[Plaintiff, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (근로복지공단)
[Defendants, Appellants] Taejang Electric Co., Ltd. and 1 other (Defendant's Attorneys Lee Jin-man and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2021. 5. 13., 2020Na2042775
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the defendants' loss on the issue of passive damages is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Outline of the case
A. Defendant Taejang Electric Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Defendant Company") was subcontracted by Defendant Korea Electric Power Corporation (hereinafter "Defendant Corporation") to perform distribution line construction work involving the removal of power lines and the demolition of utility poles in the course of relocating utility poles as part of the transmission line relocation work necessitated by the road construction in the Dunnae-Mui 2 section.
B. Non-party (deceased) (hereinafter "the injured worker"), an employee of Yuseon Telecommunications Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Yuseon Telecommunications"), which had been subcontracted by SK Telecom Co., Ltd., a telecommunications business operator, to perform the optical cable removal work as part of the above transmission line relocation work, was struck on the right side of his head by a support pole (a pole supporting the main pole) that suddenly fell on May 20, 2017 (hereinafter "the instant accident"). The injured worker died on May 24, 2017, from cerebral edema caused by traumatic subarachnoid hemorrhage.
C. The Plaintiff, as a corporation entrusted by the Minister of Employment and Labor with the administration of industrial accident compensation insurance (hereinafter "industrial accident insurance") under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, hereinafter "Industrial Accident Insurance Act"), recognized the instant accident as an occupational accident and paid the bereaved family of the injured worker medical care benefits of KRW 7,065,250, funeral expenses of KRW 14,531,690, and a lump-sum survivors' pension of KRW 199,895,332.
D. The court below determined that the instant accident occurred due to the joint tort of the Defendants, but limited the Defendants' liability to 85%, taking into account the injured worker's negligence in the occurrence and expansion of the damage, and determined that, among the Defendants' liability, the negligence of Yuseon Telecommunications, the employer of the injured worker and the industrial accident insurance policyholder, was 30%.
E. The court below calculated the scope of damages that the Plaintiff could subrogate against the Defendants by first offsetting the injured worker's negligence, and then, from the total insurance benefits borne by the Plaintiff (up to the limit of such damages), deducting the portion corresponding to Yuseon Telecommunications' 30% negligence from the damages amount after offsetting negligence.
2. The scope of subrogation of the right to claim damages against the Defendants by the Plaintiff, who paid insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act
A. The issue in this case
1) The issue in this case is the scope of subrogation when the Plaintiff, the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (hereinafter "the Service"), having paid insurance benefits to the injured worker or the bereaved family, subrogates the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
When an injured worker or beneficiary who has received insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act files a claim for damages against the tortfeasor, and the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, the question arises as to which method should be followed in calculating the amount of damages the injured worker may claim: (1) the method of first calculating the injured worker's total damages, then applying comparative negligence offsetting to determine the tortfeasor's amount of damages, and then deducting the "full amount of insurance benefits" from that amount of damages (the "offset after comparative negligence" method); or (2) the method of first deducting the Service's "full amount of insurance benefits" from the injured worker's total damages, and then applying comparative negligence offsetting (the "comparative negligence after offset" method). Depending on which of these methods is followed, it is determined whether the scope within which the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third party is the "full amount of insurance benefits" or is limited to "the amount of insurance benefits after deducting the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence."
2) The Supreme Court has previously held that where the Service, having paid insurance benefits to the injured worker, subrogates the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third-party tortfeasor pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the scope of such subrogation is the "full amount of insurance benefits" borne by the Service, up to the limit of the third party's amount of damages, and that the injured worker's claim for damages against the third party is reduced by that amount accordingly. The Court also held that, when an injured worker who has received insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act files a claim for damages against a third party, and the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, the amount of damages should be calculated by first calculating the damages, then applying comparative negligence offsetting, and then deducting the Service's full amount of insurance benefits therefrom (the "offset after comparative negligence" method) (see Supreme Court Decisions 88Daka5041 decided April 25, 1989; 89Da5997 decided February 13, 1990; 2015Da230228 decided December 10, 2015, etc.).
B. The meaning of Article 87 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act
Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that "where the Service has paid insurance benefits for an accident caused by the act of a third party, the Service shall subrogate the right of the person who received the benefits to claim damages against the third party, within the limit of the amount of such benefits." This provision, by its language, merely sets a ceiling on the right to claim damages that the Service may subrogate, without specifying the concrete scope of subrogation. Likewise, Paragraph 2 of the same Article merely provides that "if the beneficiary receives damages equivalent to insurance benefits from a third party for the same reason, the Service shall not pay insurance benefits under this Act within the limit of the amount converted according to the method prescribed by Presidential Decree," without specifying the concrete scope of the amount for which the Service may withhold insurance benefits.
In particular, where the injured worker's right to claim damages against the tortfeasor is limited due to reasons such as comparative negligence offsetting, it is not clear from the above provisions alone whether the policyholder's liability for damages under the Civil Act, etc. is extinguished by the full amount of the insurance benefits paid by the Service, and whether the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages, or withhold the corresponding insurance benefits, with respect to the full amount of the insurance benefits.
The criteria by which to calculate the scope of the tortfeasor's liability for damages that is extinguished by the Service's payment of insurance benefits under the above provisions, or the amount that the Service may subrogate or be relieved from bearing in the future within the limit of the insurance benefits paid by the Service, must be reasonably determined by the courts, comprehensively considering the content of the above provisions and other provisions of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the legal nature and function of the industrial accident insurance system, the nature of the right to receive insurance benefits, and the concept of harmony and equity within the overall legal order.
C. The history, legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and the legal nature of the industrial accident insurance system
1) With the rapid development of modern industrial society, the risk of industrial accidents has increased, making the protection of injured workers and adequate compensation inevitable. Industrial accidents suffered by workers were initially resolved mainly by means of civil damages based on the "fault liability principle." However, since World War II, the method of compensating injured workers has gradually changed, through the direct compensation system centered on the "no-fault liability theory," to compensation through the social insurance system (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2004Hun-Ba2 decided July 21, 2005, etc.). In keeping with this trend, our country enacted the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as Act No. 1438 on November 5, 1963, for the purpose of implementing industrial accident insurance projects to promptly and fairly compensate workers for occupational accidents, establishing and operating insurance facilities necessary to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of injured workers, and implementing projects for accident prevention and other improvements in worker welfare, thereby contributing to the protection of workers.
The industrial accident insurance system is a system that copes with the social risk of occupational accidents occurring to workers by way of insurance, using as its resources the insurance premiums paid by policyholder employers and the burden borne by the national treasury; it is one of the social insurance systems provided for in Article 3, Subparagraph 2 of the Framework Act on Social Security (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2002Hun-Ba52 decided November 25, 2004, etc.).
2) Although industrial accident insurance had a strong character as liability insurance at the time of its enactment, as industry developed thereafter, the need to protect workers from the high risks of industrial sites became even more pressing, and the function of industrial accident insurance as social insurance has been strengthened, including by expanding the scope for recognizing accidents occurring during commuting as occupational accidents.
A) Unlike health insurance, industrial accident insurance is structured such that, by an employer's enrollment in industrial accident insurance and payment of premiums, the employer is exempted from liability for compensation under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법); this reflects the liability-insurance character of industrial accident insurance. However, with respect to civil damages, unlike some foreign legislative examples in which an employer's liability is entirely discharged by insurance benefits under industrial accident insurance, it cannot be said that insurance benefits alone discharge the employer of all liability. Article 80(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that, by the payment of insurance benefits, a policyholder employer is "exempted from liability for compensation" under the Labor Standards Act for the same cause, thereby providing for unlimited exemption from liability under the Labor Standards Act, whereas the first sentence of Paragraph 2 provides that the policyholder is "exempted from liability for damages under other statutes within the limit of that amount," thereby making clear that the employer is not completely exempted from liability under other statutes by industrial accident insurance benefits. In light of these provisions as well, it cannot be said that industrial accident insurance has an exclusively liability-insurance character.
The Supreme Court has previously held that insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act have the character of liability insurance for an employer's liability for compensation under the Labor Standards Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 80Da2928 decided October 13, 1981; 93Da38826 decided May 24, 1994, etc.), while also holding that industrial accident insurance does not have the character of liability insurance covering the civil damages liability that an employer would bear due to an occupational accident (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Da13104 decided May 21, 2009). This reflects consideration of the fact that, while the essential character of the industrial accident insurance system lies in securing the right to survival of workers who have suffered occupational accidents, the damages system is premised on the individualistic modern civil law principles of damages theory based on the fault liability principle. In other words, even if an injured worker receives double compensation for the same loss or damage caused by the same industrial accident, it is not inevitably required, as part of the process of adjustment, that the "full amount of insurance benefits" be deducted. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the liability-insurance character of industrial accident insurance necessarily operates with respect to the portion of insurance benefits corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, and it is difficult to view that compensation for damages has been made with respect to this portion by the payment of insurance benefits.
B) Insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act are naturally paid to a worker who has suffered an industrial accident, in accordance with the requirements and procedures prescribed by the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and cannot be equated with damages under the Civil Act. Accordingly, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act compensates for the damage suffered by the injured worker at the expense of the Service, by requiring the payment of insurance benefits regardless of whether the injured worker, who is the beneficiary of the insurance benefits, was negligent. Furthermore, even where the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, it is reasonable that "at least the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, among the insurance benefits," be treated as a cost that the Service, as the insurer, should originally bear for the injured worker, such that the injured worker fully enjoys the benefit of receiving the insurance benefits. If the Service were permitted to subrogate the right to claim damages against a third party even with respect to the amount of insurance benefits corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, this would result in shifting to the injured worker a burden that the Service should have originally borne for the injured worker. This does not accord with the purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which is to promptly and fairly compensate workers for occupational accidents and to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of injured workers.
D. Financial burden of industrial accident insurance and policy considerations
1) It may be said that Article 87 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act also includes a purpose of securing the Service's insurance finances, and it is true that the broader the scope within which the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages, the more beneficial it is to the insurance finances. However, in light of the legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the social security character of the industrial accident insurance system discussed above, the interests of the injured worker must be considered with priority over securing insurance finances.
The burden of industrial accident insurance premiums is a matter of policy and legislative determination as to how to raise the funds for social insurance. The fact that an employer pays the full amount of the insurance premiums cannot serve as a basis for concluding that the employer's liability for damages to the injured worker is naturally discharged by the full amount of the insurance benefits paid by the Service, and it is difficult to conclude that the "offset after comparative negligence" method is naturally appropriate in calculating the amount of damages that the tortfeasor owes the injured worker. Therefore, in calculating the amount of damages owed to the injured worker by the employer, the employer and the Service should not be equated, and considering the complex character and function of the industrial accident insurance system, it is appropriate that the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, among the insurance benefits, be excluded from the scope within which the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party (the "comparative negligence after offset" method), so that the injured worker may receive compensation for this portion.
2) Even giving full weight to the fact that the employer pays the full amount of industrial accident insurance premiums, considering comprehensively the facts that the employer pursues profit by exposing workers to risk, and that it cannot be said that the worker who has some negligence, while exposed to the risks of the industrial accident site, bears sole responsibility for that negligence, it is difficult to conclude that it is natural for the employer to be discharged of liability for damages with respect to the full amount of the insurance benefits. Employers have a duty of care for safety in the workplace and a duty of management and supervision, which is separate from the wages that a worker receives in return for providing labor to the employer. Furthermore, employers need to guarantee a safe working environment for workers in order to pursue greater profit in a stable manner.
In fact, although the degree may differ, industrial sites are inevitably exposed to risk, and it is very rare for a worker who suffers an industrial accident at such a site to be entirely free of negligence. To require the injured worker to bear that risk simply because the injured worker was negligent runs contrary to the purpose of the industrial accident insurance system, and, by failing to consider the high degree of risk clearly present at industrial sites, in fact produces a result contrary to equity.
E. Change of precedent regarding the National Health Insurance Act
The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da287935 decided March 18, 2021, changed the previous "offset after comparative negligence" method to the "comparative negligence after offset" method, in calculating the scope of subrogation of the right to claim damages for medical expenses against a tortfeasor by a victim who received insurance benefits under the National Health Insurance Act (국민건강보험법).
In the en banc Decision 2018Da287935, the Supreme Court held, with respect to Article 58(1) of the National Health Insurance Act, that the provision does not expressly determine whether, where a victim's right to claim damages against a tortfeasor is limited due to reasons such as comparative negligence offsetting, the National Health Insurance Service (hereinafter "the NHIS") may subrogate the victim's right to claim damages, or withhold the corresponding insurance benefits, with respect to the full amount of the expenses it bore in paying insurance benefits, and that, since the scope within which the NHIS may subrogate is not clear from the language of Article 58 of the National Health Insurance Act alone, the right to claim damages that the NHIS may subrogate against the beneficiary, or the amount that the NHIS may be relieved from bearing when paying insurance benefits in the future, should not necessarily be regarded as the "full amount" of the expenses borne by the NHIS. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the criteria by which to calculate the amount that the NHIS may subrogate or be relieved from bearing in the future, within the limit of the amount borne by the NHIS, may be reasonably determined by the courts, comprehensively considering the legislative purpose and objectives of the National Health Insurance Act or the individual provision concerned, the nature of the right to receive insurance benefits, and the concept of harmony and equity within the overall legal order. It is reasonable to view that these standards of judgment apply equally to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, whose wording and format are similar.
The purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act in requiring the payment of insurance benefits regardless of whether the injured worker, the beneficiary of industrial accident insurance benefits, was negligent, is to promptly and fairly compensate workers for occupational accidents and to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of injured workers, even where the injured worker bears some responsibility for the occurrence of the insured event. Considering the purpose and function of the industrial accident insurance system as a social security system, it is a uniform interpretation within the legal order to depart from the previous "offset after comparative negligence" method, which placed excessive emphasis on the perspective of the liability-insurance character of industrial accident insurance, and to instead follow the "comparative negligence after offset" method declared with respect to health insurance in the en banc Decision 2018Da287935.
F. Scope of the Service's collection of unjust enrichment where the injured worker receives insurance benefits after the employer or a third party has paid damages
Furthermore, this legal principle applies equally to the scope within which the Service is relieved of its obligation to pay insurance benefits [main text of Article 80(3) and Article 87(2) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and Articles 76 and 81 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter "the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act")], where the beneficiary of insurance benefits receives money or goods equivalent to the insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act from the tortfeasor policyholder employer pursuant to the Civil Act or other statutes for the same cause, or receives damages equivalent to the insurance benefits from a third party. In this case, the scope within which the Service is relieved of its obligation to pay insurance benefits is limited to the amount for which the cause of payment arose due to the act of the employer or the third party, that is, the amount corresponding to the percentage of liability of the employer or the third party among the insurance benefits, and it must be held that the Service continues to bear the remaining portion, namely the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence among the insurance benefits. Therefore, where the injured worker receives insurance benefits after the employer or a third party has paid damages, the scope within which the Service may collect unjust enrichment from the injured worker pursuant to Article 84 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is also limited to the amount corresponding to the percentage of liability of the employer or the third party among the insurance benefits.
G. New legal principle
The cases in which an injured worker may claim damages against the tortfeasor on the basis of an industrial accident are: (1) where the worker suffers an industrial accident due to the tort of a third party; (2) where the worker suffers an industrial accident due to the joint tort of the industrial-accident-insured employer and a third party; and (3) where the worker suffers an industrial accident due to the tort of the industrial-accident-insured employer without the intervention of a third party. Among these, the cases in which the Service, after paying insurance benefits, subrogates the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act are (1) and (2).
Comprehensively considering the language and legislative purpose of Article 87 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the purpose and social security character of the industrial accident insurance system, and the balancing of interests among the injured worker (including beneficiaries of insurance benefits such as bereaved family members), the Service, and the tortfeasor, the scope within which the Service, after paying insurance benefits to the injured worker due to the tort of a third party, may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third party pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is limited to the amount corresponding to the third party's percentage of liability, among the insurance benefits, up to the limit of the third party's amount of damages. Therefore, the Service may not subrogate the injured worker with respect to the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, among the insurance benefits, and it must be held that the Service ultimately bears this amount for the injured worker, who remains uncompensated for this damage even after receiving insurance benefits. Viewed in this way, where an injured worker who has received insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act claims damages against a third party, and the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, the injured worker's claim for damages must be calculated by the "comparative negligence after offset" method, whereby the insurance benefits are first deducted from the amount of damages of the same nature as the insurance benefits, and comparative negligence offsetting is then applied.
Also, even where the industrial accident occurred due to the joint tort of the industrial-accident-insured employer and a third party, the scope within which the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third party is, as stated above, likewise limited to the amount corresponding to the third party's percentage of liability, among the insurance benefits, up to the limit of the third party's amount of damages. Therefore, the Service may not subrogate the injured worker with respect to the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, among the insurance benefits, and the Service ultimately bears such amount for the injured worker. Even where the injured worker claims damages against the insured employer or a third party on the basis of the joint tort of the insured employer and the third party, if the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage, the amount of damages must be calculated by the "comparative negligence after offset" method.
However, where, as above, an industrial accident occurs due to a joint tort and the Service subrogates the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party, the holding of Supreme Court en banc Decision 2000Da62322 decided March 21, 2002, which declared the principle that, for the purpose of judicial economy in preventing circular claims for indemnity, the Service may not subrogate the amount corresponding to the percentage of negligence of the industrial-accident-insured employer against the third party, remains valid. Therefore, the Service, in accordance with the "comparative negligence after offset" method, after deducting from the insurance benefits the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, must further deduct from that amount the amount corresponding to the insured employer's percentage of negligence, among the damages to be compensated to the injured worker, and may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third party only with respect to the remaining difference.
H. Change of precedent
The following judgments, along with judgments to the same effect, are all changed to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this judgment.
1) Regarding the order and scope of deduction of insurance benefits, where an injured worker who has received insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act files a claim for damages or a direct claim against the employer, a third party, or their insurer, or regarding the scope within which the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party or its insurer, in cases where the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the damage: Supreme Court Decisions 88Daka5041 decided April 25, 1989; 89Da5997 decided February 13, 1990; 89Daka22487 decided February 23, 1990; 95Da24340 decided January 23, 1996; 2002Da50149 decided December 26, 2002; 2007Da60868 decided January 31, 2008; 2006Da82793 decided December 11, 2008; 2010Da2428, 2435 decided July 15, 2010; 2015Da230228 decided December 10, 2015; 2016Da240093 decided December 1, 2016; 2016Da205243 decided May 30, 2019; 2019Da257368 decided November 15, 2019; 2018Da271633 decided November 28, 2019; and 2020Da229260 decided September 24, 2020, and other judgments to the same effect, which held that "the full amount of the Service's insurance benefits should be deducted from the total amount of damages after applying comparative negligence offsetting," or that the Service acquires by subrogation the injured worker's direct right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer by paying insurance benefits to the injured worker, and that the injured worker's direct right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer is reduced "within that limit, i.e., the full amount of the insurance benefits."
2) Regarding the scope of the Service's subrogation where an industrial accident occurs due to the joint tort of an industrial-accident-insured employer and a third party, and the injured worker's own negligence has contributed to the occurrence of the industrial accident: Supreme Court en banc Decision 2000Da62322 decided March 21, 2002; and Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da36303 decided September 24, 2002; 2004Da68250 decided March 11, 2005; 2005Da54463 decided November 25, 2005; 2008Da65686, 65693 decided January 28, 2010; 2009Da98928 decided April 29, 2010; 2007Da82059 decided May 13, 2010; 2010Da84512 decided March 24, 2011; 2013Da212004 decided January 16, 2014; 2016Da220808 decided April 24, 2018; and 2016Da247735 decided April 3, 2019, which held that the Service may seek indemnity against the third party only with respect to the difference, if any, remaining after deducting from the "amount of insurance benefits" the amount corresponding to the insured employer's percentage of negligence, among the damages to be compensated to the injured worker, on the premise that "the amount of insurance benefits" refers to the "full amount of insurance benefits" without deducting the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence (however, as stated in Section G above, the holding that, in order to prevent circular claims for indemnity, the Service may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the third party only with respect to the difference remaining after deducting the amount corresponding to the insured employer's percentage of negligence, among the damages to be compensated to the injured worker, remains valid).
3) In the same vein, regarding the limit up to which the Service's obligation to pay insurance benefits is discharged where a beneficiary of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act receives damages equivalent to the insurance benefits, for the same cause, from the tortfeasor industrial-accident-insured employer or a third party (main text of Article 80(3) and Article 87(2) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and Articles 76 and 81 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act): Supreme Court en banc Decision 76Da2119 decided February 14, 1978, and Supreme Court Decision 2005Du7501 decided June 15, 2007, and other judgments to the same effect, which held that the limit is "the full amount of insurance benefits," on the premise that the injured worker's percentage of negligence is not excluded.
3. Determination in this case
A. Ground of appeal No. 1 by Defendant Company and Ground of appeal No. 4 by Defendant Corporation
1) Determination of the court below
The Plaintiff paid to the bereaved family of the injured worker, as insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, medical care benefits of KRW 7,065,250, funeral expenses of KRW 14,531,690, and a lump-sum survivors' pension of KRW 199,895,332. In connection with the instant accident, the liability of Yuseon Telecommunications, the insured employer, and the Defendants, as joint tortfeasors, is limited to 85%, and among that, Yuseon Telecommunications' percentage of negligence is 30%.
The amount of damages that the Defendants owe to the injured worker due to the instant accident, reflecting the limitation of liability, is KRW 375,217,562 (= KRW 6,005,462 + KRW 4,250,000 + KRW 364,962,100), consisting of medical expenses of KRW 6,005,462 (= actual medical expenses of KRW 7,065,250 × the Defendants' percentage of liability of 85%), funeral expenses of KRW 4,250,000 (= KRW 5,000,000, which is customarily recognized based on empirical rules as funeral expenses of the same nature as the funeral expense benefit, × 85%), and passive damages of KRW 364,962,100 (= the injured worker's lost earnings of KRW 429,367,177 due to the instant accident × 85%).
The scope of the Plaintiff's indemnity is KRW 4,203,823 for medical expenses [= KRW 6,005,462 - (KRW 6,005,462 × 30%, the percentage of negligence of Yuseon Telecommunications, the insured employer)], KRW 2,975,000 for funeral expenses [= KRW 4,250,000 - (KRW 4,250,000 × 30%)], with respect to active damages, and KRW 90,406,702 for lost earnings [= KRW 199,895,332 - (KRW 364,962,100 × 30%)], with respect to passive damages.
2) Determination of the Supreme Court
A) Scope of subrogation of the right to claim damages with respect to medical care benefits and funeral expenses
The scope within which the Plaintiff may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants is limited to the scope of the Defendants' liability for damages as the tortfeasors. Therefore, where the insurance benefits are greater than or equal to the amount of damages of the same nature owed by the Defendants to the injured worker, there is no difference between the "offset after comparative negligence" method and the "comparative negligence after offset" method. Under either method, in this case, the scope of the Service's subrogation of the right to claim damages with respect to medical care benefits of KRW 7,065,250 and funeral expenses of KRW 14,531,690 is possible only within the scope of the Defendants' liability for damages to the injured worker; therefore, the Plaintiff may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants only within the scope of KRW 6,005,462, the amount of damages corresponding to medical expenses of the same nature as the medical care benefits, and KRW 4,250,000, recognized by the court below as funeral expenses of the same nature as the funeral expense benefit, as active damages, among the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants. Therefore, the court below's determination on this point contains no error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the scope of the Service's subrogation of the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
B) Scope of subrogation of the right to claim damages with respect to the survivors' pension
The amount of damages for lost earnings, which is the passive damages owed by the Defendants to the injured worker, is KRW 364,962,100, which is greater than the KRW 199,895,332 in survivors' pension paid by the Plaintiff, of the same nature. Therefore, depending on which of the "offset after comparative negligence" method and the "comparative negligence after offset" method is adopted, the scope of the Plaintiff's subrogation of the right to claim damages differs.
The court below determined, applying the "offset after comparative negligence" method, that the Plaintiff could subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants with respect to KRW 90,406,702, which is the amount remaining after deducting, from the "full amount of the survivors' pension" of KRW 199,895,332, the amount of KRW 109,488,630 corresponding to Yuseon Telecommunications' percentage of negligence (30%) among the KRW 364,962,100 in damages for lost earnings that the Defendants must pay to the injured worker.
However, under the "comparative negligence after offset" method, which is the new legal principle, the calculation is as follows. From the amount of KRW 169,911,032 (= KRW 199,895,332 - KRW 29,984,300), which is the survivors' pension of KRW 199,895,332 minus the amount of KRW 29,984,300 (= KRW 199,895,332 × 15%, rounded to the nearest won) corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence (15%), the Plaintiff may further deduct the amount of KRW 109,488,630 corresponding to Yuseon Telecommunications' percentage of negligence (30%) among the passive damages of KRW 364,962,100 that the Defendants must pay to the injured worker, and may subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants, and seek payment, only with respect to the remaining amount of KRW 60,422,402.
Nevertheless, the court below, in calculating the scope of the Plaintiff's subrogation of the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants, determined, with respect to the passive damages, without deducting from the survivors' pension the amount corresponding to the injured worker's percentage of negligence, that the Plaintiff could subrogate the difference remaining after deducting, from the "full amount of the survivors' pension," the amount corresponding to the percentage of negligence of Yuseon Telecommunications, the insured policyholder, among the damages to be compensated to the injured worker. This determination by the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the scope of the Service's subrogation of the injured worker's right to claim damages against a third party pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which affected the judgment. The Defendants' ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
B. The Defendants' remaining grounds of appeal
1) Ground of appeal No. 2 by Defendant Company and Grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3 by Defendant Corporation
Fact-finding regarding the degree of negligence of the parties who competed in the tort, and the determination of the percentage thereof, belong to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, unless it is found to be markedly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da8125 decided July 8, 2005, etc.).
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and the evidence duly admitted, the percentage of negligence of the injured worker and Yuseon Telecommunications determined by the court below contains no error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the calculation of percentages of liability, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2) Ground of appeal No. 1 by Defendant Corporation
The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that the negligence of Defendant Corporation, in that it buried the support pole, No. (omitted), on the Bongpyeong line, at a depth far short of the design standard for the general burial depth of utility poles, when erecting the support pole, was also a cause of the occurrence of the instant accident.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence duly admitted, the above determination by the court below contains no error of misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, which affected the judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the Defendants' loss on the issue of passive damages is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and the remainder of the appeal is dismissed. This judgment is rendered in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved, as stated in the Order.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook (Justice in charge), Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi