[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Attorneys of Naeil General Law Office, Attorney Lee O-yeong and 5 others, as Litigation Representatives)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Daewoo Motor Sales Co., Ltd. (Attorney Baek Jun-hyeon of Shinhwa Law Firm, as Litigation Representative)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2000Nu7423 rendered on October 24, 2001
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
1. Regarding the Validity of the Union Membership Scope Clause in the Collective Agreement
Under Articles 5 and 11 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합및노동관계조정법, hereinafter the "Act"), workers may freely organize or join a trade union, and the specific scope of the union's membership is determined by the bylaws of the relevant trade union. A worker acquires the status of union member by freely joining the relevant trade union in accordance with the union's bylaws. As a general principle, a collective agreement concluded between an employer and a trade union is actually applied to all members who have joined as constituents of the union that is a party to the agreement, unless there are special circumstances, such as a special provision stipulating that the agreement shall apply only to workers within a certain limited scope.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, after examining the evidence adopted, the court below found the facts as stated in the judgment, and with respect to the Plaintiffs' argument that the disciplinary provisions of the collective agreement (in particular, Articles 30 and 50, etc.) should apply to the Plaintiffs, the court below held as follows. Article 3 of the collective agreement concluded on October 15, 1996 between the Intervenor for the Defendant company (hereinafter the "Intervenor") and the trade union provides that the agreement applies to the company, the union, and union members; however, Article 6, in specifically defining the scope of union membership, enumerates, among others, employees of Grade 5 (managerial or technical positions) or higher as persons who may not become union members. At the time of the disciplinary dismissal in this case, the Plaintiffs were employees of managerial Grade 4 or assistant manager Grade 3, and thus fell within the job grades listed above as persons who may not become union members. Article 6 of the above collective agreement appears to be a provision intended, through mutual consultation between labor and management, to specifically define persons who may not become union members separately from the scope of workers subject to organization by the union under its bylaws, thereby excluding a certain range of workers from the application of the collective agreement. Even if this provision conflicts with the provisions on the scope of union membership set forth in the union's bylaws, and even if, as in this case, the union later amended its bylaws and subsequently approved the establishment of an office branch formed at the initiative of the Plaintiffs without a resolution of the general assembly (or delegates' meeting), this does not render Article 6 of the above collective agreement invalid or ineffective as being contrary to Articles 5 and 11 of the Act. On these grounds, the court below rejected the Plaintiffs' above argument.
Examining the above legal principles and the record, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below as set forth above are justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles regarding the validity of the union membership scope clause in the collective agreement as argued in the grounds of appeal. The Supreme Court decision relied upon by the Plaintiffs concerns a different factual situation and is not appropriate to be invoked in this case.
2. Regarding the General Binding Force of the Collective Agreement
Pursuant to Article 35 of the Act, "workers of the same kind" who are subject to application of a collective agreement by virtue of its general binding force refer to those persons for whom application of the relevant collective agreement is expected under the provisions of the agreement. Persons who lack the qualification to be union members under the provisions of the collective agreement cannot be said to be expected to have the collective agreement applied to them, and are therefore not subject to the collective agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da13415 rendered on October 28, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 99Du6927 rendered on December 10, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2002Da23611 rendered on June 27, 2003).
Examining the facts found by the court below in light of the record, at the time of the disciplinary dismissal in this case, the Plaintiffs did not fall within the scope of union membership prescribed in Article 6 of the above collective agreement, and thus were persons lacking the qualification of union membership under the provisions of the collective agreement. Accordingly, application of the collective agreement to them cannot be said to have been expected, and the Plaintiffs cannot be regarded as "workers of the same kind" bound by the general binding force of the collective agreement under Article 35 of the Act (moreover, the number of union members of the Intervenor company's trade union did not reach half of the regularly employed workforce at the time the Plaintiffs were disciplinarily dismissed). The judgment of the court below to this effect is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles regarding the general binding force of a collective agreement as argued in the grounds of appeal.
3. Regarding the Interpretation of the Personnel Committee Regulations
The court below also examined the Plaintiffs' argument concerning a defect in the composition of the Personnel Committee for the reexamination (re-review), and after examining the evidence adopted, found the facts as stated in the judgment. In light of the fact that the Intervenor company's Personnel Committee Regulations distinguish between the "chairperson" and "members," prescribing their respective qualifications and authority separately, it is difficult to construe the term "member" subject to replacement in the case of reexamination under Article 16.3 of the Personnel Committee Regulations as including the chairperson. Therefore, the reexamination Personnel Committee, which was composed by replacing only half of the members of the original Personnel Committee in resolving the disciplinary dismissal in this case, cannot be deemed to have violated the Personnel Committee Regulations in its composition. Moreover, even if the term "member" subject to replacement were construed as including the chairperson, since the above regulation merely provides, as a principle, for replacement of one-half or more of the members, the fact that, according to the circumstances of the Intervenor company, the reexamination Personnel Committee was composed by replacing only two members, including the chairperson, which is less than one-half, cannot in itself be deemed a material defect in the reexamination procedure sufficient to render the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiffs invalid. On these grounds, the court below also rejected the Plaintiffs' above argument.
Examining the record, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are all justified, and there is no error such as misapprehension of the legal principles regarding the interpretation of the Personnel Committee Regulations as argued in the grounds of appeal.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. It is so ordered as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice), Cho Mu-je, Lee Gyu-hong, Park Jae-yun (Justice in Charge)