[Plaintiff, Appellant] Seoul Subway Corporation Labor Union, Attorneys Yoon Jong-hyun and 3 others, counsel for the plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Seoul Metropolitan Subway Corporation, Attorney Ham Young-eop, counsel for the intervenor
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 89Gu10564 rendered on July 18, 1991
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
1. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1 asserted by the Plaintiff's counsel
The various allowances paid under Article 46 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) for extended working hours, night work, or holiday work are premium wages paid as consideration for labor. Therefore, if the actual working hours are reduced due to a change in the form of work, it is inherent in the nature of wages that the corresponding allowance payments are reduced accordingly.
Even if the actual income of the employees decreased as a result of the reduction in the amount of the above allowances due to the change in the form of work, and even if there is a need to maintain the former substantive wage level, this is a matter to be resolved through the specific procedure for determining wage amounts. It cannot be said that changing the form of work without taking measures to compensate for the reduction of the above allowances in this arbitration award was unlawful or an act beyond the scope of authority.
The judgment below, which was rendered to the same effect as above, is justified, and there is no illegality affecting the judgment, such as misunderstanding the Plaintiff's argument, insufficient examination, or omission of judgment, as argued in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, this ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the content of the arbitration award in this case concerning the adjustment of the fixed number of employees and working hours of the Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the "Intervenor") was determined less favorably than the criteria for calculating the working hours of Seoul Metropolitan subway train crew members, on the ground that, according to Evidence B No. 4, Evidence B No. 5, and Evidence B No. 25-3, the Seoul Metropolitan Subway Corporation Establishment Ordinance provided that various regulations related to the subway transportation business, such as the Seoul Metropolitan Transportation Business Establishment Ordinance applicable as of December 31, 1983, would apply only until the Intervenor enacted and enforced relevant regulations, and it was recognized that the Intervenor was already enforcing replacement regulations such as the Rules of Employment regarding working hours, etc.
Examining the evidence relied upon by the court below for the above factual finding in light of the record, Evidence B No. 4 and Evidence B No. 5 are the Intervenor Corporation's establishment ordinance and articles of incorporation respectively, and their contents do not contain anything that could replace the regulations concerning the subway transportation business. Moreover, the provisions concerning the working hours of crew members, etc. in Exhibit A No. 25-3 (Rules of Employment; it is clear that "Evidence B No. 25-3" in the judgment below is a clerical error) were amended around November 6, 1989, after this arbitration award, in accordance with the purport of the said arbitration award. Therefore, it is clear that the said Rules of Employment could not have served as the basis for calculating the fixed number of employees and adjusting working hours at the time of this arbitration award, and the above judgment of the court below was erroneous in this respect. However, according to the record, it is recognized that at the time of this arbitration award, the pre-amendment Rules of Employment (Evidence B No. 12-4) and regulations such as the construction plan document were already in force with respect to working hours and the fixed number of crew members. Therefore, it is clear that the criteria for calculating the working hours of Seoul Metropolitan subway train crew members relied upon by the Plaintiff could no longer apply pursuant to the transitional provisions of the Seoul Metropolitan Subway Corporation Establishment Ordinance, and thus the above error of the court below does not affect the outcome of the judgment. This ground of appeal is without merit.
3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3
Examining the contents of the research service report referred to in the grounds of appeal in light of the record, it can be seen that the fixing of the fixed-rate allowance at issue in this case into a fixed amount was intended to improve the wage gap among workers and the continuous increase in labor costs, and also included the purpose of enhancing wage stability. The fixed allowance under this arbitration award was not only adjusted upward from the allowance that would have originally been payable, but also,
since the effective period of an arbitration award with no fixed term is the same as that of a collective agreement, it does not become fixed at the fixed allowance amount determined in the said arbitration award. Therefore, the fixing of the fixed-rate allowance at issue in this case into a fixed amount cannot be said to constitute a change unfavorable to the employees.
There is no illegality in the judgment below, such as a violation of the rules of evidence resulting in a misapprehension of facts or insufficient examination, as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, this ground of appeal is also without merit.
4. As to Ground of Appeal No. 4
According to the record, the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had been negotiating since 1987 regarding the improvement of the organizational structure and remuneration system of the Intervenor Corporation. In the memorandum of agreement dated October 5, 1988, they agreed to prepare an improvement plan by December 30, 1988, regarding the change in the form of work and the remuneration system, which had not been settled, and to implement it from January 1989; however, they failed to prepare an improvement plan by the said deadline. Thereafter, when the Plaintiff's industrial action began, the Intervenor filed for arbitration, and the Defendant rendered a first arbitration award on March 29, 1989, providing that the implementation plan regarding the change in the form of work and the remuneration system be finalized by May 31, 1989, and implemented from June 1, 1989. However, since the Plaintiff and the Intervenor failed to reach a settlement on the implementation plan by that deadline, the Defendant ultimately rendered this arbitration award. In light of the fact that the implementation timing of the matters subject to the arbitration award had been continuously postponed, and that the fixed allowance changed by the arbitration award was based on wages reflecting all the matters of the arbitration award of March 29, it cannot be said that advancing the implementation timing is disadvantageous to the workers' side, absent special circumstances.
In this case, the Plaintiff argued that, by setting the reference date for the fixing of the allowance amount as April 20, 1989, the wage increase under the 1989 wage agreement was not reflected, resulting in a disadvantageous outcome for the employees, and that implementing this disadvantageous fixed-amount provision earlier than the other arbitration provisions, namely on September 1, 1989, was unlawful or an act beyond the scope of authority. The court below rejected this argument on the ground that the change in the form of work required a certain preparatory period for employee recruitment, training assignment, etc., and that the grace period was merely set for that reason. As pointed out in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not expressly rule on the argument that setting the reference date for fixing the allowance amount as April 20, 1989 was disadvantageous to the employees. However, according to the record, the said 1989 wage agreement was concluded around November 1989, after this arbitration award, and therefore it cannot be said that the arbitration award was unlawful or made in excess of authority merely because it did not take this into consideration. There is no illegality in the judgment below such as a violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the law as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
5. As to Ground of Appeal No. 5
According to Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Dispute Mediation Act (노동쟁의조정법), a party may file an administrative litigation to contest an arbitration award if it deems the award to be unlawful or made in excess of authority. Accordingly,
an arbitration award may be contested only where it is alleged to be unlawful or in excess of authority, such as where the procedure is unlawful, where the content is unlawful due to a violation of the Labor Standards Act, or where the arbitration award was rendered in excess of authority with respect to matters not in dispute between the parties or matters exceeding the scope of the parties' dispute without justifiable reason. A mere assertion that the arbitration award is disadvantageous to either labor or management is not sufficient grounds for an objection.
According to the record, it is clear that the content of this arbitration award did not lower working conditions on grounds relating to standards set forth in the Labor Standards Act, and the Plaintiff's argument likewise does not allege that the content falls short of the standards set forth in the Labor Standards Act. Nor is there any other basis to find that this arbitration award was unlawful or made in excess of authority. The judgment of the court below is also to the same effect, and therefore there is no illegality of misapprehension of the law in the judgment below as pointed out in the grounds of appeal.
This ground of appeal is also without merit.
6. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as stated in the Order.
Supreme Court Justice Bae Man-un (Presiding Justice), Lee Hoi-chang, Kim Seok-su