[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee]
[Judgment Below] Seoul Eastern District Court Judgment 2016Na945, decided July 15, 2016
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the claim for the agreed retainer fee and value-added tax is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul Eastern District Court. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Claim for Agreed Amount
A. Regarding the Retainer Fee and Value-Added Tax
(1) Where there is an agreement between an attorney and a client regarding the fee for handling a delegated litigation matter, an attorney who has completed the delegated matter may, in principle, claim the entire agreed fee amount. However, considering the ordinary relationship with the client, the circumstances of retention of the case, the progress and difficulty of handling the case, the degree of effort expended, the value of the subject matter of the litigation, the concrete benefit the client obtained as a result of winning the case, and other circumstances revealed in the pleadings, where there are special circumstances such that the agreed fee amount is unreasonably excessive and thus contrary to the principle of good faith or the concept of equity, the attorney may exceptionally claim only the fee amount recognized as appropriate within a reasonable range (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da8722, decided December 13, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2012Da50353, decided March 27, 2014, etc.). However, since such limitation on a fee claim is, after all, recognizing an exception to the principle of freedom of contract, the court must clearly state the reasonable grounds therefor (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da40677, decided September 10, 2009; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da18322, decided July 10, 2014, etc.).
This legal principle has been developed by the Supreme Court over a long period of time, and its validity may still be recognized at present. The reasons are as follows.
(A) The principles of private autonomy and freedom of contract, as fundamental principles of private law, form the basis governing private legal relationships. However, these principles are not recognized as absolute without any limitation. Our Civil Act (민법), in its General Provisions, declares good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights as important principles of the Civil Act. The principle of good faith functions as a general principle running through the entire legal order, preventing unreasonable results that may arise from the formalistic and rigid application of positive law or contracts, and realizing concrete validity. Private autonomy and freedom of contract may also be limited in accordance with the principle of good faith, with only the scope of its application in specific cases being at issue.
(B) Contracts such as delegation (위임) or trust (신탁) are aimed at protecting the rights and interests of the other party based on the relationship of trust between the parties, and therefore the principle of good faith and the concept of equity operate more strongly in such contracts than in contracts such as sale, which are merely an exchange of performance.
Where a client delegates litigation to an attorney, the attorney may perform all litigation acts by utilizing specialized legal knowledge. In particular, the Attorney-at-Law Act (변호사법), while granting attorneys a monopoly over legal affairs in general, declares that the mission of an attorney is to protect fundamental human rights and realize social justice, and that an attorney, as a legal professional with a public character, performs duties independently and freely (Articles 1 and 2), and demands a high degree of publicness and ethics in the performance of duties through various provisions (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Da200111, decided July 23, 2015, etc.). This significant difference between an attorney's performance of duties and the profit-seeking business activities of a merchant must also be taken into account when applying the principle of good faith to litigation delegation contracts.
(C) The provision of legal services such as litigation delegation matters requires a high degree of specialized knowledge and, in principle, can only be provided by attorneys. There is inevitably an imbalance of information between the attorney, who is a legal expert, and the client, regarding the issues, legal principles, procedures, and difficulty of the litigation. It cannot necessarily be said that attorney's fees are determined at an appropriate level according to the general laws of supply and demand. Sufficient mechanisms to ensure predictability regarding attorney's fees have also not been established. This remains the case not only in the past but also at present, when a large number of attorneys are being produced due to the implementation of the bar examination system, etc.
(D) Our Civil Act has no explicit provision limiting the fee for delegation. There are limits to deriving a specifically valid conclusion regarding attorney's fees by applying Article 103 of the Civil Act concerning acts contrary to good morals and other social order, or Article 104 of the Civil Act concerning unfair juristic acts. Moreover, since the effect under Articles 103 and 104 of the Civil Act is, in principle, the total invalidity of the juristic act, it is difficult to derive an appropriate conclusion regarding the limitation of attorney's fees through these provisions, and it cannot be said that they are superior to limiting the fee by applying the principle of good faith.
There are cases where, although the requirements of the above two provisions are not met, in a litigation delegation contract, due to information imbalance, differences in bargaining power, etc., the agreed fee amount is excessively large such that there is a need to exceptionally limit the claim therefor. In particular, there are cases where a change of circumstances unforeseeable by the parties arises according to the progress of the litigation after the conclusion of the litigation delegation contract, such that the originally agreed fee amount is determined to be excessively unreasonable. In such cases, the principle of good faith can function to supplement gaps in legal provisions and derive concrete validity. Limiting an excessive claim for attorney's fees to an appropriate level not only accords with the true intent of the parties, but is also balanced with the fact that, where there is no agreement between the parties regarding the fee, an attorney may claim an appropriate fee from the principal (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da50229, decided December 5, 1995, etc.).
(E) It is naturally to be guarded against that a court, under the pretext of seeking an appropriate conclusion, arbitrarily modifies or alters the contents of a contract between the parties by relying on the principle of good faith. However, while developing the legal principle limiting attorney's fee claims, the Supreme Court has expressed the position that, since this principle is an exceptional one limiting and modifying the principle of freedom of contract, its application must be exercised with caution, and has held that when limiting a fee claim, the reasonable grounds therefor must be clearly stated. Through such precedents, the concerns that may arise from applying the principle of good faith to attorney's fees can be considered to have been resolved.
(2) The court below, comprehensively considering the following circumstances, reduced the attorney's fee (retainer fee and value-added tax) of KRW 38,500,000 agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the Defendants in the litigation delegation contract to KRW 20,000,000, on the ground that it was unreasonably excessive and contrary to the principle of good faith and the concept of equity, and then determined that the reduced attorney's fee claim had already been fully paid and extinguished, and thereby rejected the Plaintiff's claim in this regard.
(A) The Plaintiff, having received delegation of litigation from the Defendants and others, filed and conducted a lawsuit seeking state compensation against the Republic of Korea (hereinafter "the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff"), but ultimately received a judgment of dismissal or rejection. Although the value of the subject matter of the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff was KRW 367,000,000 and there were numerous parties, the issues among the parties were the same.
(B) The Plaintiff and Defendant 2 are high school classmates. Before the first hearing date in the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff, on August 19, 2014, the Plaintiff received notice from Defendant 1 that 324 of the plaintiffs in the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff were revoking their delegation of litigation to the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Plaintiff did not resign from his position as their litigation representative and continued to conduct the litigation.
(3) However, in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the record, the judgment below is difficult to accept as it stands. The circumstances presented by the court below alone are insufficient to find special circumstances such that the attorney's fee in this case is unreasonably excessive and contrary to the principle of good faith or the concept of equity. The reasons are as follows.
(A) The retainer fee agreed upon in the litigation delegation contract in this case was KRW 100,000 per person. The Plaintiff asserted that this amount was the same as the amount the Defendants' side had paid as attorney retention costs in a related criminal complaint case, and that the Defendants' side had first proposed this to the Plaintiff, and the Defendants raised no rebuttal to this assertion even up to the court below.
The Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff sought damages against the Republic of Korea, holding it responsible for its duty to manage and supervise the National Professors' Mutual Aid Association (hereinafter "the Mutual Aid Association") and the like, in connection with the embezzlement of over KRW 50 billion by a non-party and the resulting bankruptcy of the Mutual Aid Association, which caused losses to members, including the Defendants, who had paid retirement benefits and the like into the Mutual Aid Association. The reason the value of the subject matter of the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff was KRW 367,000,000 was that the amount claimed per plaintiff in that lawsuit was KRW 1,000,000. It is difficult to see the per-person claim amount of KRW 1,000,000 as unreasonably high, and it is also difficult to view setting 10% thereof, i.e., KRW 100,000, as the per-person retainer fee as a high attorney's fee.
(B) The Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff disputed dereliction of duty, etc. by the prosecution and financial supervisory authorities (the Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service), and its issues were neither simple nor easy, and the litigation period from the filing of the suit to the pronouncement of judgment took more than one year and five months.
(C) In the course of the litigation, the Plaintiff conducted the litigation by submitting briefs seven times, submitting documentary evidence five times, and filing requests for fact-finding nine times.
(D) Although the Plaintiff ultimately received an unfavorable judgment in the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff, other attorneys also received unfavorable judgments in damages claim lawsuits with the same content, so it is difficult to conclude that any particular negligence on the part of the Plaintiff in conducting the litigation is recognized. Moreover, a retainer fee is, by its nature, one that may be claimed in full where the delegated litigation matter has been completed, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
(E) Meanwhile, before the first hearing date of the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff received notice from Defendant 1 that "324 of the plaintiffs in that lawsuit are revoking their delegation of litigation to the Plaintiff." However, after the Plaintiff filed the suit on April 14, 2014, Defendant 1, on April 22, 2014, ratified the Plaintiff's filing of the suit and stated that regarding future procedures, the Plaintiff should consult not with himself but with Defendant 2. In light of these circumstances, it can be seen that Defendant 1 notified the revocation of the litigation delegation against the will of the other defendants, including Defendant 2. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that there was any fault on the part of the Plaintiff in continuing to conduct the litigation even after receiving the above notice.
The first and second instance courts in the Lawsuit Filed by the Plaintiff also determined that "although numerous plaintiffs submitted written withdrawals of suit after the filing of the suit, it is difficult to view this as also expressing an intent to dismiss the Plaintiff as litigation representative, in addition to the intent to withdraw the suit."
(4) In the end, the judgment of the court below as described above contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the limitation of attorney's fee claims based on the principle of good faith and the concept of equity, which affected the judgment. The grounds of appeal pointing this out are well-founded.
The Plaintiff also argues that it was improper for the court below to determine that "the Defendants" remitted KRW 20,000,000 of the retainer fee to the Plaintiff when it was in fact "Defendant 1" who did so, and that the court below determined as if the Plaintiff had accepted Defendant 1's request to "reduce the retainer fee to KRW 20,000,000" when in fact the Plaintiff had rejected this request. These are all disputes regarding matters that do not affect the judgment, and thus have no effect on the outcome of the judgment.
B. Regarding the Filing Fee and Deposit for Costs
The Plaintiff argues that, since all of the Defendants are parties to the litigation delegation contract, the obligation to pay the agreed amount under the contract should be regarded as a joint and several obligation. However, in this case, where there are no special circumstances to find that the Defendants agreed to jointly and severally pay the filing fee and deposit for costs, the court below's determination that the obligation to pay the agreed amount was a divided obligation is justified. The grounds of appeal premised otherwise are not accepted.
2. Claim for Damages
The gist of the grounds of appeal in this regard is that facts relating to Defendant 1's tortious acts of embezzlement or breach of trust and defamation were either undisputed between the parties or there was evidence to establish them, yet the court below, without presenting specific reasons, unlawfully determined simply that there was no evidence or that it was difficult to view the acts as defamation. However, this merely disputes the court below's exclusive authority to select and evaluate evidence and to find facts, and, upon examination in light of the record, there is no error in the judgment below such as exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
3. Conclusion
Since the appeal regarding the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for the agreed amount relating to the retainer fee and value-added tax is well-founded, this part is reversed and remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and since the remainder of the appeal is without merit, it is all dismissed, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. This judgment is unanimous among the participating Justices, except for the separate opinion of Justice Kim Shin and Justice Cho Hee-dae.
4. Separate Opinion of Justice Kim Shin and Justice Cho Hee-dae Regarding the Part on the Claim for the Agreed Amount Relating to the Retainer Fee and Value-Added Tax
A. The Majority Opinion holds that where the amount of attorney's fees set by the parties in a contract is found to be unreasonably excessive, it may be reduced based on the principle of good faith or the concept of equity.
However, the Majority Opinion sides with the party seeking not to abide by the contract, thereby undermining the principle of private autonomy and legal stability, which are fundamental principles of our Civil Act, and results in recognizing the court, i.e., the State, as having authority to modify contracts, thereby revealing a problem in that it runs contrary to the constitutional principles proclaiming liberal democracy and a market economy order.
B. Specifically, for the following reasons, we cannot agree with the logic of the Majority Opinion, and we clarify that the attorney's fee agreed upon by the parties in a contract cannot be reduced based on the principle of good faith or the concept of equity.
(1) Article 10 of the Constitution provides that "all citizens shall have the right to pursue happiness." The right to pursue happiness includes the general right to freedom of action, and the principle of private autonomy is derived from the general right to freedom of action. Furthermore, the Constitution proclaims the liberal democratic basic order in its Preamble and Article 4, and Article 119(1) of the Constitution declares that "the economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on respect for the economic freedom and creativity of individuals and enterprises," proclaiming a market economy order as a fundamental ideology.
The principle of private autonomy is a constitutional principle that forms the basis of the market economy order. The principle of freedom of contract, which is the form in which the principle of private autonomy manifests itself in the sphere of juristic acts, refers to the freedom to decide, through the free will of the parties, whether to conclude a contract, who the counterparty shall be, and the form and content of the contract. This is based on the belief regarding the market economy that the most rational and efficient method of decision-making is to allow a contract to be formed at the point where the parties who have participated in the market, through free competition, each having sought the optimal contractual terms and having gone through a process of revising their own terms, find a point of mutual agreement.
Contracts concluded in accordance with this principle of freedom of contract must be honored, and the parties' trust in the realization of the contract must also be protected. If legal stability regarding the belief that the contract will be observed in accordance with its terms is not secured, the market economy order also cannot function smoothly.
Of course, the principle of private autonomy or the principle of freedom of contract does not mean unlimited absolute freedom. Our Constitution, in Articles 23 and 37(2), also makes clear that rights such as the exercise of property rights may be limited; even so, such limitation may only be imposed by law and only where necessary. The Civil Act individually and specifically provides for grounds for invalidity of juristic acts, such as juristic acts contrary to good morals and other social order (Article 103) and unfair juristic acts (Article 104). There also exist statutory provisions that explicitly provide that the content of a contract may be modified, such as Article 398(2) of the Civil Act, which provides that "where the amount of liquidated damages is unreasonably excessive, the court may reduce it appropriately."
However, with regard to the principle of good faith, Article 2(1) of the Civil Act merely provides that "the exercise of rights and the performance of obligations shall be done in good faith," and paragraph (2) merely provides that "a right shall not be abused," without providing this as a ground for invalidity of a juristic act. Therefore, the principle of good faith under Article 2 of the Civil Act, or the concept of equity, which is not even provided for in the Civil Act, cannot serve as a basis for declaring invalid a contract concluded between the parties.
Nevertheless, attempting to restrict the effect of an individual agreement through general principles such as the principle of good faith or the concept of equity directly runs contrary to the constitutional values discussed above.
(2) Ensuring the realization of a contract concluded by the parties is the mission of the courts. Between a party who intends to perform the contract and a party who does not, the court should protect the party who intends to perform the contract by ordering the party who refuses to perform to do so. In this case, the Plaintiff argues that the contract must be performed in accordance with its terms, while Defendant 1 disputes that he will not perform the contract he concluded even though there are no statutory grounds for invalidity or rescission thereof. In this situation, the court below sided with the said Defendant who refuses to abide by the contract. It can only be said that the court failed to be faithful to its role and rather reached a conclusion contrary to that role.
The "principle of self-responsibility," under which an individual must act according to his or her own free choice and decision and must bear the consequences thereof without shifting or transferring them to others, applies equally to legal relationships surrounding contracts, such that the parties must themselves bear the profits or losses arising from the contracts they have concluded. The parties conclude contracts by adjusting their interests to suit the circumstances and agreeing on an appropriate consideration, and this is equally true with respect to attorney's fee agreements.
An attorney does not enter into a fee agreement resigned to the possibility that the agreed fee amount will later be reduced. A client must pay the agreed fee in accordance with his or her own promise, and this does not constitute a new loss to the client. The assertion of a party who fails to keep his promise and demands a reduction of the agreed fee amount cannot take precedence over the trust of the counterparty who believed the promise would be kept, and the principle of good faith should not be used as a tool for this purpose. It is precisely the conduct of a client who seeks to avoid paying the consideration he agreed to pay that is contrary to the principle of good faith.
Rather than limiting a legitimate exercise of rights under a contract by invoking the principle of good faith, the court should instead resolutely declare that an attitude of invoking the principle of good faith to avoid keeping a promise constitutes a breach of contract.
(3) The Majority Opinion carries a problem more serious than the mere result that the court fails to be faithful to its assigned mission. That is the problem that the court has, without any statutory basis, itself created authority to modify the content of a contract set by the parties.
The Majority Opinion holds that, in light of the principle of good faith or the concept of equity, only part of the content of a contract is valid, and the effect of the remainder cannot be recognized. The proposition that a contract must be honored means that the entire content of the contract must be honored, not that it is sufficient to honor only part of it. A determination that part of the content of a contract is invalid is, in effect, the same as the court modifying the contract concluded by the parties. For a court to intervene in the specific content of a contract on the ground that the fee agreed upon by the parties is excessive, and to declare part of the agreement invalid, constitutes a serious restriction on the principle of private autonomy, and also runs contrary to the constitutional spirit of the Republic of Korea, whose fundamental ideology is liberal democracy and a market economy order. This amounts to declaring a kind of statism, under which the content declared by the State is deemed to conform to justice more than the content of a contract concluded by citizens based on their free will.
Moreover, no general provision granting the court such authority to modify a contract, nor any specific provision regarding attorney's fees, can be found. Nevertheless, the Majority Opinion, invoking the principle of good faith and the concept of equity as grounds, holds that part of a contract may be declared invalid and the content of the contract may thereby be modified.
As discussed above, the principle of good faith cannot serve as a ground for declaring a contract invalid. Furthermore, the notion that the content of a contract may be modified by relying on the principle of good faith, without individual and specific statutory grounds, is extremely dangerous. If the principle of good faith could serve as a basis for modifying a contract, then a considerable number of provisions of the Civil Act would be unnecessary, since a court could reach whatever conclusion it deems reasonable based solely on the principle of good faith.
Article 2 of the Civil Act regarding the principle of good faith is an abstract general clause. When a court applies such a general clause in a specific case, care must be taken to avoid a convenient application to justify a conclusion for which a clear reason is difficult to state, i.e., an "escape into a general clause." Furthermore, if the principle of good faith were a fundamental principle of our Civil Act, that principle would naturally have been reflected in the legislative process as well; therefore, altering the content of rights and obligations clearly recognized by individual provisions of positive law that have gone through such a legislative process, on the ground of the principle of good faith, may cause serious confusion in the legal system and pose a great threat to the authority of law and legal stability. The Supreme Court itself has repeatedly held that applying a general principle such as the principle of good faith to exclude the operation of a specific system provided for by law risks undermining legal stability, which is another fundamental principle in legal interpretation, and that caution must therefore be exercised in its application (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da33469, decided May 29, 2008, etc.). Therefore, directly applying general principles such as the principle of good faith to effectively modify the operation of positive law is, even if its purpose is to prevent unreasonable results arising from the mechanical application of statutory law, merely a measure that may be considered as a last resort, only where applying the law as it stands would produce an utterly intolerable and unreasonable result due to the peculiarity of an individual case, and even then, only within a scope that does not contradict the spirit of the law or the legislator's determination.
It is doubtful whether, in a case where the amount of attorney's fees is excessive but not to the extent of being contrary to social order or unfair such that it cannot be declared invalid under Articles 103 and 104 of the Civil Act, requiring the client to pay in full the fee amount he himself agreed to can be regarded as producing an utterly intolerable and unreasonable result. The Majority Opinion, obsessed simply with the notion that the fee amount is excessive and therefore needs to be reduced, too readily escapes into the principle of good faith, thereby constructing a forced legal theory that does not fit the overall legal system.
(4) Also seriously problematic is that the standard adopted by the Majority Opinion, namely "the fee amount recognized as appropriate within a reasonable range," is vague and indeterminate in content, such that it is entirely unclear what level of fee is deemed appropriate. As discussed above, the principle of good faith is an abstract provision that provides no specific standard for judgment whatsoever. It is practically impossible to establish a specific standard for determining whether a fee exceeds the range recognized as appropriate and thus violates the principle of good faith or the concept of equity. The Majority Opinion states that the range recognized as appropriate is to be determined by considering the ordinary relationship with the client, the circumstances of retention of the case, the progress and difficulty of handling the case, the degree of effort expended, the value of the subject matter of the litigation, the concrete benefit the client obtained as a result of winning the case, and other circumstances revealed in the pleadings, and that anything exceeding that range is unreasonably excessive; however, the six factors listed above are likewise merely abstract in content and are equally difficult to serve as concrete standards for setting an appropriate fee amount.
If no standard is presented for the range of an appropriate fee amount, whether it is appropriate can only depend entirely on the court's determination. Moreover, it cannot be said that the range of fee amounts that judges consider appropriate is the same among different judges. Ultimately, the range of fee amounts recognized as valid in a litigation delegation contract becomes clear only upon receiving the court's determination, and if the standards differ among judges such that the conclusions of the lower courts and the higher courts diverge, the fee amount is only finally determined upon a decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, following the Majority Opinion, even though the parties conclude a contract according to their own will, they cannot have an expectation that the contract will take effect as worded in the contract document. This causes uncertainty in legal relationships and an increase in legal disputes, by subjecting even the content of a contract that is clear on the face of the contract document and that the parties definitely know, to the court's determination. There is concern that the courts themselves may be leading the way in creating a perception that a contract need not be performed as agreed, by giving parties hope that if they assert the principle of good faith in court, the fee amount may be reduced.
(5) It appears that precedent originally recognized the reduction of fees cautiously, on grounds such as an attorney's public status and the character of a small number of qualified persons monopolizing the market. It is understandable that, looking back at various circumstances after the conclusion of a contract, one might think that the agreed fee is excessive. However, this is a situation that can arise not only with attorney's fees but in all contracts, such as the purchase price in a sales contract or the rent in a lease contract. Yet precedent has not adjusted the scale of the agreed consideration based on the principle of good faith in all contracts. It is only in delegation contracts, particularly litigation delegation contracts, that the reduction of attorney's fees has been recognized relatively easily and broadly. If this determination has been made because it is a field with which judges are relatively familiar, then this discriminates against the attorney profession compared to other professions without reasonable grounds. While it might be argued that a strict standard can be applied by relying on the public status and monopolistic character of attorneys, recently the reduction of fees has also been recognized, invoking the principle of good faith and the concept of equity, with respect to the fees of judicial scriveners and brokers, trust fees of trust companies, and the like, showing a trend of expanding the legal principle to delegation contracts in general, so that public status and the like can no longer be invoked as grounds either.
What is even more concerning is that, following this trend, there is no guarantee that the reduction of the price will not be recognized in the future even in other contracts, such as sales contracts.
Under a market economy order, State intervention should be used only as a means to supplement matters where economic activity, if left entirely to the market, cannot secure economic efficiency or cannot resolve on its own the social problems arising therefrom. State intervention does not always guarantee efficiency either. In particular, if State intervention in freedom of contract is generally carried out through a method of specific and direct control over the equivalence relationship between performance and counter-performance, which is an essential part of a contract, in a situation where there are no exceptional circumstances that could justify such intervention in light of public welfare or the concept of justice or equity, this would fundamentally undermine private autonomy and cannot be justified under our constitutional order.
Our Civil Act clearly provides in Articles 103 and 104 for cases where a contract is contrary to social order or is unfair such that its effect is not recognized. In other words, it can be said that the Civil Act declares that, if a case does not fall under these provisions, then even if the agreed consideration is excessive, the court should return to the principle of freedom of contract and recognize the effect of the contract as it is. This is not a gap in the legal provisions but a legislative determination. If, even in such a case, modification of the content of the contract is deemed necessary in consideration of equity between the parties, this should be resolved by enacting specific statutory provisions as provided for under the Constitution, and cannot be resolved by applying the general provision of the principle of good faith.
C. Nevertheless, the court below reduced the attorney's fee (retainer fee and value-added tax) of KRW 38,500,000 agreed upon by the Plaintiff and the Defendants in the litigation delegation contract to KRW 20,000,000, on the ground that it was unreasonably excessive and contrary to the principle of good faith and the concept of equity, and then determined that the reduced attorney's fee claim had already been fully paid and extinguished, thereby rejecting the Plaintiff's claim in this regard. This determination by the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the principle of good faith and the concept of equity discussed above, which affected the outcome of the judgment, and therefore the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for the agreed amount relating to the retainer fee and value-added tax must be reversed.
D. For the reasons stated above, while we agree with the Majority Opinion in the conclusion that the judgment below must be reversed, we state this Separate Opinion because our reasons for reversal differ.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Ko Young-han, Justice Kim Chang-seok, Justice Kim Shin (Justice in Charge), Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook