[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee, Incidental Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant, Incidental Appellant] National Federation of Taxi Transport Business Associations (Litigation Representative Attorney Jeong Gu-hun and 1 other)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon District Court Judgment 2006Na10338, decided November 9, 2006
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against the Plaintiff is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Daejeon District Court. The Defendant's appeal is dismissed, and the Defendant's incidental appeal is dismissed as unlawful.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the Plaintiff's appeal
A. The main text of Article 54(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (구 산업재해보상보험법) (before its full amendment by Act No. 8373 of April 11, 2007; hereinafter the same) provides that "where the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (hereinafter referred to as the 'Service') has paid insurance benefits for an accident caused by the act of a third party, it shall be subrogated to the right to claim damages against the third party held by the person who received the benefits, within the limit of the amount of such benefits." This provision presupposes that the injured worker who received the benefits holds a right to claim damages against the third party, and provides that the Service acquires that right to claim damages within the limit of the amount of insurance benefits paid to the injured worker; thus, the right to claim damages acquired by the Service through the payment of insurance benefits pursuant to the statutory provision retains its identity as it was (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da37421, delivered December 16, 1997, etc.).
Meanwhile, the main text of Article 9(1) of the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (구 자동차손해배상보장법) (before its amendment by Act No. 6969 of August 21, 2003, which took effect on August 22, 2004; hereinafter the same) provides that "where a person who has taken out insurance, etc. becomes liable for damages under Article 3, the victim may, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, request the insurer, etc. to pay the insurance money, etc. directly to the victim pursuant to Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act (상법)." Article 3(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (before its amendment by Presidential Decree No. 18286 of February 21, 2004; hereinafter referred to as the "former Enforcement Decree") provides that "the insurance money or mutual aid money of the liability insurance or liability mutual aid which a person who intends to operate an automobile must take out pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Act shall be as set forth in each of the following subparagraphs per victim," and in item 2 of the same paragraph provides that "in case of injury, the amount of damage incurred by the victim within the range of the amount set forth in [Attached Table 1]: provided that, where the amount of damage is less than the amount equivalent to the medical treatment fees calculated according to the standards concerning the automobile insurance medical treatment fee schedule under Article 13(1) of the Act, the amount equivalent to such medical treatment fees, within the range of the amount set forth in [Attached Table 1], shall be deemed the amount of damage." The purport of the proviso to item 2 above is interpreted to mean that, even where the amount of damage, after deducting the amount corresponding to the victim's own comparative negligence from the damage sustained by the traffic accident victim, is less than the amount equivalent to the medical treatment fees under the above provision, the amount equivalent to such medical treatment fees shall be deemed the amount of damage in order to guarantee the treatment of the victim of the traffic accident, and this amount shall be paid as liability insurance money. Accordingly, a traffic accident victim may claim, as liability insurance money under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the amount equivalent to medical treatment fees under the proviso to item 2 above, regardless of the existence or degree of his or her own negligence contributing to the occurrence of the traffic accident.
B. In this case, the insurance company's obligation to pay liability insurance money to the traffic accident victim constitutes a cumulative assumption of the tortfeasor's obligation to compensate the traffic accident victim for damages (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da19765, delivered September 18, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 2003Da6774, delivered October 7, 2005, etc.), and only the amount of damage among such obligation is deemed increased beyond the amount of damages that the tortfeasor is liable to bear, as fictionalized by the statute as described above. Further, where a traffic accident victim who is also an injured worker (hereinafter referred to as the "victim") has received liability insurance money from the insurance company pursuant to the proviso to Article 3(1)(2) of the former Enforcement Decree, the Service may regard this as a case where "damages equivalent to the insurance benefits under this Act have been received" under Article 54(2) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, and thereby be exempted from its obligation to pay insurance benefits to the victim within the amount converted into medical care expenses. In contrast, if the Service first pays the victim's medical expenses as medical care benefits, and if the insurance company, which is liable under the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act to pay the prescribed medical treatment fees as liability insurance money regardless of the existence or degree of the victim's negligence, is thereby exempted from indemnification liability for the amount corresponding to the victim's negligence, this would grant an unjust benefit to the insurance company, which had set and received insurance premiums in advance reflecting the possibility of payment of liability insurance money under the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and would result in a consequence contrary to the purpose of Article 54(1) and (2) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, which is designed to prevent the exemption of third parties from liability and to secure insurance finances. Considering these circumstances comprehensively, it is reasonable to view that the victim's right to claim liability insurance money against the insurance company under the proviso to Article 3(1)(2) of the former Enforcement Decree constitutes "the right to claim damages against the third party held by the person who received the benefits" under the main text of Article 54(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. Accordingly, the Service, having paid medical care benefits to the victim, may be subrogated, within the limit of the amount of such benefits, to the victim's right to claim liability insurance money against the insurance company under the proviso to item 2 above.
C. Examining the record in light of the foregoing legal principles, the Plaintiff paid 1,395,430 won as medical care benefits (treatment expenses) under the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act to the non-party, an injured worker (traffic accident victim) who was injured in the industrial accident (traffic accident) at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Plaintiff acquired, within the limit of the amount of such benefits, pursuant to the main text of Article 54(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, the non-party's right to claim liability mutual aid money against the Defendant, the liability mutual aid business operator of the offending vehicle, which right the non-party held pursuant to Article 9(1) of the former Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act and Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act. Pursuant to Article 3(1)(2) of the former Enforcement Decree, the non-party could claim against the Defendant, as liability mutual aid money, at least the amount equivalent to medical treatment fees under the above provision, regardless of the existence or degree of his own negligence contributing to the occurrence of the traffic accident. Accordingly, the Plaintiff acquired the non-party's right to claim liability mutual aid money against the Defendant for the amount equivalent to medical treatment fees under the above provision, while retaining its identity as it was.
However, the court below determined, on the ground that "where an insurer that has entered into an insurance contract with one of joint tortfeasors pays the entire amount of damages to the victim, thereby jointly discharging the insurer of another joint tortfeasor from liability, the insurer that paid the damages may exercise a right of indemnity against the portion that the insurer of the other joint tortfeasor should bear, and in such case, the portion to be borne shall be calculated according to the ratio of negligence among the joint tortfeasors (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da39689, delivered October 28, 2004, etc.)," that the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff only 558,172 won, corresponding to the 40% negligence ratio of the driver of the offending vehicle as found by the court below, out of the above medical treatment fees, and thereby partially rejected the Plaintiff's claim. However, the legal principle relied upon by the court below concerns a case where the insurer of one of the joint tortfeasors pays damages to the victim and then is subrogated to that joint tortfeasor's right of indemnity against another joint tortfeasor, and it cannot be invoked in this case, where the non-party, an injured worker, suffered an industrial accident caused by the driver of the offending vehicle, and the Plaintiff paid medical care benefits to the non-party and is subrogated to the non-party's right to claim damages.
Ultimately, this determination by the court below constitutes a case of making a determination contrary to the Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da37421, delivered December 16, 1997, mentioned above, concerning the nature of the right of indemnity under Article 54(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2000Da62322, delivered March 21, 2002, held that "where an industrial accident occurs due to the joint tort of an industrial accident insurance policyholder and a third party, the Service cannot seek indemnity from the third party for the amount corresponding to the negligence ratio of the industrial accident insurance policyholder," but this case, in which the industrial accident occurred due to the concurrence of the injured worker's own negligence and the negligence of a third party, is not identical in facts to the above decision).
The Plaintiff's ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.
2. As to the Defendant's appeal and incidental appeal
A. The Defendant's appeal
The Defendant did not submit a brief of grounds of appeal within the statutory period, and the petition of appeal also does not contain any statement of grounds of appeal.
B. The Defendant's incidental appeal
The deadline for filing an incidental appeal must be deemed to be the expiration of the period for submitting the brief of grounds of appeal corresponding to the conclusion of oral argument in the appellate court (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Da30165, delivered March 23, 2001; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da10439, delivered April 12, 2007, etc.). According to the record, it is clear that the Defendant filed the incidental appeal on March 19, 2007, which is more than 20 days after December 21, 2006, the date on which the notice of receipt of the appellate case record was served on the Plaintiff, the appellant. Therefore, the Defendant's incidental appeal in this case is unlawful, and this defect cannot be cured.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the Plaintiff is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the Defendant's appeal is dismissed, and the Defendant's incidental appeal is dismissed as unlawful. It is so decided by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the judgment, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Jeon Su-an (Presiding Justice), Ko Hyeon-cheol (Justice in Charge), Kim Ji-hyeong, Cha Han-seong