[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Tae-hyun, counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant] Korea Electric Power Corporation (Attorneys Kim Seong-su and 2 others, counsel for the defendant)
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court, judgment rendered on July 12, 1991, Case No. 91Na15692
[Order]
The judgment of the court below is reversed.
The case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. Determination on the First Ground of Appeal by the Defendant's Attorneys.
The court below found the following facts: On June 16, 1978, the Defendant convened a personnel committee and, on the ground that the Plaintiff, who had worked as an electrician at the Defendant's Seongdong Business Office, had received money and valuables from a customer, resolved to recommend that the Plaintiff resign, with the resolution being conditional disciplinary dismissal, whereby if the Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation on his own by July 5, it would be processed as a voluntary resignation, but if he refused to do so, it would be processed as disciplinary dismissal; that this fact was notified to the Plaintiff on June 28; and that when the Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation on July 5, it was processed as a voluntary resignation. The court below also found that under the Defendant's Articles of Incorporation and Employment Rules, disciplinary dismissal of an employee requires a resolution of the personnel committee, and that under the Defendant's Employment Management Guidelines, when the personnel committee deliberates a disciplinary case, except in cases of minor matters to be handled by admonition, or where the person concerned has expressed in advance an intention not to attend, or has been detained by the prosecuting authorities, or where attendance is impossible for other reasons, the person accused of misconduct must be summoned to attend and have his statement heard, and if the accused is absent on the date of deliberation, the deliberation must be postponed once; and that in the personnel committee in question, despite the Plaintiff not having expressed in advance an intention not to attend and despite his absence on the date of deliberation, the deliberation was not postponed and the conditional disciplinary dismissal resolution as described above was made as is. Based on these findings, the court below held that even though the Plaintiff submitted the letter of resignation as described above and was accordingly processed as having voluntarily resigned, this differs in nature from a voluntary resignation based on pure free will, such that the voluntary resignation disposition is inextricably linked with the above conditional disciplinary dismissal disposition; and since the above conditional disciplinary dismissal disposition was made in violation of the provisions of the Defendant's Articles of Incorporation, Employment Rules, and Employment Management Guidelines, without granting the Plaintiff, who was the subject of the disciplinary action, an opportunity to attend and explain himself, it is void, and therefore the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case, having been made on the basis thereof, is also void.
In light of the evidentiary relationships set forth by the court below, the above findings and determinations of the court below are justified and acceptable. Even if, as argued in the grounds of appeal, the Plaintiff did not file an appeal under the Employment Management Guidelines against the above disciplinary dismissal disposition, but instead submitted a letter of resignation and even received retirement allowance from the Defendant, unless it is found that the Plaintiff submitted the letter of resignation of his own accord while knowing at the time that the above disciplinary dismissal disposition was void, it cannot be concluded that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case is not part of the disciplinary dismissal disposition. Therefore, it cannot be found that the judgment of the court below contains an error of mistaken fact-finding as argued in the grounds of appeal.
The argument ultimately amounts to no more than a challenge to the fact-finding, which falls within the exclusive authority of the court below, and thus cannot be accepted.
2. Determination on Ground of Appeal No. 2(a).
A. The Determination of the Court Below.
The court below determined that the Defendant's defense—that for more than 12 years from the date the Plaintiff submitted the letter of resignation until the filing of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff took no legal remedial measures whatsoever regarding the above conditional disciplinary dismissal disposition or the voluntary resignation disposition based thereon, and accordingly the Defendant believed that the Plaintiff would no longer dispute the employment relationship with the Defendant and built a new personnel system on that basis, and moreover, it is realistically difficult for the Plaintiff to work again as the Defendant's electrician, so that filing this lawsuit and asserting an employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to seek confirmation that the Plaintiff is an employee of the Defendant violates the principle of good faith and is impermissible, or is unacceptable under the doctrine of loss of right through delay (실효의 법리)—was without merit, for the following reasons.
That is, under the doctrine of loss of right through delay, the issue of a right-holder's failure to exercise a right becomes problematic, even without regard to the right-holder's subjective motive, only in cases where there was an opportunity to exercise the right and it could realistically have been expected that the right would be exercised, yet it was not exercised. The court below found: that at the time the Plaintiff received the disciplinary disposition, some of the Defendant's employees who had received disciplinary dispositions together with the Plaintiff for similar acts of misconduct filed lawsuits against the Defendant seeking confirmation of invalidity of the disciplinary resolution or of the voluntary resignation, and that until around 1985, among them, those employees who had been processed as disciplinary dismissal rather than voluntary resignation prevailed, whereas employees like the Plaintiff, who had been notified of a conditional disciplinary dismissal resolution and had submitted a letter of resignation and been processed as voluntary resignation, all lost their cases; that Nonparty 1, who like the Plaintiff had received a voluntary resignation disposition based on a conditional disciplinary dismissal resolution, filed a lawsuit similar to this case around October 1985 asserting that the voluntary resignation disposition was void, and prevailed in a final and conclusive Supreme Court judgment rendered on April 25, 1988; that subsequently, Nonparty 2 filed a lawsuit with the same content as that of Nonparty 1 around May 1988, and likewise prevailed in a final and conclusive judgment around February 1989; that when this occurred, Nonparty 3, who was in the same situation, also filed a lawsuit with identical content around May 1989, but lost in the appellate court, after which the Supreme Court rendered a judgment on August 28, 1990 reversing the appellate court's judgment; and that the Plaintiff, who had been paying attention to the final outcome of the lawsuits filed by employees who, like the Plaintiff, had received voluntary resignation dispositions under similar circumstances, filed this lawsuit on September 3, 1990, after Supreme Court judgments to the effect that the voluntary resignation disposition was void were repeatedly rendered. In light of these circumstances, the court below found that it is difficult to view the Plaintiff's delay in exercising his right in this case as stemming merely from his subjective motive, and that it cannot be said that the Defendant, as the counterparty, had a legitimate reason to believe that the Plaintiff would no longer exercise his right; and further, that even though approximately 12 years had passed until the filing of this lawsuit since the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant had effectively terminated around the time of the voluntary resignation disposition against the Plaintiff, it cannot be readily concluded that it has thereby become realistically difficult for the Plaintiff to work again as the Defendant's electrician.
B. In general, the exercise of a right must be done in good faith and rights must not be abused. Therefore, where a right-holder had an actual opportunity to exercise a right, such that it was reasonably expected that the right would be exercised, but failed to exercise the right for a considerable period of time, such that the counterparty, as the obligor, came to have a legitimate expectation that the right-holder would no longer exercise the right, and where exercising the right anew thereafter would be recognized as violating the principle of good faith and fair dealing (신의성실의 원칙), which governs the entire legal order, the exercise of such right must be deemed impermissible under the so-called doctrine of loss of right through delay (see this Court's Decisions 87Nu915, delivered on April 27, 1988; 90Da15488, delivered on July 26, 1991, etc.).
In particular, in labor disputes such as this case concerning the existence of an employment relationship (an employee's status) between an employer and an employee, prompt resolution is desirable not only from the standpoint of the employer, who must respond to the economic circumstances of the time and conduct business activities with the best facilities and organization, but also from the standpoint of the employee, who maintains his own and his family's livelihood through wage income as an employee. Accordingly, it may be said that there is a need for the above doctrine of loss of right through delay to be applied even more actively than in other legal relationships. Moreover, in cases where an employee dismissed by an employer disputes the validity of the dismissal, if the employee asserts that the dismissal constitutes an unfair labor practice and applies to the Labor Relations Commission for relief from unfair labor practice, Article 40(2) of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법) provides that the application for relief must be filed within three months from the date of the unfair labor practice; however, our law contains no provision at all regarding the period for filing a lawsuit in a court seeking confirmation of invalidity of dismissal, etc., on the ground that the dismissal is void, and thus the above-mentioned necessity is all the more pressing.
Examining this case from the above perspective, as set forth by the court below, among the other employees who, like the Plaintiff, were notified of a conditional disciplinary dismissal resolution by the Defendant and were subjected to a voluntary resignation disposition upon submitting a letter of resignation, Nonparty 1 filed a lawsuit with the same content as this case, asserting that the voluntary resignation disposition based on the conditional disciplinary dismissal resolution was void, and prevailed in a final and conclusive Supreme Court judgment rendered on April 25, 1988. If the Plaintiff was paying attention to the outcome of the lawsuits filed by other employees who were in the same situation, then even if the Plaintiff did not know, at the time he received the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case, that there existed grounds for invalidity in the underlying conditional disciplinary dismissal disposition, it is reasonable to view that from the time the above Supreme Court judgment was rendered on April 25, 1988, whereby it was determined that the voluntary resignation disposition against Nonparty 1 was void, the Plaintiff also came to know that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void. However, no material can be found in the record indicating that, from that time until September 3, 1990—which the record clearly shows to be the date on which the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit—a period of as long as two years and four months, the Plaintiff exercised his right by asserting that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void.
The court below set forth that even after the above Supreme Court judgment was rendered, the Plaintiff continued to pay attention to the final outcome of the lawsuits filed by Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 3, who were in the same situation as the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff came to file this lawsuit only after Supreme Court judgments to the same effect as the above Supreme Court judgment were repeatedly rendered up until August 28, 1990. However, once it had already been finally determined by the Supreme Court judgment in the lawsuit filed by Nonparty 1 that a disposition identical in content to the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void, it is difficult to conclude that, absent any special circumstances suggesting a possibility that the view taken in that Supreme Court judgment might be overturned, the Plaintiff had no opportunity to exercise his right or no reasonable expectation of exercising his right until Supreme Court judgments to the same effect were subsequently and repeatedly rendered.
The court below should have examined in more detail why the Plaintiff, who had not disputed the validity of the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case for nearly ten years after being processed as having voluntarily resigned on July 5, 1978, failed to dispute the validity of the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case immediately or within a reasonable period even after the Supreme Court judgment regarding Nonparty 1 was rendered on April 25, 1988, and instead exercised no right whatsoever for as long as two years and four months, and whether there existed any special circumstances suggesting a possibility that the view taken in the above Supreme Court judgment might be overturned, or that the Plaintiff could not have been confident that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void, and thereupon should have determined whether the Defendant's above defense was well-founded.
Nevertheless, the court below, having set forth only the circumstances noted above, determined to the effect that the doctrine of loss of right through delay cannot be applied because the Plaintiff had no opportunity to exercise his right. Accordingly, it cannot be but concluded that the judgment of the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the doctrine of loss of right through delay, or an error of failing to conduct a proper examination.
C. Meanwhile, the length of the period of loss of right through delay (the period during which the right was not exercised) and whether the counterparty, as the obligor, had a legitimate reason to believe that the right would not be exercised, which are requirements necessary for the application of the doctrine of loss of right through delay, cannot be determined uniformly, but must be reasonably determined in accordance with social norms in each specific case, taking into account, together with the length of the period during which the right was not exercised, all the circumstances on both the right-holder's side and the counterparty's side, as well as objectively existing circumstances. In a dispute over the validity of a disciplinary dismissal disposition such as this case, one must consider all of the following: the grounds for the disciplinary action, the grounds for invalidity of the disciplinary dismissal disposition, and the circumstances under which the disciplinarily dismissed employee came to know that the disposition was void; other circumstances that would give the employer a legitimate basis to believe that the employee would not dispute the validity of the disposition (for example, circumstances such as the employee having received retirement allowance or dismissal allowance, etc., and having raised no objection to the dismissal for a long period, or having promptly obtained employment elsewhere after the dismissal); and whether the employer has been managing the business by building a new personnel system, such as hiring another employee in the dismissed employee's place. Based on all of these considerations, one must determine whether the employee's belated dispute of the validity of the disciplinary dismissal disposition would result in a violation of the principle of good faith and fair dealing. In doing so, it goes without saying that careful judgment must be exercised so that the employee's rights are not unjustly infringed.
However, according to what the court below has set forth, the ground for the conditional disciplinary dismissal disposition underlying the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case against the Plaintiff was that the Plaintiff had received money and valuables from a customer, and the ground for invalidity of the above disciplinary dismissal disposition was that the Defendant, without postponing the deliberation date once for the Plaintiff who was absent on the deliberation date of the personnel committee, immediately proceeded to adopt the disciplinary resolution. Considering these circumstances together with the fact that the Plaintiff, even after knowing that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void, did not exercise his right by asserting that the disposition was void for a period of as long as two years and four months, there is room to view that the Plaintiff's filing of a lawsuit such as this one, asserting an employment relationship with the Defendant on the ground that the disposition is void, belatedly after more than 12 years have passed since the Plaintiff's dismissal by the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case, is impermissible in light of the aforementioned demand for prompt resolution of labor disputes, the principle of good faith and fair dealing, and the doctrine of loss of right through delay (see this Court's Decisions 88Daka19804, delivered on September 29, 1989; 88Nu8869, delivered on December 12, 1989; 90Daka25512, delivered on November 23, 1990; 90Da8084, delivered on April 12, 1991, etc.).
Furthermore, the record shows that the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff received retirement allowance from the Defendant after being dismissed by the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case. However, the court below conducted no examination or determination whatsoever on this point. If the Plaintiff has indeed received retirement allowance from the Defendant, the circumstance that the Plaintiff, even after coming to know that the voluntary resignation disposition at issue in this case was void, did not return the retirement allowance received but continued to retain it as is, must also be taken into consideration in applying the aforementioned doctrine of loss of right through delay. Accordingly, the court below's failure to examine and determine this point must also be deemed an error.
If so, the above-mentioned errors committed by the court below cannot but be deemed to have affected the judgment, and therefore the argument pointing out this issue has merit.
3. Therefore, without rendering a determination on the Defendant's remaining ground of appeal (Ground No. 2(b)), the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination, the Justices participating in this decision being unanimous in their opinion, and it is so ordered as set forth in the Order.
Presiding Justice Yun Gwan
Justice Choi Jae-ho
Justice Kim Ju-han
Justice Kim Yong-jun