[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation & Welfare Service (근로복지공단)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2004Nu25665, rendered September 2, 2005
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. "Occupational accident" under Article 4, Item 1 of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Act No. 8373, wholly amended on April 11, 2007, before amendment; hereinafter the "Industrial Accident Insurance Act") refers to an accident arising from the performance of work duties, or the ordinary activities incidental thereto, under the direction and control of the business owner, based on the employment contract between the worker and the business owner. However, even though a worker's commute to and from work is closely and inseparably related to the work of providing labor, the choice of method and route of commuting is generally left to the worker, and thus cannot ordinarily be said to be under the direction and control of the business owner; and since the Industrial Accident Insurance Act contains no special provision recognizing as an occupational accident an accident occurring while a worker is commuting to and from work by the ordinary method and route, an accident occurring during commuting cannot become an occupational accident merely because the method and route of commuting chosen by the worker were ordinary. Therefore, in order for an accident occurring during commuting to become an occupational accident, it must be a case where the worker's commuting process can be viewed as being under the direction and control of the business owner, such as where the worker uses transportation provided by the business owner, or the business owner has the worker use transportation equivalent thereto (see Supreme Court Decision 99Du9025 delivered on December 24, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2005Du4458 delivered on September 29, 2005, etc.).
The court below, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, found the following facts: the deceased, the plaintiff's husband, joined Nonparty 1 Co., Ltd., located at (lot number omitted), Neungseo-myeon, Yeoju-gun, Gyeonggi-do, as a technical employee in charge of maintenance and repair work; on March 9, 2002, at approximately 08:10, while commuting to work using his own Excel passenger car with license plate number (vehicle number omitted) (Gyeonggi), he suffered a traffic accident at the Bokha 2 Bridge intersection in Mam-ri, Bubal-eup, Icheon-si, in which the left front fender and driver's side door of his vehicle were struck by a vehicle driven by Nonparty 2; and as a result of this accident, he died at approximately 09:20 the same day at Icheon Fatima Hospital, the underlying cause of death being (suspected) intercostal artery hemorrhage, the intermediate cause being left traumatic hemothorax, etc., and the direct cause of death being (suspected) hypovolemic shock, etc. The plaintiff filed a claim with the defendant for survivor benefits and funeral expenses on the ground that the deceased's death constituted an occupational accident, but on April 23, 2002, the defendant issued the disposition at issue in this case refusing to pay survivor benefits and funeral expenses to the plaintiff on the ground that the deceased died in a traffic accident that occurred while he was commuting to work using his own passenger car, and thus his death did not constitute an occupational accident. The deceased's working hours were set from 08:30 to 18:00 (until 15:00 on Saturdays), and from the time he joined Nonparty 1 Co., Ltd. until the traffic accident occurred, the deceased had commuted to and from work by directly driving his own passenger car. Based on these findings, the court below determined that the traffic accident could not be said to have occurred while using transportation provided by the business owner for commuting purposes, and furthermore, that it could not be recognized, for any reason, that the deceased suffered the traffic accident while performing his duties, or that the deceased's commuting process was in a state under the direction or control of the employer; therefore, the accident suffered by the deceased could not be said to constitute an occupational accident. Examining this in light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, this determination is justified, and there is no illegality, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning occupational accidents.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as stated in the Order.
This judgment reflects the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Kim Neung-hwan, and Justice Jeon Su-an, and there are supplementary opinions to the majority opinion by Justice Yang Seung-tae, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Ahn Dae-hee, a supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, and Justice Kim Ji-hyung, and a further supplementary opinion to the majority opinion by Justice Ahn Dae-hee.
2. Dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Kim Neung-hwan, and Justice Jeon Su-an
The majority opinion merely follows the conventional position of prior Supreme Court precedents regarding whether an accident occurring during commuting is recognized as an occupational accident, but we cannot agree with the majority opinion for the following reasons.
A. The majority opinion, while acknowledging that a worker's commuting is closely and inseparably related to work, holds that an accident occurring during commuting cannot be considered an occupational accident on the ground that the choice of method and route of commuting is left to the worker and thus not under the direction and control of the business owner. However, this disregards the work-dependent nature of commuting and cannot be deemed reasonable.
Commuting is a repeated act by which a worker travels back and forth between his residence and workplace in order to provide labor, and is an essential process that must necessarily be undergone in order to provide labor. Without commuting, there is no provision of labor; without a workplace, there is no commuting. However, the workplace and the times of commuting are not matters that the worker may freely determine, but are entirely bound by the decisions and policies of the business owner. The workplace is already fixed, and the times of commuting must also follow what the business owner has unilaterally determined.
If commuting is travel back and forth between residence and workplace, and the times of commuting and the workplace are already fixed, then the method and route of commuting must likewise be regarded as already fixed accordingly, so long as they are reasonable methods and routes in light of common social norms. This is because, while the worker may choose the method of commuting, i.e., the means of transportation, the range of means of transportation that may be recognized as reasonable in light of common social norms is limited by the commuting times and the location of the workplace, and the route of commuting is likewise determined by the means of transportation chosen within that range. The majority opinion overlooks this work-dependent nature of commuting.
Therefore, if commuting is a repeated act by a reasonable method and route in light of common social norms, it is bound by the commuting times and workplace set by the business owner, and as such, the commuting process must be regarded as being under the direction and control of the business owner. Nevertheless, the majority opinion evaluates this type of commuting act as belonging to the same category as a worker's private acts, which cannot but be deemed unjust.
B. Although the majority opinion does not explicitly state so, and thus it cannot be known for certain, if the majority opinion considers that commuting is not under the direction and control of the business owner because it is conduct occurring outside the workplace, it must be pointed out that this misunderstands the meaning of being under the direction and control of the business owner.
Whether something is under the direction and control of the business owner is a matter of interpretation of Article 4, Item 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which should be grasped normatively, and should not be evaluated by the simple physical and spatial factor of whether the conduct in question occurred inside or outside the workplace. This point is also supported by the fact that the Supreme Court has, even with respect to accidents occurring outside the workplace, recognized them as occupational accidents in certain cases related to work.
The Supreme Court recognizes that where a worker leaves the workplace and is on a business trip, the entire process of the business trip is under the direction of the business owner (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu8892 delivered on September 26, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2005Du5185 delivered on March 24, 2006, etc.). Even in the case of a business trip, the worker may choose the method and route of travel to and from the destination of the business trip, just as in the case of commuting. Therefore, if the position is that travel to and from the destination of a business trip is under the direction and control of the business owner, then by the same reasoning, it is right to recognize that commuting is likewise under the direction and control of the business owner.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, even where the conduct itself is not work conduct, recognizes it as being under the direction and control of the business owner if it is reasonable conduct incidental to work conduct in light of common social norms, and thus recognizes accidents occurring outside the workplace during rest periods as occupational accidents (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du6549 delivered on December 24, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2005Du6423 delivered on October 28, 2005, etc.).
Following this position of precedent, whether something is under the direction and control of the business owner should be determined not by the location where the conduct in question occurred, but by the nature and content of the conduct, i.e., whether it is work conduct or conduct closely and inseparably related to work. If so, since commuting is likewise conduct closely and inseparably related to work, it cannot be denied to be under the direction and control of the business owner merely because it is conduct occurring outside the workplace. Above all, there is no reason to treat an accident occurring outside the workplace during a rest period differently from an accident occurring during commuting.
C. The majority opinion holds that, since the Industrial Accident Insurance Act contains no special provision separately recognizing as an occupational accident an accident occurring while a worker is commuting by the ordinary route and method, an accident occurring during commuting cannot be considered an occupational accident merely because the method and route of commuting chosen were ordinary. However, this too is difficult to accept.
Article 4, Item 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act merely provides that "occupational accident means an injury, disease, physical disability, or death of a worker due to an occupational cause," and does not contain any explicit provision as to specifically which cases constitute occupational accidents. Therefore, whether something constitutes an occupational accident should be determined by the interpretation of Article 4, Item 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and should not be governed by whether the Industrial Accident Insurance Act contains a separate provision recognizing it as an occupational accident.
As demonstrated above, an accident occurring during commuting, if it occurred during commuting by a reasonable method and route, is an accident occurring while under the direction and control of the business owner, and must be regarded as an occupational accident within the meaning of the above statutory provision. Therefore, even if the Industrial Accident Insurance Act does not contain a separate provision recognizing an accident occurring during commuting as an occupational accident, an accident occurring during commuting of the type described above should properly be recognized as an occupational accident.
Moreover, according to the majority opinion, there would be no way to explain the reason why "accidents during business trips" or "accidents during rest periods," for which the Industrial Accident Insurance Act likewise contains no separate provision recognizing them as occupational accidents, are nevertheless recognized as occupational accidents.
Furthermore, comparing this with the provisions of the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), the Public Officials Pension Act likewise contains no separate provision recognizing as a public-duty accident an accident occurring while a public official is commuting by the ordinary route and method. Therefore, following the reasoning of the majority opinion, an accident occurring while a public official is commuting should also not constitute a public-duty accident. However, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized this as a public-duty accident (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu19309 delivered on June 29, 1993, etc.). The reasoning of the majority opinion is clearly at odds with this position of the Supreme Court in this respect as well.
Therefore, the reasoning of the majority opinion, that an accident occurring during commuting cannot be considered an occupational accident because the Industrial Accident Insurance Act does not contain a separate provision recognizing it as such, cannot be deemed appropriate in any respect.
D. The majority opinion holds that the general process of commuting cannot be said to be under the direction and control of the business owner, and that only in cases such as where the worker uses transportation provided by the business owner, or the business owner has the worker use transportation equivalent thereto, is the worker's commuting process under the direction and control of the business owner. As stated above, this view is unjust in that it overlooks the work-dependent nature of commuting and thereby views the state of being under the direction and control of the business owner too restrictively. Furthermore, this view leads to the following unreasonable results and raises the possibility of unconstitutionality in violation of the principles of equity and equality.
First, if, as in the majority opinion, an occupational accident is recognized only where the business owner provides transportation or has the worker use transportation equivalent thereto, while it is not recognized as an occupational accident where the worker uses public transportation or a private vehicle, or commutes on foot, this is in itself clearly unfair. Moreover, this leads to the unreasonable result that, from the standpoint of business owners, a business owner who provides a commuting vehicle or pays vehicle maintenance costs for the welfare of workers bears a greater burden of liability for occupational accidents than a business owner who does not do so. Also, from the standpoint of workers, considering the reality that commuting buses are provided more often to workers of large corporations than to workers of small and medium-sized enterprises, it cannot be avoided that a criticism arises of a contradictory result whereby workers in poor working environments who cannot even use a commuting bus, and who thus have a greater need for protection, are instead denied recognition as having suffered an occupational accident.
Next, according to the majority opinion, there would inevitably be inconsistency in relation to public-duty accidents of public officials and others. As noted above, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act defines an occupational accident as "an injury, disease, physical disability, or death of a worker due to an occupational cause" (Article 4, Item 1; the current Industrial Accident Insurance Act's Article 5, Item 1 provides the same), and the Public Officials Pension Act defines a public-duty accident as "disease, injury, and accident due to public duty" (Article 25); there is no basis in the wording of these respective statutory provisions for interpreting their meanings differently. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized as a public-duty accident a case where a public official suffers an accident occurring while commuting by the ordinary route and method (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu19309 delivered on June 29, 1993, etc.). The same is true for private school faculty and staff (Article 42(1) and Article 33 of the Private School Personnel Pension Act) and military personnel (Article 31(1) of the Military Pension Act, Article 4 of its Enforcement Decree, and Attached Table 1, "Classification Standards for War/Public Duty Casualties," of the Ministry of National Defense Directive No. 346, "Regulations on the Handling of War/Public Duty Casualties").
The compensation insurance systems for public-duty accidents of public officials and others and for occupational accidents of general workers differ only in the persons to whom they apply and the institutions that carry out the relevant business by entrustment from the State; they are identical in that the State acts as the insurer, in the basic principles of accident compensation, and in the financial basis of the burden borne by the business owner, and there is no difference whatsoever in the factual aspect of the act of commuting. Although Article 14 of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Officials Pension Act and Article 35(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provide differently with respect to accidents occurring during commuting, these provisions of the Enforcement Rules merely prescribe internal administrative rules of processing affairs within administrative agencies and thus have no legal (regulatory) effect (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du6549 delivered on December 24, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2005Du6423 delivered on October 28, 2005, etc.), and thus cannot serve as a basis for discrimination. Nevertheless, according to the majority opinion, the normative evaluation would differ depending on whether the person engaged in commuting is a public official or military personnel or a general worker, and further, even among general workers, depending on whether the person is a private school faculty/staff member or not. It goes without saying that this is contrary to the principles of equity and equality and is not reasonable from the standpoint of unified interpretation and application of legal norms.
E. As seen above, a worker's commuting is closely and inseparably related to work, and the reasonable method and route for commuting are determined by the workplace and commuting times set by the business owner; therefore, commuting by a reasonable method and route must be regarded as being under the direction and control of the business owner, and accordingly, an accident occurring during such a commuting process must be held to constitute an occupational accident. It is self-evident that this view accords with the legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which is to contribute to the protection of workers by promptly and fairly compensating workers for occupational accidents and by promoting the rehabilitation and social reintegration of injured workers.
F. Examining these legal principles in light of the record, in this case, the deceased died in a traffic accident while commuting to his workplace using his own passenger car, and this should be regarded as an accident occurring during the commuting process by a reasonable method and route, and thus it is proper to view it as constituting an occupational accident.
Nevertheless, the court below determined that the accident in this case did not constitute an occupational accident and thus held that the defendant's disposition at issue in this case was lawful; the judgment below thus contains an illegality of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. Therefore, it would be proper to reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the court below for further hearing and determination; since the majority opinion takes a different view, we dissent from the majority opinion.
3. Supplementary opinion to the majority opinion by Justice Yang Seung-tae, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, and Justice Ahn Dae-hee
Justice Yang Seung-tae, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, and Justice Ahn Dae-hee wish to supplement the majority opinion through a critique of the dissenting opinion.
A. The State bears the duty to protect the people from various disasters or material poverty, as well as various other duties to promote social welfare and social security, and it is the State's inherent responsibility to strive for the substantive guarantee of the right to receive social security benefits, which has an instrumental character for the realization of the right to a life worthy of human dignity; therefore, from a social security perspective, the goals of national policy should be directed in that direction. We understand that the fundamental purport of the dissenting opinion is likewise, in line with such policy goals, to guarantee workers' rights and interests by including accidents occurring during commuting within the scope of occupational accidents. We are well aware that this would accord with realizing a life worthy of human dignity for the people by providing coverage for accidents that workers might not otherwise be covered for even by private insurance.
However, the right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits, as concretized by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, is a matter belonging to social fundamental rights, and it is a matter of general constitutional principle that, in interpreting statutes related to such social fundamental rights, one must follow the wording and legislative purpose of the statute, premised on broad legislative discretion. Contrary to this constitutional principle, the dissenting opinion appears to engage in an interpretation that goes beyond the legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
Article 34(1) of the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to a life worthy of human dignity, while Article 34(2) declares the State's duty to promote social security and social welfare, and Article 34(6) declares that the State has a duty to strive to prevent disasters and to protect citizens from the dangers thereof. However, in light of the legal nature of the right to a life worthy of human dignity, the scope of its normative force is limited to the right to demand benefits necessary to guarantee "minimum material subsistence," and a concrete right to demand benefits beyond that is not directly derived therefrom; moreover, looking at Article 34(2) and (6) of the Constitution, these provisions merely present goals for State activity, such as the promotion of social security and social welfare, or impose objective duties on the State for that purpose, and it is difficult to see them as granting individuals a right to demand affirmative benefits from the State related to social security, social welfare, or disaster prevention, or as delegating legislative authority in that regard. Ultimately, the realization of benefits under social welfare and social security beyond the minimum level depends on the socio-economic conditions necessary therefor, and is a matter to be resolved through legislation that reasonably takes into account various factors such as the State's financial capacity, the overall income and living standards of the people, the overall level of social security, public sentiment, and the characteristics of the social security system; given limited available resources and the need to coordinate various conflicting public interests or national tasks, broad legislative discretion cannot but be granted to the legislature (see Constitutional Court Decision 2002Hun-Ba51 delivered on July 24, 2003, etc.).
The right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits recognized for workers, including the right to receive such benefits arising from commuting accidents, is a social fundamental right that is concretized only by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and since its main content is the right to demand affirmative benefits, whether and to what extent such a right is specifically granted should be determined by considering, above all else, factors such as the possibility of securing financial resources according to the economic level of the State and the people, rather than by considering necessity or policy preference in the first instance.
The Tripartite Commission for Economic and Social Development (경제사회발전노사정위원회) has had in-depth discussions on the scope of recognition of the right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits arising from commuting accidents, the increase in insurance premium rates, and other related matters, taking these various circumstances into account, and currently a bill to amend the Industrial Accident Insurance Act reflecting the results of such discussions is pending before the National Assembly; policy is being pursued in the direction of gradually expanding the scope of recognition of the right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits arising from commuting accidents, and this appears to be aimed at coordinating the massive financial burden entailed thereby and the opinions of the parties concerned.
In this respect, even if there is a need to include commuting accidents within the scope of occupational accidents, it cannot be immediately concluded therefrom that commuting accidents constitute occupational accidents by way of interpretation. If the right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits arising from commuting accidents, which is one of the social fundamental rights concretized only by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, is interpreted beyond the purport prescribed by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes, this would amount to the judiciary substituting for the role of the legislature and the administration with respect to matters belonging to social fundamental rights, in violation of the principle of separation of powers. In other words, if the judiciary actively induces and intervenes in this matter without consideration of the massive financial burden and the coordination of interests entailed by including such commuting accidents within the scope of compensation, this would infringe upon legislative discretion, and would not only produce the effect of the industrial accident insurance replacing private insurance and government policy crowding out private policy, but would also cause problems such as a marked deterioration of the industrial accident insurance finances, an increased burden on business owners who are mandatory insurance subscribers, hindrance to the efficient allocation of budget, and confusion in the interpretation of standards.
Looking at legislative examples of other countries, commuting accidents are recognized as occupational accidents because the industrial accident insurance laws of each country expressly recognize commuting accidents as occupational accidents, and not because such recognition is reached through interpretive theory beyond the literal scope of the statute; and even in some countries that recognize commuting accidents as occupational accidents by statute, caution is exercised in the introduction of such a system, such as by having workers bear part of the insurance premium based on economic analysis.
If so, it is right that the limits of whether to recognize commuting accidents as occupational accidents, and if so, to what extent among commuting accidents they belong to occupational accidents, should be set by legislation. Moreover, if the judiciary intervenes in this matter while discussions on amending the Industrial Accident Insurance Act are actively underway, this would constitute the formation of new legislation beyond the interpretation of law, and would cause confusion in interpretation as to the extent to which commuting accidents are included. Many of our Supreme Court's precedents on commuting accidents to date have, while deeply recognizing this problem, made reasonable interpretations in accordance with constitutional principles while awaiting a legislative solution that expands the financial resources sufficient to bear this burden and coordinates the interests of the parties concerned. Therefore, the majority opinion, which follows the position of the precedents to date on commuting accidents based on constitutional principles, is proper.
B. The dissenting opinion asserts that the majority opinion not only disregards the work-dependent nature of commuting, but also runs counter to the Supreme Court's consistent position of recognizing accidents during business trips or accidents during rest periods as occupational accidents.
However, with regard to accidents during business trips, Article 36 of the Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act expressly provides that such accidents are to be regarded as occupational accidents, and since a business trip itself constitutes work conduct, even when a worker leaves the workplace and is on a business trip, the business owner comprehensively bears responsibility for whether and how the business is carried out, and thus, absent special circumstances, the entire process of the business trip can be said to be under the direction of the business owner, and its work-performing character can be recognized.
Also, the reason the Supreme Court recognizes certain accidents occurring during rest periods as occupational accidents is that Article 35-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that where a worker is injured or dies due to an accident arising from conduct recognized in light of common social norms as conduct that may be engaged in during a rest period, within the workplace, during a rest period provided by the business owner to the worker pursuant to the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), such a case shall be regarded as an occupational accident. In the past, when the Supreme Court, contrary to this provision, focused on whether the process of conduct, regardless of whether it occurred inside or outside the workplace, was under the direction and control of the business owner in determining whether an occupational accident is recognized, this constituted a kind of exception to the principle made in consideration of various circumstances. Therefore, it must be pointed out that the dissenting opinion, by interpreting this exception as if it were the principle, confuses the principle and exception regarding the recognition of occupational accidents and simply compares commuting accidents and accidents occurring during rest periods on the same plane.
Moreover, the position of precedent regarding Enforcement Rules is that even if a given Enforcement Rule constitutes an internal administrative processing standard, the intent of the administrative agency should be respected as far as possible unless the standard is objectively unreasonable or unjust, and precedent has declared such rules invalid only in limited cases, such as where the content of the Enforcement Rule exceeds the limits of delegation under superior statutes, constitutes a blanket re-delegation, or is deemed contrary to the purpose or intent of the superior statute; the Supreme Court has not engaged in arbitrary statutory interpretation while disregarding existing Enforcement Rules. The provisions of the above Enforcement Rules regarding accidents during business trips or accidents during rest periods are made pursuant to delegation under the parent statute, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and do not exceed the purport of such delegation; therefore, they are effective regardless of whether such provisions, including the above provisions, are recognized as having legal (regulatory) effect.
Ultimately, this portion of the dissenting opinion, to the effect that the majority opinion runs counter to the Supreme Court's consistent position of recognizing accidents during business trips or accidents during rest periods as occupational accidents, appears to result from a misunderstanding of the grounds and reasons why accidents during business trips or accidents during rest periods are recognized as occupational accidents.
In addition, the dissenting opinion points out that it is inequitable, and thus improper from the standpoint of uniform interpretation and application, that while statutes and precedents recognize commuting accidents occurring via the ordinary route and method as public-duty accidents for public officials, private school faculty and staff, and others, such accidents are not recognized as occupational accidents for general workers. While it is certainly possible to raise such a question, it is rather a principle of statutory interpretation that where similar or identical terms are used in various statutes, they should not be mechanically construed identically, but the most fitting meaning should be derived within the framework of each individual statute; and fundamentally, this matter is properly resolved by legislation, and it cannot necessarily be said to violate equity in light of the fact that legislative discretion must be recognized with respect to matters belonging to social fundamental rights.
With respect to public officials and others, Article 14 of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Officials Pension Act and other provisions expressly include commuting accidents within public-duty accidents; this appears to be a matter of legislative policy taking into account the significant difference in the scale of financial burden, the difference in insurance entities, and the payment of contributions, among other factors, and it is a constitutional principle that such legislative policy considerations should be recognized in interpretation as well, insofar as the matter belongs to social fundamental rights.
If one were to attempt to eliminate such differences in legislative policy through statutory interpretation, other social security policies that the State should prioritize would be pushed to a lower priority, creating the risk that social security policy considering the State's financial burden would instead regress. Therefore, this criticism regarding equity, too, ultimately stems from a reversal of principle and exception due to a lack of understanding of social security fundamental rights.
Therefore, even though a worker's commuting is closely and inseparably related to the work of providing labor, since the choice of method and route of commuting is generally left to the worker and thus cannot ordinarily be said to be under the direction and control of the business owner, an accident occurring during commuting cannot be regarded as an occupational accident merely because the method and route of commuting chosen by the worker were ordinary; therefore, the current position of precedent, which interprets accidents during commuting as the majority opinion does, is proper.
C. To engage in an interpretation that goes beyond the legislative purpose in an area that should be resolved legislatively through the coordination of reasonable communication among the parties concerned, taking into account various social policy factors, is contrary to constitutional principle. As noted above, insofar as, following discussions at the Tripartite Commission for Economic and Social Development and other bodies, a bill to amend the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is currently pending before the National Assembly, it is proper that the limits of whether to recognize commuting accidents as occupational accidents, and if so, to what extent among commuting accidents they belong to occupational accidents, be set by legislation from a social security perspective. Our opinion in this regard accords with legal principle and is faithful to the essence of the judiciary, and represents, moreover, a more mature form of adjudication.
4. Supplementary opinion to the majority opinion by Justice Lee Hong-hoon
Justice Lee Hong-hoon wishes to supplement the majority opinion as follows.
While the majority opinion holds that an accident occurring during commuting cannot become an occupational accident merely because the method and route of commuting chosen by the worker were ordinary, it also holds that an accident occurring during commuting may be recognized as an occupational accident in cases where the worker's commuting process can be viewed as being under the direction and control of the business owner, such as where the worker uses transportation provided by the business owner, or the business owner has the worker use transportation equivalent thereto; this leaves room for expanding, through interpretation of the current law, the scope of recognizing accidents occurring during commuting as occupational accidents.
Before comprehensive system improvements are made regarding how to set the requirements for recognizing commuting accidents as occupational accidents, what level of insurance benefits to provide, and how much to raise the insurance premium rate in order to secure the necessary financial resources, interpreting ordinary commuting accidents as occupational accidents in principle could cause a financial crisis for industrial accident insurance and considerable confusion, including anticipated resistance from business owners due to increased insurance premium rates, which could actually hinder the promotion of the public welfare of workers as a whole. However, even before such improvement measures are established, it is desirable to gradually expand the scope of recognizing accidents occurring during commuting as occupational accidents. For example, I believe that where there are special circumstances, such as where work was performed during commuting, or where the worker was commuting in response to an urgent request received before the ordinary commuting time, or where it is judged that there is an extremely close relationship, in light of common social norms, between the commuting and the work such that they are closely and inseparably related, the scope of recognizing accidents occurring during commuting as occupational accidents can be expanded as much as possible through interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
As stated above, while reaching the same conclusion as the majority opinion, I wish to note, as a supplementary opinion to the majority opinion, that a path remains open for expanding the scope of recognition of occupational accidents during commuting through interpretation of the current law.
5. Supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, and Justice Kim Ji-hyung
Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, and Justice Kim Ji-hyung wish to supplement the dissenting opinion, along with a rebuttal to the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, largely from the following three perspectives.
A. From the perspective of interpretive theory in general
From the standpoint of the dissenting opinion, what is most difficult to accept about the majority opinion is, above all, that it takes completely opposite positions in interpreting the concept of "occupational accident" as defined in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the concept of "accident due to public duty" as defined in the Public Officials Pension Act, with regard to whether commuting accidents (here, "commuting" refers to the type of repeated commuting conduct by a reasonable method and route in light of common social norms; the same applies hereinafter) are included therein.
According to the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, in light of its "wording" and "legislative purpose," commuting accidents cannot be included in "occupational accidents" as defined in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and therefore, including accidents suffered by general workers during commuting within the scope of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act should be resolved not through statutory interpretation but through legislative policy, no matter how necessary it may be for the protection of workers' rights and interests. Therefore, the position seems to be that the dissenting opinion's attempt to include commuting accidents, which the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was not originally intended to cover, within "occupational accidents," is no different from imprudently creating new legislation under the guise of interpretive theory, putting ideals first.
Looking only at the provision of "occupational accident" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, it cannot be denied that the above interpretive theory of the majority opinion could, apart from whether it is right or wrong, constitute a view that is in itself sufficiently tenable.
However, the matter becomes entirely different when compared with the interpretive theory of "accident due to public duty" as provided in the Public Officials Pension Act. This is because, as stated in the dissenting opinion above, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained the position that commuting accidents are included in the concept of "accident due to public duty," which is a completely different interpretation.
Since the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion presents the "wording" and "legislative purpose" of the statutory provisions as the grounds for its interpretive theory, we examine these in turn.
First, let us examine the "wording" of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. The Industrial Accident Insurance Act defines "occupational accident" as "an injury, disease, physical disability, or death of a worker due to an occupational cause," while the Public Officials Pension Act defines it as "disease, injury, accident, and death of a public official due to public duty." Comparing the "wording" of these two statutory provisions alone, there may be minor differences in expression, but no difference can be found that would justify interpreting their meanings differently. Of course, if there were separate statutory provisions regarding commuting accidents in addition to the above definitional provisions, the premise could be different; however, apart from the provisions noted above, neither statute has any other provision regarding whether commuting accidents are included in "occupational accidents" or "accidents due to public duty." Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand, no matter how one tries, for what reason it can be said that the interpretive theory may differ on the basis of "wording."
Next, let us look at "legislative purpose." As the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion appropriately points out, we fully acknowledge that a worker's right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits is a social fundamental right that is concretized only by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and that broad legislative discretion is accordingly granted to the legislature in that regard. We therefore entirely agree that the legislature may determine whether and to what extent to grant such benefits, taking into account socio-economic conditions such as the economic level of the State and the people and the possibility of securing financial resources accordingly. Nor does the dissenting opinion assert that it is a constitutional requirement arising from the provisions on social fundamental rights that commuting accidents must necessarily be included in "occupational accidents." It is merely asserted that, in interpreting the concept of "occupational accident" as provided in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which is one of the statutes concretizing social fundamental rights, commuting accidents should be regarded as included therein.
However, at the time the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was legislated in our country, there is no basis anywhere for concluding that the legislature intended to set the industrial accident insurance benefit rights of general workers differently from those of public officials or military personnel, and further, private school faculty and staff. Rather, comparing the relevant statutory provisions as a whole, it is much more natural to view the matter not as reflecting an intent to set differently the existence or scope of insurance benefit rights with respect to commuting accidents and the like for the same matter, but rather that, due to differences in whether the persons subject to the law are general workers, public officials or military personnel, or, further, among general workers, particularly private school faculty and staff, separate individual statutes were enacted according to legislative and technical necessity.
After the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was enacted on November 5, 1963, and the Public Officials Pension Act was enacted on January 1, 1960, the Ministry of Labor, which handled industrial accident insurance benefit affairs, enacted around 1982 a Ministry of Labor regulation (예규) setting forth "Standards for Recognition of Occupational Accidents" as detailed matters in that regard on its own, and the Ministry of General Affairs (총무처), which handled public officials pension benefit affairs, likewise enacted around 1981 a Ministry of General Affairs directive (훈령) setting forth "Standards for Recognition of Public-Duty Accidents"; while the above Ministry of Labor regulation did not explicitly recognize commuting accidents as occupational accidents, the above Ministry of General Affairs directive explicitly included commuting accidents within public-duty accidents, thus taking completely opposite interpretations with respect to their respective benefit affairs. However, there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that this reflects the intent of the legislature. Rather, it appears to be merely that, regardless of the legislature's intent, different administrative agencies handled the matter differently according to circumstances in the administration of their respective benefit affairs. Needless to say, such a Ministry of Labor regulation or Ministry of General Affairs directive has no legal (regulatory) effect. Moreover, as noted in the dissenting opinion above, it is the current position of precedent that the Enforcement Rules of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the Public Officials Pension Act, which were later enacted by carrying over such regulations and directives as they were, likewise are not recognized as having legal (regulatory) effect. If the judiciary were to simply accept and interpret in accordance with such differing interpretations by the respective competent administrative agencies regarding commuting accidents, made without any legal basis and unrelated to the legislature's legislative intent, this would be no different from the judiciary, together with the administration, infringing upon the legislative power.
[Reasoning]
According to the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, it appears that the majority opinion, in giving reasons why disasters occurring during the commute of general workers should not be recognized as occupational disasters, took into consideration problems that could arise such as deterioration of insurance finances and increased burdens on employers. This is a point worth fully heeding. The dissenting opinion does not deny or make light of the fact that such problems may exist at all. However, if the majority opinion is asserting that such considerations should be taken into account as "legislative intent" in interpreting the concept of "occupational disaster" under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, hereinafter "Industrial Accident Insurance Act"), this is considered unreasonable. No matter how carefully one examines the relevant provisions of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), it is simply impossible to find any provision providing that, in interpreting and applying the concepts of "occupational disaster" or "disaster caused by official duties," respectively, the grant of entitlement to benefits or its content may be varied by taking such circumstances into account. If the legislature has made no distinction in the content of the statutory provisions determining the scope of workers' entitlement to industrial accident insurance benefits or public officials' entitlement to pension benefits under the Public Officials Pension Act, such that a given disaster is recognized as an occupational disaster or an official duty-related disaster, then the administrative agency responsible for enforcement should naturally take the necessary measures, including securing the corresponding financial resources, and implement this accordingly. Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which provides that "the State may subsidize part of the expenses required for insurance projects within the limits of the budget for each fiscal year," is itself a provision enacted with precisely this point in mind. However, if it were permissible—contrary to this—to interpret and apply the content of the statute enacted by the legislature in a discriminatory manner with respect to general workers on the ground of financial problems, as suggested in the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, and thereby to interpret and enforce it more restrictively than the legislature's original intent with respect to general workers, this would reverse the proper order of priorities in statutory interpretation, and this point must be pointed out as unreasonable.
In this way, we cannot agree at all with the position of the majority opinion, which seeks to differentiate its interpretation on the basis of a "legislative intent" that is by no means clear from any perspective. If the interpretive theory asserted by the majority opinion—that the concept of "occupational disaster" as provided in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act cannot include disasters occurring during commuting—were correct, then it would be more consistent, as a matter of systematic interpretation of statutory provisions, to likewise interpret the concept of "disaster caused by official duties" under the Public Officials Pension Act, which is textually defined in the same meaning, as also excluding disasters occurring during commuting. Of course, this does not mean that the dissenting opinion is asserting that the existing precedent's position on official duty-related disasters should be changed so as to exclude commuting disasters from the concept of official duty-related disasters. Rather, the position of the dissenting opinion is that, from the outset, commuting disasters should conceptually be included within "occupational" or "official duty" related disasters, and that the interpretive theory should be unified in that direction; in either case, it is considered improper for the courts to render entirely contradictory interpretations of what is textually the same concept under statutory provisions, thereby aggravating confusion in statutory interpretation.
As such, even though there is no basis—whether from the "text" or from the "legislative intent"—for interpreting the meanings of "occupational disaster" and "disaster caused by official duties" differently, if the Supreme Court has hitherto adopted entirely different statutory interpretations, thereby causing great confusion among the citizens who are subject to the above statutory provisions, it is the consistent position of the dissenting opinion that such irrationality should be resolved as soon as possible.
B. From the Perspective of Unconstitutionality
As discussed above, interpreting the concepts of "occupational disaster" and "disaster caused by official duties" differently is difficult to accept as a matter of general rational interpretation of statutory provisions. Moreover, even if the statutory provisions explicitly excluded commuting disasters in defining the scope of recognition of workers' occupational disasters while, conversely, including such disasters in the case of public officials and others, thereby providing for different treatment, it is doubtful whether this could be constitutionally justified.
As already discussed in the dissenting opinion, treating general workers and public officials, etc. entirely differently with respect to the grant of entitlement to insurance benefits for the same type of disaster—namely, disasters occurring during commuting—raises suspicion of unconstitutionality as violating the principle of equity or the constitutional principle of equality. However, I would like to once again emphasize the following several points in response to the matters raised in the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion.
Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status." The principle of equality based on Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution prohibits the legislature from arbitrarily treating things that are essentially the same differently, or things that are essentially different the same. However, this principle of equality does not mean absolute equality that denies all differential treatment or identical treatment; rather, it means that unreasonable differential treatment or identical treatment should not be made, not only in the application of law but also in legislation (see Constitutional Court Decision 89Hun-Ga37, 96, decided May 24, 1989; Constitutional Court Decision 2005Hun-Ga17, 2006Hun-Ba17, decided May 25, 2006, etc.).
According to the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, the fact that commuting disasters are included in "disaster caused by official duties" for public officials, unlike the case of "occupational disaster" for general workers, is constitutionally acceptable in terms of equity in light of "the marked difference in the scale of the State's financial burden," "the difference in the insurance provider," and "whether or not contributions are paid."
First of all, the basis of "whether or not contributions are paid" is itself erroneous. The Supreme Court has previously held that "under the Public Officials Pension Act, public officials pay a considerable amount of contributions, whereas in the case of industrial accidents, workers bear no such burden, and since the two are not of the same nature, treating the criteria for disasters differently does not violate the constitutional principle of equality," thereby expressing the view that differentiating the treatment of commuting disasters between occupational disasters and official duty-related disasters does not violate the principle of equality (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu15523, decided March 14, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du13588, decided February 26, 2004, etc.). However, it is clear from the relevant provisions of law, including Article 65, Paragraph 2 of the Public Officials Pension Act and Article 66 of its Enforcement Decree, that public officials' contributions are allocated to retirement benefits, and that all expenses paid for official duty-related disasters are borne by the State or local governments. Therefore, in this respect, there is no difference from occupational disasters where the employer bears the insurance premiums, and the above reasoning is not persuasive.
Furthermore, even with respect to the difference in "insurance provider," broadly speaking, both disaster benefits for public officials and industrial accident insurance for workers are systems in which the State, as the insurer, assumes the risks of accidents such as disasters or illnesses that all workers, including public officials, may suffer while working, and provides insurance benefits accordingly; it is merely that the operation of the insurance business is divided among organizations under different administrative agencies (the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs and the Ministry of Labor), and this cannot be regarded as constituting different insurance providers.
Examining the structure of insurance operation, including the insurance provider, the insurer is the State, the insured (policyholder) is the employer, and the beneficiaries are all workers, including public officials—in this respect, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the Public Officials Pension Act are entirely identical. That is, the State, as the insurer, operates the insurance business or the pension business. And the policyholder is the employer; in the case of public officials, etc., the employer is likewise the State. Here, although the State overlaps with the operator of the insurance business, in its capacity as the party obligated to pay insurance premiums, it is no different from the employer of general workers. Furthermore, the beneficiaries of insurance are general workers or public officials, etc. who receive the benefit of insurance payments due to an insured event.
Therefore, when the State, in providing public assistance, differentiates the availability of insurance benefits between public officials, etc. and general workers with respect to the same type of insured event—namely, commuting disasters—on the ground of a difference in "the scale of financial burden," this cannot but raise the suspicion that it results in "arbitrarily treating things that are essentially the same differently," thereby constituting unreasonable differential treatment beyond the scope of legislative discretion. Rather, as noted above, it is considered that the State, as the insurer, has an obligation to resolve such an imbalance in financial condition.
For example, if the State, in consideration of the financial condition of insurance operations, classifies insured events according to the degree of relatedness to work, giving priority to types with a high degree of relatedness as subjects of insurance benefits while excluding those with relatively low relatedness from the subjects of insurance benefits, such a case might conceivably be regarded as an example of reasonable differential treatment based on financial condition falling within the scope of legislative discretion. However, differentiating whether or not to grant insurance benefits for the same type of insured event with an entirely identical degree of relatedness, as in the case above, cannot be regarded as falling within such a category.
If the existing Supreme Court precedent's view, as in the majority opinion, is maintained, then the problem arising from the perspective of the constitutional principle of equality is not limited to the discrimination between "general workers" and "public officials or military personnel." Discrimination also exists among workers themselves, between "general workers who are not private school employees" and "workers who are private school employees." If differential treatment were permissible under the same logic as the supplementary opinion of the majority opinion, then, for example, it is doubtful whether it would be permissible, without raising issues of equity, to differentiate whether commuting disasters are included based on differences in the employer's financial capacity or differences in insurance providers (for instance, assuming different agencies were in charge of industrial accident insurance business) between workers employed at business establishments located in Seoul and workers employed at business establishments located elsewhere in the provinces; and as another example, whether it would be permissible to differentiate between workers at business establishments regularly employing 100 or more workers and workers at business establishments employing fewer than that number—doubts arise one after another in succession.
Thus, even where statutory provisions explicitly provide for different treatment of general workers and public officials, etc. with respect to commuting disasters, there remains a possibility of unconstitutionality; all the more so, where the statutory provisions are unclear and the text is open to multiple interpretations, there is no need to insist on an unconstitutional interpretation. It is precisely in such cases that interpreting the law, to the extent possible, in a manner consistent with the Constitution accords with the so-called principle of constitutional interpretation of statutes, and I believe this to be the proper path of statutory interpretation. Therefore, in this respect, it is difficult to accept as a valid criticism the characterization of the dissenting opinion as an interpretation exceeding the textual scope of the statutory provisions.
C. From the Perspective of Legislative Policy
The supplementary opinion of the majority opinion states that whether to include commuting disasters as subjects of industrial accident insurance is a matter of legislative policy, and that it is therefore appropriate to leave this to discussion in the National Assembly.
The dissenting opinion likewise has no objection to the view that it would be most desirable to resolve the question of whether to recognize commuting disasters as occupational disasters through legislation. In that sense, if legislative discussion on this matter proceeds in the National Assembly, it is hoped that protection at an internationally appropriate level can be provided for general workers' commuting disasters, and for that reason, I would like to add a few remarks for reference.
Looking at foreign legislative examples concerning commuting disasters, in Europe, representatively, Austria has recognized this as a type of industrial accident subject to insurance benefits since around 1917, Germany since around 1925, and France since around 1946. Nearby Japan has also designated this as a subject of protection under industrial accident (labor accident) insurance since 1973. Moreover, the International Labour Organization (ILO) also provides for the inclusion of commuting disasters within industrial accidents in its 1964 Convention No. 121.
As such, it can be seen that the protection of workers' commuting disasters as subjects of insurance benefits has been a major global trend proceeding for nearly a century. When industrial accident insurance began, its goal was simply to guarantee employers' compensation for losses to workers, but over time it has increasingly taken on the meaning of guaranteeing workers' livelihood, and today the social function of industrial accident insurance law is recognized as remarkably important. Nevertheless, the fact that our country still maintains the position of not recognizing commuting disasters as occupational disasters seems excessively belated, even taking into account our country's economic level. It appears that one cause of this situation is that, as discussed above, despite there being no reasonable ground—whether in the "text" of the statutory provisions or in "legislative intent"—for treating commuting disasters of general workers and of public officials, etc. differently, the Supreme Court has nonetheless rendered a statutory interpretation treating them differently.
If so, it would naturally be fitting, in the spirit of resolving what one has caused, for the Supreme Court to now correct its previously distorted statutory interpretation, thereby eliminating the potential for unconstitutionality and promoting unified interpretation and application of legal norms; however, regrettably, this has not yet been achieved. At this point in time, I hope that, even belatedly, legislation clearly including commuting disasters as subjects of industrial accident insurance can be enacted as soon as possible, moving in a direction faithful to the protection of workers' rights and interests.
To express "occupational disaster" more simply, it would be nothing more or less than "a disaster that a person could not help but suffer because of being in the position of a worker." Fortunately, I have heard that the Ministry of Labor has also set a policy goal for legislation to include commuting disasters within occupational disasters and is continuously working toward it, and with this hope in mind, I would like to conclude this supplementary opinion.
6. Re-Supplementary Opinion of Justice Ahn Dae-hee to the Majority Opinion
Justice Ahn Dae-hee wishes to further supplement the majority opinion, together with a rebuttal to the supplementary opinion of the dissenting opinion.
The dissenting opinion points out that there is a concern that including commuting disasters within "disaster caused by official duties" for public officials, while treating workers' commuting disasters differently, may violate the constitutional principle of equality. However, it cannot be regarded as violating the principle of equality for the State, taking into account various circumstances such as financial conditions, to selectively expand the scope of benefits. As indicated in the dissenting opinion itself, our Supreme Court precedent has made this clear (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu15523, decided March 14, 1995), and the Constitutional Court has also explicitly declared that this issue does not violate the principle of equality (see Constitutional Court Decision 93Hun-Ma45, decided September 27, 1993).
It is entirely natural that, with respect to matters belonging to social rights as fundamental rights, it does not violate the constitutional principle of equality for the State to selectively expand the scope of benefits. That is, the principle of equality provided in Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution does not prevent the State from choosing when, where, and for which class of persons to begin improving circumstances or systems relating to fundamental rights; rather, if this were not permitted, then, except in the exceptional case where improvement of systems is pursued simultaneously for all matters and all classes, no improvement of any system would be possible due to the principle of equality, which would be unreasonable and would also run counter to the very values that the principle of equality seeks to realize (see Constitutional Court Decision 90Hun-Ga27, decided February 11, 1991; Constitutional Court Decision 98Hun-Ga1, decided December 24, 1998).
As noted above, it is the majority opinion that whether to include general workers' commuting disasters within occupational disasters should be resolved through legislation. Furthermore, there is data indicating that, if such disasters were included, the financial burden on industrial accident insurance would amount to more than KRW 300 billion annually, and the required budget would increase annually, reaching more than KRW 900 billion after 20 years; this could bring the insurance finances—which currently already carry a financial deficit of more than KRW 2 trillion (and reportedly even face a liquidity crisis under present conditions)—into the worst possible situation, and an increase of around 30% in the insurance premium rate to be borne by businesses would also be unavoidable. In any event, this matter should be resolved through legislation, taking into account economic conditions and coordinating the opinions of the parties concerned; however, it is reported that the policy authorities studying such legislation also consider that, given the current reality of severe deterioration in insurance finances, legislation would require, as preconditions, not only improvement of financial conditions but also institutional measures such as changes to the method of imposing insurance premiums, as well as social consensus, including joint bearing of insurance premiums by employers and workers. There are also many countries in foreign legislative examples that do not recognize commuting disasters as occupational disasters (the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Italy), and it is reported that even in countries that do recognize commuting disasters as occupational disasters, the financial burden thereof has become severe enough to become a social problem.
It may be one of the ideals of the modern social welfare state for the State to do everything it can for the welfare of its citizens, but this is subject to constraints requiring consideration of economic conditions and realities, as is the case in every country. For social security, in addition to basic guarantees such as health insurance and unemployment insurance, substantial welfare budgets are required for the disabled, the elderly, the extremely poor, and others; making a legislative policy choice as to priorities and the scope of guarantees among these, taking financial conditions into account, is indispensable for the genuine welfare of the people. Such legislative choices ultimately require judgment that takes into account both the taxpayers who bear the burden and the priority need for guarantees. For this reason, as noted in the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion, broad legislative discretion is recognized with respect to social fundamental rights.
I wish once again to emphasize that giving a fragmentary and restrictive interpretation to a statute concerning matters belonging to social fundamental rights not only violates constitutional principles but also fails to genuinely guarantee and promote the people's social welfare as provided under the Constitution; rather, it creates the problem of confronting unprepared policies with confusion, without social measures in place, and renders it impossible to provide appropriate guarantees in fields requiring prompt protection. Together with this, I emphasize that it is exceedingly dangerous to adopt, through fragmentary statutory interpretation, matters that should be carefully decided legislatively by comprehensively considering all circumstances, and with this, I further supplement the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Judge), Justice Ko Hyun-chul, Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Yang Sung-tae, Justice Kim Hwang-sik, Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung (Justice in Charge), Justice Lee Hong-hoon, Justice Park Il-hwan, Justice Kim Neung-hwan, Justice Jeon Su-an, Justice Ahn Dae-hee