected Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2's claim for damages against the Defendant based on the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act, on the ground that "damages under the main text of Article 46(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act must be claimed against 'a person who committed the discriminatory act,' but the Defendant's omission of not expanding the facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities through amendment of the provision at issue, etc., does not constitute a discriminatory act as defined by the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act."
다. Upon examination based on the relevant statutes and the record, this determination by the court below is justified, and it contains no error, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning claims for damages under Article 46(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2's grounds of appeal on this point cannot be accepted.
5. Determination on Plaintiff 3's Claim for State Compensation
가. Even where a public official has violated a duty of office imposed on him or her with intent or negligence, the State is liable for damages only to the extent that a proximate causal relationship is recognized between the violation of the duty of office and the damage suffered by the victim. In order for such proximate causal relationship to be recognized, the content of the duty of office imposed on the public official must not be merely for the benefit of the public in general or for regulating internal order within the administrative agency, but must be established wholly or incidentally for the protection of the safety and interests of individual members of society (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da77795, decided September 9, 2010).
나. As discussed above, the Defendant's duty to enact improvement legislation regarding the provision at issue is recognized only within the scope of promoting the convenience of persons with disabilities, the elderly, and pregnant women under the Act on Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, the Elderly, Pregnant Women, etc. (장애인등편의증진법), and arose through the enforcement of the Anti-Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities Act, whose purpose is to realize human dignity and worth through the full social participation and realization of the equal rights of persons with disabilities. Therefore, the content of the duty to enact administrative legislation borne by the Defendant must also be viewed as having been established to guarantee the access right of persons with disabilities. Accordingly, the damage for which a proximate causal relationship is recognized as arising from the Defendant's failure to fulfill the duty to enact improvement legislation is limited to the damage suffered by persons with disabilities, whom that duty was intended to protect.
다. However, even according to Plaintiff 3's own allegations, Plaintiff 3, as a mother raising an infant, merely experienced inconvenience in using convenience stores, etc. lacking convenience facilities because she frequently went out pushing a stroller. While it is true that if the number of small retail stores obligated to install convenience facilities increases through the amendment of the provision at issue, this would enhance the convenience of Plaintiff 3, who frequently uses a stroller, this is merely a reflexive benefit enjoyed by non-disabled citizens as a result of the State's fulfillment of its duty to guarantee the access right of persons with disabilities. Therefore, it is difficult to view that Plaintiff 3, who is not a person with a disability, suffered damage having a proximate causal relationship with the Defendant's unlawful omission in this case.
라. The determination of the court below, which rejected Plaintiff 3's claim for State compensation against the Defendant, is justified in its conclusion, and therefore Plaintiff 3's grounds of appeal are without merit.
6. Conclusion
Therefore, the portion of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2's claims for State compensation, to the extent that payment is ordered below, is each reversed, and since this court finds it sufficient to render judgment directly on this portion of the case, the court renders judgment itself pursuant to Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법).
The Defendant is obligated to pay to Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, as State compensation, KRW 100,000 each, together with damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum as set forth in the Civil Act (민법) from November 3, 2018, the day following the date of service of a duplicate of the complaint in this case, until December 19, 2024, the date of pronouncement of this judgment, for which it is reasonable for the Defendant to contest the existence or scope of its obligation to perform, and at the rate of 12% per annum as set forth in the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진 등에 관한 특례법) from the following day until the date of full payment; accordingly, the part of the judgment of the first instance corresponding to this portion is each revoked, and the Defendant is ordered to pay each of the above amounts. The remaining appeal of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 and the appeal of Plaintiff 3 are all dismissed. The total litigation costs arising between Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, and the Defendant shall each be borne by the respective parties, and the costs of the appeal arising between Plaintiff 3 and the Defendant shall be borne by the losing party, and it is so ordered as set forth in the Order.
There is a separate opinion by Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Kwon Yeong-jun, and Justice Noh Kyung-pil regarding the nature of State compensation liability, in addition to which the opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous, and there is a concurring opinion by Justice Oh Kyung-mi and Justice Shin Suk-hee supplementing the majority opinion.
7. Separate Opinion by Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Kwon Yeong-jun, and Justice Noh Kyung-pil
가. Summary of the Separate Opinion
1) There is no reason not to agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that, because the Defendant's unlawful omission in failing for a long period to fulfill the duty to enact improvement legislation regarding the provision at issue infringed the access rights of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, who are persons with physical disabilities, the Defendant bears State compensation liability to pay them consolation money. However, the majority opinion holds that, for State compensation liability to be established, it is not sufficient that the Defendant's omission of administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue was unlawful; in addition, only where it can be found that the responsible public official neglected the objective duty of care and, as a result, the performance of official duties lost objective legitimacy, can it be said that there was an act "in violation of laws and regulations intentionally or negligently" under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act (국가배상법). Furthermore, the majority opinion set the consolation money for Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 at KRW 100,000 each.
2) The majority opinion, premised on the view that State compensation liability is the State's vicarious assumption of a public official's subjective liability for a tortious act (vicarious liability), requires, as a requirement for the establishment of State compensation liability, not only that the State's act be unlawful under public law, but also that the public official's subjective elements of liability—namely intent or negligence, i.e., neglect of the objective duty of care and loss of objective legitimacy—constitute a separate standard for determining unlawfulness. Accordingly, even where the State's act, which caused damage to citizens, is unlawful under public law, it may still be possible to deny the establishment of State compensation liability on the ground that the responsible public official did not neglect the objective duty of care or that the performance of official duties did not lose objective legitimacy.
3) However, in light of the fundamental-right nature of the right to claim State compensation as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Constitution, the State's duty to guarantee fundamental rights as set forth in the second sentence of Article 10 of the Constitution, the principle of the rule of law, which is a fundamental principle of the Constitution, and the requirement of uniform interpretation and application of statutes, it should be held that: ① so long as a citizen suffered damage due to an unlawful act of the State, the State must compensate for that damage without regard to whether the subjective liability of the public official who performed the duty is recognized; and ② even though the State's act, which caused damage to a citizen, is unlawful under public law, the State cannot be exempted from liability by applying a different standard for determining the unlawfulness of State compensation liability on the ground that the objective legitimacy of the act was not lost.
In this way, the Separate Opinion shares the same position as the majority opinion in recognizing the State's liability for compensation, but differs in its grounds. This is examined in detail below.
나. Regarding the Public Official's Subjective Liability as a Requirement for the Establishment of State Compensation Liability
1) State Compensation Liability as the State's Own Liability
The State compensation liability provided for in Article 29(1) of the Constitution is intended to realize the rule of law, a fundamental principle of the Constitution, by having the State itself eliminate the unlawful result when a citizen suffers damage due to the State's tortious act, and to fulfill the State's duty to guarantee fundamental rights under the second sentence of Article 10 of the Constitution by having the State subsequently remedy, even if belatedly, the damage suffered by citizens due to the State's unlawful act. Therefore, State compensation liability should be understood not merely as the State's vicarious assumption of an individual public official's civil tort liability, but as "self-liability" whereby the State itself bears responsibility when it causes damage to citizens through an unlawful act.
가) The State's liability for compensation has as its ideological foundation the overcoming of the modern notion of State irresponsibility, an ethic of responsibility for the integration of the social community, and the protection and realization of fundamental-right values against unlawful acts by public officials. Since the principle of the rule of law presupposes the lawful exercise of public power by the State, it requires the State to eliminate, as broadly as possible, the results of unlawful acts, and to effectively compensate citizens who suffered damage due to unlawfully exercised public power. In this respect, the State compensation liability system is rooted in the principle of the rule of law. The right to claim State compensation also constitutes part of the constitutional remedy system, in that damages function as a secondary remedy guaranteeing relief in cases where the facts have already been completed and primary remedies aimed at eliminating the unlawfulness cannot function (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ba395, decided April 30, 2015).
나) In consideration of the importance of the right to claim State compensation, our Constitution has guaranteed the right to claim State compensation as a constitutional fundamental right from the Constitution of the Republic of Korea as first enacted (제헌헌법) to the current Constitution. Article 27 of the first Constitution provided first for the individual public official's responsibility to citizens, and then provided for the citizen's right to claim State compensation for a public official's unlawful act in the course of duty. In this way, the first Constitution, by providing for the individual public official's liability and State compensation liability successively within a single provision, left room for interpretation that State compensation liability was of the same nature as the individual public official's liability and was established on the premise of the individual public official's liability.
However, unlike the first Constitution, the current Constitution provides for the individual public official's responsibility to citizens in Article 7, located in Chapter 1, General Provisions, while separately providing for State compensation liability in Article 29 of Chapter 2, which sets forth citizens' fundamental rights. In light of this structure of the current Constitution, it becomes clearer that the individual public official's liability and the State's liability are liabilities of different natures that may be recognized independently of each other.
다) It is true that Article 29(1) of the Constitution provides that State compensation liability is established where there is "a public official's unlawful act in the course of duty." However, it cannot be concluded that the term "unlawful act (불법행위)" as used in the Constitution and statutes necessarily presupposes the concept of an individual's subjective liability as set forth in Article 750 of the Civil Act (민법). For example, this is similar to how the "unlawful act (불법행위)" referred to in Article 320 of the Civil Act, as the cause that precludes the establishment of a lien where possession arises from an unlawful act, is interpreted differently from the "unlawful act (불법행위)" set forth in Article 750 of the Civil Act. The term "unlawful act" as used in the Constitution and statutes should be interpreted as having its own distinct meaning depending on the purpose of the system in which the term is used. The meaning of "a public official's unlawful act in the course of duty" as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Constitution must likewise be determined by comprehensively considering the significance and legislative purpose of the State compensation liability system established by the Constitution.
라) State compensation liability is intended to allow the State's constitutional duty to guarantee fundamental rights to be realized, even if belatedly, in cases where the State fails to fulfill its duty under the second sentence of Article 10 of the Constitution to guarantee citizens' fundamental rights and, as a result, causes damage to a citizen through an unlawful act. Such State compensation liability is rooted in the principle of the rule of law, a fundamental principle of our Constitution, and as noted above, the principle of the rule of law requires the State to eliminate, as broadly as possible, the results of unlawful acts. Therefore, to require citizens to bear the damage they suffered due to the State's unlawful act on the ground that the individual public official's intent or negligence is not recognized cannot be regarded as a result faithful to the State's duty to guarantee fundamental rights to its citizens or to the principle of the rule of law.
마) In modern society, functional interdependence in various aspects of people's life relationships is increasing, necessitating new logic of liability accordingly. For example, just as, in the private-law sphere, adherence solely to the traditional principle of fault-based liability made it difficult to achieve a fair social distribution of damage and sacrifice, leading to the emergence of theories of liability for hazardous activities or strict liability, there is likewise a need in the public-law sphere for a form of State liability capable of securing social fairness. Rather, in light of the fact that, unlike civil liability, State compensation liability has as its ideological foundation the realization of distributive justice within the social community or the securing of social fairness (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ba395, decided April 30, 2015), the need to recognize State compensation liability from a new perspective, rather than adhering to the traditional theory of fault-based liability, is all the greater.
바) Under Article 23(3) of the Constitution, the State has a duty to provide just compensation even to citizens whose property rights have been restricted by the State's lawful act. However, if the State compensation liability set forth in the Constitution is understood, in accordance with the traditional principle of fault-based liability, as being established only where the public official's civil tort liability is recognized, this could result in citizens who suffered damage due to the State's unlawful act receiving no compensation at all, simply because the public official's civil tort liability is not recognized. Our Constitution provides for a duty of just compensation even where a citizen's property rights are restricted by the State's lawful act; it is difficult to conclude that the Constitution broadly contemplated circumstances in which the State's duty to compensate would be exempted even where a citizen suffered damage due to the State's unlawful act.
사) If, as the majority opinion holds, "a public official's unlawful act in the course of duty" under Article 29(1) of the Constitution is interpreted as a concept premised on the individual public official's liability as recognized under the traditional principle of fault-based liability, this would result in a situation contrary to the systematic interpretation of the Constitution, in which, even though damage occurred due to the State's unlawful act, the unlawful result is not eliminated and the infringement of the citizen's rights continues to be left unaddressed. Therefore, "a public official's unlawful act in the course of duty" under Article 29(1) of the Constitution should be understood to mean not that the State's tortious act is established on condition of the individual public official's intent or negligence, but that the State's tortious act is realized through the performance of the public official's duties. That is, Article 29(1) of the Constitution should be interpreted as a provision that constitutionally guarantees the right of a citizen who has suffered damage due to the State's tortious act, realized through the performance of a public official's duties, to directly claim just compensation against the State, and it cannot be interpreted as a provision establishing State compensation liability on the premise of the individual public official's subjective tort liability.
2) Regarding the Meaning of "Intent or Negligence" under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act
가) While Article 29(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right to claim State compensation, it reserves the specific content thereof to be concretely formed through statute. Accordingly, Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act (국가배상법), enacted pursuant to this provision, provides that "where a public official causes damage to another person by violating laws and regulations intentionally or negligently in the course of performing official duties, the State or a local government shall compensate for such damage," thereby establishing the public official's "intent or negligence," which is not set forth in Article 29(1) of the Constitution, as a requirement for the establishment of State compensation liability; this can be viewed as having concretized the "unlawful act," which is the requirement for the establishment of State compensation liability under Article 29(1) of the Constitution (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ba395, decided April 30, 2015).
나) However, as seen earlier, insofar as the State liability for damages guaranteed under the Constitution is understood as the State's own liability (self-liability), interpreting "intent or negligence" under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act (국가배상법), which is a subordinate statute, as a requirement premised on the subjective liability of an individual public official would unduly restrict the scope of the right to claim State compensation guaranteed to the people by the Constitution. Such an interpretation is therefore inconsistent with the nature of State liability for damages presupposed by the Constitution.
다) Rather, interpreting "intent or negligence" under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act as fault in the performance of public duties by public officials arising from defects in administrative organization or operation is an interpretation that fully realizes the right to claim State compensation guaranteed to the people by our Constitution and implements the principle of the rule of law through broad control of the legality of the State's illegal acts, and is consistent with the nature of State liability for damages as set forth in Article 29(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has already held that, for State liability for damages to be established, it is not necessary to recognize intent or negligence on the part of an individual public official, and that it is sufficient if, viewing as a whole a series of State actions involving numerous public officials over a broad scope, a violation of the objective duty of care is recognized, thereby acknowledging that "intent or negligence" under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act may differ from the traditional principle of fault-based liability (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da212610, decided August 30, 2022, which recognized State liability for damages to individual citizens based on a series of State actions ranging from the issuance to the application and enforcement of Emergency Measure No. 9).
라) By contrast, Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da38677, decided February 15, 1996, which held that where a public official's illegal act is based on intent or gross negligence, that act cannot be attributed to the State, and Supreme Court Decision 87Daka1164, decided September 22, 1987, which held that negligence in the performance of a public official's duties means only subjective negligence, should all be overruled.
다. Regarding the requirement of "loss of objective legitimacy" as the standard for determining illegality in State liability for damages
1) The meaning of the requirement of loss of objective legitimacy
가) The Supreme Court has held that, in State liability for damages, a public official's harmful act must be "in violation of laws and regulations," and that violation of laws and regulations means not only violation in the strict sense but broadly encompasses acts that "lack objective legitimacy," including violations of respect for human rights, the prohibition of abuse of power, good faith, and public order and good morals (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da22607, decided May 17, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da95666, decided July 26, 2012; and Supreme Court Decision 2018Da224408, decided September 29, 2022, among others). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even where an administrative disposition has been revoked in an appeal litigation, this does not immediately and conclusively establish State liability for damages, and that State liability for damages can only be established where it is recognized that the public official in charge of the administrative disposition lacked the objective duty of care as measured against an ordinary public official, such that the administrative disposition "lost objective legitimacy" (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da70600, decided May 12, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2017Da233061, decided April 28, 2022, among others).
나) In this way, the Supreme Court views the standard for determining illegality in State liability for damages as different from the standard for determining illegality under public law generally applicable to State actions, and regards "loss of objective legitimacy" as the standard for determining such illegality. Premised on the foregoing legal principle, the majority opinion, after confirming the illegality under public law of the failure to enact administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue in this case, additionally determined whether that omission lost objective legitimacy, and only then affirmed the establishment of State liability for damages.
2) Whether the requirement of "loss of objective legitimacy" is necessary
가) However, even where it has been concluded that a State act is illegal under public law, requiring a separate element of "loss of objective legitimacy" in order to determine whether that act satisfies the illegality requirement under the State Compensation Act is inconsistent with the legal nature of State liability for damages as "self-liability under public law," and is improper as it causes systemic confusion. The specific grounds are as follows.
(1) If State liability for damages is deemed to be established only where a public official has violated laws and regulations in the strict sense, the scope of recognized illegality would become excessively narrow, which may be insufficient for the relief of citizens' rights; thus, there is ample need to broaden the scope of recognized illegality beyond that. However, even without invoking the requirement of "loss of objective legitimacy," there is sufficient room to expand the scope of recognized illegality through general principles of public law. That is, the violations of "respect for human rights, the prohibition of abuse of power, good faith, and public order and good morals," which the Supreme Court's existing case law has cited as examples of a lack of objective legitimacy, can likewise be recognized as illegal acts through the application of general principles of public law such as the principle of equality, the principle of proportionality, the duty of good faith and the principle of prohibition of abuse of authority, the principle of protection of trust, and the principle of prohibition of improper linkage. Moreover, since the Framework Act on Administrative Procedures (행정기본법), enacted March 23, 2021, has codified the aforementioned general principles of public law into statute, where a State's administrative action violates such general principles of public law, this can itself also constitute a violation of laws and regulations in the strict sense.
(2) As emphasized above, the State compensation system must be understood as a public law system guaranteed as a fundamental right of the people under Article 29(1) of the Constitution, and not merely a system whereby the State assumes, on behalf of public officials, their liability for tort under private law. In light of this public law nature of the State compensation system, it is likewise sufficient that illegality, as a requirement for the establishment of State liability for damages, be determined according to general principles of public law, and there is no need to establish a separate requirement such as "loss of objective legitimacy." Establishing a standard for determining illegality of "loss of objective legitimacy" separately from the existing public law standard for determining whether a State act is illegal amounts to applying multiple standards of illegality to the same act, resulting in an unnecessary restriction on citizens' rights.
(3) It has also been pointed out that "loss of objective legitimacy" is a requirement that does not exist anywhere in the State Compensation Act, and that the courts' recognition of it as a requirement for the establishment of State liability for damages has only added to the confusion. As seen above, while the Supreme Court treats "loss of objective legitimacy" as the standard for determining illegality, in a State compensation case arising from an illegal refusal to reappoint a national or public university faculty member, the Supreme Court held that in order to recognize "intent or negligence," the refusal to reappoint must have reached the degree of loss of objective legitimacy (Supreme Court Decision 2009Da30946, decided January 27, 2011), thereby treating the requirement of loss of objective legitimacy as if it were a standard for determining intent or negligence, making it difficult to understand it as a consistent requirement.
나) Ultimately, insofar as State liability for damages is viewed as self-liability under public law, there is no need to maintain the requirement of loss of objective legitimacy as a requirement for the establishment of State liability for damages or as a standard for determining illegality. By contrast, Supreme Court Decision 99Da70600, decided May 12, 2000, and Supreme Court Decision 2000Da22607, decided May 17, 2002, which held that State liability for damages under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act can only be established where a public official's performance of duties lacked objective legitimacy, should all be overruled.
라. Regarding the basis and amount for calculating consolation money
1) Insofar as State liability for damages is understood as the State's own liability under public law for its illegal acts, the standards and methods for calculating consolation money in State compensation liability must necessarily differ from those for calculating consolation money in tort under the Civil Act. This is even more so considering that the primary function of State liability for damages lies not in civil compensation for individual damage but in realizing the principle of the rule of law through confirmation of the State's illegal acts and sanctions against them. Accordingly, in recognizing consolation money on the ground that an individual's rights were infringed by a State's illegal act, priority may be given to normative considerations—such as whether it is necessary to officially declare the illegality of the State act at issue by recognizing consolation money and thereby prevent similar illegality in the future through sanctions—rather than a strict assessment of the degree of mental damage suffered by the victim. Furthermore, the amount of such consolation money may also be set at a somewhat symbolic amount reflecting these normative considerations.
2) The court below and the first instance court denied State liability for damages on the ground that neither intent or negligence on the part of a public official nor loss of objective legitimacy of the performance of duties was recognized, and thus it is difficult to say that they sufficiently examined the mental damage suffered by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2. If the State Compensation Act is understood as self-liability, normative considerations may be given priority in determining the amount of consolation money; accordingly, even the Supreme Court, as a court of law, need not remand this part of the case to the fact-finding court, but may directly assess the mental damage of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 normatively and set the consolation money for each at the somewhat symbolic amount of KRW 100,000.
3) The majority opinion, while following the theory of vicarious liability—under which State liability for damages is understood as the State's assumption, on behalf of the individual public official, of the public official's civil liability—nevertheless set the amount of consolation money for the mental damage suffered by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 at KRW 100,000 each. Since the normative nature of consolation money is recognized even under civil law, and since the Supreme Court has determined that there is no need or practical benefit in further examining the existence of mental damage, it cannot be said that the majority opinion, while adopting the theory of vicarious liability, erred logically in directly determining the amount of consolation money. However, it should be pointed out that, if the nature of State liability for damages is understood as self-liability, the grounds on which the Supreme Court directly determined the consolation money for Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 in this case become more persuasive.
마. Conclusion
1) Insofar as it is determined that the failure to enact administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue in this case is illegal under public law, absent special circumstances, it must be held that there was an act "in violation of laws and regulations by intent or negligence" as provided in Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act. Nevertheless, the judgment below erred in denying the establishment of State liability for damages on the ground that, even though the failure to enact administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue in this case was illegal, intent or negligence could not be recognized on the part of the Defendant.
2) The majority opinion, too, having determined that the Defendant's failure to enact administrative legislation was illegal, additionally determined whether that omission had lost objective legitimacy by being remarkably unreasonable and lacking social justifiability. Although this majority opinion is reasonable in its conclusion, it has the limitation of overlooking the nature of State liability for damages as self-liability under public law, thereby maintaining and exacerbating confusion regarding the requirements for the establishment of State liability for damages.
3) Thus, while I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the Defendant is liable to compensate the mental damage suffered by Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 due to the illegal failure to enact administrative legislation regarding the provision at issue in this case, I set forth this separate opinion because my specific reasons and grounds differ.
8. Concurring Opinion of Justice Oh Kyung-mi and Justice Shin Sook-hee to the Majority Opinion
가. There is a slogan, "A Life with a Ground Floor." There is also a public interest project called "Everyone's Ground Floor." Because much of a person's private and public, large and small, encounters and activities in the course of life take place inside buildings, the sharing of the "ground floor," which is the starting point of the passage to reach them, carries the important meaning of equal participation in everyday life. For a wheelchair-using person with a disability, even a mere 2cm threshold obstructs access to the ground floor. For a person with a physical disability, thresholds and stairs can be like the boundary between life and death. If ramps are installed at thresholds and stairs, wheelchair-using persons with disabilities can also join "everyone" who shares the ground floor. Such a right constitutes the core of the freedom to act freely according to one's own decisions and the right to pursue happiness. In this respect, the thresholds or stairs installed at the entrances of small retail stores symbolize the discrimination and exclusion that prevent persons with disabilities from living, in their daily lives, as beings possessing human dignity and worth equal to that of non-disabled persons.
This case is not simply about whether persons with disabilities should be able to additionally enjoy the convenience of purchasing goods at small retail stores in addition to online shopping malls or large discount stores. Rather, the thresholds and stairs at issue in this case raise a core question as to how our society should guarantee the right of persons with disabilities to enjoy human dignity and worth equally with non-disabled persons in their daily lives. In the process of seeking an answer to that question, we supplement the majority opinion in order to examine what role the courts should play in interpreting and applying the Constitution and statutes that guarantee accessibility rights for persons with disabilities, and to suggest the direction in which we should proceed to effectively guarantee accessibility rights for persons with disabilities.
나. The majority of non-disabled persons, who have no experience of disability, are unlikely to recognize that thresholds or stairs are symbols of discrimination and exclusion for persons with disabilities, and tend to regard them as trivial matters. For non-disabled persons, thresholds or stairs cause no particular inconvenience in daily life, and rather even provide some utility in distinguishing the outside from the inside. As a result, it is difficult for non-disabled persons to understand the necessity of expending social costs to remove thresholds or stairs. Such ordinary indifference likely contributed to the fact that the provision at issue in this case remained unamended and neglected for more than 24 years after the enforcement of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc.
Upon reflection, the experience of persons with disabilities living in our society, filled with buildings whose ground floors are studded everywhere with thresholds and stairs, may be similar to that of a non-disabled person visiting a city of "invisible people" with the ability to pass through solid matter, only to find all the entrance doors of the ground floors locked, or with no doors at all. The residents of that city pass in and out of countless shops and stores without any restriction, using their ability to pass through solid matter, but a non-disabled traveler cannot enter. He may even be forced to sleep on the street because he cannot find a hotel. Only by experiencing the position of a person with a disability does a non-disabled person come to realize that, in daily life, thresholds and stairs are social devices and barriers of exclusion that make persons with disabilities feel a fundamental doubt about their own dignity and worth. Only by making an effort to understand the world from the perspective of persons with disabilities, on the premise that they too are equal members of society, can we know what persons with disabilities are deprived of while living in this society, and what conveniences must be provided to guarantee them substantive equality.
In order to ensure that all members of society equally enjoy human dignity, the supreme value pursued by our Constitution, it is essential to imagine the lives and experiences of others and, in that process, to understand and empathize with the suffering of others. Through this process, we can build an environment and system in which minorities of diverse backgrounds and characteristics are not marginalized, recover their rightful share, and can fully pursue their individuality and ideals in this society.
다. Let us consider the role of the courts in interpreting and applying the Constitution and statutes that guarantee accessibility rights for persons with disabilities, in light of the right to a trial provided under Article 27(1) of the Constitution. In the realms of legislation and administration, where the principle of majority rule prevails, minorities who must bear disadvantages without being able to fully assert their legitimate interests have, through the constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial, the opportunity to demand, in an open courtroom, correction of infringements upon their fundamental rights and to actively advocate for their rights and interests. Moreover, the courts, as a neutral adjudicating body, can directly confront minorities through the process of oral argument and, by listening to their problem-raising and assertions, can carefully examine the objective realities of the lives of minorities that they might not otherwise directly experience, and the impact of discriminatory treatment on their lives, thereby being able to provide reasonable authoritative answers to the problems they raise (see the Concurring Opinion of Justice Kim Sang-hwan and Justice Oh Kyung-mi to the majority opinion in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2023Du36800, decided July 18, 2024).
In this case, through this lawsuit, Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 actively asserted in an open courtroom how a mere 2cm threshold or stairs function as a barrier to them as persons with physical disabilities, how widespread the barriers to accessibility for persons with disabilities are at small retail stores in our country, how much they had hoped that the enactment of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc. and the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities would finally guarantee persons with disabilities the freedom to engage in daily activities equally with non-disabled persons, and how their hopes were frustrated by the Defendant's prolonged legislative omission. The courts below were able to listen to and examine the reality of the discriminatory daily lives these plaintiffs faced. In particular, the first instance court, after such oral argument proceedings, held that the provision at issue in this case was illegal and void because, contrary to the intent of the delegation under the parent statute, it failed to fulfill the duty to substantively guarantee accessibility for persons with disabilities, thereby infringing upon the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities; this determination served as one impetus for the Defendant to amend the provision at issue in this case approximately two months after that judgment. It can be said to be the result of these plaintiffs, who as persons with disabilities had long been unable to fully assert their legitimate interests in the realms of legislation and administration and had to bear disadvantages, raising, through an open forum of litigation, the experiences and suffering they endured as minorities, and receiving through the courts a reasonable authoritative answer, while simultaneously gaining the empathy and support of members of society. Subsequently, the Supreme Court also, through the public oral argument in this case, had the opportunity to directly hear the personal experiences of persons with disabilities regarding thresholds and stairs, thereby gaining, if only slightly, an opportunity to understand the world from the perspective of persons with disabilities, and came to reach this en banc judgment, concluding that the weight of the mental suffering endured by persons with disabilities during the period in which the Defendant's illegal omission continued was serious enough to warrant consolation through State compensation.
라. The amendment of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc. regarding facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities, including the provision at issue in this case, remains insufficient. This is because the guarantee of accessibility rights is also urgently needed for existing small retail stores and the like that have already been installed, but this aspect has been excluded. Item (a) and item (b) of subparagraph 2 of [Attached Table 1] of Article 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc., including the provision at issue in this case, were amended by Presidential Decree No. 32607 on April 27, 2022, and accordingly, the floor area standard for excluding small retail stores from facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities was reduced from the previous "less than 300㎡" to "less than 50㎡." In addition, the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities was also greatly expanded with respect to facilities used by the public as provided in item (a) and item (b) of subparagraph 2 of the above [Attached Table 1] (hereinafter "facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b)"), such as snack bars, bakeries, barbershops, beauty salons, public bathhouses, medical clinics, and Oriental medicine clinics (the provisions amended as above are hereinafter referred to as "the amended provisions at issue"). However, the Addenda to the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc. (April 27, 2022) provided that the amended provisions at issue shall take effect on May 1, 2022 (Article 1), while providing that facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b) that were installed before that effective date shall be governed by the provisions prior to the amendment (Article 2(1) of the Addenda, hereinafter "the Addenda provision at issue"). As a result, even though the amended provisions at issue have come into effect, most facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b), including existing small retail stores, are governed by the provisions prior to the amendment and thus still bear no obligation to install convenience facilities.
During the 24 years from the enforcement of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc. until the amendment of the provision at issue in this case, our society underwent a process of rapid urbanization and modernization, and countless sturdy buildings were newly constructed using new architectural technologies and methods. The lifespan of such buildings is considerably long. Facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b), such as existing small retail stores installed in the numerous buildings constructed as described above, are not subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities under the amended provisions at issue and the Addenda provision at issue. If the obligation to install convenience facilities is imposed only on facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b) that will be newly installed in the future, the scope of such expansion will be very limited, no matter how much the scope of facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities is expanded. This is because, given the nature of facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b), which typically operate within sturdy buildings, the majority of such existing facilities can retain their thresholds and stairs as they are for as long as those sturdy buildings continue to exist. As a result, the accessibility rights of persons with disabilities will remain restricted until some future point in time when most existing buildings are reconstructed and convenience facilities for persons with disabilities are installed in the small retail stores and the like that move into the new buildings. It is difficult to readily accept that the exemption from the obligation to install convenience facilities for the numerous existing small retail stores and other facilities used by the public under items (a) and (b) installed in existing buildings over the more than 24 years since the enforcement of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc., resulting in a broad state of restriction, will continue to be maintained in the future through the Addenda provision at issue.
Indeed, disability organizations, including the Plaintiffs, are concerned that even after the amendment of item (a) and item (b) of subparagraph 2 of [Attached Table 1] of Article 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc., including the provision at issue in this case, infringements on accessibility rights will continue for a long time to come due to existing small retail stores and the like that remain exempt from the obligation to install convenience facilities. It can by no means be interpreted that the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc., the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities have deferred the point in time at which accessibility rights for persons with disabilities are realized to the distant future, when most buildings are reconstructed. The Defendant should amend the amended provision at issue and the Addenda provision at issue to impose, in stages, the obligation to install convenience facilities even on existing small retail stores and the like, so as to substantively guarantee accessibility rights for persons with disabilities. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the approach of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of Convenience for Persons with Disabilities, etc., which limits the facilities subject to the obligation to install convenience facilities for persons with disabilities to only a portion of facilities based on scale such as floor area, requires fundamental reconsideration.
마. The late Mr. Kim, a wheelchair-using person with a disability, in a suicide note dated September 19, 1984, lamented the pain and sense of alienation in his life caused by the restrictions on accessibility he had to endure throughout his daily life, and sounded an alarm by strongly denouncing the indifference and discrimination of our society that caused these restrictions. "Why must we turn back, enduring our hunger, at the thresholds of restaurants embedded in every alley? Why must we fight against those thresholds just to drink a mouthful of water to quench our thirst? The streets of Seoul, which give us no space in which to move at all... (omitted) Those who have never experienced it themselves, who have never felt it in their own skin, can never understand. Persons with disabilities are not treated as human beings. I tried hard to achieve even a small dream, but as time passes, society only makes me weaker." This appeal and cry still resonate deeply, even 40 years later. That is the essential problem confronting this case.
The view that approaches disabled persons' right of access to small retail stores merely as a question of whether they can purchase daily necessities at such stores only deepens their suffering. If it were only about the act of purchasing itself, this could be replaced by having a personal assistant make purchases at large discount stores, which are cheaper and better equipped with convenience facilities, or online shopping could serve as a convenient alternative. However, the issue of disabled persons' access to small retail stores is not a matter of "shopping" but a matter of life itself. Non-disabled persons do not worry in advance about whether they will be able to gain access when they happen to run into a friend at lunchtime and go to a restaurant or coffee shop, when they suddenly think of something on their way home and stop by a bookstore or flower shop, or when they suddenly have a stomachache and use a pharmacy or visit a neighborhood clinic. The daily life of disabled persons should be the same. This is because planned "shopping" can be replaced by large discount stores and online shopping, but the daily "life" made up of chance and spontaneity cannot be replaced. Although understanding of and empathy for disabled persons, who are a minority, has broadened considerably compared to 1984, whether it is sufficient remains questionable. On this issue, while listening to the voices of the disabled persons themselves, our society must constantly reflect on whether it is yet another "city of invisible people." The distinction between disability and non-disability is relative. The systems and structures that organize the framework of daily life within society determine disability and non-disability. In a city of "invisible people," a person lacking the ability to pass through walls would be evaluated as disabled. This is because systems and structures created on the standard of the "invisible person" would determine disability and non-disability based on the presence or absence of the ability to pass through. In a society where the disabled persons' right to mobility and right of access are properly guaranteed, a wheelchair user who can go anywhere might no longer be considered disabled. What makes disabled persons disabled may be the world that non-disabled persons have built centered on themselves, excluding them. I express this concurring opinion in the hope that the day will come sooner when all disabled persons in our society have their rights guaranteed without discrimination.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Judge), Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice No Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Oh Kyung-mi, Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Gyeong-hwan, Justice Kwon Yeong-jun, Justice Eom Sang-pil, Justice Shin Suk-hee, Justice No Gyeong-pil, Justice Park Yeong-jae, Justice Lee Suk-yeon (Justice in charge)