[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 33 others (Attorneys: Law Firm Simin and 3 others)
[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Plaintiff 21 and 12 others (Attorneys: Law Firm Simin and 3 others)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Minister of Construction and Transportation (Attorney: Law Firm Dawoo, in charge of Attorney Seok Yun-su)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2005Nu14440, decided June 15, 2006
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. Each party shall bear its own costs of appeal.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined as follows.
1. As to the grounds of appeal by Plaintiff 1 through Plaintiff 20, Plaintiff 22, Plaintiff 24, Plaintiff 25, Plaintiff 27 through Plaintiff 29, Plaintiff 34, Plaintiff 37 through Plaintiff 41, Plaintiff 46, and Plaintiff 47
A. Whether the strike in this case was legitimate
In order for a worker's collective action (industrial action) to constitute a legitimate act under the Criminal Act (형법), it must satisfy all of the following conditions: first, the subject thereof must be one who is capable of being a party to collective bargaining; second, its purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; third, it must be commenced only when the employer has refused to engage in collective bargaining regarding the workers' specific demands for improvement of working conditions, and, absent special circumstances, must go through the procedures prescribed by statute, such as approval by a vote of the union members; and fourth, its means and methods must be reconcilable with the employer's property rights and must not amount to the exercise of violence (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 99Do4837, delivered on October 25, 2001).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and of the first-instance judgment cited therein, the court below, after comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted and finding the facts as indicated in its reasoning, held as follows: it is reasonable to view that the primary purpose of the strike in this case was to wage a struggle against the Government in order to block the legislative process regarding railway structural reform related to the Government's plan to convert the railway into a corporation (공사화); the conversion of the railway into a corporation is a matter belonging to the Government's industrial policy decision-making authority and, in principle, cannot be the subject of collective bargaining; and, absent special circumstances such as that such policy was pursued with an improper intent without urgent managerial necessity or reasonable grounds, the primary purpose of the strike in this case cannot be recognized as legitimate. Furthermore, with respect to the procedure of the strike, the court below held that, once an agreement between the railway labor and management was reached on April 20, 2003 regarding the general strike resolution demanding withdrawal of privatization and improvement of working conditions, and the ratification procedure therefor had been completed, in order to carry out a new strike demanding rejection of the passage of the structural reform bill through the National Assembly on the ground of a breach of that agreement, separate procedures prescribed under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법) had to be followed; however, since the strike in this case was carried out without excluding such requirements—that is, without conducting a vote of union members deciding on the industrial action, without notifying the occurrence of the dispute, and without undergoing the mediation-precedence procedure—the strike in this case cannot be recognized as legitimate in terms of its procedure either.
In light of the foregoing legal principles and the record, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below are justified.
The judgment below is not, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, unlawful due to a violation of the rules of evidence or a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the legitimacy of industrial action.
B. Propriety of the disciplinary action against the public officials who served as full-time union officers
Every public official bears the duty of good faith under Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), the duty of obedience under Article 57, and the duty not to leave one's post under Article 58. Even where a public official becomes a full-time union officer and is thereby exempted from the duty to provide labor, this exemption has meaning only insofar as it guarantees that the official may devote himself or herself to legitimate trade union activities as a full-time officer; therefore, even a public official who is a full-time union officer cannot be said to be entirely exempted from the above duties under the State Public Officials Act with respect to conduct that exceeds the scope of legitimate trade union activities.
Accordingly, it was justified for the court below to determine that the acts of Plaintiff 1 through Plaintiff 21, who, as full-time union officers, instigated the strike in this case, personally participated in the strike, and incited other union members to participate in the strike, exceeded the scope of legitimate trade union activities and thus violated the duty of good faith under Article 56 and the duty not to leave one's post under Article 58(1) of the State Public Officials Act, and that the fact that the above plaintiffs, despite the order to return to their posts issued by the Commissioner of the Korea National Railroad, failed to return to the designated place, such as the union office, by the deadline for return, constituted a violation of the duty of obedience prescribed in Article 57 of the State Public Officials Act.
The judgment below is not unlawful due to any misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the legal status of a public official who is a full-time union officer, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. Appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed
(1) Whether misconduct covered by an exemption agreement may be taken into account
Even where an agreement has been reached not to impose discipline (an "exemption agreement") with respect to a worker's misconduct, such agreement merely prohibits treating that misconduct as a ground for discipline; it does not prohibit taking into account, as material for determining the appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction, the fact that such exempted misconduct occurred, when disciplining the worker on the basis of other misconduct (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da52294, delivered on September 5, 1995).
Accordingly, it was justified for the court below to hold that, although the misconduct of the above plaintiffs prior to April 30, 2003, which had originally been included in the request for discipline but was excluded from the grounds for discipline at the time of the disciplinary resolution, does not itself constitute a ground for discipline, it may nevertheless be taken into account as a factor in assessing the appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction.
The judgment below is not unlawful due to any misapprehension of fact or law concerning the grounds for discipline or the disciplinary authority's discretion that affected the outcome of the judgment, as alleged in this regard.
(2) Whether there was any other deviation from or abuse of discretion in determining the disciplinary sanction
Where grounds for discipline exist with respect to a public official subject to discipline, the choice of what disciplinary action to impose is a matter left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority; however, only where the disciplinary action taken by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of its discretion is recognized as having so clearly lost reasonableness, in light of common social norms, as to constitute an abuse of discretion, may that action be deemed unlawful. In order to find that a disciplinary action against a public official has so clearly lost reasonableness in light of common social norms, it must be possible to determine, based on a comprehensive consideration of factors such as the content and nature of the misconduct giving rise to the discipline, the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline, and the standards for determining the disciplinary sanction, considered in light of the specific case, that the disciplinary action is objectively and clearly unreasonable. Even though the exercise of the disciplinary authority is left to the discretion of the appointing authority, such disciplinary action shall be deemed to have exceeded the bounds of discretion and thus be unlawful where it violates the principle of public interest, which requires that disciplinary authority be exercised for a public purpose; where it violates the principle of proportionality by selecting an excessively harsh disciplinary sanction disproportionate to the general degree of the misconduct constituting the grounds for discipline; or where it violates the principle of equality by selecting, without reasonable cause, a disciplinary sanction that departs from and is inconsistent with the standards generally applied to misconduct of the same degree (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du16991, delivered on April 13, 2007, among others).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and of the first-instance judgment cited therein, the court below, after comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted and finding the facts as indicated in its reasoning, determined as follows: the above plaintiffs violated the duty of good faith under Article 56, the duty of obedience under Article 57, and the duty not to leave one's post under Article 58 of the State Public Officials Act; the fact that the above plaintiffs actively participated in the strike in this case, which not only failed to follow lawful procedures but also lacked legitimacy, cannot be said to constitute a light degree of violation of law; a considerable number of the above plaintiffs had previously been punished for crimes such as obstruction of business by participating in an illegal strike on February 25, 2002 in connection with railway union activities, and yet participated once again in the illegal strike in this case, and moreover incited the strike and played a leading role in various rallies; and, comprehensively considering various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, including the manner and scale of the strike in this case, the above plaintiffs' positions within the railway union, and the status of the defendant's disciplinary actions against those involved in the strike in this case, the court below determined that, even taking fully into account the above plaintiffs' asserted grounds, including their records of commendation, the respective dispositions against the above plaintiffs in this case cannot be said to violate the principle of equity or to be excessively harsh in terms of the disciplinary sanction imposed.
In light of the foregoing legal principles and the record, upon examination of the relevant evidence, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below are deemed justified and acceptable.
The judgment below is not, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, unlawful due to a violation of the rules of evidence or a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the determination of disciplinary sanctions.
2. As to the defendant's grounds of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and of the first-instance judgment cited therein, the court below, after comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted and finding the facts as indicated in its reasoning, determined as follows: although the respective grounds for discipline found against Plaintiff 21, Plaintiff 23, Plaintiff 26, Plaintiff 30 through Plaintiff 33, Plaintiff 35, Plaintiff 36, and Plaintiff 42 through Plaintiff 45 constitute violations of the duty of good faith under Article 56, the duty of obedience under Article 57, and the duty not to leave one's post under Article 58 of the State Public Officials Act, the grounds for discipline against most of the above plaintiffs consist of having participated in the strike in this case and having failed to comply with the Commissioner of the Korea National Railroad's order to return to duty; the above plaintiffs did not reach the level of actively leading or inciting the strike in this case, nor did they coerce other union members into participating in the strike against their will or obstruct the normal return to work after the strike, such that the degree of illegality is relatively minor; in the case of Plaintiff 21, although he led the general strike send-off ceremony on the day before the strike in this case in addition to the above grounds for discipline, it is difficult to see the degree of illegality as significantly different from that of a simple strike participant; in the case of Plaintiff 43, he had received commendations and citations on several occasions; and, in connection with the strike in this case, the severe disciplinary sanctions of removal from office or dismissal were imposed on only an extremely small number of simple participants. Comprehensively considering these and other circumstances as indicated in its reasoning, the court below determined that disciplining the above plaintiffs by removal from office or dismissal constitutes an unlawful deviation from or abuse of the disciplinary discretion.
In light of the legal principles set forth in 1.C.(2) above and the record, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below are deemed justified and acceptable.
The judgment below cannot be said to be unlawful due to a failure to exhaust the deliberation required, or due to a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the determination of disciplinary sanctions, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the respective losing parties. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the Justices participating in the deliberation.
Justice Cha Han-sung (Presiding Justice), Ko Hyun-cheol, Kim Ji-hyung (Justice in charge), Jeon Su-an