[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 3 others (Attorneys of the law firm Shinsung, Ahn Sang-don and 8 others, as counsel)
[Defendant, Appellant] Busan Metropolitan City School Safety Mutual Aid Association (Attorneys of the law firm Jungin, Lee Ki-jung and 3 others, as counsel)
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 2015Na50842 dated January 28, 2016
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds for appeal (including the supplementary brief submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds for appeal, to the extent it supplements the grounds for appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Regarding the First Ground for Appeal
A. A "school safety accident" as defined under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for Accidents at School (학교안전사고 예방 및 보상에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "School Safety Act") means "any accident occurring during educational activities that causes harm to the life or body of a student, faculty/staff member, or educational activity participant, and any disease prescribed by Presidential Decree that arises in a student, faculty/staff member, or educational activity participant as a direct result of duties within the principal's management and supervision, such as school meal services" (Article 2, Item 6). Here, "educational activities" are defined as classes, extracurricular activities, discretionary activities, after-school activities, training activities, field trip activities such as school excursions, or activities such as athletic events, conducted in accordance with the school's curriculum (Article 2, Item 4), but there is no separate provision limiting the cause of the accident beyond this. Therefore, any accident occurring during such "educational activities" that causes harm to the life or body of a student, faculty/staff member, or educational activity participant constitutes a school safety accident as defined by the School Safety Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, decided December 13, 2012).
Furthermore, Articles 39 and 40 of the School Safety Act provide that survivor benefits and funeral expenses shall be paid "where an insured person dies due to a school safety accident." Therefore, in order to receive such mutual-aid benefits, there must be a causal relationship between the school safety accident and the death; however, even if the primary cause of death is not directly related to the school safety accident, if the school safety accident at least combined with the primary cause of death to induce the death, a causal relationship must be recognized between them. Moreover, such causation need not be clearly proven in a medical or scientific sense; if, considering all the circumstances, it can be inferred that there is a proximate causal relationship between the school safety accident and the death, such proof shall be deemed to have been established (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc.).
B. The court below, based on the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: that the non-party (소외인) went to school on February 21, 2014, and at around 14:00, while engaged in self-study, entered a bathroom on the third floor of the school and collapsed forward (hereinafter "the instant accident"); that at around 16:50, when self-study ended, students in the same class discovered the non-party collapsed in the bathroom; that the 119 emergency rescue team, having received the emergency call, arrived at the school at around 17:02 and transported the non-party, who was in cardiac and respiratory arrest, to the emergency room of ○○ University Hospital by ambulance while performing chest compressions, but the non-party died in the emergency room of that hospital at around 17:18. Based on these facts, the court below determined that the instant accident, in which the non-party collapsed in the bathroom after the start of self-study, constituted an accident occurring during educational activities and thus fell under a school safety accident under the School Safety Act.
Furthermore, the court below determined as follows: considering that the non-party, at the time of the instant accident, was a second-year high school student who appears to have been under considerable stress from classes, examinations, and the like; that although the non-party had been receiving treatment for epilepsy at △△ University Hospital since September 11, 2008, the course of treatment had been favorable, and there had been no recurrence of convulsions since one occurred on June 28, 2011, such that the epilepsy had improved and treatment was nearing its conclusion; and that, according to the death examination report, the direct cause of death was "asphyxiation due to posture (presumed)," with the underlying cause being "epileptic seizure (presumed)" — in light of these circumstances, the court below determined that the excessive stress and the like affected the non-party's epilepsy or combined with the disease to cause the instant accident, and that there was a proximate causal relationship between the instant accident and the non-party's death.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error, as alleged in the grounds for appeal, in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning school safety accidents.
2. Regarding the Second Ground for Appeal
A. The School Safety Act, whose purpose is to prevent school safety accidents and to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of the school safety accident compensation mutual-aid project so as to promptly and appropriately compensate students, faculty/staff members, and educational activity participants for harm suffered due to school safety accidents, imposes on superintendents of education, school principals, and others the duty to prevent school safety accidents, and provides that, in the event of a school safety accident, mutual-aid benefits shall be paid to the insured, such as harmed students or faculty/staff members, by the superintendent of education, school principal, or others, regardless of whether they are at fault for the occurrence of the accident. The legislative purpose of the Act is thereby to protect the life and body of students, faculty/staff members, and others from school safety accidents, and, where harm is unavoidably suffered, to promptly and appropriately compensate for that harm so as to establish a substantive school safety net. The mutual-aid system under the School Safety Act as described above was structured on the basis that the school safety mutual-aid associations, which had previously been established and operated as non-profit corporations under the Civil Act (민법) by each municipal and provincial office of education as mutual-aid organizations, were dissolved upon the enforcement of the School Safety Act, with their rights and obligations comprehensively succeeded to by the mutual-aid association under the School Safety Act, while also allowing the association to receive support from the State and local governments. In light of the legislative purpose and history of this system, the mutual-aid system under the School Safety Act must be understood as having been created by special statute to directly compensate, on a mutual-aid and social security basis, for harm suffered by an insured person due to a school safety accident, and its purpose and objectives differ from those of the general tort damages system. Accordingly, unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, the principle of fault-based liability or the doctrine of comparative negligence cannot necessarily be deemed applicable to the liability to pay mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act. Furthermore, the legal principle applied in civil damages cases—whereby, when a pre-existing condition has contributed to the expansion of damages, the scope of liability for damages is limited by analogical application of the comparative negligence doctrine from the standpoint of fairness—likewise does not apply to mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act, absent a special statutory provision (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc.).
Meanwhile, under Article 75 of the Constitution (헌법), a Presidential Decree is issued with respect to matters specifically delegated by statute within a defined scope and matters necessary for the execution of the statute; therefore, a Presidential Decree may only provide detailed matters necessary for the practical execution of the statute within the scope of matters delegated by, or provided for in, the parent statute, and may not, without statutory delegation, alter or supplement the content of individual rights and obligations provided for by statute, or add grounds for restricting rights not found in the statute (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Da37342, decided January 24, 1995, etc.). Moreover, a statutory delegation of matters to be prescribed by Presidential Decree must specifically define its scope, such that the purpose, content, and scope of the delegation, as well as the goals and standards to be observed in the subordinate legislation pursuant to that delegation, can be discerned in advance from the content and purport of the delegating provision; and whether such delegation exists must be determined by considering not only the form and content of the delegating provision but also the overall structure, purport, and purpose of the relevant statute (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 98Du6265, decided October 19, 2000, etc.).
B. The School Safety Act divides the mutual-aid benefits paid by the school safety mutual-aid association into medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34), and provides that the amount of each type of mutual-aid benefit shall be determined pursuant to Articles 36 through 40 (Article 35). While prescribing the payment standards, etc., for each mutual-aid benefit amount (Articles 36 through 40), the Act provides, with respect to medical care benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses, that "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 36(5), Article 38(2), Article 39(2), Article 40(2)), and with respect to disability benefits, that "matters necessary concerning the criteria for determining the degree of disability, the calculation of disability benefit amounts, and the method of payment, etc., shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 37(2)), thereby providing for delegation to Presidential Decree in each instance. Pursuant to such delegation, the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act (hereinafter simply the "Enforcement Decree") prescribes detailed matters concerning the payment standards for each item of benefit and the factors for calculating the payment amount (Articles 14 through 19).
Meanwhile, the School Safety Act comprehensively provides for grounds for restricting the payment of mutual-aid benefits in Article 43, enumerating: cases where the insured person has engaged in self-harm or suicide for a reason other than a school safety accident; cases where it is clear that the insured person's injury or other condition has worsened, or that treatment at a medical care institution has been obstructed, due to the insured person's failure, without justifiable cause, to follow the instructions of a medical care institution; cases where the person entitled to benefits has received damages under the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents (자동차손해배상 보장법); and cases of delinquency in mutual-aid premium payment attributable to the insured person's fault; and there is no other provision prescribing grounds for restricting payment.
Considering comprehensively the form and content, structure of the above provisions of the School Safety Act and its Enforcement Decree, the legislative purpose and basic ideology of the School Safety Act, and the resulting nature of the mutual-aid benefits, it must be understood that the delegation to Presidential Decree under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act of matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., for each type of benefit was intended, in consideration of the legislative-technical difficulty of prescribing in the statute itself every detail of the method of calculating or paying the benefit amount, to allow for flexible operation of the mutual-aid benefit system by enabling appropriate responses to changes in the socioeconomic environment, and that such delegation merely allowed the Enforcement Decree to prescribe detailed standards for paying mutual-aid benefits and the method of calculating the benefit amount; it cannot be understood as further delegating authority to restrict mutual-aid benefits on grounds other than those set forth in Article 43 of the School Safety Act.
C. However, Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree provides, in paragraph (1), that "when determining the amount of a mutual-aid benefit pursuant to Article 35 of the School Safety Act, the mutual-aid association may, where a pre-existing disease, injury, or physical disability of the insured person has worsened due to a school safety accident, pay the mutual-aid benefit excluding the costs necessary for treating such pre-existing disease, injury, or physical disability"; in paragraph (2), that "when calculating disability benefits, nursing care benefits, and survivor benefits under Articles 37 through 39 of the School Safety Act, the mutual-aid association may set off against such benefits where the insured person is at fault"; and in paragraph (3), that "matters necessary concerning the subject and standards of comparative negligence set-off under paragraph (2), etc., shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education" (Article 19-2, paragraphs (1) through (3) of the Enforcement Decree are hereinafter collectively referred to as "the instant Enforcement Decree provision").
Ultimately, under the instant Enforcement Decree provision, where the insured person receiving mutual-aid benefits for a school safety accident had a pre-existing disease, injury, or physical disability, the costs necessary for treating such pre-existing condition may be excluded when determining the payment amount of each mutual-aid benefit, and where the insured person's negligence has contributed to the school safety accident, the payment amount may be limited by comparative negligence set-off when calculating disability benefits, nursing care benefits, and survivor benefits—that is, all of the five types of mutual-aid benefits except medical care benefits and funeral expenses. However, in light of the legislative purpose of the School Safety Act and the nature of mutual-aid benefits as discussed above, the purport of the delegation under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, and the fact that the parent statute, the School Safety Act, exhaustively enumerates the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual-aid benefits in Article 43, if the instant Enforcement Decree provision, which prescribes grounds for restricting payment based on pre-existing conditions and comparative negligence, were to be regarded as prescribing matters delegated under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, this would exceed the scope of that delegation; and since no other provision in the parent statute can be found delegating authority to the Enforcement Decree to add such grounds for restricting payment, it must ultimately be concluded that the instant Enforcement Decree provision is invalid as restricting the rights of the insured person without statutory delegation.
D. In the same vein, the court below's determination that the instant Enforcement Decree provision is invalid, and its consequent rejection of the Defendant's arguments for reduction based on pre-existing conditions and for comparative negligence set-off, is justified. There is no error, as alleged in the grounds for appeal, in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the validity of the instant Enforcement Decree provision.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Defendant. It is so decided as set forth in the Order. Regarding this judgment, apart from the separate opinion of Justice Kwon Soon-il concerning the method of hearing this litigation procedure and the validity of the instant Enforcement Decree provision, the dissenting opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae concerning whether the portion of Article 19-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree prescribing grounds for restricting payment based on pre-existing conditions, among the instant Enforcement Decree provision, is invalid, and the dissenting opinion of Justices Lee Ki-taek and Kim Jae-hyung concerning the validity of the instant Enforcement Decree provision, the opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous, and there is a supplementary opinion of Justices Park Byung-dae and Park Bo-young concerning the majority opinion.
4. Separate Opinion of Justice Kwon Soon-il Concerning the Method of Hearing This Litigation Procedure and the Validity of the Instant Enforcement Decree Provision
A. First, I examine the legal nature of a lawsuit seeking payment of mutual-aid benefits prescribed under the School Safety Act against the mutual-aid association.
(1) The purpose of the School Safety Act is to prevent school safety accidents and to provide for matters necessary for the implementation of the school safety accident compensation mutual-aid project so as to promptly and appropriately compensate students, faculty/staff members, and educational activity participants for harm suffered due to school safety accidents (Article 1). Under this Act, the superintendent of education establishes a mutual-aid association in the relevant metropolitan city/province to carry out the school safety mutual-aid project (Article 11(1), Article 15(1)), and has authority over matters such as appointing the officers of the mutual-aid association, approving the fund management plan, and directing/supervising inspections of business or property status (Articles 20, 25, 55). The principal of a school as defined in Article 2, Item 1 of this Act becomes a party to the school safety mutual-aid insurance and is not permitted to withdraw (main text of Article 12), and students, faculty/staff members, educational activity participants, and others at a school enrolled in the school safety mutual-aid insurance become insured persons under the school safety mutual-aid insurance (Article 14(1)). The types of mutual-aid benefits paid by the mutual-aid association include medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34); a person wishing to receive mutual-aid benefits must claim payment of the mutual-aid benefits from the mutual-aid association in accordance with the procedures and manner prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education (Article 41(1)); the mutual-aid association, upon receiving such claim, must determine whether to pay the mutual-aid benefit and the amount thereof (main text of Article 41(2), Article 35(1)); and payment of the mutual-aid benefit is made accordingly (Article 41(4)). The right of a person entitled to benefits to receive mutual-aid benefits may not be transferred or seized (Article 47(2)).
(2) Considering comprehensively the purpose of the school safety mutual-aid project, the entity implementing the project, and the content and payment procedures of mutual-aid benefits as seen in each of the above provisions, together with the circumstances discussed below, it is proper to view the school safety mutual-aid system as a social insurance system that addresses the social risk of school safety accidents occurring to students, faculty/staff members, and others by means of an insurance method; accordingly, the right to receive mutual-aid benefits under this system is one form of so-called "social security benefit right," a public-law right that is concretely formed by the statute known as the School Safety Act. Therefore, the right of an insured person and their bereaved family to receive mutual-aid benefits is of a different nature from private-law rights such as a claim for damages under the State Compensation Act (국가배상법) or a claim for damages arising from default or tort under the Civil Act. Although a decision by the school safety mutual-aid association concerning benefits cannot be regarded as an administrative disposition subject to an appeal litigation (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du20874, decided December 13, 2012), inasmuch as the right to receive mutual-aid benefits is a public-law right, the legal nature of litigation concerning that right must be understood not as civil litigation but as a public-law party litigation as prescribed in Article 3, Item 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act (행정소송법).
First, the entity implementing the school safety mutual-aid project is the superintendent of education (Article 11(1)), and the entities establishing the school safety mutual-aid association and the school safety mutual-aid federation are, respectively, the superintendent of education and the Minister of Education (Article 15(1), Article 28). Moreover, the officers and employees of the mutual-aid association and mutual-aid federation, as well as the members of the examination committee and the reexamination committee, are deemed public officials for purposes of the application of the crime of bribery under the Criminal Act (Article 70). The principal of a school as prescribed under the School Safety Act likewise becomes a party by operation of law in the principal's capacity as an educator, not as a private individual enrolling in the mutual-aid insurance. Furthermore, the person authorized to take measures necessary to correct violations, such as issuing an order to pay mutual-aid premiums, against a mutual-aid insurance policyholder who has failed to fulfill the obligation to pay mutual-aid premiums, is likewise the Minister of Education or the superintendent of education (Article 49(6)).
Second, the financial resources for the school safety mutual-aid project are borne by the finances of the State and local governments (Article 51(1), (2), Article 52(2)). Even where a mutual-aid insurance policyholder pays mutual-aid premiums (Article 49(1)), the "school budget" that serves as the source of such payment is itself formed from the special account for education expenses, whose revenues consist of transfers received from the State's general account or a local government's special account for education expenses, and subsidies and support funds from the State or local governments.
Third, insured persons under the school safety mutual-aid insurance and their bereaved families are subject to no restriction whatsoever in exercising a claim for damages under the State Compensation Act, or a claim for damages arising from default or tort under the Civil Act, against the State, a local government, or any other responsible individual liable for harm caused by a school safety accident. It is merely that, where a person entitled to benefits has received mutual-aid benefits for harm arising from a school safety accident, the State, local government, mutual-aid insurance policyholder, or insured person who is liable for compensation or damages is exempted from liability for compensation or damages under other statutes to the extent of the amount of such mutual-aid benefits, and where a person entitled to benefits has received compensation or damages equivalent to the mutual-aid benefits under other statutes, the mutual-aid association may simply choose not to pay the mutual-aid benefit to the extent of such compensation or damages (Article 45(1), (2)).
Finally, even according to Supreme Court precedent, the mutual-aid system under the School Safety Act has the character of directly compensating, "on a social security basis," for harm suffered by an insured person due to a school safety accident, and its purport and purpose differ from those of the system for compensating tort damages; accordingly, absent special statutory provision, the principle of fault-based liability or the doctrine of comparative negligence does not apply (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc.). This must be understood as recognizing that the right to receive mutual-aid benefits held by an insured person or their bereaved family under the School Safety Act is not a private-law right but a public-law right.
B. Next, I examine whether the instant Enforcement Decree provision is invalid due to lack of delegation from the parent statute, the School Safety Act.
(1) As discussed above, the right of an insured person or their bereaved family to receive mutual-aid benefits corresponds to a social security benefit right specially recognized by the School Safety Act; accordingly, the specific content, scope, and method of the mutual-aid benefit that the mutual-aid association is to pay to the person entitled to benefits falls within the domain of legislative policy, which the National Assembly may determine by statute with broad discretion, comprehensively considering the financial capacity of the State and local governments, the overall level of social security, the criteria for evaluating school safety accidents and the resulting harm, and other factors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du13302, decided November 13, 2008, etc.); and it is also permissible for the statute not to directly determine the content, scope, and method of mutual-aid benefits, but instead to delegate certain matters to subordinate legislation, such as a Presidential Decree, to prescribe the specific content.
Moreover, with respect to provisions that shape the content of a right having the character of a social security benefit, the requirement of specificity and clarity in delegation is relatively relaxed (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2015Heonba191, decided February 25, 2016); however, even in such a case, the content of the subordinate legislation must fall within a range in which the general outline of the delegated content can be predicted from the parent statute itself, and the existence of such predictability must be determined not by considering the particular provision alone but by comprehensively and systematically considering all relevant statutory provisions in light of the legislative purpose of the statute.
(2) The types of mutual-aid benefits prescribed under the School Safety Act include medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses. The School Safety Act delegates to Presidential Decree matters such as "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., for medical care benefits," "matters necessary concerning the criteria for determining the degree of disability, the calculation of disability benefit amounts, and the method of payment, etc.," "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., for nursing care benefits," "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., for survivor benefits," and "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc., for funeral expenses" (Article 36(5), Article 37(2), Article 38(2), Article 39(2), Article 40(2)).
Furthermore, the School Safety Act provides that all or part of a mutual-aid benefit may be withheld where, as grounds for restricting mutual-aid benefits: "the insured person has engaged in self-harm or suicide (excluding, however, cases of self-harm or suicide caused by a school safety accident)"; "it is clear that the injury, disease, or disability condition of an insured person who has suffered harm due to a school safety accident has worsened, or that treatment at a medical care institution has been obstructed, because the insured person or the insured person's guardian, without justifiable cause, failed to follow the instructions of the medical care institution"; or "a person entitled to receive mutual-aid benefits under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act in connection with a school safety accident has received damages under the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents" (Article 43(1), Items 1, 2, and 3).
(3) In light of the legal principles set forth above, together with the content of each of the above provisions, the legal nature of mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act, and the following circumstances, it must be concluded that the instant Enforcement Decree provision exceeds the scope of delegation under the parent statute and is thus invalid.
First, while it is difficult to say that the matters delegated under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, the provisions constituting the basis for delegation, which delegate to Presidential Decree "matters necessary concerning the payment standards, etc." for each mutual-aid benefit, are necessarily limited to "matters necessary concerning payment standards," Article 43 of the School Safety Act, which concerns "restriction on or suspension of payment of mutual-aid benefits," does not delegate to Presidential Decree any grounds for restricting or suspending payment of mutual-aid benefits beyond those set forth in that provision itself. Accordingly, the fact that the instant Enforcement Decree provision prescribes an insured person's pre-existing condition or negligence as grounds for restricting mutual-aid benefits is something not contemplated by the School Safety Act, and it is difficult to say that this falls within the range in which the general outline of the delegated content can be predicted from the parent statute itself.
Second, considering that the school safety mutual-aid system is a social insurance system designed to address the social risk of school safety accidents, and that the right to receive mutual-aid benefits under this system is a social security benefit right, restricting the right to receive mutual-aid benefits on grounds of pre-existing conditions or negligence not explicitly provided for by statute not only runs counter to the purpose of the school safety mutual-aid system, which is to promptly and appropriately compensate for harm suffered due to school safety accidents, but is also difficult to reconcile with the purport of Article 13 of the Framework Act on Social Security (사회보장기본법), which provides that social security benefit rights may be restricted only to the minimum extent necessary for their purpose, even where there is a basis in statute or subordinate legislation for doing so.
C. As discussed above, the legal nature of a lawsuit seeking payment of mutual-aid benefits prescribed under the School Safety Act against the mutual-aid association must be understood not as civil litigation but as a public-law party litigation as prescribed in Article 3, Item 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act; accordingly, the instant lawsuit is a case that should have been brought as a party litigation under the Administrative Litigation Act, but was mistakenly brought as civil litigation.
[Reasoning]
However, the Panel Division of the Busan District Court, which was the court of first instance in this case, also has jurisdiction in the event that this lawsuit is a party litigation under the Administrative Litigation Act (행정소송법), and therefore no issue of lack of jurisdiction arises in this case. Furthermore, although the court below should have heard this lawsuit in accordance with administrative litigation procedure but instead heard it in accordance with civil litigation procedure, there is no indication that the court below determined the facts without applying provisions such as those concerning ex officio investigation, thereby affecting the judgment. Accordingly, it is difficult to view the above procedural error as grounds for reversing the judgment below.
Meanwhile, the court below's conclusion, in which it held the provision of the Enforcement Decree (시행령) at issue in this case to be invalid and rejected the Defendant's arguments for reduction based on pre-existing conditions and comparative negligence offset, is justified in its conclusion, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, arising from a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the effect of the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue.
As stated above, while we agree with the Majority Opinion's conclusion to dismiss the appeal in this case, we set forth this separate opinion because our reasoning differs.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae regarding whether Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for grounds for limiting payment based on pre-existing conditions among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, is invalid
A. The Majority Opinion holds that not only Article 19-2, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Enforcement Decree, which provide for grounds for limiting payment based on comparative negligence offset, but also Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for grounds for limiting payment based on pre-existing conditions, among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, are invalid as restricting the rights of the insured without delegation by statute.
B. However, the Majority Opinion's legal reasoning holding Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for grounds for limiting payment based on pre-existing conditions among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, to be invalid cannot be accepted, for the following reasons.
(1) Article 1 of the School Safety Act (학교안전법) provides: "The purpose of this Act is to prevent school safety accidents and to prescribe matters necessary for the implementation of the School Safety Accident Compensation Mutual Aid Project in order to promptly and appropriately compensate for damage suffered by students, faculty and staff, and educational activity participants due to school safety accidents." Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree provides: "When the Mutual Aid Association determines the amount of mutual aid benefits pursuant to Article 35 of the Act, if a disease, injury, or physical disability, etc. that pre-existed in the insured has been aggravated due to a school safety accident, the Mutual Aid Association may pay mutual aid benefits excluding the costs necessary for treatment of the pre-existing disease, injury, or physical disability, etc."
(2) The "damage" prescribed in Article 1 of the School Safety Act refers to damage suffered by the insured, such as students and faculty and staff, due to a school safety accident that is in proximate causal relationship with the school safety accident, or the scope of such damage, and does not mean the amount of damage calculated after comparative negligence offset. Therefore, where the negligence of the insured, such as a student or faculty/staff member, concurs in causing damage due to a school safety accident, the portion of damage attributable to the insured's own negligence may also be considered included in the damage suffered due to the school safety accident.
However, "the costs necessary for treatment of a so-called 'pre-existing condition,' i.e., a disease, injury, or physical disability, etc. that pre-existed in the insured, where such pre-existing condition has been aggravated due to a school safety accident," as prescribed in Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, concerns a condition that already existed before the occurrence of the school safety accident, and therefore must be viewed as not included in the damage suffered by the insured due to the school safety accident. As with comparative negligence offset, in the case of pre-existing conditions as well, it is possible to calculate the amount of damage by first regarding the damage, including the portion attributable to the insured's pre-existing condition, as damage caused by the school safety accident, and then reducing that damage in accordance with the principle of limitation of liability; however, this is merely for the convenience of calculating the amount of damage, and the costs necessary for treatment of the insured's pre-existing condition are, by their nature, not included from the outset in the concept of damage in proximate causal relationship with the school safety accident. Allowing the insured to be paid even the costs necessary for treatment of a pre-existing condition would constitute excessive payment contrary to the wording and legislative purpose of the School Safety Act, which aims at appropriate compensation for damage suffered due to school safety accidents, and is therefore improper.
Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree thus merely prescribes the self-evident legal principle that mutual aid benefits may be paid excluding portions not recognized as damage suffered due to a school safety accident, and it is difficult to say that a separate basis or delegation provision in the parent statute is required for this.
Moreover, Article 36, Paragraph 5, Article 38, Paragraph 2, Article 39, Paragraph 2, and Article 40, Paragraph 2 of the School Safety Act, each of which provides that matters necessary concerning the "payment criteria, etc." of medical care benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree, as well as Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the School Safety Act, which provides that matters necessary concerning "the criteria for determining the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc." in relation to disability benefits shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree, can be viewed, at the very least, as a basis or delegation provision in the parent statute for limiting the grounds for payment based on pre-existing conditions.
(3) Therefore, Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, as a provision that specifies matters necessary concerning the limitation of mutual aid benefits contemplated in Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, cannot be considered an invalid provision that exceeds the limits of delegated legislation.
C. Nevertheless, the court below determined that even Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, which provides for grounds for limiting payment based on pre-existing conditions among the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, is an invalid provision lacking delegation by statute, on the ground that it limits mutual aid benefits prescribed by statute without any basis or delegation provision in the parent statute concerning limitation of payment of mutual aid benefits, and rejected the Defendant's argument for reduction based on pre-existing conditions on that basis. This determination by the court below contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the effect of Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree, which affected the judgment, and therefore the portion of the judgment below against the Defendant should be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, we dissent from the Majority Opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek and Justice Kim Jae-hyung regarding whether the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case are invalid
A. The issue in this case is whether the provisions of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, which allow pre-existing conditions to be taken into account and comparative negligence offset to be permitted in calculating the amount of mutual aid benefits payable under the School Safety Act, exceed the scope of delegation under the parent statute, the School Safety Act. This issue is ultimately determined by whether the pre-existing condition or comparative negligence offset prescribed in Article 19-2 of the Enforcement Decree is included within "matters necessary concerning the payment criteria, etc." of bereaved family benefits, etc., and "matters necessary concerning the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc." as prescribed by the School Safety Act.
The Majority Opinion holds that each provision of Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act only delegates to the Enforcement Decree the authority to prescribe detailed criteria for paying mutual aid benefits and the method of calculating the amount of benefits, and does not directly prescribe grounds for limiting mutual aid benefits or delegate the authority to prescribe such grounds to the Enforcement Decree, and that Article 43 of the School Safety Act only allows mutual aid benefits to be limited for the grounds directly enumerated in that provision, and does not delegate the authority to prescribe other grounds for limitation in the Enforcement Decree. However, the Majority Opinion is not persuasive in light of the wording and legislative purpose of the School Safety Act.
B. The School Safety Act provides that, where a school safety accident occurs, the School Safety Mutual Aid Association shall pay mutual aid benefits to the insured, such as students and faculty/staff members, who suffered damage to life or body as a result thereof (Article 36, Paragraph 1; Article 37, Paragraph 1; Article 38, Paragraph 1; Article 39, Paragraph 1; Article 40, Paragraph 1), and divides the mutual aid benefits paid by the School Safety Mutual Aid Association into medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing benefits, bereaved family benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34), providing that the amount of mutual aid benefits for each type of benefit shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 36 through 40 (Article 35). This Act does not specifically prescribe the amount of each of the above mutual aid benefits, but instead provides that "matters necessary concerning the payment criteria, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 36, Paragraph 5; Article 38, Paragraph 2; Article 39, Paragraph 2; Article 40, Paragraph 2), and that "matters necessary concerning the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 37, Paragraph 2), thereby delegating these matters to the Presidential Decree.
Articles 14 through 19 of the Enforcement Decree prescribe detailed matters concerning the payment criteria and the factors for calculating the payment amount for each item of benefit, and then Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree provides: "When the Mutual Aid Association determines the amount of mutual aid benefits pursuant to Article 35 of the School Safety Act, if a disease, injury, or physical disability, etc. that pre-existed in the insured has been aggravated due to a school safety accident, the Mutual Aid Association may pay mutual aid benefits excluding the costs necessary for treatment of the pre-existing disease, injury, or physical disability, etc."; Paragraph 2 provides: "When the Mutual Aid Association calculates disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family benefits pursuant to Articles 37 through 39 of the School Safety Act, if the insured is negligent, such negligence may be offset"; and Paragraph 3 provides: "Matters necessary concerning the subject of, and criteria for, comparative negligence offset under Paragraph 2 shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education."
Where damage occurs to the insured due to a school safety accident, the amount of mutual aid benefits payable must be determined in accordance with the School Safety Act. However, the question may arise as to whether, where the insured has a pre-existing condition or the insured is negligent, the amount payable should be reduced compared to the case of an insured person without such circumstances. In preparation for such cases, it can be considered that the above Act delegated "matters necessary concerning the payment criteria, etc." and "matters necessary concerning the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc." to the Enforcement Decree, and that the Enforcement Decree clearly prescribed that pre-existing conditions or comparative negligence offset may be taken into account. Accordingly, it can be said that the general interpretation of the statutory language is that whether the treatment costs may be deducted from the amount of mutual aid benefits payable where the insured has a pre-existing condition (Article 19-2, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree), and whether the insured's negligence must be taken into account when calculating disability benefits, nursing benefits, and bereaved family benefits among mutual aid benefits (Article 19-2, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree), may be included within "matters necessary concerning the payment criteria, etc." and "matters necessary concerning the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc."
C. (1) The Majority Opinion holds that because Article 43 of the School Safety Act exhaustively enumerates the grounds for limiting mutual aid benefits, the Enforcement Decree cannot prescribe grounds for limiting payment based on pre-existing conditions and comparative negligence offset.
However, the grounds for limitation prescribed in Article 43 are: where the insured self-harms or commits suicide for a cause other than a school safety accident; where it is clear that the insured, without justifiable grounds, failed to follow the instructions of a medical institution, thereby aggravating the state of the injury, etc., or obstructed treatment at a medical institution; where the person entitled to receive benefits has received compensation for damage under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act; and where mutual aid premiums are in arrears due to a cause attributable to the insured — and these cannot be considered as excluding the determination of the payment amount by taking into account the insured's pre-existing condition or negligence. Therefore, even though the School Safety Act enumerates grounds for limiting mutual aid benefits in Article 43, this does not mean that mutual aid benefits cannot be limited for other grounds. Rather, there is room to view Article 43 of the School Safety Act itself as premised on the possibility that mutual aid benefits may, depending on the circumstances, be limited in whole or in part.
(2) The Majority Opinion distinguishes between the calculation of the payment amount and the limitation of payment, and holds that taking pre-existing conditions into account or performing comparative negligence offset falls not within the area of calculating the payment amount but solely within the area of limiting payment. This is similar to the manner of distinguishing, where liability for damages arises due to non-performance of obligation or tort, between determining the scope of damages and calculating the amount of damages, on the one hand, and limiting liability for damages, on the other.
However, the area of "the scope of damages and the calculation of the amount of damages" and the area of "limitation of damages" are not strictly distinguished. Furthermore, the portion of damage suffered by the insured that is attributable to a pre-existing condition, or the portion in causal relationship with the insured's own negligence, cannot be said to constitute damage suffered due to a school safety accident.
(A) First, we examine the matter of taking pre-existing conditions into account.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in numerous judgments that "where damage occurs or is expanded due to the concurrence of the tortfeasor's act and factors on the victim's side, even if the factors on the victim's side, such as a constitutional predisposition or the risk of disease, are unrelated to any fault attributable to the victim, if it would be contrary to the concept of fairness for the tortfeasor to bear the entirety of the damage in light of the nature and degree of such condition, the court may, in determining the amount of damages, apply the legal principles of comparative negligence offset by analogy and take into account the factors on the victim's side that contributed to the occurrence or expansion of the damage" (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da1576, decided March 27, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2012Da37251, decided April 24, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da16968, decided July 10, 2014, etc.). Also, the Supreme Court has, from the standpoint of fair sharing of damage, taken into account the victim's pre-existing condition or constitutional predisposition in the form of limiting liability for damages (Supreme Court Decision 2009Da95714, decided March 25, 2010; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da28939, decided November 27, 2015).
In this way, applying the legal principles of comparative negligence offset by analogy, or considering pre-existing conditions in the form of limitation of liability, in determining the amount of damages, is intended to facilitate the calculation of the amount of damages. Since it is clear that a pre-existing condition does not constitute "negligence" as referred to in comparative negligence offset, it can be considered that the Supreme Court applies the legal principle of comparative negligence offset by analogy, rather than applying the provision itself. Treatment costs for a pre-existing condition are not damage arising from non-performance of obligation or tort. When compensating for damage arising from non-performance of obligation or tort, the portion of the total damage attributable to the pre-existing condition, although it may be difficult to separate strictly in an arithmetical sense, can at least be separated conceptually or proportionally from the damage itself arising from the non-performance of obligation or tort. Therefore, it can be said that treatment costs for a pre-existing condition are either excluded because the causal relationship between the debtor's or tortfeasor's act and the damage is denied, or excluded from the scope of damages. Accordingly, whether to take a pre-existing condition into account in determining the scope of damages or calculating the amount thereof, or whether to first determine the amount of damage in the absence of the pre-existing condition and then limit liability by taking into account the treatment costs for the pre-existing condition, is merely a technical matter.
An accident occurring during educational activities as defined in Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the School Safety Act and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree, which causes damage to the life or body of a student, faculty/staff member, or educational activity participant, constitutes a "school safety accident" as defined by the School Safety Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, decided December 13, 2012). Article 1 of the School Safety Act provides that its purpose is to prescribe matters necessary for the implementation of the School Safety Accident Compensation Mutual Aid Project in order to promptly and appropriately compensate students, faculty/staff members, and educational activity participants for "damage suffered due to a school safety accident." Therefore, of the total damage, the portion attributable to the victim's constitutional predisposition or pre-existing condition cannot be considered as "damage suffered due to a school safety accident," and excluding it does not deviate from the legislative purpose of the School Safety Act. It can be viewed that the above Act and Enforcement Decree merely prescribe this purport more clearly.
(B) Next, we examine the matter of comparative negligence offset.
Where the obligee is negligent in relation to non-performance of obligation, the court shall take this into account in determining liability for damages and the amount thereof (Article 396 of the Civil Act (민법)), and this provision applies mutatis mutandis to damages arising from tort (Article 763 of the Civil Act). The system of comparative negligence offset is intended to have the obligee's or victim's lack of the care required under the principle of good faith taken into account in calculating the amount of damages in accordance with the principle of fairness. Accordingly, where the obligee or victim fails to exercise the care required by common social norms or social life under the principle of good faith, thereby causing or expanding the damage, the obligee may be found negligent and comparative negligence offset may be applied (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da35389, decided June 13, 2000, etc.).
"Damage" as referred to in the context of damages means "damage for which compensation is owed," i.e., damage for which there is legal liability to compensate, not all damage suffered by the victim. Concepts such as causation, the scope of damages, comparative negligence offset, and limitation of liability are used to determine such "damage for which compensation is owed." For example, in the case of non-performance of obligation, Article 393 of the Civil Act, concerning the scope of damages, and Article 396, concerning comparative negligence offset, can be regarded as provisions for specifically calculating the damage referred to in Article 390 of the Civil Act. Furthermore, the above provisions concerning the scope of damages and comparative negligence offset apply mutatis mutandis to damages arising from tort (Article 763 of the Civil Act), and this can be regarded as a provision for specifically calculating the damage referred to in Article 750 of the Civil Act. From this perspective, there is no a priori legal rule requiring that the stage of determining the scope of damages or calculating the amount thereof, and the stage of comparative negligence offset or limitation of liability, must operate strictly separately in distinct areas; rather, it can be viewed that the task of determining "damage for which compensation is owed" is carried out by distinguishing these stages conceptually or for convenience. In light of the Civil Act provisions requiring that the obligee's or victim's negligence be taken into account without exception where it exists, so long as the obligee's or victim's negligence exists, the damage for which there is legal liability to compensate must inevitably always be the amount of damage calculated after comparative negligence offset.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "where the victim is also negligent with respect to the occurrence or expansion of damage arising from tort, such circumstance must naturally be taken into account in determining the scope of the tortfeasor's liability for damages" (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da44401, decided April 12, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 96Da54560, decided February 28, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2003Da6873, decided February 27, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da52126, decided October 28, 2010, etc.). The fact that negligence is taken into account in determining the "scope of the tortfeasor's liability for damages" in this manner shows that comparative negligence offset is considered at the stage of determining the scope of damages, and that the notion that comparative negligence offset operates only at the stage of limitation of liability is merely for the convenience of calculation.
The School Safety Act imposes on superintendents of education, school principals, etc. a duty to prevent school safety accidents, and provides that, where a school safety accident occurs, mutual aid benefits shall be paid to the insured, such as students and faculty/staff members who suffered damage due to the school safety accident, regardless of whether the superintendent of education, school principal, etc. bears responsibility for the occurrence of the school safety accident (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, decided December 13, 2012). However, the fact that liability to pay mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act is a no-fault liability does not mean that comparative negligence offset is denied.
Comparative negligence offset in liability for damages is based on the concept of fairness or the principle of good faith, and can be recognized even in no-fault liability. Under current law, there are cases where comparative negligence offset is explicitly recognized for no-fault liability. For example, the Mining Industry Act (광업법) provides for no-fault liability for mining damage caused by excavation of land, discharge of pit water or waste water, accumulation of waste rock or mine tailings, or emission of mine smoke (Article 75), and recognizes comparative negligence offset for such liability (Article 78). The liability of a shipowner for oil pollution damage caused by a tanker (Article 5, Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Act on the Guarantee of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage) and product liability (Articles 3 and 8 of the Product Liability Act (제조물책임법)) are also no-fault liabilities, but comparative negligence offset is recognized therein. The Supreme Court has recognized comparative negligence offset even though the liability of an owner of a structure under Article 758, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act is a no-fault liability (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da31668, decided February 9, 1993). Meanwhile, while the Supreme Court has held that, with respect to a seller's or contractor's warranty liability for defects, since this is a no-fault liability specially recognized by law, Article 396 of the Civil Act concerning comparative negligence offset cannot be applied mutatis mutandis, it has nonetheless held that, since warranty liability is based on the principle of fairness, which is the guiding ideology of the Civil Act, the fault of the buyer or the person ordering work, to the extent it contributed to the occurrence or expansion of the defect, may be taken into account (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da923, decided November 11, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 94Da23920, decided June 30, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 2001Da70337, decided August 20, 2004, etc.). Accordingly, comparative negligence offset cannot be denied solely on the ground that mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, which have the nature of directly compensating for damage suffered by the insured due to a school safety accident at the social security level, are recognized regardless of the negligence of faculty/staff members, etc.
(3) In light of the legislative purpose of the School Safety Act and the nature of mutual aid benefits as examined above, even if the legal principle of taking into account the victim's pre-existing condition and negligence in determining the amount of damages under the Civil Act is adopted for the purpose of calculating the amount of mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, this does not run contrary to the purpose or objective of the School Safety Act, which establishes the mutual aid benefit system. Even if the nature of mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act is not itself compensation for damages, the portion of damage suffered by the insured attributable to a pre-existing condition or negligence is a portion for which the insured must bear responsibility, and therefore does not, from the outset, fall within the subject matter of compensation under the School Safety Act, i.e., "damage suffered due to a school safety accident."
(4) In conclusion, just as it is not appropriate, in civil damages, to strictly distinguish between the stage of "the scope of damages or the calculation of the amount of damages" and the stage of "limitation of damages" and to regard comparative negligence offset and the consideration of pre-existing conditions as concerning only limitation of damages, unrelated to the scope of damages or the calculation of the amount thereof, it is likewise not appropriate to strictly distinguish, under the School Safety Act, between "calculation of the amount of mutual aid benefits payable" and "limitation of payment," and to regard comparative negligence offset and the consideration of pre-existing conditions as falling not within the area of calculating the payment amount but solely within the area of limiting payment. Therefore, even while regarding "payment criteria, etc." under Article 36, Paragraph 5, Article 38, Paragraph 2, Article 39, Paragraph 2, and Article 40, Paragraph 2 of the School Safety Act, and "the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc." under Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the School Safety Act, as delegation provisions in the parent statute delegating matters concerning the payment amount and scope of mutual aid benefits, it need not be concluded that comparative negligence offset and the consideration of pre-existing conditions fall outside the scope of delegation under the provisions of the School Safety Act.
D. It can be considered that the "payment criteria" for bereaved family benefits, etc. as prescribed by the School Safety Act include the subject of payment, the scope of mutual aid benefits, the method of calculating the payment amount, and the factors to be considered in determining the payment amount. "Payment criteria, etc." encompasses matters similar to payment criteria in addition to payment criteria themselves. Going further, "matters necessary concerning payment criteria, etc." can be understood in a broader sense than what has been set forth above. In particular, the above provisions of the School Safety Act all use the phrase "concerning...," which opens the possibility of a broad interpretation, in that it allows delegation to the Enforcement Decree of "matters related to" payment criteria or payment methods. Similarly, "matters necessary concerning the calculation of the amount of disability benefits and the method of payment, etc." as prescribed by the School Safety Act, although expressed somewhat differently, can be viewed in a similar manner.
e. The Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, rendered on December 13, 2012, which the majority opinion cites, held that "unless there is a special provision in the statute," the principle of fault-based liability or the doctrine of comparative negligence does not apply to the liability to pay benefits under the School Safety Act (학교안전법; hereinafter the "School Safety Act"), and that the legal principle of taking into account a pre-existing condition that contributed to the expansion of damage, by analogical application of the doctrine of comparative negligence in civil damages cases, cannot be deemed to apply as it is to mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act. Supreme Court Decisions 2011Da77238 and 2012Da48572, rendered on the same date, are to the same effect (hereinafter Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, Supreme Court Decision 2011Da77238, and Supreme Court Decision 2012Da48572 are collectively referred to as "Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc."). However, the above holding in Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc., stated conversely, means that "where there is a special provision in the statute," the principle of fault-based liability, the doctrine of comparative negligence, and the legal principle of taking a pre-existing condition into account may also apply to the liability to pay benefits under the School Safety Act.
Except in exceptional cases where the legislature must regulate a matter directly by formal statute as an essential matter subject to the principle of legislative reservation (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Du23808, decided August 20, 2015, etc.), the National Assembly may legislate not only by directly providing for a matter in a formal statute but also by delegating the matter to a Presidential Decree (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ma882, decided March 25, 2004; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ma514, decided April 30, 2009, etc.). Therefore, the term "statute" as used in Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc., must be construed to include an enforcement decree enacted pursuant to delegation under the School Safety Act. The majority opinion's determination of whether there exists a provision in the School Safety Act, the parent statute, delegating authority with respect to the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, may also be regarded as premised on the understanding that the "statute" referred to above includes an enforcement decree provision enacted pursuant to delegation under the School Safety Act.
In the cases underlying Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc., comparative negligence was not applied nor was a pre-existing condition taken into account in determining the amount to be paid in the conclusion; however, since the school safety accidents in all of those cases occurred before April 1, 2012, the effective date of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, it may be said that the Supreme Court did not rule on whether the School Safety Act, the parent statute, contained a provision delegating authority with respect to the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case. Therefore, even if this judgment holds that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is valid because there is a delegating provision in the parent statute, this does not conflict with Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961, etc.
In addition, while the Supreme Court has denied that a pre-existing condition may be taken into account or that comparative negligence may be applied with respect to medical care benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and medical care compensation under the Seafarers Act (선원법) (see Supreme Court Decision 81Daka351, decided October 13, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 2007Da84420, decided March 27, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2010Du5141, decided August 19, 2010, etc.), none of the statutes or enforcement decrees governing these benefits or compensation contain any provision concerning a pre-existing condition or comparative negligence, which distinguishes those cases from the case at hand.
f. Taking these points together, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, which provides that a pre-existing condition of the insured person may be taken into account and comparative negligence may be applied in calculating mutual-aid benefits, merely gives concrete form to matters necessary for determining the amount and scope of mutual-aid benefits contemplated by Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, and cannot be deemed to exceed the limits of delegated legislation.
g. Nevertheless, the court below erred by holding that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, despite the absence of any basis provision or delegation in the parent statute concerning restrictions on the payment of mutual-aid benefits, restricts the mutual-aid benefits provided for by statute, and is therefore invalid for lack of statutory delegation, and by rejecting the Defendant's assertions concerning the reduction based on the pre-existing condition and comparative negligence made on the basis thereof. Such determination by the court below contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the validity of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case as discussed above, which affected the outcome of the judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, I state that I cannot agree with the majority opinion.
7. Concurring Opinion of Justice Park Byong-dae and Justice Park Bo-young Supplementing the Majority Opinion
a. The mutual-aid benefit system under the School Safety Act is not fundamentally a system of damages. It is a special compensation system under the school safety accident compensation mutual-aid project (hereinafter the "Mutual-Aid Project") implemented by superintendents of education to compensate students, faculty and staff, and educational activity participants who suffer harm to life or body due to school safety accidents. While a victim is compensated for harm by receiving mutual-aid benefits, the legal nature of the mutual-aid benefits paid by the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association, the operator of the Mutual-Aid Project, is not structured like liability insurance—such as the compensation mutual-aid system for automobile transport business operators—whereby the insurer performs the compensation obligation on behalf of the tortfeasor. The mutual-aid benefits are not damages but merely a benefit under a kind of statutory obligatory relationship whereby the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association, created by statute out of consideration for the safety of the school educational process, directly compensates for harm suffered by an insured person due to a school safety accident. In that even harm caused by a natural disaster is subject to compensation, so long as it occurs during educational activities as a school safety accident, this differs fundamentally in nature from a general damages system, and it should be regarded as a kind of statutory liability based on its governing statute, similar to industrial accident compensation insurance.
If mutual-aid benefits were in the nature of damages, it might naturally follow that the principles of liability limitation due to a pre-existing condition or comparative negligence would apply. However, if mutual-aid benefits are in the nature of a statutory liability under a special statute rather than damages, then the scope of and restrictions on mutual-aid benefits must all be governed in accordance with what is provided in that statute, and should not be judged by the general damages system under the Civil Act (민법).
b. The roots of the Mutual-Aid Project under the School Safety Act lie in the self-help mutual-aid system that operated within the school community even before the enactment of the statute. Where harm arises from various accidents occurring during educational activities at school, it is often difficult, in accidents occurring between immature students, to determine which party is at fault and obtain damages, and even if fault is established, it may not be possible to recognize the capacity for liability in a young student, resulting in a gap in compensation. On the other hand, school operators sought to alleviate the burden of liability for damages arising from unforeseen accidents through a mutually supportive business operation. In other words, the system began as a concept of guaranteeing necessary compensation to victims prior to determining where fault for an accident lay, using funds accumulated by schools on a mutually supportive basis as the source of compensation, which was realized and operated in practice before being codified into law. If this system must be compared to another system, it can be said to be similar in nature to industrial accident compensation insurance. The reason the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act does not provide, whether in the statute or its enforcement decree, for comparative negligence or liability limitation based on a pre-existing condition, is that the essential nature of that system is not damages. In a system of damages, the ideal of fair sharing of loss and equity would operate; however, since the purpose of the industrial accident compensation insurance system is to promote workers' welfare through compensation for occupational accidents, the general principles of damages under the Civil Act are not applied as they are. Examining the compensation structure of the School Safety Act and the regulatory framework under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, there are many similarities in various respects, including the types of benefits, grounds for restricting benefits, and the system for recovering improperly paid benefits. They are also alike in that neither contains provisions on a pre-existing condition or comparative negligence. This is not something the legislature overlooked, nor was it left to be governed by the general principles of damages under the Civil Act. Rather, it is because the purpose of the system and the nature of the benefits are not damages. While it would not be impossible to amend the School Safety Act to include provisions requiring comparative negligence or consideration of a pre-existing condition, enacting such provisions is not merely a technical matter of determining the method of calculating the amount of mutual-aid benefits. It would change the fundamental nature of the School Safety Act and the benefits provided thereunder. If that were done, the fundamental nature of the system, which seeks to provide adequate and prompt compensation for harm suffered by students and others due to accidents occurring on school premises, would be transformed into one of damages or liability insurance therefor. In that case, since mutual-aid benefits would become part of damages, the provisions concerning the right of indemnity and other matters would also need to be comprehensively reorganized to achieve consistency and coherence. Therefore, the statute should not be easily amended without serious reflection on such a fundamental change in nature and a determination to reorganize the system, nor should the enforcement decree, under the current statutory compensation structure, be allowed to provide for liability limitation through comparative negligence or the like without an explicit statutory delegation. This is not merely a matter of determining the criteria for calculating compensation amounts but a matter concerning the very essence of mutual-aid benefits, and it is therefore difficult to readily recognize the legality and validity of such an enforcement decree through interpretation.
c. Let us examine in detail several provisions reflecting the nature of mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act as described above.
(1) First, the party enrolled in school safety mutual aid is the school principal (Article 12 of the Act; hereinafter, in citations of articles, "the Act" refers to the School Safety Act). Since the operating entity of a school is the State for national schools, the local government for public schools, and the school juristic person or an individual for private schools, if liability for damages such as employer's liability under the Civil Act, liability for defects in structures, or state compensation liability were to arise from a school safety accident, the above school operating entity would be the party liable for compensation. However, under school safety mutual aid, the school principal, who is not the party liable for compensation, becomes the enrolled party, and the school principal also bears the obligation to pay mutual-aid premiums (Articles 12 and 49(1) of the Act). While the school principal may collect payments from insured persons, such as students or faculty and staff who receive mutual-aid benefits, to cover mutual-aid premiums, this is not mandatory (proviso to Article 49(1) of the Act), and in practice such collection is not made; moreover, the Act provides that mutual-aid premiums for insured students may be borne by the State or local governments (Article 51(2) of the Act). In short, if mutual-aid benefits were general damages liability, the structure would need to be such that the mutual-aid premiums are borne by the school operating entity, which would be the party liable for damages, or by the students, faculty and staff, etc., who have the potential to become tortfeasors, as in the case of insurance under the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents (자동차손해배상 보장법); however, the school safety mutual-aid system is not structured in that way. This means that the Mutual-Aid Project under the School Safety Act is fundamentally different in nature from a general damages system.
(2) The Mutual-Aid Project under the School Safety Act covers extremely diverse target institutions and facilities, ranging from kindergartens under the Early Childhood Education Act (유아교육법), elementary and secondary schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (초·중등교육법), lifelong education facilities under the Lifelong Education Act (평생교육법), to Korean schools under the Act on the Support of Education for Overseas Koreans, etc. (재외국민의 교육지원 등에 관한 법률) (Article 2(1) of the Act), and accordingly, the types and content of school safety accidents that can occur are equally diverse. The types of preventive education that the School Safety Act mandatorily requires to be provided are also extremely diverse and broad, including traffic safety education, hygiene and health management education, disaster preparedness safety education, school violence prevention education, sexual violence prevention education, prostitution prevention education, and safety accident prevention education related to experience-based educational activities (Article 8(1) of the Act). Accordingly, the liability for damages that may arise from school safety accidents is also clearly very diverse, encompassing not only various tort liabilities provided for under the Civil Act but also liability for damages provided under individual statutes.
However, the School Safety Act provides that where a person entitled to mutual-aid benefits has received compensation or damages equivalent to such mutual-aid benefits under other statutes, mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act shall not be paid to the extent of such compensation or damages received (Article 45(2) of the Act), while, on the other hand, where a person has received damages under the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents, such person is entirely excluded from being paid mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act (proviso and item 3 of Article 43(1) of the Act). As a result, where a victim has received damages under the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents, that victim may not additionally claim mutual-aid benefits even if the amount of damages received is less than the amount of mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act, whereas, where compensation or damages have been received under other statutes, if the amount received is less than the amount of mutual-aid benefits, the victim may claim mutual-aid benefits equivalent to the difference. Although this appears to be a provision that takes into account the finances of the Mutual-Aid Project, regardless of the legislative intent, such a regulatory structure indirectly demonstrates that the Mutual-Aid Project and the mutual-aid benefit system under the School Safety Act differ in nature from a damages system.
(3) The School Safety Act provides that, where a school safety accident occurs due to the intent or gross negligence of an insured person, the amount equivalent to the mutual-aid benefits paid may be claimed against the person who caused the school safety accident or that person's guardian, etc. (Article 44(1) of the Act). However, if the mutual-aid benefit system under the School Safety Act were in the nature of liability insurance for the benefit of the enrolled parties—namely, the State, local governments (in the case of national or public schools), and school juristic persons, etc. (in the case of private schools)—the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association should be able to fully exercise its right of indemnity against the person who caused the accident. Yet the statute limits the exercise of the right of indemnity against such a causative actor who is an insured person to cases where that person has intent or gross negligence. Furthermore, if the mutual-aid benefit system were in the nature of liability insurance for the benefit of students, faculty and staff, and educational activity participants, then, even if the School Safety Mutual-Aid Association pays mutual-aid benefits to a victim, it should not be able to exercise a right of indemnity against a student or faculty or staff member who is in the position of tortfeasor and simultaneously insured; yet, as noted above, where there is intent or gross negligence, the Association may exercise a right of indemnity even against such students or faculty and staff members. This structural design demonstrates that the mutual-aid benefit system is not intended to fulfill civil liability for damages, nor is it in the nature of liability insurance premised thereon.
(4) With respect to accidents occurring on school premises, the duty of a school principal or teacher to protect and supervise students is recognized only within the scope of a life relationship closely and inseparably connected with educational activities, and only where foreseeability and avoidability exist (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da44205, decided April 11, 2000, etc.). While liability for damages arising from a tort or breach of obligation presupposes fault attributable to the tortfeasor, mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act constitute a strict statutory liability recognized even in the absence of fault attributable to the school, such as negligence. According to materials on the legislative process, the original government bill contained a provision excluding harm caused by natural disasters from the scope of compensation, but this was deleted during deliberation in the National Assembly. This clearly reveals the nature of mutual-aid benefits. Accordingly, an insured person need not raise any issue of fault attributable to the school or other students, but need only assert and prove that the incident falls within the scope of a school safety accident. Of course, it is not that comparative negligence, etc. can never be applied to such a statutory liability, but this is appropriate only where the statute forming the basis of the liability explicitly so provides, or where the legal nature of the liability is that of damages, and it cannot be said that this is naturally recognized as a general principle applicable to all compensation or damages. Liability for damages under the Mining Act (광업법), the Act on Guarantee of Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (유류오염손해배상 보장법), and the Product Liability Act (제조물책임법), which is strict liability but permits comparative negligence, is in essence liability for damages in each case, which differs in legal nature from mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act.
(5) The specific criteria for calculating mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act also differ from the criteria for calculating damages under general tort liability for personal injury accidents, etc. For example, among the items of damages arising from a tort, nursing care expenses cover both the hospitalization period and the anticipated amount necessary in the future, all of which are subject to compensation; however, nursing care benefits under the School Safety Act are "paid to the insured person or that person's guardian, etc. who actually receives nursing care, where a person who has received medical care benefits medically requires constant or occasional nursing care even after receiving treatment" (Article 38(1) of the Act). Case law holds that "after receiving treatment" here means "after reaching a stage where the effects of treatment can no longer be expected and the symptoms have stabilized" (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da78976, decided August 20, 2014). Ultimately, unlike nursing care expenses, nursing care benefits under the School Safety Act are paid only for days on which nursing care was actually provided during the period after treatment was received (the period of hospitalization for treatment is also excluded from the scope of nursing care benefits); accordingly, nursing care expenses for the period after treatment has concluded cannot be claimed in advance, and only past nursing care expenses actually incurred may be claimed. In addition, the School Safety Act contains a provision allowing consolation benefits to be paid where a person dies during educational activities from a "cause that cannot be identified" other than a school safety accident (Article 40-2 of the Act). In this way, there is considerable room for mutual-aid benefits, etc. under the School Safety Act to be determined differently in terms of payment items, payment criteria, payment ceilings, etc., depending on the financial condition of the mutual-aid fund, changes in the social environment, the capacity of the State and local governments, etc. However, this is a matter to be discussed on an entirely different foundation from the perspective of fair sharing of loss under the damages liability system.
d. Meanwhile, once the grounds for payment of mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act arise, the right and obligation to pay the amount determined in accordance with the payment criteria set forth in the governing statute arise, and whether a pre-existing condition or the victim's own negligence influenced the occurrence of the accident or the extent of harm is not a matter to be considered in determining the amount to be paid. Accordingly, while a pre-existing condition may be discussed in connection with the requirement for the occurrence of grounds for the payment of mutual-aid benefits—namely, the issue of causation between the school safety accident and the harm—once an accident is recognized as having occurred during educational activities, an obligation arises to pay mutual-aid benefits in accordance with the payment criteria set forth by statute, and the contribution attributable to a pre-existing condition cannot be excluded. Examining materials on the legislative history, it can be seen that, during the initial drafting process, a plan to exclude from compensation accidents caused by a student's morbid predisposition or pre-existing disease was considered, but this was deleted during the drafting of the bill. It is the intent of the statute that, if there is a causal relationship between a school safety accident and the occurrence of harm, mutual-aid benefits are to be paid even if a pre-existing condition overlaps as one of the causes of the accident, and in such a case, it is not contemplated that the contribution attributable to the pre-existing condition be reflected in calculating the amount of mutual-aid benefits. As noted above, this is the same as in the case of industrial accident compensation insurance, and this is because the nature of such benefits is not damages.
e. In conclusion, mutual-aid benefits under the School Safety Act are essentially different in nature from liability for damages, and constitute a separate domain to which the general principles of comparative negligence and liability limitation based on a pre-existing condition, applicable in civil tort and similar matters, do not apply. Therefore, unless the governing statute contains an explicit and clear provision restricting rights or a lawful delegation provision, it is not appropriate to broadly interpret the scope within which restrictions on rights are permitted. The enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is not only inconsistent with the fundamental nature of mutual-aid benefits, but was also enacted without delegation from the parent statute or in excess of the scope of delegation, and must therefore be held invalid. The foregoing sets forth the concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Justice Lee Sang-hoon, Justice Park Byong-dae (Justice in charge), Justice Kim Yong-deok, Justice Park Bo-young, Justice Kim Chang-seok, Justice Kim Shin, Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung