[Plaintiff, Appellee] Coreworld Co., Ltd. (Attorney-in-fact: Bae, Kim & Lee LLC (Yulchon)...
Wait, let me redo this properly with accurate law firm name.
[Plaintiff, Appellee] Coreworld Co., Ltd. (Counsel: Attorney Oh Sang-won of Kim & Chang...
I need to translate the law firm name accurately: 법무법인(유한) 태평양 = Bae, Kim & Lee... No, 태평양 is "Yulchon"? Actually 법무법인(유한) 태평양 is "Bae, Kim & Lee"? Let me just transliterate: "Law Firm (LLC) Taepyeongyang"
[Plaintiff, Appellee] Coreworld Co., Ltd. (Counsel: Attorney Oh Sang-won of Law Firm (LLC) Taepyeongyang)
[Defendant, Appellant] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for Defendant] Korean Metal Workers' Union
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2015Nu57071, decided March 23, 2016
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. Of the costs of the appeal, the portion arising from the intervention shall be borne by the Intervenor for Defendant, and the remainder shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. According to the provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Trade Union Act"), workers may freely organize or join a trade union (Article 5), and a trade union may demand collective bargaining with the employer on behalf of its members (Article 29(1)); however, where two or more trade unions coexist within a single business or workplace, regardless of their organizational form, each trade union must, in principle, determine a bargaining representative union through the bargaining window unification procedure and demand collective bargaining with the employer through that representative union (main text of Article 29-2(1)).
The reason the Trade Union Act introduced this system of bargaining window unification for multiple trade unions, thereby requiring the unification of the collective bargaining procedure, is to establish an efficient and stable collective bargaining system by effectively resolving problems that may arise when multiple trade unions each exercise independent bargaining rights—such as conflict and discord among trade unions or between trade unions and the employer, reduced efficiency in collective bargaining, and increased costs (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hun-Ma338, decided April 24, 2012).
Meanwhile, the Trade Union Act (Article 29-2(2) through (8)) and its Enforcement Decree enacted pursuant to delegation (Articles 14-2 through 14-9) prescribe detailed procedures for bargaining window unification, which largely consist of: (i) a procedure for confirming the trade unions requesting bargaining, by which the trade unions among the multiple unions that actually wish to participate in collective bargaining are identified, and (ii) a procedure for confirming the bargaining representative union, by which a bargaining representative union is determined from among such multiple bargaining-requesting trade unions.
In addition, the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act (Article 14-10), while establishing the term during which the status of bargaining representative union is maintained, expressly limits the cases in which a trade union becomes a bargaining representative union entitled to have such term of status guaranteed to the following: "① where all bargaining-requesting trade unions have autonomously determined a bargaining representative union (Article 29-2(2) of the Trade Union Act); ② where a trade union is organized by a majority of the entire membership of the bargaining-requesting trade unions, or where two or more trade unions, through means such as delegation or affiliation, together come to represent a majority of the entire membership (Article 29-2(3) of the Trade Union Act); ③ where the bargaining-requesting trade unions autonomously organize a joint bargaining representative delegation (Article 29-2(4) of the Trade Union Act); and ④ where the Labor Relations Commission, upon application by a trade union, determines the composition of a joint bargaining representative delegation taking into account the proportion of union members (Article 29-2(5) of the Trade Union Act)."
In light of the foregoing, the bargaining window unification system can be said to be a system designed, absent special circumstances, on the premise that multiple trade unions are confirmed as bargaining-requesting trade unions and that, among them, it becomes necessary to select a trade union to represent all of the bargaining-requesting trade unions.
Furthermore, according to the provisions of the Trade Union Act, the representative of a bargaining representative union determined through the bargaining window unification procedure has the authority to conduct collective bargaining with the employer and to conclude a collective agreement on behalf of all bargaining-requesting trade unions or their members (Article 29(2)).
However, in a case where no trade union other than the union in question exists, such that there was from the outset no room whatsoever for reflecting the intentions of another trade union, the concept of a bargaining representative union not only becomes meaningless but it is also difficult to find any inherent significance in it.
In conclusion, considering comprehensively the purpose and objective of the bargaining window unification system as described above, the structure of the bargaining window unification system and the content of the related provisions, and the concept of a bargaining representative union, it is reasonable to construe that a trade union that is the sole trade union existing within a single business or workplace cannot acquire the status of a bargaining representative union, even if it has formally undergone the procedures prescribed by the Trade Union Act and its Enforcement Decree.
2. Citing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment, the court below determined as follows: at the time the Intervenor for Defendant (hereinafter referred to simply as the "Intervenor") proceeded with the bargaining window unification procedure, engaged in collective bargaining with the Plaintiff, and concluded the 2013 collective agreement, the Intervenor was the only trade union existing at the Plaintiff's workplace; therefore, the Intervenor did not hold the status of bargaining representative union and could not be guaranteed the term of maintenance of the status of bargaining representative union. Accordingly, the court below determined that the Plaintiff's refusal of the Intervenor's demand for collective bargaining, made in the course of concluding the 2014 collective agreement with another trade union that had subsequently been confirmed as the bargaining representative union through a newly conducted bargaining window unification procedure, did not constitute an unfair labor practice against the Intervenor.
Examining the reasoning of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below in light of the evidence lawfully adopted, the above determination by the court below is consistent with the legal principles set forth above, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the bargaining window unification procedure or the status of a single trade union as bargaining representative union (Article 29-2(1) of the Trade Union Act), or concerning the unfair labor practice of refusing collective bargaining (Article 81(3) of the Trade Union Act).
Furthermore, the argument in the grounds of appeal pointing to an alleged misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the term of maintenance of the status of bargaining representative union (Article 14-10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act) cannot be accepted either, since, given that the court below's determination denying the Intervenor's status as bargaining representative union is justified as noted above, whether the argument is well-founded has no bearing on the judgment.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and it is ordered that, of the costs of the appeal, the portion arising from the intervention shall be borne by the Intervenor, and the remainder shall be borne by the Defendant. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Kim Jae-hyung (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Bo-young, Justice Kim Chang-seok (Justice in Charge), Justice Lee Ki-taek