[Plaintiffs, Appellees]
[Defendant, Appellant] Republic of Korea
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2012Na93543 rendered on May 2, 2013
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (including the statements in the brief submitted after the deadline for submission of the grounds of appeal, to the extent they supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined.
1. As to the First Ground of Appeal
A. The statute of limitations (소멸시효) runs from the time when a right has objectively arisen and can be exercised, and does not run while the right cannot be exercised. Here, a case in which "the right cannot be exercised" refers to a case where there exists a legal impediment to the exercise of the right, such as the non-arrival of a period or non-fulfillment of a condition, and does not include circumstances such as the mere factual difficulty in exercising the right. However, the exercise of the defense based on the completion of the statute of limitations is also governed by the good faith principle and the principle prohibiting abuse of rights, which are fundamental principles of the Civil Act (민법); therefore, where there existed, prior to the completion of the limitation period, an objective factual impediment preventing the exercise of the right, and there are special circumstances under which the exercise of the right could not have been expected, it is not permissible, as an abuse of rights contrary to the good faith principle, for the obligor to assert the completion of the statute of limitations (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604, delivered December 9, 1994, among others).
Meanwhile, even where the obligee was under such an objective factual impediment preventing the expectation of exercising the right, once that impediment has been removed, the obligee must exercise the right within a reasonable period thereafter in order to block the obligor's defense of completion of the statute of limitations. Whether the right was exercised within a "reasonable period" in this context is to be determined by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including the relationship between the obligee and the obligor, the cause giving rise to the right to claim damages, the reasons for the delay in the obligee's exercise of the right, and the course of events up to the filing of the action for damages. However, since the statute of limitations system is founded on the ideals of achieving legal stability and providing relief from difficulties of proof, denying the effect of the completion of the limitation period on the basis of the good faith principle, despite the requirements for its application being met, must remain a very exceptional restriction. Accordingly, the "reasonable period" for exercising the right must, absent special circumstances, be limited to a short period corresponding to the period of suspension of the statute of limitations under the Civil Act, and in particular, in cases concerning claims for damages arising from tort, even where it is unavoidable to extend that period due to very special individual circumstances, it must not exceed three years, which is the short-term limitation period prescribed in Article 766(1) of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, delivered May 16, 2013).
B. Where a prosecution has been instituted based on evidence collected through unlawful acts, etc., committed by a state agency during the investigative process, and a final and conclusive guilty judgment has even been rendered, but the existence of grounds for retrial (재심사유) is belatedly discovered, such that a judgment of acquittal is finally rendered in a retrial procedure, and thereafter a claim for damages is brought against the State on the ground of the unlawful acts, etc., of the state agency, it must be held that, until the judgment of acquittal in the retrial procedure became final and conclusive, there existed a factual impediment such that the obligee could not have been expected to bring the claim for damages. Accordingly, in such a case, the defense of completion of the statute of limitations raised by the State as obligor cannot be permitted, as it constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the good faith principle. However, absent special circumstances, the obligee must exercise the right within six months, corresponding to the period of suspension of the statute of limitations under the Civil Act, from the date on which the judgment of acquittal in the retrial became final and conclusive, which is when such impediment was removed.
In this regard, whether the right was exercised within that period is, in principle, to be determined based on whether an action for damages was filed. However, where a judgment of acquittal in a retrial has become final and conclusive, the obligee may, prior to seeking civil damages, first apply for criminal compensation under the Act on Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor (형사보상 및 명예회복에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Criminal Compensation Act"), which may be considered a simpler procedure. However, since the amount of criminal compensation is to be calculated by taking into account all relevant circumstances, including the type and length of the detention, with the compensation payable per day of detention capped at a minimum of the daily minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법) for the year in which the cause of the compensation claim arose, up to five times that amount (Article 5(1) and (2) of the Criminal Compensation Act and Article 2 of its Enforcement Decree), the specific amount of criminal compensation can only be ascertained after awaiting the court's decision on criminal compensation. Moreover, Article 6(3) of the Criminal Compensation Act provides that "where a person entitled to receive damages under another statute has received compensation under this Act for the same cause, the amount of such compensation shall be deducted in determining the amount of damages."
Therefore, even if the obligee did not file an action for damages within six months from the date the judgment of acquittal in the retrial became final and conclusive, if the obligee filed a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation Act within that period, it must be held that there exist special circumstances warranting an extension of the "reasonable period" for exercising the right sufficient to block the defense of completion of the statute of limitations; in that case, if the action for damages is filed within six months from the date the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive, the right shall be deemed to have been exercised within a reasonable period. However, even in this case, that period must not exceed three years from the date the judgment of acquittal in the retrial became final and conclusive, which is when the factual impediment to the exercise of the right was objectively removed (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da201844, delivered December 12, 2013).
C. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found: ① Plaintiff 1 was unlawfully arrested and detained on September 16, 1985 by investigators of the 506th Security Unit of the Seoul Command of the Defense Security Command (국군보안사령부, hereinafter "DSC"), which belonged to the Defendant, and thereafter, having been subjected to beatings, various forms of torture, and other cruel treatment, made a false confession regarding the alleged criminal facts; on the basis of this, he was prosecuted for violation of the National Security Act (국가보안법) (espionage, etc.) for criminal facts including that "he was recruited by Kimura, a person connected with Chongryon (조총련), an anti-state organization, and, from 1982 to 1984, engaged in espionage activities in Japan and Korea upon receiving instructions and operational funds from North Korea"; on April 16, 1986, he was sentenced by the Seoul Criminal District Court to fifteen years' imprisonment and fifteen years' suspension of qualifications; he appealed, and on July 22, 1986, the Seoul High Court sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment and seven years' suspension of qualifications; and that judgment became final and conclusive around that time; ② on November 18, 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (진실·화해를위한과거사정리위원회) rendered a decision finding the truth to the effect that the espionage case against Plaintiff 1 was one in which the DSC, which had no authority to investigate civilians, unlawfully detained Plaintiff 1 for 41 days and obtained a false confession through torture and cruel treatment, on the basis of which he was punished, and that it was necessary for the State to take measures such as a retrial; ③ after receiving the above truth-finding decision, Plaintiff 1 applied to the Seoul High Court for a retrial of the above guilty judgment, and that court rendered a judgment of acquittal in favor of Plaintiff 1 on October 29, 2010 (hereinafter the "Retrial Judgment"); the prosecutor appealed against the Retrial Judgment, but the Supreme Court dismissed the prosecutor's appeal on April 14, 2011, on which date the Retrial Judgment became final and conclusive; ④ Plaintiff 1 filed a claim for criminal compensation with the Seoul High Court on April 27, 2011, within six months from the date the Retrial Judgment became final and conclusive, and received a decision on criminal compensation from that court on October 10, 2011, which decision became final and conclusive around that time; and ⑤ the Plaintiffs filed the instant action on February 23, 2012, within six months from the date the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive.
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, it can be seen that, until April 14, 2011, the date on which the Retrial Judgment concerning Plaintiff 1 became final and conclusive, there existed an objective factual impediment preventing the Plaintiffs from being expected to exercise the instant right to claim damages against the Defendant. Moreover, since Plaintiff 1 filed a claim for criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation Act within six months from the date the Retrial Judgment became final and conclusive, which was when that impediment was removed, and the Plaintiffs filed the instant action within six months from the date the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive, it is proper to view that the Plaintiffs exercised their rights within the reasonable period sufficient to block the Defendant's defense of completion of the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, although there are some deficiencies in the reasoning of the judgment below on this point, the lower court's rejection of the Defendant's defense of completion of the statute of limitations, on the ground that it constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the good faith principle, is ultimately justified. It cannot be said that there is any error of law affecting the judgment due to a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning abuse of rights in the defense of completion of the statute of limitations, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to the Second Ground of Appeal
In calculating consolation money (위자료) for damages arising from a tort, it is consistent with the principle of equitable distribution of damages, which is a principle of damages law, to take into account not only circumstances on the victim's side, such as the victim's age, occupation, social status, property and living conditions, the degree of suffering caused by the harm, and the degree of the victim's fault, but also circumstances on the tortfeasor's side, such as the degree of the tortfeasor's intent or negligence, the motive and cause of the tortious act, and the tortfeasor's conduct after the tortious act; and the court may, in the exercise of its discretion belonging to its own authority, determine the amount of consolation money after taking these various circumstances into account (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377, delivered April 23, 1999, and Supreme Court Decision 2007Da77149, delivered December 24, 2009, among others). Meanwhile, in exceptional cases where the delay damages on the obligation to pay consolation money for a tort are to be calculated from the date the fact-finding court concludes the oral argument, it is necessary to appropriately take into account, in calculating the principal amount of consolation money as of the date the fact-finding court concludes the oral argument, the circumstance that the payment of compensation has been delayed compared to the ordinary case in which delay damages accrue from the time of the tortious act; and in cases such as the present one, involving torts arising from human rights violations committed by public officials, the degree of illegality of the act, the content and duration of the suffering endured by the victim and the victim's family as a result thereof, and the need to deter and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, must also be considered as important factors in calculating consolation money (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da1234, delivered January 27, 2011).
In light of the foregoing legal principles and the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it cannot be said that the amount of consolation money recognized in the instant case by the lower court is so excessive as to significantly violate the principle of equity and thereby exceed the bounds of the discretion possessed by the fact-finding court. Furthermore, it is not found that there was any misunderstanding of the legal principles or any illegality, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in the lower court's process of calculating the consolation money.
3. Conclusion
All appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice), Shin Young-cheol, Kim Yong-deok, Kim So-young (Justice in Charge)