[Plaintiff, Appellee and Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Republic of Korea
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 2012Na20384, decided January 30, 2013
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party respectively.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal
In calculating consolation money for damages arising from a tort, it accords with the principle of fair distribution of damages, which is a fundamental principle of damages law, to consider not only circumstances on the victim's side—such as the victim's age, occupation, social status, property and living conditions, the degree of suffering caused by the harm, and the degree of the victim's negligence—but also circumstances on the tortfeasor's side, such as the degree of the tortfeasor's intent or negligence, the motive and cause of the tortious act, and the tortfeasor's attitude after the tort. The court may determine the amount of consolation money at its discretion, within the scope of its authority, after considering all such circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377, decided April 23, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2007Da77149, decided December 24, 2009, etc.). Meanwhile, in exceptional cases where delay damages on a consolation money obligation arising from a tort are to be calculated from the date the fact-finding court concludes its hearing, it is necessary, in determining the principal amount of consolation money as of the date the fact-finding hearing concludes, to appropriately take into account the circumstance that compensation has been delayed compared to the ordinary case in which delay damages accrue from the time of the tort. Furthermore, in cases such as this one, involving torts committed through human rights violations by public officials, the degree of illegality of the act, the nature and duration of the suffering inflicted on the victim and family members thereby, and the need to deter and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents must also be considered as important factors in calculating consolation money (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da1234, decided January 27, 2011).
In light of the foregoing legal principles and the reasoning of the judgment below together with the record, the amount of consolation money recognized by the court below cannot be said to be so inadequate as to constitute a departure from the bounds of discretion held by the fact-finding court in a manner markedly contrary to the principle of equity. Furthermore, it cannot be found that there was any misapprehension of legal principles or illegality, as alleged in the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal, in the process by which the court below calculated the consolation money. The Plaintiff's grounds of appeal are without merit.
2. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. The extinctive prescription period runs from the time a right objectively arises and may be exercised, and does not run during the period in which the right cannot be exercised. Here, "cannot be exercised" refers to a case where there exists a legal impediment to the exercise of the right, such as the non-arrival of a time period or the non-fulfillment of a condition, and does not include circumstances such as factual difficulty in exercising the right. However, since the exercise of the defense of extinctive prescription is also governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are fundamental principles of the Civil Act (민법), in cases where there existed, prior to the completion of the prescription period, an objective factual impediment preventing the exercise of the right, such that there were special circumstances making it unreasonable to expect the exercise of the right, the debtor's assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith and cannot be permitted (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604, decided December 9, 1994, etc.).
Meanwhile, even where the creditor was under such an objective factual impediment making it impossible to expect the exercise of the right, the creditor must exercise the right within a reasonable period after such impediment is removed, in order to defeat the debtor's defense of extinctive prescription. Whether the right was exercised within a "reasonable period" in this context is to be determined by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including the relationship between the creditor and the debtor, the cause giving rise to the claim for damages, the reasons for the delay in the creditor's exercise of the right, and the process leading up to the filing of the action for damages. However, since the system of extinctive prescription is founded on the ideals of achieving legal stability and remedying difficulties of proof, denying the effect of the completion of the prescription period on the ground of the principle of good faith, despite the requirements for its application being met, should remain a very exceptional limitation. Accordingly, the "reasonable period" for the exercise of the right must, absent special circumstances, be restricted to a short period, in a manner analogous to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act; and in particular, in cases involving claims for damages arising from tort, even where it is unavoidable to extend such period due to highly unusual and specific circumstances, the period may not exceed three years, the short-term extinctive prescription period prescribed in Article 766(1) of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, decided May 16, 2013).
B. Where a public prosecution is instituted and a conviction becomes final based on evidence collected through illegal acts committed by a state agency in the course of an investigation, but the existence of grounds for a retrial is belatedly discovered, and an acquittal is subsequently rendered final through retrial proceedings, and the victim thereafter seeks damages from the State on the ground of such illegal acts by the state agency, it must be held that, until the acquittal became final through the retrial proceedings, there existed a factual impediment such that the creditor could not be expected to bring a claim for damages. Accordingly, in such a case, the defense of completion of extinctive prescription raised by the State, as debtor, constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith and cannot be permitted. However, absent special circumstances, the creditor must exercise the right within six months from the date the acquittal on retrial becomes final—the date on which such impediment is removed—by analogy to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act.
Whether the right was exercised within that period is, in principle, to be determined based on whether an action for damages was filed. However, where an acquittal on retrial has become final, the creditor may, prior to seeking civil damages, first file a claim for criminal compensation under the Act on Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor (형사보상 및 명예회복에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Criminal Compensation Act"), which constitutes a simpler procedure. The amount of criminal compensation is to be calculated by considering all relevant circumstances, including the type and length of the detention, and the daily compensation limit is set at up to five times the daily minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법) applicable in the year in which the cause for the compensation claim arose, with that daily minimum wage as the floor (Article 5(1) and (2) of the Criminal Compensation Act, Article 2 of its Enforcement Decree); accordingly, the specific amount of criminal compensation can only be ascertained by awaiting the court's decision on criminal compensation. Moreover, Article 6(3) of the Criminal Compensation Act provides that "where a person entitled to receive damages under other statutes has received compensation under this Act for the same cause, the amount of such compensation shall be deducted in determining the amount of damages."
Accordingly, even where the creditor did not file an action for damages within six months from the date the acquittal on retrial became final, if the creditor filed a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation Act within that period, there exist special circumstances warranting an extension of the "reasonable period" for the exercise of the right sufficient to defeat the defense of extinctive prescription; in such a case, if the action for damages is filed within six months from the date the decision on criminal compensation becomes final, the right shall be deemed to have been exercised within a reasonable period. However, even in such a case, that period may not exceed three years from the date the acquittal on retrial became final, which is the date on which the factual impediment to the exercise of the right was objectively removed.
C. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and of the first-instance judgment cited therein, together with the record, the following facts may be found: ① Plaintiff 1 was unlawfully arrested and detained on July 19, 1983 by investigators belonging to the Daegu Security Command, and was subjected to abusive treatment, including beatings and various forms of torture, as a result of which he confessed to the alleged offenses; based on this, he was prosecuted for violation of the National Security Act (국가보안법) and other offenses, on charges including meeting with members of North Korea, an anti-state organization, receiving money and valuables therefrom, and praising, encouraging, and benefiting an anti-state organization; on June 8, 1984, the Daegu High Court found him guilty on all charges and sentenced him to 12 years' imprisonment and 12 years' suspension of qualifications, and the conviction became final around that time. ② On January 19, 2009, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (진실·화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회) rendered a decision finding the truth to the effect that the alleged espionage-fabrication case against Plaintiff 1 was a case in which investigative agencies unlawfully apprehended Plaintiff 1 and, through torture and other abusive treatment, extracted a false confession from him leading to his punishment, and that the State needed to take appropriate measures, such as retrial, in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) and other relevant statutes, in order to restore the honor of Plaintiff 1 and related persons who suffered harm as a result of the unlawful final conviction. ③ After receiving this truth-finding decision, Plaintiff 1 applied to the Daegu High Court for a retrial of the aforementioned final conviction, and on February 9, 2010, that court found him not guilty on all charges except for part of the meeting, communication, and receipt of money and valuables charges, and the violation of the Passport Act (여권법), and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment (hereinafter the "retrial judgment"). ④ The prosecutor's appeal against the retrial judgment was dismissed, and the retrial judgment became final as is on January 27, 2011. ⑤ Within six months from the date the retrial judgment became final, on February 15, 2011, Plaintiff 1 filed a claim for criminal compensation with the Daegu High Court, and on December 13, 2011, received a decision granting criminal compensation from that court, which became final on December 19, 2011. ⑥ The Plaintiffs filed the instant action on February 1, 2012, within six months from the date the criminal compensation decision became final.
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, it may be found that, until January 27, 2011, the date on which the retrial judgment concerning Plaintiff 1 became final, there existed an objective factual impediment such that the Plaintiffs could not be expected to exercise their claim for damages against the Defendant. Furthermore, since Plaintiff 1 filed a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation Act within six months from the date the retrial judgment became final—the date on which such impediment was removed—and the Plaintiffs filed the instant action within six months from the date the criminal compensation decision became final, it is proper to conclude that the Plaintiffs exercised their rights within the reasonable period sufficient to defeat the Defendant's defense of extinctive prescription.
Accordingly, although the reasoning of the court below on this point is somewhat insufficient, its conclusion rejecting the Defendant's defense of extinctive prescription on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith is, in the end, justified. It cannot be said that there was any error affecting the judgment arising from a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning abuse of the defense of extinctive prescription, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in this case, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by the respective losing parties, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Kim Chang-seok (Presiding Justice), Yang Chang-soo, Park Byung-dae (Justice in Charge), Ko Young-han