[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Daewoo Educational Foundation (School Juridical Person), Litigation Representative Attorney Yoon Seung-yeong
[Original Judgment]
Seoul High Court, Judgment of June 20, 1990, Case No. 89Na47085
[Order]
The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. As to Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 5 of the Defendant's Litigation Representative
The court below, based on the evidence it adopted, found the following facts as the grounds giving rise to the Defendant's liability. That is, the Plaintiff, having lost his Republic of Korea nationality upon acquiring U.S. citizenship around January 1971, was, while serving as a tenured professor and chair of the Department of Business Administration at Fordham University in the United States, invited to Ajou University, which is operated by the Defendant, and began working there on May 26, 1981 as Dean of the College of Business Administration and Professor. After a trial employment period, he was appointed on March 9, 1983, effective from March 1 of that year, as a professor of business administration for a ten-year term until February 28, 1993, and the appointment report was accepted by the Ministry of Education (then the Ministry of Education, hereinafter the same) on March 26, 1983; however, on June 1 of that year, he was removed from his positions as Dean of the College of Business Administration and Chair of the Department of Business Administration by the President of Ajou University. The Plaintiff, having entered Korea for the purpose of professorial activities, had been obtaining extensions of his period of stay in Korea from the immigration office every three months by submitting a certificate of employment issued in the name of the President of Ajou University together with a statement of reasons for the extension application. However, on June 20, 1983, the Ministry of Education issued guidelines on the management of foreign professors, to the effect that, with respect to foreign professors teaching humanities and social science subjects other than foreign languages that could not be replaced by Korean nationals, such professors should gradually be replaced by Korean nationals and the hiring of foreign professors should be restricted. Accordingly, when the immigration office inquired of Ajou University on November 4 of that year as to the necessity of continuing to employ the Plaintiff as a professor and the possibility of replacing him with a Korean professor, the President of Ajou University replied to the immigration office on November 14 that the Plaintiff, as a professor in the Department of Business Administration, was in charge of subjects such as Readings in Business Literature, Business English, and Organizational Behavior; that his appointment report for the period from March 1, 1983 to February 28, 1993 had been accepted by the Ministry of Education; and that it was determined that the subjects taught by the Plaintiff could be replaced by a Korean professor. In accordance with this reply, the immigration office, on November 18, 1983, made a decision restricting the Plaintiff's period of stay in Korea, extending it only this one time until February 29, 1984. Thereafter, the Plaintiff obtained permission from the President of Ajou University for overseas travel from December 16, 1983 to February 16, 1984, and departed Korea on December 4, 1983. He then demanded that Ajou University withdraw the above reply and guarantee his status of stay in Korea, but Ajou University failed to comply. Judging that entry into Korea would be meaningless in a situation where staying in Korea for professorial purposes was impossible, the Plaintiff did not enter Korea even after February 29, 1984 had passed. Accordingly, the President of Ajou University, on May 4 of that year, on the ground that the Plaintiff had failed to enter the country by that time and could not conduct lectures, issued an order of leave of absence retroactive from March 1, 1984 to August 31 of that year, covering the first semester; and when the second semester began without the Plaintiff's entry into Korea and residency issues being resolved, the University, on September 3 of that year, extended the leave of absence period to October 31 of that year, and thereafter, on October 31, 1984, issued an order of ex officio dismissal.
Having found these facts, the court below held that, inasmuch as Ajou University had appointed the Plaintiff, a foreigner, as a professor pursuant to an agreement with him, the obligation to grant the Plaintiff entry qualifications and extensions of the period of stay under the immigration laws and regulations, or to prepare supporting documents such as certificates of employment necessary to demonstrate the need for his continued employment, so as to enable the Plaintiff to carry out his professorial duties, formed part of the above appointment contract. Therefore, when the immigration office inquired as to whether continued employment of the Plaintiff as a professor was necessary and whether he could be replaced by a Korean professor, in accordance with the Ministry of Education's foreign professor management guidelines, Ajou University knew or could have known that, depending on its reply, it would be understood as expressing an intention to replace the Plaintiff with a Korean professor, resulting in a shortened period of stay or difficulty in extending it. Nevertheless, on November 14, 1983, Ajou University replied that the subjects taught by the Plaintiff could be replaced by a Korean professor, thereby causing the immigration office to restrict the Plaintiff's period of stay in Korea to February 28, 1984. By this intentional or negligent act, contrary to the above professorial appointment contract, the University caused the Plaintiff to be no longer able to stay in Korea for the purpose of teaching. Furthermore, given that the restriction on the Plaintiff's period of stay was made in accordance with the above reply from Ajou University, that Ajou University had officially expressed its judgment regarding the possibility of replacing the Plaintiff, and that, after the expiration of the period of stay, a new entry qualification would be required, while the Ministry of Education's policy on managing foreign professors remained in effect, the court below held that, in order for the Plaintiff to obtain a new entry qualification for professorial purposes, absent other special circumstances, it was a prerequisite that Ajou University itself withdraw the above reply and actively assert to, and make the relevant authorities recognize, the necessity of continuing to employ the Plaintiff as a professor in his original subjects, contrary to what it had stated in its reply; and that such action need not necessarily be preceded by an application from the Plaintiff. Since there was no evidence that the Defendant took such affirmative action, the court below held that the Plaintiff's inability to remain in Korea for professorial purposes after March 1, 1984, and his consequent inability to perform his professorial duties under the appointment contract, were attributable solely to causes chargeable to the Defendant; that the above leave of absence and dismissal dispositions were therefore void; and that accordingly, the professorial appointment relationship between the Defendant and the Plaintiff remained validly in existence, such that the Defendant was obligated to pay wages to the Plaintiff pursuant to Article 538(1) of the Civil Code (민법).
The above factual findings and determinations of the court below conform to the purport of this Court's judgment remanding the case, and are justified; there is no failure to exhaust the examination of evidence, violation of the rules of evidence, or misapprehension of the legal principles under Article 538(1) of the Civil Code, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
Furthermore, the court below's determination that the Plaintiff cannot be held responsible for the impossibility of performing his professorial duties merely because he failed to enter Korea within the period of stay and to apply for an extension of the period of stay, or for entry qualification for professorial purposes, or for a change of status of stay, and that this impossibility was attributable solely to causes chargeable to the Defendant, and consequently the court below's decision not to apply comparative negligence offset, are also justified. Accordingly, there is no illegality in the form of failure to exhaust examination regarding the recognition of the Plaintiff's negligence, or misapprehension of legal principles regarding comparative negligence offset, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2 of the Defendant's Litigation Representative
The court below, comprehensively considering the evidence, found that the Plaintiff was, in 1984, receiving the salary of a full professor at pay grade 39 at Ajou University, and that professors at Ajou University advance one pay grade every year, with salaries being raised every year effective January 1 and remaining uniform through December 31; based on this, the court below calculated the amount of salary that the Defendant should have paid to the Plaintiff for the period from March 1, 1984 to May 30, 1990.
However, Article 151(1) of the Education Act (교육법) provides that the school year of each school begins on March 1 and ends on the last day of February of the following year, and Article 30 of the Private School Act (사립학교법) provides that the fiscal year of a school juridical person shall follow the school year of the private school it establishes and operates. Therefore, the Defendant's fiscal year runs from March 1 of each year to the last day of February of the following year, and the salaries of the Defendant's faculty and staff are to be raised every year effective March 1, in accordance with the fiscal year. Accordingly, in calculating the Plaintiff's salary, it would be correct to divide the calculation according to the fiscal year, such that for January and February of each year, the salary schedule of the previous year (not yet raised) should serve as the basis for calculating the salary payable to the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court below calculated the salary on the premise that it was raised according to the calendar year, using the salary schedule of the then-current (raised) year as the basis. This constitutes an error in the misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the fiscal year under the Private School Act.
According to the descriptions in Exhibits Gap No. 10-1 through 14 and Gap No. 19-1 through 7, whose authenticity is undisputed, together with the overall purport of the pleadings, it can be seen that the Plaintiff, while serving as a professor, was advanced to pay grade 39 on September 1, 1983, and that professors under the Defendant advance one pay grade for every year of continuous service. The court below, in calculating the Plaintiff's salary on the premise that he was at pay grade 39 as of January 1, 1984, and that he was advanced one pay grade each year thereafter, and that salaries were raised each year effective January 1, applied the raised salary schedule effective from March 1 of the then-current year to January and February of each year, thereby calculating in a manner favorable to the Plaintiff. However, for the period from September 1 to December 31 of each year, the pay grade is calculated one grade lower than it should be, resulting in an outcome unfavorable to the Plaintiff in the total calculation for each year; however, this outcome accords with the Plaintiff's own assertion. The above illegality found by the court below is deemed to have affected the judgment, and this ground of appeal is with merit.
3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3 of the Defendant's Litigation Representative
The court below found that the bonus allowance that the Defendant was obligated to pay to the Plaintiff amounted to 600% of the annual total salary each year. However, on this point, the Defendant asserts that it paid its faculty and staff a bonus allowance of 400% per year and a diligence allowance of up to 100% every six months, such that for those with less than one year of continuous service, 50% was paid, and for those with one year or more of continuous service, the amount was increased by 5% for each additional year of service.
Upon examination of the record, there is no evidence to support the court below's finding that the Defendant paid the Plaintiff a bonus allowance of 600% per year; rather, according to the descriptions in the above Exhibits Gap No. 10-1 through 14, it can be seen that the bonus allowance paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in 1983 was less than 600%. The judgment of the court below cannot escape criticism for having found facts without evidence, or for a failure to exhaust the examination of evidence, in violation of the rules of evidence. This ground of appeal is with merit.
4. As to Ground of Appeal No. 4 of the Defendant's Litigation Representative and Ground of Appeal No. 1 of the Plaintiff
(1) Deduction of amounts paid by the Defendant during the leave of absence period
According to the record, the Defendant asserted that it paid the Plaintiff KRW 4,135,842, equivalent to half of his monthly salary, for the eight-month leave of absence period from March 1, 1984 to October 31 of that year, and although the amount actually received by the Plaintiff is not made clear, there is testimony from witness Kwon Tae-eok in the court below to the effect that a certain amount was paid during the leave of absence period pursuant to the compensation regulations. Nevertheless, the court below made no determination on this point. The court below should have examined and determined the actual amount of leave allowance received by the Plaintiff and deducted it from the amount of damages. Accordingly, the ground of appeal of the Defendant's Litigation Representative asserting failure to exhaust examination and omission of judgment in the judgment of the court below is with merit.
(2) Deduction of interim income
Where an employee dismissed due to causes attributable to the employer earns profit by working at another job during the period of dismissal, the employer may, in paying wages for the dismissal period to said employee, deduct the amount of such profit (so-called "interim income") from the wage amount. This is because such interim income corresponds to the profit gained from being relieved of an obligation, as referred to in Article 538(2) of the Civil Code. However, Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) provides, for the purpose of guaranteeing the minimum livelihood of employees, that where an employer causes a work stoppage due to causes attributable to the employer, the employer shall pay the relevant employee an allowance of not less than 70/100 (60/100 prior to the amendment by Act No. 4099 of March 29, 1989) of the average wage during the work stoppage period. Here, "work stoppage" includes cases where an individual employee, despite having the intention to provide labor under the employment contract, is refused employment or rendered unable to work against his will. Therefore, of the wage amount that the employee could have received, the amount up to the limit of the work stoppage allowance under Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act cannot be made the subject of profit deduction, and interim income must be deducted only from the amount exceeding such work stoppage allowance.
Moreover, even when deducting interim income up to the limit of the amount exceeding the above work stoppage allowance, the period during which the interim income arose must correspond in time to the period for which the wages are payable, and profits earned during a period temporally different therefrom must not be deducted.
Furthermore, since Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act was amended and promulgated on March 29, 1989, raising the work stoppage allowance from 60% to 70% of the average wage, in this case, interim income should be deducted only up to the limit of the amount exceeding 60% of the average wage, the work stoppage allowance under the former Act, for the period from March 1, 1984 to March 28, 1989, and up to the limit of the amount exceeding 70% under the amended Act thereafter.
The court below calculated the total amount of salary that the Defendant should have paid to the Plaintiff for the period from March 1, 1984 to May 30, 1990 as KRW 137,618,129, and found, based on the evidence, that the Plaintiff, during the 13-month period from January 1, 1988 to January 31, 1989 while under the dismissal disposition, worked as a responsible expert committee member at the non-party Korea Standards Association and received a total of KRW 30,795,000 in monthly salary and bonuses. To this income amount, the court below added KRW 25,142,733, representing the amount the Plaintiff, as a U.S. citizen, would have received under the U.S. minimum wage law of USD 3.35 per hour, amounting to USD 580.67 per month from March 1, 1984 (a period which the Plaintiff himself conceded should be deducted), converted at KRW 833.20 per dollar, having failed to work at Ajou University as a professor and instead engaged in other employment. Adding these figures together, the court below arrived at a total of KRW 55,937,733, and determined that this amount exceeded the 40% limit for interim income deduction from the above KRW 137,618,129, and accordingly held that the Defendant must pay 60% thereof, namely KRW 82,570,877.
However, with respect to the interim income of KRW 30,795,000 that the Plaintiff earned while working at the non-party Korea Standards Association, it is necessary to determine whether this amount exceeds the remaining amount after deducting 60% of the average wage, the work stoppage allowance under the former Labor Standards Act Article 38, based on the salary corresponding, in point of time, to the period during which such interim income was earned, out of the salary the Plaintiff would have received from the Defendant. However, as for the deduction of interim income for the remaining period, since the Plaintiff himself concedes to such deduction, it would be permissible to deduct this amount without limiting it to the amount exceeding the work stoppage allowance.
Also, although the court below erred in applying the former Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act even after March 29, 1989, since after this date the amount deducted was the U.S. minimum wage amount which the Plaintiff himself concedes should be deducted, and this amount does not exceed the remaining amount after deducting the 70% work stoppage allowance under the amended Act, this error did not affect the outcome of the judgment. Accordingly, this ground of appeal by the Defendant's Litigation Representative is without merit, and the Plaintiff's ground of appeal is with merit only insofar as it concerns the portion of deducting the total interim income from the total salary amount; the remainder of the Plaintiff's argument is without merit.
(3) Student guidance allowance, and research allowances by pay grade and rank
The court below, in calculating the amount of salary that the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff, included the student guidance allowance and research allowances by pay grade and rank. According to the descriptions in Exhibits Gap No. 19-1 through 17, it can be seen that the Defendant regularly and uniformly paid its faculty and staff student guidance allowances, research allowances by pay grade, and research allowances by rank according to their ranks. Accordingly, the court below's action of including such amounts in the wage calculation is justified. The Defendant's Litigation Representative's argument on this point is without merit.
5. As to the Plaintiff's remaining grounds of appeal
(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, with respect to the Plaintiff's assertion that the present value, after deducting intermediate interest, of the wages that would arise from the date of conclusion of the appellate court's oral argument until the expiration of the term of the appointment contract should be immediately paid, the court below held that, while a claim for wages up to the time of the Plaintiff's reinstatement as a professor at Ajou University might be sought as a lawsuit for future performance based on the above professorial appointment contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, there is no basis for claiming, as a lump sum in advance in the above manner, wages up to the expiration date of the above appointment contract term. Even if the claim for the amount equivalent to the above wages were regarded as a claim for damages due to the Defendant's non-performance of obligation or tort continuing after the date of conclusion of oral argument, while a claim, as a lawsuit for future performance, for damages that might arise up to the time of the Plaintiff's reinstatement as a professor might be considered, in light of the course of this litigation—including the fact that the judgment of the High Court prior to remand between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in this case was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Plaintiff's inability to perform his professorial duties was due to causes attributable to the Defendant—it is difficult to conclusively determine that the Defendant's state of non-performance of obligation or tort will continue until the expiration of the above appointment contract term. The court below thus held that, in this case, a claim cannot be made in advance as a lump sum, deducting intermediate interest, for anticipated damages on the premise that such state will continue until the expiration of the appointment contract term.
However, the Plaintiff asserts that the professorial appointment contractual relationship with the Defendant remains validly in existence, and seeks payment of wages that will continuously and repeatedly arise until the expiration date of the above professorial appointment contract, seeking, for wages after the conclusion of oral argument, the present value after deducting intermediate interest. Accordingly, while this may, at first glance, be understood as a lawsuit for immediate performance, it may also be considered to include the purport of seeking, in the event such claim is not accepted, performance as a lawsuit for future performance. The court below should have exercised its authority to clarify this point with respect to the portion of the wage claim after the conclusion of oral argument, so as to clarify the purport of the claim. However, even if it is considered that a claim for future performance is included, this should be understood as limited to wages from the conclusion of oral argument until the time of reinstatement as a professor.
The court below's rejection of the claim for wages from the date of conclusion of the court below's oral argument until the time of the Plaintiff's reinstatement, within the term of the above professorial appointment, without exercising its authority to clarify, constitutes an illegality in the form of failure to exhaust examination, or an illegality in the form of misapprehension of legal principles concerning lawsuits for future performance, which affected the judgment. This ground of appeal is with merit on this point.
(2) In order to render a judgment ordering future performance, it must be possible to determine, definitively as of the time of conclusion of oral argument, not only that the time for performance of the obligation will arrive in the future, but also that the cause of non-performance will continue to exist until that time (see this Court's Decision 86Daka2151, delivered on September 22, 1987). The Plaintiff asserts that the retirement allowance to be received in the future should be converted into its present value after deducting intermediate interest and paid immediately. In this case, however, there is no material to conclusively determine that the Plaintiff will not be reinstated by the expiration date of the above professorial appointment contract, and it is therefore impossible to definitively determine, as of the time of conclusion of oral argument, the Plaintiff's date of retirement, which serves as the basis for calculating the retirement allowance. Accordingly, a claim of this nature cannot be permitted either as an immediate performance claim or as a future performance claim.
The court below's rejection of the claim for retirement allowance is justified in its conclusion. This ground of appeal is without merit.
(3) The court below, in calculating the monthly salary amount that the Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff, included only the base salary, student guidance allowance, research allowance by pay grade, research allowance by rank, and bonus allowance, while excluding the position allowance and admissions duty allowance. As for the position allowance, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff held a position such as dean at the time of the leave of absence or ex officio dismissal disposition, nor is there evidence that the appointment contract was concluded with the Plaintiff as Dean of the College of Business Administration at Ajou University. As for the admissions duty allowance, there is no evidence that it was paid regularly and uniformly; rather, it appears to have been paid within budgetary limits to professors engaged in admissions administration work, and thus it cannot be included in the wages. Accordingly, the court below's action of excluding these allowances from the calculation of the wage amount is justified. There is no illegality in the judgment of the court below in the form of violation of the rules of evidence, failure to exhaust examination, or misapprehension of legal principles regarding wages, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
6. As stated above, since a portion of the grounds of appeal of the Defendant's Litigation Representative and a portion of the grounds of appeal of the Plaintiff are to be accepted, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below, without rendering a determination on the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal concerning delay damages, etc., and it is so decided as per the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Presiding Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Park Woo-dong, Justice Bae Seok, Justice Yoon Young-chul