Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 92도1855

Violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률위반) and Obstruction of Business (업무방해)집회및시위에관한법률위반, 업무방해

Decided1992. 09. 22. Court대법원Case reversed and remanded (파기환송) — the lower court's guilty finding was vacated for further review
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A labor union member led a rally protesting a dismissal and demanding wage negotiations, which the lower court found constituted obstruction of business. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that violations of the 'cooling-off period' (냉각기간) for labor disputes do not automatically render a strike or rally illegal, and that the legitimacy of collective action (쟁의행위) must be assessed based on the specific circumstances.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA union member organized a rally demanding withdrawal of a dismissal and wage negotiations, and was charged with illegal assembly and obstruction of business.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that a mere procedural violation (like breaching the cooling-off period) does not automatically make a labor rally illegal, and sent the case back for further fact-finding.
  • LessonEmployers and unions should understand that technical violations of strike procedures do not automatically criminalize collective action — courts must weigh the full context, including purpose and actual impact on business operations.
Issues
  • What are the requirements for the legitimacy of collective labor action (쟁의행위의 정당성)?
  • What is the legal effect of violating the cooling-off period (냉각기간) or the prior notice requirement?
  • Does holding a rally, by itself, establish the crime of obstruction of business (업무방해)?
Key reasoning

The Court held that the legality of collective labor action (쟁의행위의 정당성) must be evaluated across three dimensions: the legitimacy of its purpose, the legitimacy of its timing and procedure, and the legitimacy of its methods and manner. Even where there is a violation of the statutory cooling-off period or a failure to give prior notice, this does not automatically make the action illegal — the surrounding facts and circumstances must be considered. The Court further found that the lower court had not clearly established the causal link between the rally itself and the alleged obstruction of business, meaning the case required further factual examination before a conclusion on illegality could be reached.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] A labor dispute act includes not only passive refusal or suspension of labor provision by workers, but also active acts that impede the normal operation of business in order to achieve their demands; therefore, the fact that the employer's normal business is impeded is an unavoidable consequence of the essential nature of labor dispute acts, and the employer bears the duty to tolerate this. However, where such workers' labor dispute act exceeds the limits of legitimacy, the workers cannot be exempted from criminal liability, including the crime of obstruction of business.

[2] The requirements for legitimacy that exempt a labor dispute act from criminal liability are as follows: the purpose of the labor dispute act must be legitimate, in that it is related to collective bargaining and aims at maintaining or improving working conditions, etc.; the timing and procedures of the labor dispute act must be legitimate, in accordance with the provisions of statutes; and the methods and manner of the labor dispute act must fall within a legitimate scope, that is, not accompanied by violence or destructive acts, or otherwise not bearing a highly antisocial character.

[3] With regard to the timing and procedures of labor dispute acts, Articles 14 and 16 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법) provide for a cooling-off period and a prior notification system, and Articles 47 and 48 of the same Act even provide penal provisions for violations of each of the above provisions. However, the purpose of the provisions concerning the cooling-off period and prior notification is to provide an opportunity for prior mediation of disputes so as to avoid the occurrence of a labor dispute, and to give advance notice of the occurrence of a labor dispute so as to provide an opportunity for measures to prevent damage; it is not intended to prohibit the labor dispute act itself. Accordingly, the mere fact that a labor dispute act did not follow the timing and procedures prescribed by the provisions on the cooling-off period or prior notification should not automatically be regarded as rendering the labor dispute act lacking in legitimacy. Rather, the existence or absence of legitimacy, and thus the existence or absence of criminal liability, must be determined by examining specific circumstances, such as whether the violation is likely to bring about unjust results, including unexpected confusion or damage to social and economic stability or to the employer's business operations.

Full text (English, AI translation) 12,178 chars

[Defendant] A
[Appellant] Defendant
[Judgment Below] Seoul Criminal District Court, Judgment of June 25, 1992, Case No. 92No1967

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal District Court.

[Reasoning]

The Defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the point of obstruction of business

A labor dispute act (쟁의행위) includes not only the passive act of a worker refusing or suspending the provision of labor, but also active acts that impede the normal operation of business in order to achieve the worker's demands (see Article 3 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법)). Therefore, it is unavoidable, by the very nature of a labor dispute act, that an employer's normal business operations may be impeded in some cases, and the employer bears a duty to tolerate this. However, when such a labor dispute act by workers exceeds the limits of legitimacy, the workers cannot be exempted from criminal liability, including for the crime of obstruction of business. Meanwhile, the requirements of legitimacy under which criminal liability is exempted are as follows: the labor dispute act must be legitimate in its purpose, namely, that it must be conducted in connection with collective bargaining for the purpose of maintaining or improving working conditions, etc.; the timing and procedures of the labor dispute act must be legitimate, in accordance with the provisions of statutes; and the methods and manner of the labor dispute act must fall within a legitimate scope, that is, they must not involve violence or destructive acts or other acts of a highly antisocial nature.

Now, with respect to the timing and procedures of a labor dispute act, Articles 14 and 16 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act provide for a cooling-off period and a prior notification system, and Articles 47 and 48 of the same Act even provide penal provisions for violations of these respective provisions. However, the purpose of the provisions regarding the cooling-off period and prior notification is to provide an opportunity to resolve disputes in advance and thereby avoid the occurrence of a labor dispute, and also to give advance notice of the occurrence of a labor dispute so as to provide an opportunity to take measures to prevent damage; it is not to prohibit the labor dispute act itself. Therefore, the mere fact that a labor dispute act did not comply with the timing and procedures prescribed by the provisions on the cooling-off period or prior notification does not necessarily mean that the labor dispute act unconditionally lacks legitimacy. Rather, one must examine the specific circumstances, such as whether the violation is likely to cause an unjust result, including unexpected disruption or damage to social and economic stability or to the employer's business operations, and determine the presence or absence of legitimacy accordingly, in order to judge whether criminal liability exists.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below upheld the judgment of the first instance court, which found the Defendant guilty of obstruction of business through force, and applied the law accordingly, on the following factual findings: (1) that on December 21, 1990, from approximately 07:40 to 07:50, at the roadside in front of and in the company athletic field of Sunghwa Co., Ltd. (성화(주)), located at (address omitted), Guro-gu, Seoul, when non-indicted B was dismissed on the ground of undercover employment (disguised employment), the Defendant, without reporting to the authorities, gathered about 20 union members and led a rally, causing them to make a commotion by shouting slogans such as "Withdraw B's dismissal" and "If the president is arrogant, the workers are tough," while also, through obstruction and delay of work by management staff and non-union employees, causing production losses amounting to KRW 949,000 to the company, thereby obstructing business through force; (2) that on April 24, 1991, from approximately 07:30 to 07:50, in front of the main gate of the same company, when non-indicted C was dismissed on the ground of undercover employment, the Defendant gathered about 150 workers, asserted C's reinstatement, and led a rally by chanting slogans such as "Crush unjust dismissal, let's win the 1991 wage struggle" and leading labor songs such as "Song of Solidarity Struggle" and "Song of Comrades," with participants repeating after him, while also, through obstruction and delay of work by management staff and non-union employees, causing production losses amounting to KRW 949,000 to the company, thereby obstructing business through force; and that on the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 29th of the same month, at the same time and place, in the same manner, he led rallies while also causing, through obstruction and delay of work by management staff and non-union employees, a total of KRW 4,745,000 worth of production losses to the company, thereby obstructing business through force; (3) that on May 24 of the same year, from approximately 07:40 to 08:00, and on May 25 of the same year, from approximately 07:40 to 08:00, in front of the said company, on the ground that the wage negotiations between labor and management were delayed, the Defendant gathered about 200 workers and led a rally by chanting slogans such as "Crush labor oppression, let's win the 1991 wage struggle" and leading labor songs and strike songs, with participants repeating after him, while also, through obstruction and delay of work by management staff and non-union employees, causing production losses amounting to KRW 1,898,000 to the company, thereby obstructing business through force; and (4) that on May 30 of the same year, from approximately 07:40 to 08:00, from in front of the said company to in front of the Korea Keystone Valve Company within the nearby industrial complex, on the ground that the wage negotiations between labor and management were delayed, the Defendant gathered about 300 workers and led a rally and demonstration by chanting slogans such as "Let the union members unite as one and win the 1991 wage struggle" and leading labor songs and strike songs, with participants repeating after him, while also, through obstruction and delay of work by management staff and non-union employees, causing production losses amounting to KRW 949,000 to the company, thereby obstructing business through force.

However, with respect to the point of obstruction of business, it is first unclear whether the content of the obstruction of business as found by the first instance court means that the Defendant, in addition to leading the rallies as found, separately committed acts of obstructing and delaying the work of management staff and non-union employees, or whether it means that by leading the rallies as found, the rally activity itself caused the obstruction and delay of work as found.

If it is the former, then not only was the act of obstruction of business not specifically identified, but upon examining the evidence cited by the first instance court, no material can be found to support a finding of a specific act of obstruction of business.

If, on the other hand, it is the latter, the Defendant has defended that he ended the rallies before 08:00, the starting time of the company's work hours, and therefore did not impede the company's business at all; and even according to the reasoning of the first instance judgment, as upheld by the court below, it is found that the six rallies held on December 21, 1990, April 24, 1991, and the 25th, 26th, 27th, and 29th of the same month were conducted until approximately 07:50, while the three rallies held on May 24, May 25, and May 30, 1991 were conducted until approximately 08:00. Therefore, if the company's starting time for work were 08:00, then, absent special circumstances, in the six instances where the rally ended by approximately 07:50, it cannot be said that there was obstruction of business, since work had not yet commenced; and even in the three instances where the rally ended by approximately 08:00, unless the said starting time for work itself signifies the time at which actual work commences, it would be difficult to conclude that there was an act of obstruction of business.

However, according to the statement recorded in the statement of D taken by the judicial police officer, which the first instance judgment adopted, D stated that work began at 08:00, but was disrupted for 10 minutes due to the rally led by the Defendant and others, and that based on a production rate of 400 pairs of shoes per hour, the failure to produce 65 pairs during the 10-minute period resulted in a loss amounting to KRW 949,000. According to the statement of D taken by the prosecutor, D stated that although the working hours began at 08:00, workers were required to prepare the work line at 07:50, ten minutes prior, but this was delayed for 20 minutes due to the rally and other acts of the Defendant and others. Furthermore, according to the statement of E taken by the prosecutor, E stated that management staff arrived at work by approximately 07:30 to prepare for work, and workers also arrived by approximately 07:40 to prepare for work, with work commencing at 08:00, but that due to the rally activity of the Defendant and others, work could not commence at 08:00.

However, according to the testimony of D as a witness in the first instance trial, D testified that the company's starting time for work was 08:00, and that if a worker punched the time card at the main gate by 08:00, there was no problem whatsoever; and D also testified to the effect that although the Defendant and others held the rally near the main gate, when management staff came to work, a path was cleared for them so that there was no obstruction whatsoever to their commencing work. In light of the fact that, generally speaking, the starting time for work refers to the time of arrival at the workplace, which is not the same as the time work actually commences after a preparation period, and in light of the content of D's testimony in court, the content of the statements of D and E taken by the prosecutor and the statement of D taken by the judicial police officer are not readily credible.

The court below should have specifically ascertained the actual time at which work commenced at the said company and whether the rally activity of the Defendant and others obstructed work, and should have examined and determined whether this lacked legitimacy to the extent that criminal liability for obstruction of business could be imposed. Nevertheless, without doing so, the court below merely and carelessly upheld the judgment of the first instance court, thereby committing an illegality that affected the judgment by failing to exhaust its examination and erring in the evaluation of the evidence. The argument on this point is well-founded.

2. As to the point of violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (집회및시위에관한법률)

Upon examination of the record, it is amply established, as found in the first instance judgment upheld by the court below, that the Defendant led an assembly and demonstration without reporting, and also participated in a demonstration that was clearly likely to pose a threat to public peace and order. Therefore, the judgment below, which found the Defendant guilty of the charged violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration, is justified, and there is no illegality as argued. Accordingly, the argument on this point is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the judgment below cannot be sustained with respect to the point of obstruction of business, for the reasons set forth above. Since the judgment below treated the crime of obstruction of business and the crime of violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration as concurrent offenses and imposed a single sentence, the entire judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Kim Seok-su (Presiding Justice), Lee Hoi-chang, Bae Man-woon, Choi Jong-young

【판결요지】

가. 쟁의행위는 근로자가 소극적으로 노무제공을 거부하거나 정지하는 행위만이 아니라 적극적으로 그 주장을 관철하기 위하여 업무의 정상적인 운영을 저해하는 행위까지 포함하므로, 쟁의행위의 본질상 사용자의 정상업무가 저해되는 경우가 있음은 부득이한 것으로서 사용자는 이를 수인할 의무가 있으나, 이러한 근로자의 쟁의행위가 정당성의 한계를 벗어날 때에는 근로자는 업무방해죄 등 형사상 책임을 면할 수 없다.

나. 쟁의행위의 형사상 책임이 면제되는 정당성의 요건은 쟁의행위가 단체교섭과 관련하여 근로조건의 유지·개선 등을 목적으로 하는 것이어서 그 목적이 정당하여야 하고, 쟁의행위의 시기와 절차가 법령의 규정에 따른 것으로서 정당하여야 하며, 또 쟁의행위의 방법과 태양이 폭력 또는 파괴행위를 수반하거나 기타 고도의 반사회성을 띈 행위가 아닌 정당한 범위 내의 것이어야 한다.

다. 쟁의행위의 시기와 절차에 관하여 노동쟁의조정법 제14조 및 제16조는 냉각기간과 사전신고제를 규정하고, 같은 법 제47조 및 제48조는 위 각 규정위반행위에 대하여 벌칙규정까지 두고 있으나, 위 냉각기간이나 사전신고에 관한 규정의 취지는 분쟁을 사전 조정하여 쟁의발생을 회피하는 기회를 주고 또 쟁의발생을 사전 예고케 하여 손해방지조치의 기회를 주려는 데에 있는 것이지 쟁의행위 자체를 금지하려는 데에 있는 것이 아니므로, 쟁의행위가 위 냉각기간이나 사전신고의 규정이 정한 시기와 절차에 따르지 아니하였다고 하여 무조건 정당성이 결여된 쟁의행위라고 볼 것이 아니라 그 위반행위로 말미암아 사회, 경제적 안정이나 사용자의 사업운영에 예기치 않는 혼란이나 손해를 끼치는 등 부당한 결과를 초래할 우려가 있는지의 여부 등 구체적 사정을 살펴서 그 정당성 유무를 가려 형사상 죄책 유무를 판단하여야 한다.

【참조조문】

가.나.다. 노동조합법 제2조, 노동쟁의조정법 제3조 / 다. 같은 법 제14조, 제16조, 제47조, 제48조

【참조판례】

나.다. 대법원 1991.5.14. 선고 90누4006 판결(공1991,1654), 1991.5.24. 선고 91도324 판결(공1991,1817), 1992.3.13. 선고 91누10473 판결(공1992,1324) / 나. 대법원 1990.10.12. 선고 90도1431 판결(공1990,2334), 1992.1.21. 선고 91누5204 판결(공1992,927)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 4,478자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】 A

【상 고 인】 피고인

【원심판결】 서울형사지방법원 1992.6.25. 선고 92노1967 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고 사건을 서울형사지방법원 합의부에 환송한다.

【이 유】 피고인의 상고이유를 본다.

1. 업무방해의 점

쟁의행위는 근로자가 소극적으로 노무제공을 거부하거나 정지하는 행위만이 아니라 적극적으로 그 주장을 관철하기 위하여 업무의 정상적인 운영을 저해하는 행위까지 포함하는 것이므로( 노동쟁의조정법 제3조 참조), 쟁의행위의 본질상 사용자의 정상업무가 저해되는 경우가 있음은 부득이한 것으로서 사용자는 이를 수인할 의무가 있으나, 이러한 근로자의 쟁의행위가 정당성의 한계를 벗어날 때에는 근로자는 업무방해죄 등 형사상 책임을 면할 수 없다. 한편 형사상 책임이 면제되는 정당성의 요건은 쟁의행위가 단체교섭과 관련하여 근로조건의 유지·개선 등을 목적으로 하는 것이어서 그 목적이 정당하여야 하고, 쟁의행위의 시기와 절차가 법령의 규정에 따른 것으로서 정당하여야 하며, 또 쟁의행위의 방법과 태양이 폭력 또는 파괴행위를 수반하거나 기타 고도의 반사회성을 띈 행위가 아닌 정당한 범위 내의 것이어야 한다.

그런데 쟁의행위의 시기와 절차에 관하여 노동쟁의조정법 제14조 및 제16조는 냉각기간과 사전신고제를 규정하고 같은 법 제47조 및 제48조는 위 각 규정위반행위에 대하여 벌칙규정까지 두고 있으나, 위 냉각기간이나 사전신고에 관한 규정의 취지는 분쟁을 사전 조정하여 쟁의발생을 회피하는 기회를 주고 또 쟁의발생을 사전 예고케 하여 손해방지조치의 기회를 주려는 데에 있는 것이지 쟁의행위 자체를 금지하려는 데에 있는 것이 아니므로, 쟁의행위가 위 냉각기간이나 사전신고의 규정이 정한 시기와 절차에 따르지 아니하였다고 하여 무조건 정당성이 결여된 쟁의행위라고 볼 것이 아니라 그 위반행위로 말미암아 사회, 경제적 안정이나 사용자의 사업운영에 예기치 않는 혼란이나 손해를 끼치는 등 부당한 결과를 초래할 우려가 있는지의 여부 등 구체적 사정을 살펴서 그 정당성 유무를 가려 형사상 죄책유무를 판단하여야 할 것이다.

원심판결 이유에 의하면 원심은 피고인이 당국에 신고없이 (1) 1990.12.21. 07:40경부터 동일 07:50경까지 서울 구로구 (지번 생략) 소재 성화(주)의 앞 노상과 사내운동장에서 공소외 B가 위장취업을 이유로 해고하자, 노조원 20여명을 모아놓고 B의 해고를 철회하라 사장이 배짱이면 노동자는 깡다구다라는 등의 구호를 외치면서 소란을 피우게 하여 집회를 주도함과 동시에 관리직사원과 비노조원 등의 작업방해 및 작업지연으로 동 회사에 금 949,000원 상당 생산차질을 가져오게 하는 등으로 위력으로써 업무를 방해하고, (2) 1991.4.24. 07:30경부터 동일 07:50경까지 동 회사 정문 앞에서 공소외 C가 위장취업을 이유로 해고되자 근로자 약 150명을 모이게 한 후 C 복직을 주장하면서 "부당해고 박살내고 91임투 승리하자" 등의 구호와 "단결투쟁가", "동지가" 등 노동가를 선창하고, 참가자들이 후창하는 방법으로 집회를 주도함과 동시에 관리직사원과 비노조원 등의 작업방해 및 작업지연으로 동 회사에 금 949,000원 상당 생산차질을 가져오는 등으로 위력으로써 업무를 방해하고, 같은 달 25. 같은 달 26. 같은 달 27. 같은 달 29일에도 동일 시간대에 동일한 장소에 같은 방법으로 집회를 주도함과 동시에 관리직사원과 비노조원 등의 작업방해 및 작업지연으로 동 회사에 도합 4,745,000원 상당의 생산차질을 가져오게 하여 위력으로써 업무를 방해하고, (3) 동년 5.24. 07:40경부터 동일 08:00경까지와 동년 5.25. 07:40경부터 동일 08:00경까지 위 회사 앞에서 노사간 임금협상이 지체된다는 이유로 근로자 약 200여명을 모이게 한 후 "노동탄압 박살내고 91임투 승리하자"라는 등의 구호와 노동가, 파업가 등을 선창하고 참가자들이 후창하는 방법으로 집회를 주도함과 동시에 관리직 사원과 비노조원 등의 작업방해 및 작업지연으로 동 회사에 1,898,000원 상당의 생산차질을 가져오게 하여 위력으로 업무를 방해하고, (4) 동년 5.30. 07:40경부터 동일 08:00경까지 위 회사 앞에서 부근 공단내 한국키스톤발브회사 앞까지 노사간 임금교섭이 지연된다는 이유로 근로자 약 300여명을 규합한 뒤 "조합원이 하나되어 91임투 승리하자"라는 등의 구호와 노동가, 파업가 등을 선창하고 참가자들이 후창하는 방법으로 집회시위를 주도함과 동시에 관리직 사원과 비노조원 등의 작업방해 및 작업지연으로 동 회사금 949,000원 상당의 생산차질을 가져오게 하여 위력으로써 업무를 방해한 사실을 인정하고 피고인을 업무방해죄로 의율처단한 1심판결을 정당하다 하여 유지하고 있다.

그러나 업무방해의 점에 관하여 보건대, 우선 제1심이 판시한 업무방해의 내용이 피고인이 그 판시와 같은 집회를 주도하는 외에 별도로 관리직사원과 비노조원 등의 작업을 방해하고 작업을 지연케하는 행위를 하였다는 것인지, 아니면 그 판시와 같은 집회를 주도함으로써 그 집회행위로 그 판시와 같은 작업방해, 작업지연 등을 초래하였다는 것인지 분명치 않다.

만일 전자의 경우라면, 업무방해의 행위가 구체적으로 특정되지 않았을 뿐 아니라 1심거시 증거를 살펴보아도 구체적인 업무방해행위를 인정할 자료를 찾아볼 수 없다.

이와 달리 후자의 경우라면, 피고인은 위 회사의 출근시간인 08:00전에 집회를 끝냈으므로 위 회사의 업무를 저해한 바 없다고 변소하고 있고, 원심이 유지한 1심판결 이유설시에 의하더라도 1990.12.21., 1991.4.24., 같은 달 25. 같은 달 26. 같은 달 27. 같은 달 29.의 6차례 집회는 07:50경까지 하였고, 1991.5.24. 같은 달 25. 같은 달 30.의 3차례 집회는 08:00경까지 하였던 사실이 인정되므로, 만일 위 회사의 출근시간이 08:00라면 07:50경까지 집회를 끝낸 6차례의 경우에는 특별한 사정이 없는 한 업무개시 전이어서 업무방해가 있다고 볼 수 없고, 또 08:00경까지 집회를 끝낸 3차례의 경우도 위 출근시간이 바로 작업개시시간을 의미하지 않는 한 업무방해행위라고 단정하기 어려울 것이다.

그런데 제1심 판결이 채용한 사법경찰관사무취급작성의 D에 대한 진술조서 기재에 의하면 동인은 작업이 08:00에 시작하는데 피고인 등의 집회로 10분간 방해를 받았으므로 1시간당 신발생산량 400족을 기준으로 10분간의 생산량 65족 시가 949,000원 상당을 생산하지 못한 것이라고 진술하고 있고, 동인에 대한 검사작성의 진술조서 기재에 의하면 작업시간은 08:00부터이나 10분 전인 07:50경에 작업라인에 작업준비를 하여야 하는데 피고인 등의 집회 등 행위로 20분 간 지연되었다는 취지로 진술하고 있으며, 또 검사의 E에 대한 진술조서 기재에 의하면 동인은 관리자 등은 07:30경까지 출근하여 작업준비를 하고 근로자들도 07:40경까지 출근하여 작업준비를 하고 08:00에 작업이 개시되는데 피고인 등의 집회행위로 08:00에 작업개시를 하지 못하였다는 취지로 진술하고 있으나, 1심증인 D의 증언에 의하면 위 회사의 출근시간은 08:00이고 근로자는 08:00까지 정문에서 출근카드를 찍으면 아무런 하자가 없다고 진술하고 또 피고인 등이 정문쪽에서 집회를 하면서도 관리직 사원들이 출근할 때에는 길을 비켜주어 출근에 아무런 지장을 주지 않았다는 취지로 진술하고 있는바, 일반적으로 출근시간은 근무처에 도착하는 시간으로서 작업준비시간을 거쳐 작업에 착수하는 작업개시시간과 같지 않은 점과 위 D의 법정증언내용에 비추어 보면 검사의 D, E에 대한 각 진술조서 및 사법경찰관사무취급작성의 D에 대한 진술조서의 각 기재내용은 선뜻 믿기 어렵다.

원심으로서는 구체적으로 위 회사의 실제 작업개시시간과 피고인 등의 집회행위로 인한 작업방해 여부를 밝히고 그것이 업무방해의 형사상 책임을 물을만큼 정당성이 결여되었던 것인지를 심리판단하였어야 함에도 불구하고 이에 이름이 없이 만연히 1심판결을 유지한 것은 심리를 다하지 아니하고 증거의 가치판단을 그르쳐 판결에 영향을 미친 위법을 저지른 것으로서 이 점에 관한 논지는 이유 있다.

2. 집회및시위에관한법률위반의 점

기록에 의하여 살펴보면 원심이 유지한 1심판시 내용과 같이 피고인이 신고없이 집회 및 시위를 주도하고 또 공공의 안녕질서에 위협을 가할 것이 명백한 시위에 참가한 사실이 넉넉히 인정되므로 판시 집회및시위에관한법률위반죄에 관하여 피고인을 유죄로 판단한 원심판결은 정당하고 소론과 같은 위법이 없으므로 이 점에 관한 논지는 이유 없다.

3. 결국 원심판결은 업무방해의 점에 관하여 위에서 설시한 이유로 도저히 유지될 수 없는바, 원심판결은 업무방해죄와 집회및시위에관한법률위반죄를 경합범으로 처단하여 하나의 형을 선고하였으므로 원심판결 전부를 파기환송하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 김석수(재판장) 이회창 배만운 최종영

Related statutes

Similar cases

Cases with high content similarity to this one.

#1
2009노204,2645(병합) · 서울고등법원 2010-08-17
특수공무집행방해치상·특수공용물건손상·특수공무집행방해·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등재물손괴등)·집회및
#2
2009도840 · 대법원 2009-07-23
집회및시위에관한법률위반·도로교통법위반
#3
2012도11518 · 대법원 2013-10-24
집회및시위에관한법률위반
#4
2010노1887 · 부산지방법원 2010-10-15
폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(공동주거침입)·집회및시위에관한법률위반
#5
2011도2327 · 대법원 2013-07-26
폭력행위 등 처벌에 관한 법률 위반(공동주거침입)·집회 및 시위에 관한 법률 위반

Cases citing this decision

95도2970 · 대법원 1996-02-27
Obstruction of Business (업무방해) and Violation of the Labor Di
93도613 · 대법원 1994-02-22
Obstruction of Business
92도1645 · 대법원 1992-12-08
Obstruction of Business
92누1094 · 대법원 1992-12-08
파면처분취소

Related tools & guides

AI answers need an account (free accounts: 2 per month) — submit and you'll return to this question after logging in. Search and case reading stay free.

Cross-check the original: 국가법령정보센터 (auxiliary link)