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대법원 2012다45603

State Compensation Claim (국가배상)국가배상

Decided2014. 03. 13. Court대법원Partially reversed and remanded (일부 파기환송) — most plaintiffs' claims were dismissed based on the settlement effect, but the blacklist-related claim was sent back for further review.
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This Supreme Court (대법원) ruling addressed the legal effect of an agreement to a compensation award by the Deliberation Committee for Compensation of Persons Related to Democratization Movements (보상심의위원회). The Court held that once a claimant related to a democratization movement (민주화운동관련자) agrees to the Committee's compensation decision, this agreement has the same legal effect as a judicial settlement (재판상 화해) covering all damages related to that democratization movement. As a result, most plaintiffs' state compensation claims were dismissed, but one plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages related to a government blacklist was remanded for further review, since it had not been squarely addressed in the original compensation decision.

Key takeaways
  • CasePlaintiffs who suffered harm related to democratization movements had previously agreed to compensation decisions by the government's Deliberation Committee, but later filed separate lawsuits seeking additional damages, including for blacklist-related employment discrimination.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that agreeing to a compensation decision generally bars further claims (acting as a judicial settlement), but sent the blacklist-related claim back to the lower court because it required separate factual examination.
  • LessonClaimants who accept government compensation for democratization movement-related harm should be aware that this acceptance may legally bar future claims for the same incident, except for issues the Committee did not clearly address, such as blacklist-based employment discrimination.
Issues
  • The scope of the judicial settlement effect (재판상 화해 의제) triggered by a claimant's agreement to a compensation decision under the Democratization Movement Compensation Act (민주화운동보상법)
  • Whether employment interference caused by government blacklist compilation and management falls within the scope of harms already covered by the original compensation decision
  • Whether a separate claim for state tort liability (국가의 불법행위) can be pursued independently of the Committee's compensation decision
Key reasoning

Under the Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to Democratization Movements (민주화운동보상법), if a claimant agrees to the Committee's compensation decision, this agreement is deemed to have the same effect as a judicial settlement, barring further claims for damages related to that democratization movement. This broad settlement effect applies unless the Committee explicitly ruled that certain claimed harms did not qualify as related to the democratization movement. However, the Court found that harm caused by government blacklisting (interference with employment through blacklist compilation and management) required separate examination, since it was not clearly covered by the original compensation review. Therefore, while the general settlement effect barred most claims, the blacklist-related claim needed independent judicial consideration.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

Considering the legislative purpose of the ‘Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation, etc. for Persons Related to the Democratization Movement’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Democratization Movement Compensation Act’), the content of the relevant provisions, and the content stated in the consent and claim forms prepared and submitted by the applicant, and in particular, considering that the legislative purpose of Article 18(2) of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act is, by conferring upon an applicant’s consent to a decision on payment of compensation, medical support money, or living support money (hereinafter referred to as ‘compensation, etc.’) the same effect as a judicial compromise, in particular res judicata effect, to promptly conclude and implement such matters through the procedure for deciding on payment of compensation, etc. by the ‘Deliberation Committee for the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to the Democratization Movement’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Compensation Deliberation Committee’) prior to litigation, and thereby to confer stability upon decisions on payment of compensation, etc., it follows that, unless the Compensation Deliberation Committee has explicitly rendered a decision that a portion of the matters applied for by the applicant does not fall under the requirements for a person related to the democratization movement as prescribed by the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, when the applicant consents to the Compensation Deliberation Committee’s decision on payment of compensation, etc., the same effect as a judicial compromise under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법) arises, pursuant to Article 18(2) of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, with respect to all damages suffered in connection with the democratization movement for which the applicant received compensation, etc., including consolation money.

Full text (English, AI translation) 19,283 chars

[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 22 others (Attorney Kim Jae-yong, Counsel for the plaintiffs)

[Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees] Plaintiff 10 and 1 other

[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Republic of Korea (Attorney Seo Gyu-yeong and 1 other, Counsel for the defendant)

[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2011Na91229 decided May 3, 2012

[Order]

1. A. The part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7's claim for consolation money for damages caused by obstruction of employment through the preparation and management of a blacklist, etc. is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

B. The remainder of the appeal by Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7 is dismissed.

2. The appeals by the remaining plaintiffs and the appeal by the Defendant against Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22 are all dismissed.

3. Of the costs of the appeal, the portion arising between Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 22 and the Defendant shall be borne by each party respectively, and the portion arising between the remaining plaintiffs (excluding Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 10, and Plaintiff 22) and the Defendant shall be borne by the said remaining plaintiffs.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal (to the extent that the statements in the supplementary briefs on grounds of appeal, etc., submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal of the remaining plaintiffs excluding Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22

A. (1) Article 1 of the Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to the Democratization Movement (이하 ‘민주화운동보상법’, hereinafter referred to as the "Democratization Movement Compensation Act") provides, "The purpose of this Act is to promote stability of living and improvement of welfare for persons sacrificed in connection with the democratization movement and their bereaved families by the State restoring their honor and providing compensation, and to contribute to the development of democracy and national harmony." Article 2, Item 1 provides, "The term 'democratization movement' means activities that, resisting authoritarian rule that disturbed the free democratic basic order and infringed upon the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution on or after March 24, 1964, contributed to the realization of the ideology and values pursued by the Constitution and the establishment of a democratic constitutional order, and restored and enhanced the freedom and rights of citizens." The main text of Item 2 provides, "The term 'person related to the democratization movement' means a person falling under any of the following items who has been deliberated and determined as such by the Committee for the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to the Democratization Movement under Article 4 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Compensation Deliberation Committee')," and lists as eligible persons under each item: "(a) a person who died or went missing in connection with the democratization movement; (b) a person who was injured in connection with the democratization movement; (c) a person who is recognized as having suffered from a disease prescribed by Presidential Decree due to the democratization movement or as having died from its aftereffects; (d) a person who received a conviction, was dismissed from office, or received academic disciplinary action on the grounds of the democratization movement." Article 10, Paragraph 1 provides, "A related person or his/her bereaved family who wishes to receive compensation, medical support funds, or living support funds (hereinafter referred to as 'compensation, etc.') under this Act shall apply in writing to the Committee for the payment of compensation, etc., attaching relevant supporting documents, as prescribed by Presidential Decree." Article 14, Paragraph 1 provides, "An applicant who has been served with the original of the decision on compensation and who wishes to receive compensation, etc. shall, without delay, request the Committee to pay the compensation, etc., attaching a letter of consent to the decision." The Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Persons Related to the Democratization Movement provides, "Where an applicant consents to a decision on the payment of compensation, etc. under this Act, it shall be deemed that a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법) has been reached with respect to the damage suffered in connection with the democratization movement."

Furthermore, Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act provides, "An applicant who has received a notice of decision on compensation, a notice of decision on payment of living support funds, or a notice of decision on restoration of honor and who wishes to receive compensation, etc. shall submit to the Committee a letter of consent and request in the form of Attached Form No. 10, stating the following matters, attaching one copy each of the original of the decision on compensation, the decision on payment of living support funds, or the decision on restoration of honor, and the applicant's certificate of seal impression," and provides in Item 3, "A statement to the effect that the applicant consents to the decision on compensation and requests payment of compensation, etc." The letter of consent and request in Attached Form No. 10 of the said Enforcement Decree states, "The applicant pledges that, upon receiving the compensation, etc., he/she is entering into a settlement agreement with respect to the case, and that he/she will not make any further claim by any means whatsoever with respect to the case."

(2) In light of the above legislative purpose of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, the content of the relevant provisions, the content of the letter of consent and request prepared and submitted by the applicant, and especially in light of the fact that the legislative purpose of Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act is to grant an effect equivalent to that of a judicial compromise, in particular res judicata, where the applicant consents to a decision on the payment of compensation, etc., thereby promptly concluding and implementing the matter through the compensation payment decision procedure of the Compensation Deliberation Committee prior to litigation and granting stability to the decision on payment of compensation, etc., it should be held that, unless the Compensation Deliberation Committee has explicitly decided that part of the content applied for by the applicant does not meet the requirements for a person related to the democratization movement as prescribed by the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, when the applicant consents to the Compensation Deliberation Committee's decision on the payment of compensation, etc., pursuant to Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, an effect identical to that of a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act arises with respect to the entirety of the damage suffered in connection with the democratization movement for which the applicant received the compensation, etc., including consolation money.

B. (1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be found: ① Police officers of the Incheon Dongbu Police Station arrested, without a warrant, key figures of the executive body of the labor union of the non-party company on July 23, 1976, thereby preventing them from attending the delegates' assembly and otherwise obstructing labor union activities; and when, on February 23, 1978, at around 06:00, on the date of the union delegate election, opposing union members threw excrement at union members who were about to vote, thereby preventing the voting from proceeding, and other union members held a demonstration in protest, approximately 120 union members including the plaintiffs, were dismissed on April 1, 1978, upon the direction of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency; ② On April 10, 1978, a list containing personal information of the dismissed workers of the non-party company, including the plaintiffs, was attached under the name of the head of the Busan branch of the National ○○ Labor Union, and the so-called "△△ Industry Blacklist," discovered around 1987, also included the names of 116 dismissed workers of the non-party company; because of this, the dismissed workers of the non-party company, including the plaintiffs, were unable to find employment at other companies, or if employed, were soon dismissed, and state agencies including the Korean Central Intelligence Agency were involved in the preparation and distribution of the said list; ③ the plaintiffs were recognized as persons related to the democratization movement by the Compensation Deliberation Committee between 2001 and 2010, and the facts recognized at that time concerned the demonstrations and sit-ins and the resulting dismissals, and for some of the plaintiffs, the fact that they had received criminal punishment was also noted; however, matters relating to the obstruction of employment due to the preparation and management of the blacklist, etc. are not stated in the resolutions of the Compensation Deliberation Committee, except that, with respect to the resolution concerning Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7, a decision of non-recognition was made on the ground that "the loss of opportunity for re-employment due to the preparation and distribution of the blacklist does not meet the requirements for a person related to the democratization movement as prescribed by the Democratization Movement Compensation Act"; ④ the remaining plaintiffs excluding Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22 (hereinafter in this Section 1 referred to as "plaintiffs who received living support funds" or "said plaintiffs") applied to the Compensation Deliberation Committee for living support funds as persons related to the democratization movement, and each received a decision granting living support funds of 50,000,000 won or 40,631,000 won, respectively, and around that time consented to the said decisions on payment and received the living support funds in full.

(2) In light of the above findings of fact and the following circumstances discernible from the record, namely: ① the Defendant's obstruction of the above labor union activities and forced dismissal, and the obstruction of employment through the preparation and management of the blacklist, etc., all occurred before the enactment of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act and before the said plaintiffs received the living support funds; ② the reason the agencies under the Defendant prepared, managed, and distributed the blacklist against union members was ultimately to manage the dismissed union members and to make their re-employment difficult, and such conduct may be seen as an extension of, or as being in a very close relationship with, the "dismissal on grounds of the democratization movement" for which the said plaintiffs were recognized as persons related to the democratization movement; ③ the period of dismissal caused by the democratization movement and the period of dismissal caused by the subsequent obstruction of employment would overlap, so, absent special circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the applicant, by receiving compensation, etc., is compensated for the damage from both, it should be held that the damage suffered by the said plaintiffs due to the Defendant's obstruction of the above labor union activities, forced dismissal, and preparation and management of the blacklist, etc., all constitute damage suffered in connection with the democratization movement related to the labor union of the non-party company, to which the said plaintiffs consented in receiving living support funds under Article 9 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, and that, pursuant to Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act, an effect identical to that of a judicial compromise extends thereto.

C. (1) The court below's determination, to the same effect, that as between the Defendant and the plaintiffs among the plaintiffs who received living support funds excluding Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7, a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act was reached pursuant to the said provision with respect to the damage suffered in connection with the democratization movement, and that therefore the instant lawsuit, in which the plaintiffs who received living support funds excluding Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7 again claim consolation money for damage suffered in connection with the democratization movement, lacks the benefit of legal protection and is therefore entirely unlawful, is justifiable, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the scope of the effect of Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act.

(2) However, in light of the legal principles set forth above, with respect to Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7, since the Compensation Deliberation Committee's resolution explicitly decided not to recognize them as persons related to the democratization movement with respect to the portion concerning the loss of opportunity for re-employment due to the preparation and distribution of the blacklist, and living support funds were paid on that basis, it cannot be said that, merely because Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7 received living support funds, the effect of the resulting judicial compromise extends even to the portion of their claim for consolation money for damage caused by obstruction of employment through the preparation and management of the blacklist, etc.

Nevertheless, the court below erred in holding, contrary to the above, that the effect of the judicial compromise extends even to Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7's above claim for consolation money, thereby misapprehending the legal principles concerning the scope of the effect of Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the Democratization Movement Compensation Act and erring in its determination.

D. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs who received living support funds' argument that the above compromise constitutes an unfair juristic act or should be rescinded for mistake is a new argument raised only at the appellate stage of the final appeal and does not constitute a legitimate ground of appeal.

2. As to the Defendant's first ground of appeal

A. Where the State, having received an application for truth verification from a victim subject to the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation (진실·화해를 위한 과거사정리 기본법), has, through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (이하 ‘정리위원회’, hereinafter referred to as the "Reconciliation Commission") under the Defendant, made a decision on truth verification confirming or presuming the victim to be a sacrificed person, it is reasonable to view that there exist special circumstances that would give rise to a reasonable trust that, if the victim exercises his/her rights within a reasonable period based on that decision, the Defendant will not, at least, assert extinguishment of the right on the ground of the completion of the statute of limitations; and that, notwithstanding this, the State's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith and is therefore impermissible. Furthermore, the "reasonable period" for the exercise of the above right is, absent special circumstances, limited to a short period analogous to the case of suspension of the statute of limitations under the Civil Act, and in the case of a claim for damages arising from a tort, the period is limited, at most, to three years, which is the short-term statute of limitations period prescribed in Article 766, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819 decided May 16, 2013, etc.).

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be found: the Reconciliation Commission made a decision on truth verification concerning the case relating to the labor union of the non-party company on June 30, 2010; and Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22 filed the instant action for damages on December 6, 2010, within six months thereof. Accordingly, it is reasonable to view that the said plaintiffs filed the instant action for damages within a reasonable period after the Reconciliation Commission's decision on truth verification, and therefore the Defendant's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations with respect to the said claim for damages constitutes an abuse of rights and is therefore impermissible.

C. Although the court below's determination on this point is not entirely without inappropriateness, its rejection of the Defendant's argument on the ground that the Defendant's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations against the said plaintiffs constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith and is therefore impermissible is justifiable in its conclusion, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the statute of limitations that affected the outcome of the judgment.

3. As to the grounds of appeal of Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22, and the Defendant's second ground of appeal

The amount of consolation money for mental suffering caused by a tort may be determined by the court of fact-finding, in its discretion belonging to its own authority, upon consideration of various circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da43165 decided November 26, 2002, etc.).

The court below determined the amount of consolation money for Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22 upon consideration of the content and degree of the Defendant's tort, the time interval between the time when the tort was committed and the present, and other various circumstances revealed in the pleadings of this case.

Upon examining the record in light of the legal principles set forth above, the above measure of the court below is deemed justifiable and acceptable, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the calculation of consolation money.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7's claim for consolation money for damage caused by obstruction of employment through the preparation and management of the blacklist, etc. is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below; the remainder of the appeal by Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7, the appeals by the remaining plaintiffs, and the Defendant's appeal against Plaintiff 10 and Plaintiff 22 are all dismissed; and, of the costs of the appeal, the portion arising from the appeals other than that of Plaintiff 6 and Plaintiff 7 shall be borne by the respective losing parties. This judgment is rendered with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices as set forth in the Order.

Justice Park Bo-yeong (Presiding Justice), Min Il-young (Justice in charge), Lee In-bok, Kim Shin

【판결요지】

‘민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상 등에 관한 법률’(이하 ‘민주화운동보상법’이라 한다)의 입법 취지, 관련 규정의 내용, 신청인이 작성·제출하는 동의 및 청구서의 기재 내용에 더하여 특히 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항의 입법 목적이 신청인이 보상금·의료지원금·생활지원금(이하 ‘보상금 등’이라 한다) 지급결정에 동의한 경우 재판상 화해와 같은 효력, 특히 기판력을 부여함으로써 소송에 앞서 ‘민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상심의위원회’(이하 ‘보상심의위원회’라 한다)의 보상금 등 지급결정절차를 통하여 이를 신속히 종결·이행시키고 보상금 등 지급결정에 안정성을 부여하는 데 있는 점 등을 종합하여 볼 때, 보상심의위원회가 신청인이 신청한 내용 중 일부에 관하여 명시적으로 민주화운동보상법에서 정한 민주화운동관련자 요건에 해당하지 아니한다는 결정을 하지 아니한 이상, 신청인이 보상심의위원회의 보상금 등 지급결정에 동의한 때에는 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항에 따라 위자료를 포함하여 그가 보상금 등을 지급받은 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해 일체에 대하여 민사소송법의 규정에 의한 재판상 화해와 동일한 효력이 발생한다.

【참조조문】

민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상 등에 관한 법률 제18조 제2항

【주문】·【이유】 전문 6,608자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 원고 1 외 22인 (소송대리인 변호사 김재용)

【원고, 상고인 겸 피상고인】 원고 10 외 1인

【피고, 피상고인 겸 상고인】 대한민국 (소송대리인 변호사 서규영 외 1인)

【원심판결】 서울고법 2012. 5. 3. 선고 2011나91229 판결

【주 문】

1. 가. 원심판결 중 원고 6, 원고 7의 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등에 의한 취업방해로 인한 위자료청구 부분을 파기하고, 이 부분 사건을 서울고등법원에 환송한다.

나. 원고 6, 원고 7의 나머지 상고를 기각한다.

2. 나머지 원고들의 상고와 피고의 원고 10, 원고 22에 대한 상고를 모두 기각한다.

3. 상고비용 중 원고 10, 원고 22와 피고 사이에 생긴 부분은 각자 부담하고, 원고 6, 원고 7, 원고 10, 원고 22를 제외한 나머지 원고들과 피고 사이에서 생긴 부분은 나머지 원고들이 부담한다.

【이 유】 상고이유(상고이유서 제출기간이 경과한 후에 제출된 상고이유보충서 등의 기재는 상고이유를 보충하는 범위 내에서)를 판단한다.

1. 원고 10, 원고 22를 제외한 나머지 원고들의 상고이유에 관하여

가. (1) 민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상 등에 관한 법률(이하 ‘민주화운동보상법’이라 한다) 제1조는 "이 법은 민주화운동과 관련하여 희생된 자와 그 유족에 대하여 국가가 명예회복 및 보상을 행함으로써 이들의 생활안정과 복지향상을 도모하고, 민주주의의 발전과 국민화합에 기여함을 목적으로 한다"고 규정하고, 제2조 제1호는 "민주화운동이라 함은 1964년 3월 24일 이후 자유민주적 기본질서를 문란하게 하고 헌법에 보장된 국민의 기본권을 침해한 권위주의적 통치에 항거하여 헌법이 지향하는 이념 및 가치의 실현과 민주헌정질서의 확립에 기여하고 국민의 자유와 권리를 회복·신장시킨 활동을 말한다"고 규정하며, 제2호 본문은 "민주화운동관련자라 함은 다음 각 목의 1에 해당하는 자 중 제4조의 규정에 의한 민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상심의위원회(이하 ‘보상심의위원회’라 한다)에서 심의·결정된 자를 말한다"고 규정하면서 각 목에서 그 대상자로 "가. 민주화운동과 관련하여 사망하거나 행방불명된 자, 나. 민주화운동과 관련하여 상이를 입은 자, 다. 민주화운동으로 인해 대통령령이 정하는 질병을 앓거나 그 후유증으로 사망한 것으로 인정되는 자, 라. 민주화운동을 이유로 유죄판결·해직 또는 학사징계를 받은 자"를 들고 있고, 제10조 제1항은 "관련자 또는 그 유족으로서 이 법에 의한 보상금·의료지원금·생활지원금(이하 ‘보상금 등’이라 한다)을 지급받고자 하는 자는 대통령령이 정하는 바에 따라 관련증빙서류를 첨부하여 서면으로 위원회에 보상금 등의 지급을 신청하여야 한다"고 규정하며, 제14조 제1항은 "보상결정서정본을 송달받은 신청인이 보상금 등을 지급받고자 할 때에는 지체 없이 그 결정에 대한 동의서를 첨부하여 위원회에 대하여 보상금 등의 지급을 청구하여야 한다"고 규정하고, 민주화운동관련자 명예회복 및 보상 등에 관한 법률은 "이 법에 의한 보상금 등의 지급결정은 신청인이 동의한 때에는 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해에 대하여 민사소송법의 규정에 의한 재판상 화해가 성립된 것으로 본다"고 규정하고 있다.

그리고 민주화운동보상법 시행령 제20조는 "보상결정통지서·생활지원금지급결정통지서 또는 명예회복결정통지서를 받은 신청인이 보상금 등의 지급을 받고자 하는 때에는 다음 각 호의 사항을 기재한 별지 제10호 서식의 동의 및 청구서에 보상결정서·생활지원금지급결정서 또는 명예회복결정서 정본과 신청인의 인감증명서 각 1부를 첨부하여 위원회에 제출하여야 한다"고 규정하면서 제3호로 "보상결정에 동의하고 보상금 등의 지급을 청구한다는 취지"를 규정하고 있고, 위 시행령 별지 제10호 서식의 동의 및 청구서에는 "신청인은 그 보상금 등을 받은 때에는 그 사건에 대하여 화해계약을 하는 것이며, 그 사건에 관하여 어떠한 방법으로라도 다시 청구하지 아니할 것임을 서약합니다"라고 기재되어 있다.

(2) 위와 같은 민주화운동보상법의 입법 취지, 관련 규정의 내용, 신청인이 작성·제출하는 동의 및 청구서의 기재 내용에 더하여 특히 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항의 입법 목적이 신청인이 보상금 등 지급결정에 동의한 경우 재판상 화해와 같은 효력, 특히 기판력을 부여함으로써 소송에 앞서 보상심의위원회의 보상금 등 지급결정절차를 통하여 이를 신속히 종결·이행시키고 보상금 등 지급결정에 안정성을 부여하는 데 있는 점 등을 종합하여 볼 때, 보상심의위원회가 신청인이 신청한 내용 중 일부에 관하여 명시적으로 민주화운동보상법에서 정한 민주화운동관련자 요건에 해당하지 아니한다는 결정을 하지 아니한 이상, 신청인이 보상심의위원회의 보상금 등 지급결정에 동의한 때에는 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항에 따라 위자료를 포함하여 그가 보상금 등을 지급받은 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해 일체에 대하여 민사소송법의 규정에 의한 재판상 화해와 동일한 효력이 발생한다고 할 것이다.

나. (1) 원심판결 이유와 기록에 의하면, ① 인천동부경찰서 경찰관들이 1976. 7. 23. 소외 회사 노동조합 집행부의 핵심인물을 영장 없이 체포하여 대의원 대회에 참석하지 못하도록 하는 등 노동조합 활동을 방해하고, 노동조합 대의원 선거일인 1978. 2. 23. 06:00경 반대파 조합원들이 투표를 하려던 조합원들을 향해 똥물을 투척하여 투표가 진행되지 못하도록 한 것에 대해 다른 조합원들이 시위를 하자 중앙정보부의 지시로 1978. 4. 1. 원고들을 포함한 120여 명의 조합원들이 해고된 사실, ② 1978. 4. 10. 전국○○노동조합 부산지부 지부장 명의로 원고들을 포함한 소외 회사 해고 노동자들의 신상정보가 기재된 명단이 첨부되었고, 1987년경 발견된 이른바 ‘△△산업 블랙리스트’에도 소외 회사 해고 노동자 중 116명의 명단이 포함되어 있었으며, 이 때문에 원고들을 포함한 소외 회사 해고 노동자들은 다른 회사에 취업할 수 없었고 취업되더라도 곧 해고되었는데, 위 명단 작성 및 배포에 중앙정보부 등 국가기관이 관여한 사실, ③ 원고들은 2001년에서 2010년경 사이에 보상심의위원회에서 민주화운동관련자로 인정되었고, 그 당시 인정된 사실은 시위 및 농성, 그로 인한 해고에 관한 것이며 원고들 중 일부에 대해서는 형사처벌을 받은 사실도 함께 적시되어 있는데, 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등으로 인한 취업방해 행위 관련 내용은 보상심의위원회의 의결서에 기재되어 있지 아니하고, 다만 원고 6, 원고 7에 대한 의결에서는 "블랙리스트 작성·배포에 따른 재취업 기회의 상실은 민주화운동보상법이 규정하는 민주화운동관련자 요건에 해당하지 아니한다"는 이유로 그 부분에 관하여 불인정 결정을 한 사실, ④ 원고 10, 원고 22를 제외한 나머지 원고들(이하 제1항에서는 ‘생활지원금 수령 원고들’ 또는 ‘위 원고들’이라 한다)은 보상심의위원회에 민주화운동관련자로서 생활지원금을 신청하여 각각 생활지원금 50,000,000원 또는 40,631,000원의 지급결정을 받아 그 무렵 위 지급결정에 동의하고 생활지원금을 모두 수령한 사실을 알 수 있다.

(2) 위 인정 사실 및 기록에 비추어 알 수 있는 다음과 같은 사정, 즉 ① 피고의 위 노동조합활동 방해 및 강제해고와 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등으로 인한 취업방해 행위는 모두 민주화운동보상법이 제정되어 위 원고들이 생활지원금을 지급받기 전에 이미 발생한 것들인 점, ② 피고 산하 기관이 노동조합원들에 대한 블랙리스트를 작성·관리 및 배포한 이유는 결국 해고된 조합원들을 관리하고 이들의 재취업을 곤란하게 하기 위한 것으로서, 이러한 행위는 위 원고들이 민주화운동관련자로 인정받은 사유인 ‘민주화운동을 이유로 한 해직’의 연장선상에 있거나 그와 매우 밀접한 관계에 있다고 볼 수 있는 점, ③ 민주화운동으로 인한 해직기간과 그 이후에 있었던 취업방해 행위로 인한 해직기간은 중첩될 것이므로, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 신청인이 보상금 등을 지급받음으로써 양쪽의 피해를 모두 보상받는 것으로 보는 것이 합리적인 점 등에 비추어 보면, 피고의 위 노동조합활동 방해 및 강제해고, 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등 행위에 의하여 위 원고들이 입은 피해는 모두 위 원고들이 민주화운동보상법 제9조 소정의 생활지원금을 지급받는 데 동의한, 소외 회사 노동조합 관련 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해에 해당하여, 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항에 따라 재판상 화해와 동일한 효력이 미친다고 보아야 한다.

다. (1) 원심이 같은 취지에서, 생활지원금 수령 원고들 중 원고 6, 원고 7을 제외한 원고들과 피고 사이에 위 조항에 따라 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해들에 대하여 민사소송법의 규정에 따른 재판상 화해가 성립하였으므로 생활지원금 수령 원고들 중 원고 6, 원고 7을 제외한 원고들이 민주화운동과 관련하여 입은 피해들에 대하여 다시 위자료를 청구하는 이 사건 소는 권리보호이익이 없어 모두 부적법하다고 판단한 것은 정당하고, 거기에 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항의 효력 범위 등에 관한 법리오해의 잘못이 없다.

(2) 다만 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 볼 때, 원고 6, 원고 7에 대하여는 보상심의위원회의 의결에서 명시적으로 블랙리스트 작성·배포에 따른 재취업 기회의 상실 부분에 관하여 민주화운동관련자로 인정하지 아니하는 결정을 하였고 그에 기초하여 생활지원금이 지급된 이상, 원고 6, 원고 7이 생활지원금을 수령하였다고 하여 그로 인한 재판상 화해의 효력이 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등에 의한 취업방해로 인한 위자료청구 부분에 대하여까지 미친다고 할 수는 없다.

그럼에도 불구하고 원심이 이와 달리 원고 6, 원고 7의 위 위자료청구 부분에 대하여도 재판상 화해의 효력이 미친다고 본 것은 민주화운동보상법 제18조 제2항의 효력 범위에 관한 법리를 오해하여 판단을 그르친 것이다.

라. 한편 위 화해가 불공정한 법률행위에 해당한다거나 착오로 취소되어야 한다는 생활지원금 수령 원고들의 주장은 상고심에 이르러 비로소 내세우는 새로운 주장으로서, 적법한 상고이유가 되지 못한다.

2. 피고의 상고이유 제1점에 관하여

가. 국가가 진실·화해를 위한 과거사정리 기본법의 적용 대상인 피해자의 진실규명신청을 받아 피고 산하 진실·화해를 위한 과거사정리위원회(이하 ‘정리위원회’라 한다)에서 희생자로 확인 또는 추정하는 진실규명결정을 하였다면, 그 결정에 기초하여 피해자가 상당한 기간 내에 권리를 행사할 경우에, 피고가 적어도 소멸시효의 완성을 들어 권리소멸을 주장하지 않을 것이라는 데 대한 신뢰를 가질 만한 특별한 사정이 있다고 봄이 상당하고, 그럼에도 불구하고 국가가 소멸시효의 완성을 주장하는 것은 신의성실 원칙에 반하는 권리남용에 해당하여 허용될 수 없다. 그리고 위 권리 행사의 ‘상당한 기간’은 특별한 사정이 없는 한 민법상 시효정지의 경우에 준하여 단기간으로 제한되는바, 불법행위로 인한 손해배상청구의 경우 그 기간은 아무리 길어도 민법 제766조 제1항이 규정한 단기소멸시효기간인 3년으로 제한된다(대법원 2013. 5. 16. 선고 2012다202819 전원합의체 판결 등 참조).

나. 원심판결 이유 및 기록에 의하면, 정리위원회가 2010. 6. 30. 소외 회사 노동조합 관련 사건에 관하여 진실규명결정을 한 사실, 원고 10, 원고 22는 그로부터 6개월 내인 2010. 12. 6. 이 사건 손해배상청구의 소를 제기한 사실을 알 수 있다. 그렇다면 위 원고들은 정리위원회의 진실규명결정 후 상당한 기간 내에 이 사건 손해배상청구의 소를 제기한 것으로 봄이 상당하므로, 그 손해배상청구에 대하여 피고가 소멸시효의 완성을 주장하는 것은 권리남용에 해당하여 허용될 수 없다.

다. 원심의 이 부분 판단에 부적절한 점이 없지 아니하나, 피고가 위 원고들에 대하여 소멸시효의 완성을 주장하는 것이 신의성실의 원칙에 반하는 권리남용에 해당하여 허용될 수 없다는 이유로 피고의 주장을 배척한 것은 결론에 있어 정당하고, 거기에 소멸시효에 관한 법리를 오해하여 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 잘못이 없다.

3. 원고 10, 원고 22의 상고이유 및 피고의 상고이유 제2점에 관하여

불법행위로 입은 정신적 고통에 대한 위자료 액수에 관하여는 사실심 법원이 여러 사정을 참작하여 그 직권에 속하는 재량에 의하여 이를 정할 수 있다(대법원 2002. 11. 26. 선고 2002다43165 판결 등 참조).

원심은 피고의 불법행위의 내용 및 정도, 불법행위가 이루어진 때와 현재의 시간적 간격 등 이 사건 변론에 나타난 여러 가지 사정을 참작하여 원고 10, 원고 22에 대한 위자료 액수를 정하였다.

앞서 본 법리에 비추어 기록을 살펴보면, 원심의 위와 같은 조치는 정당한 것으로 수긍이 가고, 거기에 위자료 산정에 관한 법리를 오해한 잘못이 없다.

4. 결론

그러므로 원심판결 중 원고 6, 원고 7의 블랙리스트 작성·관리 등에 의한 취업방해로 인한 위자료청구 부분을 파기하여 이 부분 사건을 원심법원에 환송하고, 원고 6, 원고 7의 나머지 상고와 나머지 원고들의 상고 및 피고의 원고 10, 원고 22에 대한 상고를 모두 기각하고, 상고비용 중 원고 6, 원고 7의 상고를 제외한 나머지 상고로 인한 부분은 패소자들이 각 부담하기로 하여, 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 박보영(재판장) 민일영(주심) 이인복 김신

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