Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 2006두4127

Revocation of Non-Payment of Survivor Benefits, etc. (유족급여등부지급처분취소)유족급여등부지급처분취소

Decided2008. 09. 25. Court대법원The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the deceased worker's family, reversing the lower court's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings recognizing the death as a work-related accident.
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A worker who stayed at the office until late at night to handle urgent company business died in a traffic accident while driving home, as public transportation was no longer available at that hour. The Supreme Court held that because the employee had no realistic choice but to drive home under these circumstances, his commute was effectively under the employer's control, making his death compensable as an industrial accident (업무상 재해). The lower court's ruling denying industrial accident status was reversed and remanded.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA worker died in a car accident while driving home after working late into the night on urgent company business, as public transit was unavailable.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that since driving was the only realistic option, the commute was under the employer's control, qualifying the death as an industrial accident.
  • LessonEmployers should recognize that requiring or enabling late-night work without providing safe transportation options can extend their liability to accidents occurring during employees' subsequent commutes home.
Issues
  • Whether a traffic accident occurring during a worker's commute home qualifies as an industrial accident (업무상 재해)
  • The standard for determining when a commute is under the employer's control and management (지배·관리)
  • Whether the worker had genuine autonomy in choosing the method of transportation for the commute
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court reasoned that when late-night work makes public transportation unavailable, an employee's decision to drive home is not truly a free personal choice but a practical necessity created by the employer's work demands. In such situations, the method of commuting is not left to the worker's own discretion but is effectively dictated by the employer's operational control. Since the deceased had no other reasonable means of getting home, the commute fell under the employer's objective control and management (지배·관리) at the time of the accident. Therefore, the fatal traffic accident that occurred under these constrained circumstances should be recognized as an industrial accident eligible for survivor benefits.

Full text (English, AI translation) 8,391 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant]

[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (근로복지공단)
[Lower Court Judgment] Busan High Court Judgment 2005Nu4076, decided January 27, 2006

[Order]

The lower court judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.

[Reasoning]

We examine the grounds of appeal.

"Occupational accident" under Article 4, Item 1 of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, before its full amendment by Act No. 8373 on April 11, 2007; hereinafter the "Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act") means an accident that occurs due to the performance of work duties or ordinary activities incidental thereto, based on an employment contract between a worker and an employer, while under the employer's control and supervision. In general, even though a worker's commute to and from work is closely and inseparably related to the work of providing labor, insofar as the choice of the means and route of commuting is left to the worker, the mere fact that the means and route of commuting chosen by the worker were ordinary cannot make an accident occurring during the commute an occupational accident. However, conversely, where the process of commuting can be regarded as being under the employer's control and supervision, an accident occurring during the commute may also constitute an occupational accident (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du12572, decided September 28, 2007). This includes cases where a worker uses transportation provided by the employer, or where the employer has the worker use transportation equivalent thereto (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du121, decided April 23, 2004), as well as cases where, although on its face the choice of the means and route of commuting appears to have been left to the worker, the worker actually performed work duties during the commute, or, due to urgent work-related matters before or after the ordinary commuting hours, or due to the nature of the work or the particularities of the workplace, there was in fact no room for choice regarding the means of commuting, such that it cannot be said that the choice was truly left to the worker, and it is determined that the commute is, in social norms, extremely closely and inseparably related to the work (see Supreme Court Decisions 2002Du10124, decided November 25, 2004; 2002Du12298, decided November 25, 2004; 2005Du4458, decided September 29, 2005; 2006Du2022, decided March 27, 2008; and 2006Du15660, decided April 24, 2008). In such cases, there exists a direct and close internal relationship between the accident occurring during the commute and the work, such that the accident may be regarded as having occurred due to work-related causes under the employer's control and supervision.

According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: the deceased, who had been an assistant manager in the general affairs department of the non-party company since joining on October 10, 2004, was in charge of various duties as stated in the judgment, including employee salaries and document dispatch, and had been commuting to work at around 08:00 and leaving work at around 21:00 to 23:00; on October 29 of that year (the lower court's reference to October 28 is clearly a clerical error), after finishing work at around 19:30, she participated in a dinner gathering with employees of the company's management office, returned to the company at around 22:00 the same day to handle remaining work, left work at around 23:30 the same day driving a passenger car registered in her mother's name, and at around 00:08 on October 30, the following day, caused a traffic accident by colliding with a utility pole on the sidewalk, dying at around 02:20 the same day. Based on these findings, the lower court determined that even though the deceased died in this traffic accident that occurred while she was driving home after working until 23:30 the night before the accident, and even though it was late at night when it would have been difficult to use other means of public transportation such as taxis, such circumstances alone were insufficient to find that the deceased's process of commuting home was under the control and supervision of the non-party company, the employer, or that the above passenger car was transportation equivalent to that provided by the employer; therefore, the deceased's death could not be regarded as an occupational accident. Furthermore, the lower court determined that even if the deceased suffered the traffic accident due to drowsy driving caused by overwork, this could not be considered to fall within the scope of risk ordinarily accompanying fatigue arising from the performance of her duties, and thus there was no proximate causal relationship between the deceased's work and her death resulting from the accident.

However, according to the evidence adopted by the lower court and the record, the following circumstances may be identified: since joining the company, the deceased had come to work almost every day, including holidays, and had continued to work extended hours into the night; this was due to the operational necessity of the non-party company, which was preparing for its opening ceremony, and the volume of work the deceased was handling at the time was objectively excessive for one person to manage alone; the dinner gathering the day before the accident was an official company gathering that had been planned in advance, following the company's opening ceremony held the previous day, which the deceased attended without consuming alcohol, and after the gathering ended, the deceased, along with a total of four employees, returned to the company under the guidance of the head of the general affairs department to handle remaining work, and at around 23:30, at the recommendation of the head of the general affairs department, left work, driving the above passenger car from the company located in Changwon City along the ordinary route toward her home located in Jinhae City. Examining the facts found by the lower court together with the above circumstances in light of the legal principles set forth above, there is substantial room to find that the deceased, a 26-year-old unmarried woman, had, at the time of the accident, continued working until late at night due to urgent business necessity of the company, and, since it was difficult to use public transportation such as taxis or buses, had no reasonable alternative but to commute home, located outside the city, using the above passenger car, which appears to have been prepared in anticipation of frequent night work. If that is the case, it cannot be said that the choice of the means and route of commuting at the time of this accident was in fact left to the deceased; rather, it should be regarded as having been under the objective control and supervision of the company, the employer, and therefore the deceased's death may be found to constitute an occupational accident under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act.

Furthermore, under such circumstances, it cannot be concluded that this traffic accident occurred solely due to the deceased's careless driving, unrelated to her work.

Nevertheless, the lower court, without fully examining whether the exceptional circumstances necessary for determining an accident occurring during a commute to be an occupational accident, as discussed above, existed, concluded, based solely on the circumstances stated in its judgment, that this accident was not an occupational accident or that there was no proximate causal relationship with the work. This constitutes an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and failing to conduct the necessary examination.

The argument in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.

Therefore, the lower court judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further examination and determination. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices as set forth in the Order.

Justice Cha Han-seong (Presiding Justice), Justice Ko Hyeon-cheol, Justice Kim Ji-hyeong (Justice in charge), Justice Jeon Su-an

【참조조문】

구 산업재해보상보험법(2007. 4. 11. 법률 제8373호로 전문 개정되기 전의 것) 제4조 제1호( 현행 제5조 제1호 참조)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 3,230자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】

【피고, 피상고인】 근로복지공단

【원심판결】 부산고법 2006. 1. 27. 선고 2005누4076 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 부산고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 본다.

구 산업재해보상보험법(2007. 4. 11. 법률 제8373호로 전문 개정되기 전의 것, 이하 ‘산재보험법’이라고 한다) 제4조 제1호의 ‘업무상 재해’라 함은 근로자와 사업주 사이의 근로계약에 터잡아 사업주의 지배·관리 아래 당해 근로업무의 수행 또는 그에 수반되는 통상적인 활동을 하는 과정에서 이러한 업무에 기인하여 발생한 재해를 말하고, 일반적으로 근로자의 출·퇴근이 노무의 제공이라는 업무와 밀접·불가분의 관계에 있다 하더라도 그 출·퇴근 방법과 경로의 선택이 근로자에게 유보되어 있는 이상 근로자가 선택한 출·퇴근 방법과 경로의 선택이 통상적이라는 이유만으로 출·퇴근 중에 발생한 재해가 업무상의 재해로 될 수는 없을 것이지만 이와 달리 근로자의 출·퇴근 과정이 사업주의 지배·관리 아래 있다고 볼 수 있는 경우에는 출·퇴근 중에 발생한 재해도 업무상의 재해로 될 수 있는바( 대법원 2007. 9. 28. 선고 2005두12572 전원합의체 판결 참조), 사업주가 제공한 교통수단을 근로자가 이용하거나 또는 사업주가 이에 준하는 교통수단을 이용하도록 하는 경우( 대법원 2004. 4. 23. 선고 2004두121 판결 참조)를 비롯하여, 외형상으로는 출·퇴근의 방법과 그 경로의 선택이 근로자에게 맡겨진 것으로 보이나 출·퇴근 도중에 업무를 행하였다거나 통상적인 출·퇴근시간 이전 혹은 이후에 업무와 관련한 긴급한 사무처리나 그 밖에 업무의 특성이나 근무지의 특수성 등으로 출·퇴근의 방법 등에 선택의 여지가 없어 실제로는 그것이 근로자에게 유보된 것이라고 볼 수 없고 사회통념상 아주 긴밀한 정도로 업무와 밀접·불가분의 관계에 있다고 판단되는 경우에는( 대법원 2004. 11. 25. 선고 2002두10124 판결, 대법원 2004. 11. 25. 선고 2002두12298 판결, 대법원 2005. 9. 29. 선고 2005두4458 판결, 대법원 2008. 3. 27. 선고 2006두2022 판결, 대법원 2008. 4. 24. 선고 2006두15660 판결 참조), 그러한 출·퇴근 중에 발생한 재해와 업무 사이에는 직접적이고도 밀접한 내적 관련성이 존재하여 그 재해는 사업주의 지배·관리 아래 업무상의 사유로 발생한 것이라고 볼 수 있을 것이다.

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 그 채택 증거를 종합하여, 소외 회사의 총무과 대리이던 망인이 2004. 10. 10. 입사한 이래 직원들 급여, 문서발송 등 그 판시 각종 업무를 담당하면서 08:00경 출근하여 21:00 내지 23:00경 퇴근하여 오다가 같은 해 10. 29.(원심이 10. 28.로 기재한 것은 오기임이 명백하다) 19:30경 업무를 마치고 회사 관리실 직원들의 회식에 참여한 후 같은 날 22:00경 회사로 돌아와 잔무를 처리하고 같은 날 23:30경 망인의 어머니 명의의 승용차로 퇴근하던 중 다음날인 10. 30. 00:08경 인도에 있던 전신주를 들이받는 교통사고를 일으켜 같은 날 02:20경 사망한 사실을 인정한 다음, 망인이 사고 전날 23:30까지 근무하다가 승용차를 운전하여 귀가하던 중 일어난 이 사건 교통사고로 사망하였고 귀가 당시는 한밤중이라 택시 등 다른 대중교통수단을 이용하기 어려웠다 해도 그러한 사정만으로는 망인의 퇴근과정이 사업자인 소외 회사의 지배·관리 아래 있다거나 위 승용차가 사업자가 제공한 것에 준하는 교통수단이라고 볼 수 없어 망인의 사망을 업무상 재해로 볼 수 없고, 나아가 망인이 과로로 인한 졸음운전으로 교통사고를 당했다면 이는 그 업무수행에 기인된 과로에 통상 수반하는 위험의 범위 내에 있는 것이라고도 보기 어려우므로 망인의 업무와 위 사고로 인한 사망 사이에는 상당인과관계 역시 인정되지 아니한다고 판단하였다.

그러나 원심의 채택 증거 및 기록에 의하면, 망인은 입사 이래 휴일을 포함하여 거의 매일 출근하여 야간 연장근무를 계속하여 왔는데, 이는 개업식을 앞둔 소외 회사의 업무상 필요에 따른 것으로, 당시 망인이 맡았던 업무는 혼자서 감당하기에는 객관적으로 과중한 정도의 분량이었던 점, 사고 전날의 회식도 그 전날 있었던 회사 개업식에 뒤이어 사전에 계획된 회사의 공식 회식으로서, 망인은 여기에 참석하였다가 음주는 하지 아니한 채 회식을 마친 후 소속 총무과장의 선도하에 망인을 비롯한 총 4명의 직원들이 회사로 돌아가 잔무를 처리하다가 23:30경 총무과장의 권유로 퇴근을 하면서 창원시에 위치한 회사에서 위 승용차를 운전하여 통상의 경로에 따라 진해시에 위치한 자택을 향하여 간 점 등의 사정을 알 수 있는바, 원심의 인정 사실과 위 각 사정을 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 살펴보면, 만 26세의 미혼 여성이던 망인이 사고 당시 회사의 긴요한 업무상 필요 때문에 심야까지 근무를 계속한 후 택시나 버스 등 대중교통수단을 이용하기 어려웠던 까닭에 시외에 위치한 자택으로 퇴근하기 위해서는 잦은 야간근무에 대비한 것으로 보이는 위 승용차를 이용한 퇴근 이외에 다른 합리적 선택의 기대가능성이 없는 경우에 해당한다고 볼 여지가 많다 할 것이고, 사정이 그러하다면 이 사건 사고 당시 퇴근방법과 경로의 선택이 사실상 망인에게 유보되었다고 볼 수 없고 사업주인 회사의 객관적 지배·관리 아래 있었다고 보아야 할 것이므로 망인의 사망은 산재보험법상 업무상 재해에 해당한다고 볼 수도 있을 것이다.

나아가 그와 같은 사정하에서라면 이 사건 교통사고가 망인의 업무와 무관하게 오로지 망인의 운전부주의로 인하여 발생한 것이라고 단정할 수도 없을 것이다.

그럼에도 원심이 위에서 살펴본 출·퇴근 중에 발생한 사고의 업무상 재해 판정에 필요한 예외적 사정의 존재 여부에 관하여 심리를 다하지 아니한 채 그 판시와 같은 사정만을 들어 이 사건 사고가 업무상 재해가 아니라거나 업무와 상당인과관계가 없다고 단정한 것은, 산재보험법상 업무상 재해에 관한 법리를 오해하여 필요한 심리를 다하지 아니한 위법이 있다 할 것이다.

이 점을 지적하는 취지의 상고이유의 주장은 이유 있다.

그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 좀 더 심리·판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여, 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 차한성(재판장) 고현철 김지형(주심) 전수안

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