[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 96Gu3401, decided September 4, 1997
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence adopted in its judgment, found the following facts.
The deceased Nonparty 1 was a painter who performed paint-coating work on doors and door frames at construction sites, and for about five years had worked as a painter mainly at construction sites where ○○ Painting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "○○ Painting"), a company engaged in paint sales and painting work, had subcontracted painting jobs, as an employee affiliated with ○○ Painting.
○○ Painting subcontracted the painting work in the construction of △△ Villa, which was being built by △△ Construction Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "△△ Construction"), an entity enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance. The deceased, as an employee of ○○ Painting, first reported to work at the △△ Villa construction site at approximately 07:30 on July 26, 1995, and after finishing the paint-coating work on five interior doors, at approximately 08:30 on the same day suddenly complained of a headache and thirst, drank water given to him by his co-worker Nonparty 2, and went to rest in an adjoining room, where he died.
At the time of his death, the deceased was 62 years old and, apart from mild hypertension and knee neuralgia, had no particular illness. His work consisted of paint-coating of doors and door frames at construction sites and miscellaneous chores such as cleaning; his working hours were from 07:30 to approximately 17:30; and for several months prior to his death he had worked approximately 25 days per month.
Dr. Nonparty 3, who examined the body of the deceased, recorded in the death examination report that the cause of death was presumed to be acute myocardial infarction, but no autopsy or further investigation into the cause of death was conducted.
Myocardial infarction refers to a condition in which the blood flow supplying oxygen to the myocardium is blocked, causing necrosis of the affected myocardium; its course may result in sudden death due to complicating arrhythmia, death due to heart failure, or may pass without complications. Its principal cause is arteriosclerosis, with hypertension, obesity, and smoking being the most important risk factors, and symptoms of ischemic heart disease may manifest due to overwork or stress, potentially leading to death through myocardial infarction caused by ischemic injury and consequent complications such as arrhythmia.
B. Based on the above findings, the court below, in response to the Plaintiff's argument that the deceased Nonparty 1 died as a result of accumulated fatigue from excessive work and that his death therefore constitutes an occupational accident, held that the cause of death was merely presumed to be acute myocardial infarction and could not be regarded as clearly established; furthermore, even granting that the deceased, being 62 years old at the time of death and having mild hypertension, possessed risk factors capable of inducing myocardial infarction, this was insufficient to infer that the work performed by the deceased constituted excessive work for him such that it induced the myocardial infarction or caused it to rapidly worsen beyond its natural course; moreover, since the deceased worked at the construction site of △△ Construction, an entity enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance, for only about one hour, and there was no evidence establishing that ○○ Painting or the entities for which the deceased had previously worked were enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance, there was no evidence to establish that the work performed by the deceased was work for an entity enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance. On these grounds, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's argument, determining that the deceased's death did not constitute an occupational accident.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1
However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that the deceased Nonparty 1 worked: in May 1995, for 24.5 days, at the Yangsan apartment construction site of □□ Housing Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "□□ Housing") and at the Gaegeum Family Town construction site of ◇◇ Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "◇◇ Development"); in June 1995, for 27 days, at the Gaegeum Family Town construction site; and in July 1995, for 22 out of 25 days until the day before his death, at the Gaegeum Family Town construction site, the Haeundae construction site of ∇∇ Housing Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "∇∇ Housing"), and the model house construction site of ◇◇ Development, performing the painting work subcontracted to ○○ Painting; and that on the date of his death, July 26, 1995, he first reported to work at the △△ Villa construction site of △△ Construction and died after working for approximately one hour. Since each of the aforementioned construction projects of □□ Housing, ◇◇ Development, and ∇∇ Housing appears to be new construction of apartments or row houses, in light of the scale of such construction, there is a considerable possibility that the total construction cost of each project exceeded 40 million won as prescribed in Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 6 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법시행령) (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 15589 of December 31, 1997), and thus there is a considerable possibility that each of these construction projects was subject to mandatory application of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법) or that its contractor was enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance. If that were the case, then the deceased, as an employee of ○○ Painting, which was subcontracted to perform the painting portion of each of these construction projects, would also be covered by industrial accident compensation insurance (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da54225, decided August 29, 1997). Therefore, in determining whether the deceased's death constitutes an occupational accident, not only the work the deceased performed for approximately one hour at the construction site of △△ Construction, but also the work he performed at each of the construction sites of □□ Housing, ◇◇ Development, and ∇∇ Housing where he had worked prior to his death, should all be included and considered as material for the determination (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu10466, decided May 12, 1992).
Therefore, the portion of the judgment below holding, solely on the grounds that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that the entities for which the deceased worked prior to his death were enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance, and that the deceased worked at the construction site of △△ Construction, an entity enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance, for only about one hour, that the work performed by the deceased was not work for an entity enrolled under industrial accident compensation insurance, contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning entities enrolled in industrial accident compensation insurance and the scope of such enrollment, as well as the legal principles concerning the scope of work to be considered as material in determining whether an occupational accident occurred, thereby failing to exhaust the necessary examination and violating the rules of evidence. However, as discussed below, in this case, even if all of the work performed by the deceased at each of the construction sites of □□ Housing, ◇◇ Development, and ∇∇ Housing where he worked prior to his death is included as material for determining whether the death constitutes an occupational accident, a causal relationship between the deceased's death and his work cannot be recognized, and thus the deceased's death does not constitute an occupational accident. Accordingly, the aforementioned error of the court below cannot be deemed an illegality that affected the outcome of the judgment. Ultimately, Ground of Appeal No. 1 cannot be accepted.
3. As to Grounds of Appeal No. 2 and No. 3
In order for a death to be recognized as a death due to occupational cause as prescribed in Article 4, Item 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), the death must not only have occurred during the performance of work, but must also have arisen from the work, and there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident; in this regard, the causal relationship between the worker's work and the accident must be proven by the party asserting it. Therefore, even where a worker's death occurs during the performance of work, the fact that the cause of death is unclear does not permit an immediate presumption that the death was caused by the work (see Supreme Court Decisions 97Nu19984, decided February 27, 1998; 98Du3303, decided April 24, 1998; 98Du13287, decided December 8, 1998, etc.). Meanwhile, the existence of a causal relationship between the work and the death must be determined not on the basis of an ordinary average person, but on the basis of the health and physical condition of the worker concerned (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Nu5433, decided September 10, 1991; 91Nu3727, decided November 8, 1991; 96Nu6103, decided September 6, 1996, etc.).
Now, as the court below lawfully found, the death examination report prepared by Dr. Nonparty 3 regarding the deceased merely stated the cause of death as "acute myocardial infarction (presumed)," and no autopsy or other investigation was conducted to further establish the cause of death. This being a case where the cause of the deceased's death is unclear, the deceased's death cannot be presumed to have been caused by his work. Furthermore, even assuming that the deceased died of acute myocardial infarction, according to the record, the deceased, as noted above, worked as a daily-wage painter for approximately 25 days per month at construction sites such as □□ Housing's for several months prior to his death; however, the work he performed—paint-coating of doors and door frames and miscellaneous chores such as cleaning—constitutes relatively light manual labor, and his working hours were from 07:30 to 17:30, with a one-hour lunch break and two 30-minute snack breaks in between, meaning his actual working hours were 8 hours. Therefore, even taking into account the fact that the deceased was 62 years old at the time of death and had ordinarily suffered from hypertension, and that he had performed the above work for approximately 25 days per month for several months prior to his death, these circumstances alone are insufficient, in light of the content of the deceased's work and his working hours as noted above, to establish that the work he performed over several months constituted excessive work for him such that it induced the myocardial infarction or caused it to worsen beyond its natural course, thereby leading to his death, and no other evidence sufficient to establish this can be found in the record.
Accordingly, the judgment below's determination that the deceased's death does not constitute an occupational accident is acceptable, and it cannot be said that there was an error in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the standard for determining excessive work-related fatigue, or a violation of the rules of evidence concerning causation, as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. The precedents cited in the grounds of appeal concern cases whose facts differ from those of the present case and are either inappropriate to invoke in this case, or are not precedents supporting the grounds of appeal. All grounds of appeal on this point are without merit.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff, the appellant. This judgment is rendered in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as stated in the Order.
Justice Jeong Gwi-ho (Presiding Justice), Kim Hyeong-seon, Lee Yong-hun (Justice in charge), Cho Mu-je