[Plaintiff, Appellee] Jinju Seobu Agricultural Cooperative (Attorney Lim Seong-gyu, counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant, Appellant] Intervenor for the Defendant 1 and 2 others (Attorneys Jang Eun-hye and 1 other, counsel for the intervenors)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2008Nu14526 rendered on January 8, 2009
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning Intervenor for the Defendant 2 and Intervenor for the Defendant 3 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeal by Intervenor for the Defendant 1 is dismissed. The costs of the appeal by Intervenor for the Defendant 1 shall be borne by the said Intervenor.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Determination on the grounds of appeal by Intervenor for the Defendant 1
A. As to Ground 1
(1) The court below, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, found that Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Intervenor") 1, without the permission of Nonparty 1, applied part of the proceeds from the cancellation of Nonparty 1's installment savings account to the repayment of another person's loan interest, and determined that as a result, the Plaintiff suffered damage in that it was unable to recover the amount corresponding to the funds thus improperly applied out of the money the Plaintiff had lent to Nonparty 1.
Upon examination of the record, the findings and determination of the court below are acceptable, and there is no violation of law regarding the rules of evidence or misapprehension of legal principles as alleged.
(2) According to the judgment below and the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited therein, the court below found that Intervenor 1, while working at the Plaintiff's Sangbong Branch, handled the loan business for Nonparty 2 on October 26, 2000; that the related documents required at the time of the loan were not properly retained; that the credit information inquiry sheet for Nonparty 2 currently retained was one inquired as of April 20, 2001, not as of the time of the loan; and that a non-performing loan of 3,391,585 won had arisen in connection with the said loan. On this basis, the court below determined that these circumstances also constituted grounds for the suspension of duties and the standby order (waiting for assignment) at issue in this case.
However, from the circumstances found alone, it cannot be known whether the Intervenor executed the loan without preparing the related documents at the time of the loan, or whether the related documents were lost due to Intervenor 1's negligence; therefore, it is difficult to conclude that Intervenor had any negligence or wrongdoing in connection with the said loan business, and this cannot be concluded merely from the fact that a non-performing loan resulted in damage to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, it was erroneous for the court below to have cited the above circumstances as grounds for the suspension of duties and standby order at issue in this case.
However, as will be seen below, since the remaining grounds alone are sufficient to recognize the legitimacy of the suspension of duties and standby order at issue in this case, this error of the court below did not affect the outcome of the judgment.
(3) The court below, based on the facts it found, determined that since it was confirmed that Nonparty 3 formed the same household as Nonparty 4, who had already received a loan of 2.2 billion won from the Plaintiff, Intervenor 1 should have carefully examined whether the loan violated the same-person loan limit provisions set forth in the Plaintiff's Credit Business Manual by verifying Nonparty 3's assets and occupation, etc., but was negligent in executing the loan without conducting any such verification or examination.
Upon examination of the record, the determination of the court below that Intervenor 1's execution of the loan to Nonparty 3 constituted business conduct in violation of regulations is justified, and there is no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to Ground 2
The court below, regarding the interpretation of the requirement under the Plaintiff's Personnel Regulations for suspension of duties, namely "when suspension of duties is necessary to prevent the expansion of and to resolve a matter arising from serious wrongdoing or an unfortunate incident," premised its determination as follows: in light of the purpose of the suspension of duties order to exclude from work an employee who has committed serious wrongdoing or caused an incident, thereby preventing the occurrence of additional incidents and damage, the requirement of "prevention of expansion of the matter" under the Personnel Regulations cannot be limited to interpretation as meaning prevention of expansion of only "the matter in question," but should be interpreted as meaning that suspension of duties may be ordered not only to prevent expansion of the matter in question but also to prevent the occurrence of additional incidents and damage. On this premise, the court below determined that once the fact of Intervenor 1's loan in violation of regulations and the resulting damage was revealed, there was a need to exclude the said Intervenor from work to prevent in advance any further loans in violation of regulations or occurrence of damage, and that this corresponded to the requirement for suspension of duties.
Upon examination of the record, the above determination of the court below is justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles regarding the interpretation of the requirements for suspension of duties as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. As to Ground 3
Personnel orders, including standby orders (orders to await assignment), in principle belong to the inherent authority of the employer who holds the power of personnel management, and considerable discretion is recognized for the employer within the scope necessary for business regarding such personnel orders; therefore, unless there are special circumstances such as violation of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or the like, or constituting abuse of rights, such orders cannot be deemed unlawful. Whether a standby order falls within the scope of such legitimate exercise of personnel authority should be determined by weighing the business necessity against the resulting disadvantage to the employee's living conditions, and by whether procedures required under the principle of good faith, such as consultation with the employee in the course of issuing the standby order, were followed; however, whether a sincere consultation procedure was conducted with the employee is merely one factor in determining whether the exercise constitutes legitimate personnel authority, and the mere fact that such procedure was not followed does not automatically render the standby order invalid as an abuse of rights (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da63029 rendered on February 18, 2005).
Examining the facts found by the court below in light of these legal principles, considering that substantial damage was caused to the Plaintiff, including the occurrence of a non-performing loan, due to Intervenor 1's loan in violation of regulations, and that there was recognized a need for the Plaintiff to prevent in advance the occurrence of additional loans in violation of regulations or damage, it cannot be said that the suspension of duties and standby order at issue in this case constituted an abuse of personnel authority. Accordingly, the determination of the court below to the same effect is justified, and there is no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles regarding abuse of personnel authority as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. Determination on the grounds of appeal by Intervenor 2 and Intervenor 3
A. As to Ground 4
In the case of an employee who has concluded a labor contract for a fixed term, upon expiration of that term, the employee's status as an employee naturally terminates, and in principle, unless the labor contract is renewed, the employee is automatically retired even without a manifestation of intent to refuse renewal. However, where the labor contract, employment rules (취업규칙), collective bargaining agreement (단체협약), etc. contain provisions to the effect that the labor contract will be renewed if certain requirements are met despite the expiration of the term, or even absent such provisions, where, considering comprehensively various circumstances surrounding the relevant labor relationship, such as the content of the labor contract, the motive and circumstances leading to the conclusion of the labor contract, the criteria for renewal, whether requirements or procedures for renewal have been established and the actual practice thereof, and the content of the work performed by the employee, a relationship of trust has been formed between the parties to the labor contract that the labor contract will be renewed if certain requirements are met, such that the employee is recognized as having a legitimate expectation that the labor contract may be renewed, then an employer's unjust refusal to renew the labor contract in violation of such expectation has no effect, in the same manner as an unfair dismissal, and in such a case, the labor relationship after the expiration of the term is identical to that in which the previous labor contract has been renewed (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du1729 rendered on April 14, 2011). Furthermore, even if the collective bargaining agreement has lost its effect, the portions concerning wages, retirement allowances, working hours, and other individual working conditions become part of the content of the labor contract of the employee who was subject to the collective bargaining agreement, and remain as part of the content of the labor contract governing the employer and employee unless a new collective bargaining agreement or employment rules amending them are concluded or prepared, or unless the consent of the individual employee is obtained; the same applies to the portions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning the requirements and procedures for re-contracting or contract renewal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da51758 rendered on December 27, 2007).
According to the facts found by the court below and the record, Intervenor 2 was employed as a contract employee of the Plaintiff on October 9, 2000, with a contract term of one year, and thereafter concluded a re-contract every year, maintaining the labor relationship until October 8, 2006; Intervenor 3 was employed as a part-time administrative assistant of the Plaintiff on November 21, 2000, with a contract term of one year, and thereafter concluded a re-contract every year, maintaining the labor relationship until November 14, 2006. According to the Plaintiff's "Contract Employee Operation Regulations" and "Part-Time Administrative Assistant Operation Guidelines" (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Regulations at issue in this case") and the labor contracts concluded between the Plaintiff and the said Intervenors, it is established that the continuous period of employment shall not exceed five years. However, Article 24 of the collective bargaining agreement concluded between the Plaintiff and the labor union on July 31, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case") provided that "re-contracting of non-regular employees shall be governed by the Part-Time Administrative Assistant Guidelines and the Contract Employee Regulations, provided that if the person concerned wishes to continue working, continued employment may be allowed regardless of the contract term, based on the performance evaluation score." Pursuant to this provision, the Plaintiff had concluded re-contracts, based on performance evaluation scores, even with fixed-term employees, including the said Intervenors, who had worked beyond five years. Thereafter, the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case lost its effect as of September 10, 2006. According to these facts, Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, in the case of an employee whose contract term has expired and who wishes to re-contract, excludes the application of the provision limiting the continuous employment period set forth in the Regulations at issue in this case or the labor contract, and allows re-contracting based on the performance evaluation score regardless of the total employment period; this constitutes a matter concerning the requirements for re-contracting, and thus, despite the loss of effect of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, it continues to validly exist as part of the content of the labor contract between the Plaintiff and the said Intervenors unless a new collective bargaining agreement is concluded or the consent of the individual employee is obtained. Accordingly, the portion of the Regulations at issue in this case and of the labor contracts between the Plaintiff and the said Intervenors that limits the conclusion of re-contracts by capping the continuous employment period at five years constitutes a working condition inferior to that set forth in Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, and its validity cannot be recognized.
Furthermore, according to the record, the Regulations at issue in this case and Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, etc. set the performance evaluation score as the criterion for determining whether to re-contract; the Regulations at issue in this case set forth relatively detailed provisions concerning the timing, method, and procedure of performance evaluation, and, according to these provisions, expressly specify 70 points as the criterion score for re-contracting. It can be seen that the Plaintiff had, absent special circumstances, concluded re-contracts with employees whose performance evaluation scores met the said re-contracting criterion, and had concluded re-contracts even with employees who had worked beyond five years before the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case lost its effect; that the Plaintiff, for reasons such as enhancing flexibility in manpower management and improving productivity, had maintained the proportion of fixed-term employees, including contract employees and part-time administrative assistants, among all employees at a certain level; and that there was no particular need to reduce the number of such employees at the time of the refusal to re-contract at issue in this case. Considering these circumstances, it is recognized that the said Intervenors, who are subject to Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, had a reasonable and legitimate expectation that they could be re-contracted, regardless of the continuous employment period limitation under the Regulations at issue in this case or the labor contract, if they received a score meeting the re-contracting criterion as a result of the performance evaluation.
Nevertheless, the court below, premising that Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, being a provision concerning the term of the labor contract, does not constitute a "working condition" under the Labor Standards Act and thus lost its effect upon the loss of effect of the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case, determined that the expectation that a re-contract may be concluded based on the result of performance evaluation, pursuant to the provisions concerning re-contracting requirements and procedures under the Regulations at issue in this case or the labor contract, is recognized only for contract employees, etc. whose continuous employment period has not yet reached four years, and that such a reasonable and legitimate expectation regarding the conclusion of a re-contract is not recognized for contract employees, etc., such as the said Intervenors, who have completed the maximum employment period of five years. This judgment of the court below contains an illegality that misapprehends the legal principles concerning the loss of effect of a collective bargaining agreement and fixed-term labor contracts, thereby affecting the judgment, and the ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. As to Ground 5
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that even assuming the said Intervenors are recognized as having a legitimate expectation regarding the conclusion of a re-contract, such expectation is to the effect that a re-contract may be concluded if the performance evaluation score is an average of 70 points or higher; since the said Intervenors both received scores below an average of 70 points in the last performance evaluation, and it is difficult to view that evaluation as objectively unfair, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff's failure to conclude a re-contract with the said Intervenors infringed upon their legitimate expectation regarding the conclusion of a re-contract.
However, the determination of the court below is difficult to accept as it stands, for the following reasons.
Considering the circumstances recognized from the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the court below and the record, namely: (i) in the performance evaluation conducted for the period from the 4th quarter of 2005 to the 3rd quarter of 2006 (hereinafter referred to as "the Performance Evaluation at issue in this case"), which took place immediately before the refusal to re-contract at issue in this case, the said Intervenors received scores below 70 points; (ii) however, in the process of this evaluation, the 1st and 2nd evaluators, who had a high degree of contact with the said Intervenants, gave scores of 70 points or higher, whereas the 3rd and 4th evaluators, who had a low degree of contact, gave scores falling short of this, and in particular, the score given by the 4th evaluator, the chairman of the cooperative, was markedly lower compared to the scores of the 1st and 2nd evaluators, becoming a factor causing the overall average to decline; and there is no circumstance found in the record that would account for such a wide discrepancy in scores among the evaluators; and (iii) the said Intervenors had maintained an average performance evaluation score of 70 points or higher from the date of their employment until September 30, 2005, except that Intervenor 2 received 69.3 points in the 1st quarter of 2005, and there is no material to recognize that their work performance ability or attitude had deteriorated so sharply as to result in a score falling short of the re-contracting criterion score of 70 points in the last performance evaluation - considering these circumstances comprehensively, it appears that when the Collective Bargaining Agreement at issue in this case lost its effect as of September 10, 2006, the Plaintiff, while refusing to re-contract with fixed-term employees, including the said Intervenors, who had worked beyond five years, based on the Regulations at issue in this case setting a limit on the continuous employment period, gave them, in the course thereof, scores falling short of the re-contracting criterion score en masse.
If so, this indicates that the Plaintiff conducted the performance evaluation merely as a formality solely for the purpose of using it as grounds for refusing re-contracting, which lacks fairness and rationality; and the refusal to re-contract, made on the ground that the score derived through such an evaluation process lacking fairness and rationality fell short of the re-contracting criterion score, in substance constitutes unfair dismissal, and thus its validity cannot be recognized.
The judgment below, having determined otherwise that the refusal to re-contract at issue in this case was not unjust, contains an illegality that misapprehends the legal principles concerning unfair dismissal, etc., thereby affecting the judgment, and the ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning Intervenor for the Defendant 2 and Intervenor for the Defendant 3 is reversed without the need to determine the remaining grounds of appeal, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the appeal by Intervenor for the Defendant 1 is dismissed. This judgment is rendered in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the order.
Justice Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice), Kim Ji-hyeong, Jeon Su-an (Justice in charge), Yang Chang-soo