[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Kim & Chang LLC(Yuhan), Attorney Yoon Seong-won and one other
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2019No287, decided September 26, 2019
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Establishment of a double mortgage on real estate and the crime of breach of trust
A. The crime of breach of trust is established when a person who administers another's affairs obtains a pecuniary advantage for himself or causes a third party to obtain it by an act in breach of his duty, thereby causing damage to the other person who is the subject of the affairs. Therefore, the subject of this crime must be in the position of administering another's affairs. In order to be regarded as "a person who administers another's affairs" here, the typical and essential content of the relationship between the parties must be, as in the case where a person administers all or part of the affairs concerning the management of another's property on behalf of that other person, to protect or manage another's property based on a relationship of trust between them that goes beyond the ordinary conflict-of-interest relationship found in ordinary contracts (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Do10479 delivered on January 20, 2011; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363 delivered on August 21, 2014, etc.).
In an ordinary contractual relationship involving conflicting interests, the mere fact that the counterparty obtains a benefit—namely, the satisfaction of a contractual right or the realization of a claim—through the debtor's faithful performance of an obligation, or the mere fact that there is an incidental duty to protect or consider the counterparty in performing the contract, does not make the debtor "a person who administers another's affairs" (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do1301 delivered on March 26, 2015, etc.). Rather, as in the case of mandate (委任) and the like, the typical and essential performance under the contract must be one in which a party undertakes, with a certain degree of authority, to handle the counterparty's property-related affairs (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do9756 delivered on February 20, 2020).
B. Even if a debtor, under a mortgage-creation agreement concluded to secure a monetary obligation, has assumed an obligation to create a mortgage over real estate owned by him in favor of the creditor, this cannot be regarded as the debtor undertaking to handle the creditor's affairs based on a relationship of trust with the creditor that goes beyond the conflict-of-interest relationship found in ordinary contracts.
The debtor's obligation to create a mortgage, which the debtor owes to the creditor under the mortgage-creation agreement, is the debtor's own obligation assumed under the contract. Since the debtor's performance of such an obligation is nothing more than the debtor's own affair, the debtor cannot be regarded, in relation to the creditor, as "a person who administers another's affairs." Accordingly, even if the debtor first creates a mortgage over the collateral in favor of a third party, or transfers the collateral, thereby diminishing or extinguishing its value as security and creating a risk to the creditor's realization of the claim, this does not constitute the crime of breach of trust.
C. The foregoing legal principle also applies to a case where a debtor, having entered into a transfer-security agreement (양도담보설정계약) over real estate as security for a monetary obligation and thus owing a duty to complete the registration of transfer of ownership in favor of the creditor, disposes of the real estate to a third party.
D. To the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this Decision, Supreme Court Decision 2007Do9328 delivered on March 27, 2008, and Supreme Court Decision 2011Do11224 delivered on November 10, 2011, as well as other Supreme Court decisions to the same effect—which held that the crime of breach of trust is established where a debtor who has agreed to create a mortgage (근저당권) over real estate in favor of a creditor as security for a debt disposes of the object of the security, on the premise that the debtor is a person who administers the creditor's affairs—are hereby all overruled.
Meanwhile, Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 delivered on May 17, 2018 recognized the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate. That decision maintained the prior view that the crime of breach of trust is established in cases of double sale of real estate, in consideration of the fact that real estate occupies a large share in the economic life of citizens, that the purchase price for real estate is ordinarily paid in installments consisting of a down payment, an interim payment, and the balance, and of the particular circumstances of transactional reality in which, even after the buyer has paid the down payment and the interim payment—which together constitute a substantial portion of the purchase price—to the seller, there is no sufficient means to prevent the seller's double sale. In light of this, it is hereby clarified that the purport of the above en banc decision is not inconsistent with the majority opinion in this Decision.
2. Judgment of the court below
A. The court below found the Defendant guilty of the charge in this case, namely, that although the Defendant, upon borrowing KRW 1.8 billion from the victim, had agreed to create a fourth-priority mortgage over the apartment in question in favor of the victim, the Defendant instead created a fourth-priority mortgage with a maximum secured amount of KRW 1.2 billion in favor of a third party, thereby obtaining a pecuniary advantage equivalent to KRW 1.2 billion and causing damage of the same amount to the victim.
B. However, in light of the legal principles set out above, the typical and essential content of the relationship between the Defendant and the victim under the mortgage-creation agreement at issue in this case lies in the repayment of the debt and the provision of security therefor, and, insofar as the Defendant cannot be regarded as having undertaken to handle the victim's affairs based on a relationship of trust with the victim that goes beyond the conflict-of-interest relationship found in ordinary contracts, the Defendant cannot be deemed to be "a person who administers another's affairs" in relation to the victim. Nevertheless, the court below found the Defendant guilty of the charge in this case on the premise that the Defendant falls under such a person, and the judgment of the court below thus erred by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the meaning of "a person who administers another's affairs" in the crime of breach of trust. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and judgment, as set forth in the Order. The Justices are unanimous in this Decision except for the dissenting opinions of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Min Yu-suk, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Dong-won, and there are supplementary opinions of Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, and Justice Noh Tae-ak on the majority opinion, and supplementary opinions of Justice Kim Jae-hyung and Justice Min Yu-suk on the dissenting opinion.
4. Dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Min Yu-suk, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Dong-won
A. The issue in this case is whether the crime of breach of trust is established where a debtor, having agreed to create a mortgage over real estate as security in exchange for borrowing money from a creditor, creates a mortgage in favor of a third party after receiving the borrowed money but before creating the mortgage in favor of the creditor (the property at issue is limited to real estate, and the timing of disposal is limited to after receipt of the borrowed money and before the creation of the mortgage; although what was actually created was a "근저당권" (mortgage to secure a maximum amount), it is here referred to simply as a "mortgage," as in the majority opinion). This issue may be regarded as a matter of interpreting an abstractly defined penal provision, but since the property subject to the classification, the timing of the offense, and the mode of conduct are all specifically identified, the fundamental principle of nulla poena sine lege (the principle of legality in criminal law) does not by itself dictate either conclusion. This is analogous to the fact that it would be unwarranted to criticize the majority opinion in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 delivered on May 17, 2018, which affirmed the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate, as being contrary to the principle of legality.
The majority opinion holds that, because the obligation of a debtor who has entered into a mortgage-creation agreement over real estate as security for a debt owed to the creditor to create a mortgage in favor of the creditor is merely "one's own affair" and does not constitute "another's affair," the crime of breach of trust is not established even if the debtor disposes of the real estate to a third party before creating the mortgage in favor of the creditor.
However, where a debtor, in the course of assuming an obligation such as by borrowing money from a creditor, enters into a mortgage-creation agreement to secure that obligation, the debtor's obligation, under the terms of that agreement, to create a mortgage in favor of the creditor constitutes not only the debtor's own affair but also a duty to cooperate in the preservation of the counterparty's property, and thus constitutes "another's affair." The majority opinion is logically inconsistent with the Supreme Court's precedents, which have held that where there exists a duty to cooperate in the preservation of another's property in order to protect the relationship of trust between the parties arising from a transactional relationship, the party bearing that duty is "a person who administers another's affairs," the subject of the crime of breach of trust; and it cannot be endorsed, as it disregards the fact that the relationship of trust founded on a security agreement can also constitute a legal interest that ought to be protected by the crime of breach of trust.
B. The essence of the crime of breach of trust lies in causing pecuniary damage to another person by committing an act in breach of duty that undermines the trust of that other person, which trust is based on a relationship of confidence; and such a breach of duty includes any and all acts that betray the relationship of trust with another person by failing to do what is naturally expected to be done, or by doing what is naturally expected not to be done, in light of statutory provisions, the terms of the contract, or the principle of good faith, taking into account the specific circumstances such as the content and nature of the affairs concerned.
While the modes of conduct constituting the crime of breach of trust may thus manifest in various forms, since not every breach of trust arising in a transactional relationship can be punished as the crime of breach of trust, it may be considered inevitable and necessary, to some extent, to limit punishable breach-of-trust conduct to a certain scope through the interpretation of penal provisions. Nevertheless, even so, care must be taken not to lean too heavily toward, or be blindly led by, such restrictive interpretation, so as to excessively narrow the scope of punishment for breach of trust and thereby exclude from the scope of protection even individual property rights or relationships of trust that ought to be duly protected by criminal law, creating a legal vacuum in which the crime of breach of trust, as a penal provision, fails to fulfill its inherent function.
This is so not only because there exists broad social consensus that the intervention of penal provisions is justified with respect to acts of betrayal such as the double sale of real estate, but also in light of the process by which the established precedent—that a person who owes a duty to cooperate in the preservation of the counterparty's property may be punished for breach of trust where he intentionally violates that duty and causes irreparable damage to the counterparty—has come to be established as a settled legal principle.
C. 1) The Supreme Court has consistently held, not only in cases where a person administers affairs concerning the management of another's property on behalf of that other person, but also in cases involving the completion of transactions such as sale or the creation of security rights, that where the affair constitutes both one's own affair and, at the same time, the performance of a duty to cooperate in the preservation of the counterparty's property, such affair constitutes "another's affair" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust (see Supreme Court Decision 71Do1544 delivered on November 15, 1971; Supreme Court Decision 83Do2057 delivered on October 11, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 96Do1218 delivered on June 24, 1997, etc.). As a result, the Supreme Court has, for a long time, consistently held in cases of double sale of real estate that, once the seller has received the interim payment, the seller owes a duty to cooperate until the registration of ownership transfer in favor of the buyer is completed, and that the crime of breach of trust is established where the seller doubly transfers the subject real estate to a third party, thereby establishing such precedent (see Supreme Court Decision 74Do2215 delivered on December 23, 1975; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do5713 delivered on October 28, 2005, etc.).
2) Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 delivered on May 17, 2018 reaffirmed the legal principle that the affair in question need not consist solely of protecting and managing another's interests, and that even if it also has the character of promoting one's own interest, it may still constitute "another's affair" where the character of being an affair for another goes beyond an incidental or peripheral significance and forms an important part of the content of the affair; and, on that basis, maintained the prior precedent recognizing the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate, on the ground that, from the stage at which the sales contract begins to be substantially performed, such as through the payment of the interim payment, the seller stands in a relationship of trust requiring the seller to cooperate in the preservation of the buyer's property and to protect and manage the buyer's pecuniary interests.
3) Furthermore, the precedents have held that the relationship of trust concerning the transfer of rights over real estate, and the necessity of protecting that relationship, are equally recognized not only in sales contracts but also in other legal relationships aimed at the transfer or creation of rights over real estate, and have accordingly affirmed the establishment of the crime of breach of trust. Thus, the crime of breach of trust has been recognized to be established where, after entering into a mortgage-creation agreement (근저당권설정계약), a person disposes of the real estate to a third party or creates a mortgage registration in favor of a third party before completing the registration procedure under that agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do9328 delivered on March 27, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2011Do11224 delivered on November 10, 2011, etc.), and where, after entering into a leasehold-security-right-creation agreement (전세권설정계약) or a transfer-security agreement over real estate, a person creates a mortgage registration or the like in favor of a third party before completing the registration procedure under that agreement, thereby giving rise to a risk of diminishing security capacity (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do2206 delivered on September 28, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 96Do1218 delivered on June 24, 1997, etc.).
4) Moreover, notwithstanding Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363, the Supreme Court has, up until recently, affirmed the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in double-mortgage cases involving real estate (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Do15584 delivered on January 10, 2019; Supreme Court Decision 2019Do13730 delivered on November 28, 2019). In addition, following the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, which affirmed the establishment of the crime of breach of trust with respect to double sale of real estate, the Supreme Court, applying the same legal principle, has affirmed the establishment of the crime of breach of trust with respect to persons who owe an obligation to complete registration of transfer of ownership on grounds such as exchange, gift, and accord and satisfaction agreements, on the ground that such persons stand in a relationship of trust requiring them to cooperate in the preservation of the counterparty's property and to protect and manage the counterparty's pecuniary interests (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do11337 delivered on October 4, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do19308 delivered on December 13, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do1944 delivered on April 11, 2019).
D. In light of the foregoing precedents, in a case such as this, where a person, after entering into a mortgage-creation agreement (근저당권설정계약) over real estate for security purposes, arbitrarily disposes of the real estate to a third party, the crime of breach of trust should be held to be established, in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedents to date. This is because both sale and the act of creating security share the common feature of violating a duty based on a relationship of trust involving cooperation in registration procedures, and because treating the two differently in terms of criminal liability, as the majority opinion does, is difficult to reconcile with the position that the Supreme Court has consistently taken with respect to the double disposal of property (sale, creation of mortgage, creation of leasehold security right, licenses, etc.).
The reason the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 maintained the position that the crime of breach of trust is established with respect to a double seller of real estate, as noted above, is not that it was based on the simple non-performance of the obligation to transfer ownership under the sales contract, but rather that its core lies in the fact that the seller, despite owing a duty to cooperate in the buyer's acquisition of the real estate, intentionally betrayed that trust and rendered the buyer's acquisition of ownership impossible. Given the nature of real estate transactions, the seller is in a position capable of inflicting on the buyer the risk of rendering the buyer's acquisition of ownership impossible, and it was on this basis that the seller was held to be "a person who administers another's affairs," the subject of the crime of breach of trust. In other words, it was recognized that the seller's act of transferring the right to the buyer through registration is not merely the performance of the obligation to transfer ownership under the sales contract, but is founded on the strong relationship of trust that has developed between seller and buyer in real estate transactions, that the duty to perform the sales contract or to cooperate in registration may be evaluated as a duty arising from that relationship of trust, and that the seller's position, bearing a duty to cooperate under such a relationship of trust, may be evaluated as that of a person who administers affairs concerning the buyer's acquisition of rights.
Viewed in this light, where a debtor who has entered into a mortgage-creation agreement disposes of the real estate that was to be provided as security to a third party, this is in no way different, in terms of the establishment of the crime of breach of trust, from the case of double sale of real estate. In fact, whereas, in the case of sale, a seller who has received only the interim payment may assert a defense of simultaneous performance with respect to the balance in response to the buyer's claim for registration of ownership transfer, in the case where a debtor who has received the borrowed money has entered into a mortgage-creation agreement as security for the monetary obligation, since the creditor has already completed performance of all of the creditor's obligations, the debtor cannot even raise such a defense and has no choice but to comply with the creditor's demand for registration of the mortgage when the creditor requests it. In the latter case, the debtor's position is similar to that of a real estate seller who has received the entire balance of the purchase price, and thus the debtor's character as "a person who administers another's affairs," the subject of the crime of breach of trust, may be regarded as even stronger than in the former case; accordingly, it is natural to hold that, in such a case, the crime of breach of trust is established where the debtor again disposes of the real estate to a third party. Under the majority opinion, inconsistent results are reached: the crime of breach of trust is recognized as established where a person who agreed to transfer ownership on the ground of sale, in order to convert the real estate into cash, instead creates a mortgage in favor of a third party, whereas the crime of breach of trust is not established where a person, having agreed to create a mortgage in favor of a creditor, instead sells the real estate to a third party and completes the registration of ownership transfer in the third party's favor. Treating these two situations, in which an identical duty to cooperate arises, differently in this manner lacks logical persuasiveness, and it is difficult to find any fundamental reason to justify treating them differently.
Furthermore, considering that real estate still occupies a large share in economic life in Korea and that transactions aimed at real estate still carry great socio-economic significance, it cannot be concluded that the illegality or blameworthiness of an act, such as in this case, whereby a debtor who has borrowed money from a creditor and agreed to create a mortgage disposes of the subject real estate to a third party, is necessarily lighter than that of double sale of real estate. A debtor who wishes to convert owned real estate into cash may choose, instead of selling the real estate, to provide it as security and borrow an amount of money corresponding to its market value, and in many cases this amount may exceed the sum of the down payment and interim payment ordinarily set in a real estate sale. Nevertheless, if, unlike in the case of double sale of real estate, the affair of a debtor who has borrowed money creating a mortgage in favor of the creditor as promised is regarded as merely the debtor's personal affair unrelated to the preservation of the creditor's claim, this would fundamentally undermine the relationship of trust in monetary loan transactions secured by real estate, and there is a risk of causing unforeseeable confusion in the role and function performed by such transactions.
Moreover, notwithstanding the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363, the Supreme Court's precedents have, until recently, based on the recognition that real estate occupies a large share in economic life in Korea and that transactions aimed at real estate carry great socio-economic significance, continued to hold that, even in cases of exchange or gift, the duty to cooperate in the preservation of the counterparty's property constitutes an essential element of the relationship of trust, thereby affirming the establishment of the crime of breach of trust without overruling that precedent. This purport should apply equally to the relationship of trust between parties who have agreed to lend money and to create a mortgage as security therefor. This is because the relationship of trust concerning the transfer of rights over real estate, and the necessity of protecting creditors in that regard, should equally be given weight in other legal relationships aimed at the transfer or creation of rights over real estate. In particular, there cannot be said to have been such a lapse of time as would now warrant treating the case of double mortgage over real estate—where the degree of betrayal of the relationship of trust between the parties and the damage inflicted on the counterparty are incomparably greater than in the case of exchange or gift—as not constituting punishable breach of trust, and it is doubtful whether there has been any essential change in the social evaluation thereof or in transactional reality.
E. The majority opinion's view—that performance of the procedure for registering a mortgage under a mortgage-creation agreement constitutes merely "one's own affair" under the agreement and not "another's affair"—appears to be premised on the perspective that a mortgage-creation agreement is ancillary to the contract giving rise to the secured claim, that even after the mortgage is created, the typical and essential duty in the relationship between the parties remains the repayment of the secured debt, and that the various obligations borne by the debtor before and after the creation of the mortgage are merely incidental and ancillary to the monetary obligation.
Where real estate is provided as security for a monetary obligation, the debtor bears both a duty to repay the debt and a duty to maintain the security, and upon completion of repayment, the duty to maintain the security is extinguished. This result is based on the principle of accessoriness (부종성), whereby a security right can arise only in the presence of the secured claim; and, under civil law principles, it is indeed the rule that a security right does not arise if the secured claim does not arise, and that a security right is extinguished when the secured claim is extinguished.
However, the debtor's obligation under a monetary loan agreement and the mortgagor's obligation under a security-creation agreement clearly arise from different contracts, and it is inappropriate to link the fact that a security right has such accessoriness to the secured claim with the criterion for determining "another's affair" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust. In particular, the mortgage (근저당권) at issue in this case is one in which accessoriness with respect to extinguishment is excluded, such that, until the secured claim is finalized, the mortgage's continued existence is unaffected even if the claim is extinguished by repayment or otherwise (see the second sentence of Article 357(1) of the Civil Code (민법)).
The reason the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363 denied the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in a case involving an accord-and-satisfaction agreement (대물변제예약) for securing a claim was that the ultimate purpose of an accord-and-satisfaction agreement lies in securing performance of the obligation to repay the borrowed money, and that the debtor's obligation to complete the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership over the real estate under the accord-and-satisfaction agreement was regarded as merely an incidental matter required of the debtor in order to achieve that ultimate purpose. By contrast, the security right acquired by the creditor through a security agreement has, in itself, independent property value, and the creditor's reliance on the security value of the collateral also constitutes an inherent legal interest that ought to be protected by criminal law. Put simply, a creditor holding a mortgage is not in the position of merely waiting and hoping that the secured claim will be repaid by the debtor; rather, the creditor may create a pledge over the secured claim, which is backed by the mortgage, in order to raise necessary funds from outside sources, or may recover the funds invested by transferring the mortgage, together with the secured claim, to a third party. In recent years, asset securitization, whereby mortgages are transferred together with the secured claims to issue asset-backed securities, has gained attention as a new means of financing. In this way, a security right is a right aimed at the acquisition and control of the exchange value inherent in a given object; and if, in the case of double sale of real estate, ownership encompasses both use value and exchange value, then the only difference in the case of double mortgage over real estate is that what is captured is the exchange value, which is a qualitative part of the content of ownership. Therefore, just as the crime of breach of trust is naturally held to be established, as in any ordinary case of double sale of real estate, where a quantitative part of ownership of real estate—namely, a co-ownership share—is doubly transferred, it is both logical and consistent to hold that the crime of breach of trust is likewise established in a case of double mortgage over real estate, where a qualitative part of the content of ownership is doubly transferred.
[Reasoning]
Today, security interests, including mortgages, function not only as a means of financing for the consumption of ordinary individuals but also as a system through which enterprises obtain financing. As is widely known, security interests have thus moved beyond their traditional role as a mere ancillary means of securing repayment of a monetary claim and now play an important role as a medium through which a financial provider participates in the profit distribution of an enterprise in the form of interest and the like, thereby making a kind of investment. In this way, active transactions related to the circulation of funds are taking place in reality, such as security interests being successively transferred to other persons or new rights, such as pledges, being created on the basis thereof, and this phenomenon will intensify and occur more frequently as economic development progresses. In response, academia has been discussing the need to relax, in accordance with actual circumstances, the accessory nature (附從性) and accompanying nature (隨伴性) that a security interest has in relation to the secured claim, and in the case of a revolving mortgage (根抵當權), the accessory nature has been substantially relaxed. This is precisely why a mortgage-creation contract cannot be regarded as merely an ancillary part of a monetary loan transaction. Rather, the creditor's right under the mortgage-creation contract and the debtor's corresponding obligation to maintain and preserve the collateral value, or the relationship of trust regarding that obligation, must be seen as the essential element that makes the transaction possible in the first place, and it must be understood that an independent relationship of trust distinct from the legal relationship (the monetary loan) that gave rise to the secured claim arises, in itself, from the mortgage-creation contract concluded between the creditor and the debtor. Therefore, just as the essence of the relationship of trust in a real estate sale contract lies in transferring ownership of the real estate, the essence of the relationship of trust in a mortgage-creation contract concluded for security purposes lies in causing the creditor to acquire the security value of the real estate by providing it as collateral, and ultimately the two should be treated in the same manner with respect to whether the crime of breach of trust is established.
(f) Meanwhile, the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do9756 delivered on February 20, 2020, concerning the double security-assignment of movables, addressed the issue of whether the security assignor's duty to maintain and preserve the collateral, etc., after the creation of a security assignment on movables, could be regarded as "another person's affairs." By contrast, the issue in this case is whether the debtor's obligation to create a mortgage, i.e., the debtor's obligation to cooperate in the creditor's acquisition of the right, can constitute the typical and essential content of the relationship of trust between the parties.
Accordingly, this case is one in which the issue is whether the obligation to cooperate in the preservation of property with respect to the acquisition of a right can be regarded as "another person's affairs," and the degree of the contract's binding force, transactional practice, the type and content of the relationship of trust, and the degree of breach of trust relevant to determining whether a punishable breach of duty exists must be evaluated differently from the case addressed in the above en banc Decision 2019Do9756.
(g) The Majority Opinion, taking the view that the ultimate purpose of a mortgage-creation contract is merely to secure the performance of a monetary obligation, reaches the conclusion that a debtor's obligation to complete mortgage registration on real estate pursuant to a mortgage-creation contract does not constitute "another person's affairs." Underlying this is a shift away from the previous position of thickly protecting, through criminal punishment, security interests as property rights guaranteed by the Constitution (헌법), toward a view that even if the essential content of a security interest—namely, objectively and properly grasping the exchange value of property and securing priority control over it—is infringed, this should not be regarded as so significant as to warrant criminal punishment. If so, the Majority Opinion, as the highest court which must present the values our society should pursue and the direction thereof, ought to articulate more fundamental and essential reasons for reaching, at this point in time, a determination different from the past, rather than substituting superficial reasoning concerning "another person's affairs" in the crime of breach of trust for society's important value judgment. Moreover, as noted above, since the true issue in this case has nothing to do with the principle of legality (罪刑法定主義) or, as one aspect thereof, the principle of clarity of penal statutes, it cannot be regarded that a correct answer to the above question has been provided merely by invoking that principle.
(h) The Majority Opinion states that "even if a debtor comes to bear an obligation to create a mortgage in favor of a creditor pursuant to a mortgage-creation contract in order to secure a monetary obligation, this cannot be regarded as the debtor undertaking to handle the creditor's affairs based on a relationship of trust with the creditor, going beyond the relationship of conflicting interests found in ordinary contracts." It further states that "the same legal principle applies where a debtor, having concluded a security-assignment contract with respect to real estate as security for a monetary obligation, disposes of the real estate to a third party despite having an obligation to complete the ownership transfer registration procedure in favor of the creditor."
However, the "debtor's obligation to create a mortgage in favor of the creditor pursuant to a mortgage-creation contract," as stated by the Majority Opinion, and the "buyer's obligation to transfer ownership to the seller pursuant to a sale contract," as stated in the above en banc Decision 2017Do4027, differ only in the form of the transfer of rights, and there is no difference between them in that, in both cases, the obligation to cooperate in the preservation of property vis-à-vis the creditor constitutes the essential and typical content of the relationship of trust between the parties. Moreover, in the case of a security assignment, since, just as in the case of a real estate sale, the security assignor's obligation is an "obligation to transfer ownership," it can be said that the Majority Opinion directly conflicts with the above en banc Decision 2017Do4027.
(i) In conclusion, where a debtor who has concluded a mortgage-creation contract with respect to real estate betrays that relationship of trust by disposing of the real estate to a third party, thereby making it impossible or significantly difficult for the creditor to acquire a mortgage on the real estate, such conduct constitutes a violation of the essential and typical relationship of trust arising from the mortgage-creation contract and thus constitutes the crime of breach of trust. This view is also logically consistent with the settled position of precedent recognizing the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate, double creation of jeonse rights (전세권), double disposal of licenses, and the like.
In light of the above legal principles, the court below's determination that the Defendant's act of, having concluded a contract to create a revolving mortgage, creating a revolving mortgage in favor of a third party on the real estate that had been agreed to be provided as collateral, constitutes the crime of breach of trust is justified, and there is no error therein based on a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the meaning of "a person who administers another's affairs" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust.
For the foregoing reasons, we express our dissent from the Majority Opinion.
5. Concurring Opinion of Justices Kwon Soon-il, Ahn Cheol-sang, and Noh Tae-ak Supplementing the Majority Opinion
(a) The Dissenting Opinion argues that, just as the essence of the relationship of trust in a real estate sale contract lies in transferring ownership of the real estate, the essence of the relationship of trust in a mortgage-creation contract concluded for security purposes lies in causing the creditor to acquire the security value of the real estate by providing it as collateral, and that, accordingly, double sale of real estate and double mortgaging should be treated the same for purposes of establishing the crime of breach of trust.
(b) However, the Dissenting Opinion runs counter to the principle of strict interpretation of penal statutes, the trend, in keeping with the development of the legal system, toward restraint in the intervention of the State's penal power in mere civil non-performance of obligations, and the recent line of Supreme Court en banc decisions denying the establishment of the crime of breach of trust with respect to the double disposal of property, and thus is difficult to accept as it stands.
1) The interpretation of penal statutes must be strict, and excessively expanding the meaning of the statutory language in a direction unfavorable to the defendant, or applying it by analogy, runs counter to the principle of legality and is impermissible. Furthermore, in the sphere of economic activity governed by the principle of private autonomy, resolving disputes through penal statutes rather than through civil means carries the risk of excessive intervention by the State's penal power, infringing upon individual freedom, and may also produce the negative effect of distorting the rational and autonomous adjustment of interests; accordingly, such intervention should be exercised with restraint.
(a) The crime of breach of trust is constituted where "a person who administers another's affairs," through an "act in breach of duty," acquires a pecuniary advantage or causes a third person to acquire such advantage, thereby causing loss to the principal. Supreme Court precedent holds that an act in breach of duty in the crime of breach of trust means "any act that betrays the relationship of trust with the principal by failing to conform to conduct that, in light of the specific circumstances such as the content and nature of the affairs being administered, would naturally be expected under statutory provisions, the terms of the contract, or the principle of good faith." However, if this is interpreted to mean that any act in violation of a statute or a private-law contract may be punished as the crime of breach of trust, this would result in the wholesale criminalization of civil matters and cannot be permitted. In this respect, care must be taken to interpret the meaning of "a person who administers another's affairs," the subject of the crime of breach of trust, faithfully in accordance with the essence of the crime of breach of trust, so that it is not abused. Since it is not appropriate to charge as breach of trust conduct constituting a violation of contract amounting to non-performance under civil law, great care must be exercised in applying the above precedential legal principle concerning "act in breach of duty" in the crime of breach of trust to specific cases involving violation of contractual obligations.
There were reasons of its own for the Supreme Court's traditional recognition of the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate on the basis of the obligation to cooperate in registration. Real estate, unlike other property, has a large property value, and correspondingly there was a relatively great need to protect the parties to the transaction; there was also an aspect in which the legal consciousness reflecting remnants of the principle of intention (意思主義) that persisted in the transition from the applied Civil Code (依用民法) to the current Civil Code (民法) could not be disregarded. However, now that more than half a century has passed since the Civil Code came into force, the notion that a right is acquired only upon completion of registration has become firmly established among the public, various forms of systems enabling civil relief of rights have been established, and there is now much property of greater value than real estate. Moreover, excessive intervention by the State's penal power into the sphere of private law also impedes the proper and efficient allocation of limited resources.
(b) The subject of the crime of breach of trust is "a person who administers another's affairs." The crime of breach of trust is a genuine status offense (眞正身分犯) requiring the status of "a person who administers another's affairs." Accordingly, in order to recognize the establishment of the crime of breach of trust, whether the person falls under "a person who administers another's affairs" must be examined before examining whether there was an act in breach of duty. "Another's affairs" in the crime of breach of trust must be affairs that belong to another, meaning that the subject of the affairs must be another person. That is, it must be a case of administering, in place of another, affairs that the other person should originally administer. Accordingly, even where one party to a contract faithfully performs the obligations under the contract owed to the counterparty, and the counterparty thereby obtains the benefit of satisfaction of its contractual rights, if the performance of that obligation does not constitute "another's affairs" in the above sense, it is merely "one's own affairs."
In light of the foregoing, in order to hold that one party to a contract falls under "a person who administers another's affairs," it must be required not merely that the party bears a duty of good faith to consider the protection of the counterparty's pecuniary interests, but that a relationship of trust has been formed whose essential and typical content is the duty to protect or manage, as the counterparty's property, the right that is the object of the contract.
(c) The Supreme Court has held that the seller under a sale contract for movables is not in the position of administering the buyer's affairs, and therefore even if the seller disposes of the subject matter to a third party, the crime of breach of trust is not established (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Do10479 delivered on January 20, 2011); and has denied the establishment of the crime of breach of trust where a debtor who concluded an agreement for payment in kind (代物辨濟豫約) with respect to real estate for security purposes disposed of the real estate to a third party without authorization, on the ground that the debtor's obligation to transfer ownership of the real estate pursuant to the agreement for payment in kind does not constitute another's affairs (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363 delivered on August 21, 2014). Furthermore, with respect to a debtor who created a security assignment of movables for security of a monetary obligation, the Court has denied the establishment of the crime of breach of trust even where the debtor disposed of the collateral without authorization, on the ground that the obligation to maintain and preserve the collateral value owed to the security assignee, who is the creditor, cannot be regarded as another's affairs (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do9756 delivered on February 20, 2020).
The recently rendered Supreme Court Decision 2015Do6057 delivered on June 4, 2020, likewise denied the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in a case of double transfer of shares prior to issuance of share certificates, on the ground that it is difficult to view the transferor of shares as being in the position of administering another's affairs. The Majority Opinion faithfully follows the purport of this line of precedent.
2) The Dissenting Opinion argues that the legal principle of Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 delivered on May 17, 2018, which recognized the establishment of the crime of breach of trust with respect to double sale of real estate, should apply to the facts of this case, and that the Majority Opinion runs counter to the purport of that decision. It also argues that the Majority Opinion's differing evaluation of what it considers to be the same matter violates the principle of equality. However, double sale of real estate and double mortgaging differ in several respects, as set out below.
(a) A real estate sale contract is something experienced by most ordinary citizens, and it is the practice in transactions to pay the price in installments consisting of a down payment, an intermediate payment, and a final payment. It is common to see families investing all of their assets in the purchase price in order to realize the dream of owning a home, or, in order to sell a house and acquire a new one, covering an insufficient amount through loans or borrowed funds. However, there is often a considerable interval of time between the payment of the down payment and intermediate payment and the payment of the final balance and the receipt of the ownership transfer registration, and in such cases, the reality is that the means of securing rights with respect to amounts already paid are insufficient. Accordingly, there remains a very great need for measures to remove legal uncertainty and secure rights.
By contrast, in the case of a mortgage-creation contract, the creditor need simply refrain from providing the funds unless the mortgage registration is completed; providing funds prior to the creation of the mortgage registration is the exception, and there are also many cases in which a mortgage is agreed to be created to secure an existing obligation. Generally speaking, in the case of a real estate sale, the buyer is in a more unstable position than the seller, whereas in the case of the creation of a mortgage, the creditor may be regarded as being in a superior position relative to the debtor.
(b) A mortgage-creation contract is an agreement to create a mortgage on real estate for security purposes in anticipation of the possibility that the original monetary obligation may not be performed, and in that it involves bearing an obligation to complete registration of a right with respect to real estate, it appears similar to the case of double sale of real estate. However, in the case of double sale of real estate, a seller who has received the intermediate payment has no way of escaping the obligation to transfer ownership of the real estate to the buyer unless the seller rescinds the contract on grounds such as the buyer's non-performance of the obligation to pay the price. In particular, for a seller who has received even the final balance, transferring ownership of the real estate to the buyer is the only way to be relieved of the obligation.
By contrast, in the case of a mortgage-creation contract for securing an obligation, the debtor may at any time be relieved of the obligation to create a mortgage in favor of the creditor by repaying the borrowed debt. Although the two are similar in that there is an obligation to complete registration of a right with respect to real estate, there is a substantial difference in the content of the obligation and the degree of its binding force.
(c) In the case of double sale of real estate, the social and economic utility obtained through the criminal sanction of breach of trust lies in ensuring that the buyer receives the transfer of ownership of the specific real estate as originally agreed. In a real estate sale, since the buyer grasped the value of the real estate as a specific object and expected to receive the transfer of ownership thereof, it is often the case that receiving monetary damages after the fact alone cannot achieve the purpose sought to be accomplished through the sale contract. In this respect, it cannot be denied that there is a practical need to compel performance of the sale contract, through the sanction of the crime of breach of trust, in addition to imposing civil liability for damages on the seller who caused the impossibility of performance.
By contrast, in the case of a mortgage-creation contract for securing an obligation, the social and economic utility sought to be obtained through the criminal sanction of breach of trust is to secure the creditor's monetary claim. Since the creditor's main interest lies in grasping the value of the real estate as collateral in order to be repaid on the existing monetary claim, the ultimate purpose is to be repaid the principal and interest of the existing monetary claim, rather than the creation of the security interest on the real estate itself. Accordingly, even if the creditor fails to have a mortgage created by the debtor, if the creditor is repaid the principal and interest of the existing monetary claim by the debtor, the purpose sought to be achieved through the mortgage-creation contract will in effect have been accomplished.
3) The Majority Opinion takes the position that Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 concerning double sale of real estate does not conflict with the Majority Opinion in this case. This point is the crux of the difference between the Majority Opinion and the Dissenting Opinion.
(a) The above en banc decision does not use the term "obligation to cooperate in registration." That is, it moved away from the previous precedent's position of regarding the obligation to cooperate in registration arising from the principle of joint application (共同申請主義) as another's affairs, and instead regarded the obligation, arising from a relationship of trust, to cooperate in the preservation of another's property as another's affairs. The purport of this is that, rather than automatically regarding the obligation to cooperate in registration, which necessarily accompanies every real estate transaction, as another's affairs, it is proper to individually determine whether the obligation to cooperate in the preservation of property constitutes another's affairs, based on the type of real estate contract and the related social reality.
In this respect, there is no problem in legal principle even if double sale of real estate and double mortgaging are treated differently with respect to the establishment of the crime of breach of trust. The Supreme Court merely recognizes the establishment of the crime of breach of trust in the case of double sale of real estate in consideration of our social reality. In the future, if the intermediate payment system in real estate sale contracts is improved, or if the use of means of securing rights such as provisional registration (假登記) or provisional injunction against disposal (處分禁止假處分) becomes routine, the precedent could change in the direction of excluding double sale of real estate as well from the scope of punishment for breach of trust. Meanwhile, exchange or gift of real estate is a contract aimed at the transfer of ownership, similar to a real estate sale, and in that sense, since it cannot be regarded as directly conflicting with the Majority Opinion in this case, it was simply not listed among the decisions to be overruled; no determination was made as to whether the decisions concerning such matters are proper. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to criticize the Majority Opinion in this case on that basis either.
(b) If, as the Dissenting Opinion holds, a debtor is deemed to fall under "a person who administers another's affairs" and may be punished for breach of trust on the ground that the debtor has an obligation to cooperate in creating a mortgage in favor of the creditor, this would conflict with Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363 concerning an agreement for payment in kind with respect to real estate. The Supreme Court made clear that, in an agreement for payment in kind whereby ownership of real estate is to be transferred as security for a claim, the obligation to be performed pursuant to the agreement constitutes "one's own affairs." That is, the ultimate purpose of the agreement for payment in kind lies in securing the performance of the obligation to repay the borrowed money, and the debtor's obligation to complete the ownership transfer registration procedure pursuant to the agreement for payment in kind is merely an ancillary matter required of the debtor in order to achieve that ultimate purpose. This purport can also be confirmed in en banc Decision 2019Do9756 concerning double security assignment of movables.
The important ground for holding, as above, that this cannot be regarded as another's affairs is that the debtor's obligation, under a mortgage-creation contract, to create a mortgage in favor of the creditor cannot constitute the essential content of the relationship of trust. In applying this legal principle, there is no reason to draw a distinction based on whether the form of security is a mortgage-creation contract, an agreement for payment in kind, or a security-assignment contract, or on whether the object of the security is real estate or movables. Even where the object of security or the form of security for the obligation differs, the ultimate purpose of each agreement and the debtor's principal obligation thereunder are the same, namely, repayment of the monetary obligation.
(c) The criticism that Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 concerning double sale of real estate, by continuing to regard the seller's obligation to cooperate in the preservation of the buyer's property as another's affairs, lacks consistency with the en banc decisions concerning double sale of movables, agreements for payment in kind with respect to real estate, and double security assignment of movables, deserves consideration. However, an agreement for payment in kind, a security-assignment contract, and a mortgage are all the same type of security interest, being merely means of securing performance of a monetary obligation. Ultimately, the type of legal relationship similar to the mortgage-creation contract at issue in this case is an agreement for payment in kind, and it is difficult to regard it as a sale contract. Unless the above en banc decisions are overruled, the logic of the Dissenting Opinion has no basis to stand.
The specific circumstances in which real estate is provided as collateral for a mortgage include cases where money is borrowed on the condition of providing security, and cases where security is agreed to be provided as a means of ensuring repayment after an obligation has already arisen. In the former case, it is difficult to find that a transactional practice exists whereby money is lent even before the security is created, and if, from the outset, without any intention of providing security, the debtor received the loan on the condition of providing security and failed to provide the security, this may be subject to prosecution not for breach of trust but for fraud, which carries a heavier statutory penalty. Meanwhile, in the latter case, if security is not provided, in substance this is no different from mere non-performance of an ordinary civil obligation.
(c) There is a legal maxim that contracts must be honored. It is, of course, the role of the courts to protect the party asserting that a contract must be honored as agreed, against a party unwilling to honor the contract. Where, under a mortgage-creation contract, the debtor is unwilling to perform the contract while the creditor asserts that the contract must be performed, the courts may protect the creditor by ordering the debtor to perform, or by ordering damages for non-performance. That is the extent of the courts' role.
The foregoing supplements the grounds of the Majority Opinion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung Supplementing the Dissenting Opinion
The issue is whether, where the owner of real estate agrees to create a revolving mortgage in favor of a creditor and then creates a revolving mortgage in favor of a third party, the owner may be punished for breach of trust. On this issue, I wish to supplement the Dissenting Opinion from the standpoint of the interpretation of penal statutes, and to express my views on several points raised in the Concurring Opinion Supplementing the Majority Opinion.
(a) First, I supplement the Dissenting Opinion from the standpoint of the interpretation of penal statutes.
1) Penal statutes must be strictly interpreted and applied, and must not be expansively interpreted or applied by analogy in a direction unfavorable to the defendant. However, the interpretation of penal statutes is a task of clarifying their normative meaning so that they may be applied to specific facts, and, as with other statutes, various methods of interpretation are required.
First, the possible linguistic meaning of the terms or sentences used in the statute must be clarified (literal interpretation), and at the same time, the interpretation must achieve logical consistency, taking into account, among other things, the relationship with other statutes (logical interpretation). Where following the language or logic of the penal statute alone is insufficient to fully grasp its meaning as a legal norm, its meaning must be given concrete content, without departing from the ordinary meaning of the penal statute, by comprehensively considering various factors such as the ideology of the legal order as a whole, the function of the penal statute, its legislative history, its legislative purpose and objectives, the legal interest and purpose of protection of the penal statute, and the form of the conduct in question (teleological interpretation). This method of interpretation has been repeatedly confirmed as settled by the Supreme Court (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Do2819 delivered on February 21, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do2363 delivered on January 10, 2003; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do6525 delivered on May 12, 2006; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2006Do4549 delivered on November 16, 2006).
2) The Majority Opinion fails to maintain consistency in its literal interpretation concerning the crime of breach of trust.
[Reasoning]
Everyone agrees that when determining whether the crime of breach of trust (배임죄) is established, one must start from the literal meaning of "a person who administers another's affairs" (타인의 사무를 처리하는 자) as used in Article 355(2) of the Criminal Act (형법). However, there have been various views, whether consciously or unconsciously, regarding that meaning. The majority opinion may be seen as limiting a person who administers another's affairs to a case where one acts on behalf of another (대행), but narrowly construing "administer" (처리) as "act on behalf of" (대행) contradicts its literal meaning.
"Administer" (처리) means to arrange and conclude or finish an affair or matter according to procedure, whereas "act on behalf of" (대행) means to act in place of another. Unlike "act on behalf of," the term "administer" does not carry the limited meaning of acting in place of another. Legal terms that are used distinctly from "acting on behalf of," such as agency (대리), representation (대표), and management of affairs without mandate (사무관리), are also included within "administer," and beyond that, de facto acts, such as running an errand or a bank teller's act of transferring funds, may also be included within "administer."
For a long time, the Supreme Court has consistently held, with regard to the literal meaning of a person who administers another's affairs, that "it refers to a case having as its essential content the duty to protect or manage another's property based on a relationship of trust, in which one administers on behalf of another affairs concerning the management of another's property—for example, a case where one, under a contract such as mandate or employment, bears the duty of managing and preserving another's property and exercises certain authority for the principal, or a case such as the duty to cooperate in registration, which is one's own affair for the purpose of completing one's own transaction such as sale or the creation of a security right, while at the same time being under a duty to cooperate in preserving the property of the counterparty" (see Supreme Court Decision 81Do3137, delivered February 8, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 2004Do6890, delivered March 25, 2005, etc.). That is, it has been made clear that "another's affairs" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust includes not only cases of acting on behalf of another but also cases where there is a duty to cooperate in preserving the counterparty's property, and this has been established over a long period through numerous cases and now functions as an established legal principle governing the economic life of our society. The fact that the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, delivered May 17, 2018, viewed the seller's duty to cooperate in the preservation of property, such as registration of transfer of ownership, owed to the buyer as "another's affairs" was likewise based on this established interpretation of the text. This position has been consistently followed in Supreme Court decisions rendered even recently, and will remain unchanged after this decision unless a new en banc decision is rendered.
In a real estate sale, the seller's duty—having received payment up to the interim payment—to register the transfer of ownership to the buyer, and the debtor's duty—having received a loan—to register the establishment of a maximum mortgage (근저당권) in favor of the creditor, are both cases that are one's own affair for the purpose of completing the transaction while simultaneously being a duty to cooperate in the counterparty's preservation of property, and there is no difference between the two in that protecting the counterparty's property interest constitutes the typical and essential content of the relationship of trust. If either of these two cases is to be denied, the other must likewise be denied; affirming one while denying the other is a loss of consistency.
Unlike the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, the majority opinion narrowly construes the literal meaning of "another's affairs" as limited to cases of acting on behalf of another, and thereby holds that the debtor's duty to cooperate in preserving property owed to the creditor, arising from a contract to establish a maximum mortgage, is not "another's affairs." Moreover, the majority opinion is silent as to the basis on which "another's affairs" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust is limited to cases of acting on behalf of another, and as to why the duty to register the establishment of a maximum mortgage cannot be viewed as a duty to cooperate in preserving property that constitutes the essence of the relationship of trust. This position departs from the stance the Supreme Court has established with respect to "another's affairs," and forgets the Supreme Court's basic mission of presenting a uniform standard for legal interpretation.
Affairs arising from statutes, juristic acts, management of affairs without mandate, and the principle of good faith are, in most cases, a mixture of the characteristics of one's own affairs and another's affairs, such that it cannot be said that only one characteristic exists. Even the mandate contract, which the majority opinion cites as a typical example of acting on behalf of another, is, when made for consideration, a bilateral contract (it is the general position of precedent that, absent a special agreement for no compensation, there is an implicit agreement to pay compensation, and in fact bilateral contracts constitute the majority of cases), such that each obligation of the mandator and the mandatary stands in a relationship of consideration to the other. The mandatary has a duty to administer the affairs entrusted by the mandator, but this duty is also the mandatary's own affair, undertaken in order to receive compensation from the mandator and to complete the purpose of the mandate contract. A case where a client retains an attorney to handle a case is a representative example of a mandate contract. If an attorney who has been retained for litigation enters into a settlement in litigation proceedings on terms contrary to the client's property interests, the majority opinion would presumably have no objection to the view that the attorney, as a person who administers another's affairs, would be liable for breach of trust. The attorney's affairs described above are likewise a mixture of the characteristics of one's own affairs and another's affairs.
As shown above, even affairs arising from a mandate cannot be viewed purely as another's affairs alone, yet the majority opinion, based on this mistaken premise, commits the error of narrowly construing a person who administers another's affairs.
The majority opinion appears to view work performed under a contract such as mandate or employment as constituting "acting on behalf of another." However, there is no need to view the mandatary or employee as acting in place of the mandator or employer. The mandatary or employee is performing the work entrusted to them, and it suffices to regard them as a person who administers another's affairs if that work can be seen as corresponding to the affairs of the mandator or employer.
The reason the Supreme Court has held that "the administration of affairs need not consist solely of protecting and managing another's interests; even if it also has the nature of promoting one's own interest, if the character of the affair as being for another exceeds a merely incidental or peripheral significance and constitutes an important content, it falls within a person who administers another's affairs as referred to herein" is likewise because, as described above, affairs for another arising from contracts and the like are difficult to categorize as falling exclusively on one side or the other.
The majority opinion might claim that limiting a person who administers another's affairs to cases of acting on behalf of another follows from literal interpretation. However, if the literal interpretation of a person who administers another's affairs cannot encompass cases where there is a duty to cooperate in preserving the counterparty's property, then the aforementioned Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, along with countless other decisions, can no longer be sustained.
Therefore, the view that limits a person who administers another's affairs to cases of acting on behalf of another either disregards the established literal meaning of "another's affairs," or else construes the literal meaning of "another's affairs" differently depending on the case in order to justify the desired conclusion.
3) The majority opinion is inconsistent with the legislative history of the crime of breach of trust and with a teleological interpretation that takes into account the nature of the crime of breach of trust.
Article 355(2) of the Criminal Act provides that the crime consists of "a person who administers another's affairs obtaining a pecuniary advantage or causing a third party to obtain such advantage through an act in violation of his or her duty, thereby causing loss to the principal," and it is generally held that this was influenced by Article 442(2) of Japan's 1940 Draft Amendment to the Criminal Act (which provided that "when a person who administers another's affairs commits an act in violation of his duty in order to promote his own or a third party's interest, thereby causing loss to the principal and obtaining an unlawful pecuniary advantage or causing a third party to obtain such advantage").
The current Japanese Criminal Code provides the requirements of breach of trust as: "when a person who administers affairs for another, for the purpose of promoting his own or a third party's interest or causing loss to the principal, commits an act in violation of his duty, thereby causing pecuniary loss to the principal." In a case involving a double mortgage on real estate, Japanese case law affirmed the establishment of breach of trust, holding that "the mortgagor bears a duty to cooperate with the mortgagee until the registration thereof is completed, and this duty is borne primarily for the benefit of the mortgagee, who is another person."
The German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) provides the subject of the crime of breach of trust as "a person who abuses the authority to dispose of another's property or to impose obligations on another, granted by statute, commission of a public authority, or juristic act, or who violates a duty to look after another's pecuniary interests imposed by statute, commission of a public authority, juristic act, or relationship of trust, and thereby causes loss to the person whose pecuniary interests were to be protected." German law constitutes the crime of breach of trust so as to include both the "abuse-of-authority" element (Missbrauchstatbestand) and the "breach-of-trust" element (Treubruchstatbestand), and the prevailing view in Germany treats the abuse-of-authority element as a special form of the breach-of-trust element, with the breach-of-trust element regarded as the general requirement. The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) similarly holds that the essence of the crime of breach of trust "lies in the violation of the duty to protect another's pecuniary interests." Accordingly, breach of trust is understood as requiring that the essential content of the relationship between the parties be, based on a relationship of trust, to protect or manage another's property.
The above German legal doctrine on breach of trust has had a direct influence on the interpretation of the crime of breach of trust in Korea, and the prevailing view and case law in Korea follow the "breach-of-trust theory" (배신설), under which the essence of the crime of breach of trust lies in infringing property by betraying another's trust. That is, breach of trust is viewed as a crime whose content consists of the person administering the affairs violating the duty of good faith owed to the principal, thereby infringing on property. Accordingly, whether breach of trust is established is examined by focusing not on the relationship between the person administering the affairs and the third party, but on the relationship between the person administering the affairs and the principal.
Teleological interpretation is a method of interpretation that seeks the meaning of a legal provision in accordance with the rational purpose objectively required within the legal order. Legal interpretation is not simply a repetition of what the legislature has already considered, but rather a task of discerning, in light of new circumstances, the meaning and spirit of the law that the legislature intended.
The provision on breach of trust in the Criminal Act merely states "another's affairs" without providing any definition of what constitutes another's affairs. Based on the premise that the essence of breach of trust is "betrayal of a relationship of trust," the Supreme Court has established the interpretive doctrine that "another's affairs" has as its essential content the duty, based on a relationship of trust, to protect and manage another's property (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do3532, delivered May 10, 2012, etc.). It has also held that a breach-of-trust act "includes any act that betrays the relationship of trust with another, by failing to perform an act that, in light of the specific circumstances such as the content and nature of the affair, is naturally expected to be performed under statutory provisions, the terms of a contract, or the principle of good faith, or by performing an act that is naturally expected not to be performed" (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do1696, delivered July 22, 2002, etc.). These legal doctrines regarding "another's affairs" and "breach-of-trust acts" cannot be directly derived from the wording of the Criminal Act provision itself, and are instead grounded in a teleological interpretation based on the essence of the crime of breach of trust and the meaning and spirit of the law intended by the legislature.
There are cases, such as larceny or bodily injury, where whether the crime is established can be determined relatively easily from the elements of the offense alone, but there are also cases, such as obstruction of the exercise of rights or breach of trust, where comprehensive and ambiguous concepts are used in the elements of the offense, making it difficult to determine whether the crime is established from the provision alone. For example, if it were held that the crime of obstruction of the exercise of rights is established whenever the exercise of another's right, whatever that right may be, is obstructed in any form, the scope of that crime could expand without limit. Breach of trust requires as its elements that "a person who administers another's affairs commits a breach-of-trust act, thereby obtaining a pecuniary advantage and causing loss to the principal." The basis for being "a person who administers another's affairs" includes not only statutes and contracts but also the principle of good faith, and the content of the administration of affairs varies depending on each basis and the relationship between the parties, and it is often unclear what constitutes the principal duty. Courts have made individual determinations in various types of cases as to what constitutes another's affairs and what constitutes the essential content of the relationship of trust. What legal relationship is protected by the crime of breach of trust, and what is the typical and essential content of the relationship of trust used as an indicator in determining breach of trust, cannot be stated uniformly, and must inevitably be determined by considering the type of legal relationship, the content of the individual agreement, and the relationship between the parties.
The majority opinion regards the purpose of a contract to establish a maximum mortgage as being repayment of the debt. However, repayment of the debt is the purpose of the loan-for-consumption contract (소비대차계약), not the purpose of the contract to establish a maximum mortgage. The purpose of a contract to establish a maximum mortgage is to secure a security interest over real estate through registration of the establishment of the maximum mortgage. This is not different in nature from the fact that the purpose of a real estate sale contract is to secure ownership of the real estate through registration of transfer of ownership. The majority opinion states that under a mortgage contract, the debtor may at any time free himself from the duty to establish a mortgage in favor of the creditor by repaying his loan debt, but it is unclear on what basis a debtor or property owner who has agreed to establish a mortgage but whose time for performance has not yet arrived could nonetheless free himself from the duty to establish the mortgage by repaying the debt.
What is at issue in this case is not a mortgage but a maximum mortgage (근저당권), which has a distinct feature setting it apart from an ordinary mortgage in that the so-called accessory nature with respect to extinguishment does not apply. In the case of a maximum mortgage, even if the secured debt is extinguished or transferred, the maximum mortgage still continues to exist (Article 357(1), second sentence, of the Civil Act (민법)). That is, before the secured claim is finalized, even if the debtor repays a claim that has arisen, the maximum mortgage is not thereby extinguished (see Supreme Court Decision 64Da1698, delivered April 20, 1965).
The majority opinion appears to regard the double maximum-mortgage case on real estate (referring to a case in which the debtor, having entered into a contract to establish a maximum mortgage but without having performed it, disposes of the real estate, such as by establishing a maximum mortgage registration in favor of a third party) as similar to the case of an agreement for substitute performance regarding real estate (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363). In the case of an agreement for substitute performance regarding real estate, the debtor may, even after the exercise of the right to complete the agreement, extinguish and free himself from the duty to perform the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership by paying the monetary debt; however, under a contract to establish a maximum mortgage, the debtor cannot at any time free himself from the duty to establish the maximum mortgage registration simply by repaying the secured debt (an agreement for substitute performance regarding real estate is an agreement concerning the "method of performing the debt," provided for in the Obligations part of the Civil Act, whereas a contract to establish a maximum mortgage is an agreement concerning the "establishment of a security right," under which the debtor immediately incurs the duty to establish the maximum mortgage, and because the accessory nature with respect to extinguishment does not apply, it cannot be said that the duty to register the establishment of the maximum mortgage is extinguished merely by repayment of the secured debt). Therefore, the principal content of a contract to establish a maximum mortgage cannot but consist in the registration of the establishment of the maximum mortgage. Should it be said that, because the duty to register the establishment of a maximum mortgage is merely incidental content, the contract to establish a maximum mortgage cannot even be rescinded for failure to perform that duty? It is unclear what the majority opinion means by "incidental content."
Ultimately, the question of which types of legal relationships should be punished as breach of trust must be determined according to what purpose is objectively required within the legal order, taking into account the legal interest protected by the crime of breach of trust. Given that breach of trust is provided for as a significant crime under the Criminal Act, the courts, whose duty it is to interpret and apply that provision, must neither excessively broaden nor excessively narrow the scope of its punishment.
Dividing the types of "another's affairs" and limiting the establishment of breach of trust solely to cases of acting on behalf of another is contrary to the legal interest protected by the crime of breach of trust and to the established interpretive doctrine of the Supreme Court concerning its establishment. In relationships where the parties stand in opposition to each other, it accords with the overall system and purpose of criminal law to punish as breach of trust certain cases where, beyond merely performing one's own obligation, the counterparty cannot acquire the right without the performance of that obligation.
A party to a contract need only perform the obligations set forth in that contract, and is not obligated, beyond that, to protect or look after the counterparty's pecuniary interests. Accordingly, in the case of nonperformance of a contract, the party is liable only for breach of contract, not for tortious liability, and it is even rarer for criminal liability to attach. This is to be distinguished from cases involving the infringement of a real right such as ownership, where not only tortious liability but also criminal liability may attach if the elements of a crime under the Criminal Act are satisfied.
Nevertheless, among cases of nonperformance of contractual obligations, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the establishment of breach of trust with regard to double sales and double mortgages of real estate, which are evaluated as typical breach-of-trust acts. In the aforementioned Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 as well, while reaffirming the legal doctrine that "the affair in question need not consist solely of protecting and managing another's interest; even if it also has the nature of promoting one's own interest, if the character of the affair as being for another exceeds a merely incidental or peripheral significance and constitutes an important content, it falls within another's affairs," the Court maintained its prior precedent recognizing breach of trust in cases of double sale of real estate, holding that once a real estate sale contract has reached the stage of substantive performance, such as payment of the interim payment, the seller stands in a relationship of trust under which he must cooperate in preserving the buyer's property and protect and manage the buyer's pecuniary interest.
Such precedent has evaluated the duty to cooperate in the counterparty's acquisition of rights—even though it is simultaneously the affair of the person administering the affairs—as essential content of another's affairs based on a relationship of trust. This reflects an effort, taking into account the legal interest and purpose of breach of trust, to restrictively interpret the meaning of the text concerning breach of trust so as to exclude mere nonperformance of a debt from the scope of punishment for breach of trust, while nonetheless punishing certain cases among types of nonperformance, such as double sale of real estate, as breach of trust. The majority opinion, without any comment as to whether this teleological interpretation by the Supreme Court is erroneous, denies the establishment of breach of trust on the ground that the mortgagor's duty to establish a maximum mortgage cannot be regarded as another's affairs.
Above all, if the aforementioned Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 regarded the seller's duty to cooperate in the buyer's acquisition of rights as a punishable breach-of-trust act, then the same evaluation must be given to an act infringing a relationship of trust of the same type. Accordingly, in the case of a double mortgage on real estate—where, as with a double sale of real estate, there exists a duty to cooperate in the acquisition of a right, and where, without performance of that duty, the counterparty cannot acquire the property, such that the disposal act by the person administering the affairs significantly infringes the relationship of trust between the parties—this too should be regarded as a punishable breach-of-trust act. The majority opinion, which evaluates the two cases differently, amounts to an evaluative contradiction in the sense that it has reached different conclusions on matters that should be evaluated identically, and thereby infringes the constitutional principle of equality.
Limiting a person who administers another's affairs to cases of acting on behalf of another, such as under a mandate, has no basis whether considered in light of the legislative history and essence of the crime of breach of trust discussed above under a teleological interpretation, or in light of comparative legal analysis of the crime of breach of trust.
B. I express my views on several issues raised in the concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
1) Whether double mortgages on real estate are to be punished as breach of trust is a matter of interpreting and applying the crime of breach of trust. So long as the Criminal Act provision on breach of trust is not unconstitutional, it is the duty of the courts to apply this provision to fit the case at hand. Setting aside, as a matter of legislative policy, the possibility of amending the crime of breach of trust to limit it to certain cases, or of abolishing the crime of breach of trust altogether, the establishment of breach of trust cannot be denied in cases of double mortgage on the abstract ground of excessive intervention by the State's power to punish or infringement of the principle of private autonomy.
While there are countries that, without a provision on breach of trust, punish matters regulated as breach of trust in Korea through other penal provisions, the Criminal Act of Korea, like those of Germany and Japan, provides for breach of trust as a very significant crime. Unlike Germany, which, by adopting the principle of sole application for real estate registration, has no concern about double disposition of real estate, Korea and Japan, which have adopted the principle of joint application for real estate registration—creating a temporal gap between the juristic act that is the cause of registration and the registration itself—experience various problems arising from the double disposition of real estate. Unlike other countries, in Korea, registrations for the establishment of maximum mortgages are made more frequently than registrations of transfer of ownership, such that maximum-mortgage transactions occupy a large share of economic life, and the problem of double mortgages has also become a serious social issue.
In the absence of a notarization system or the like for real estate sales, criminal intervention in acts of double disposition has served to prevent such acts of double disposition and to guarantee the safety of transactions. In that it has spread the notion that a contract must be honored as agreed, this can be seen as having contributed to the establishment of the principle of private autonomy.
The concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion states that "since various forms of systems for civil remedy of rights have now been established, there has been a change in circumstances such that matters may be left to private autonomy, and criminal intervention is no longer necessary." However, there is no specific answer as to what expansion of civil remedies has occurred, constituting a change in circumstances rendering criminal intervention unnecessary, in the period from Supreme Court Decision 71Do1544, delivered November 15, 1971, which affirmed the establishment of breach of trust with regard to double mortgages on real estate, up to the present.
The principle of private autonomy, and in particular the principle of freedom of contract, refers to the freedom to enter into a contract and to shape its content. This does not include the freedom to break a contract or the freedom to violate a contract. Betraying the expectations of a counterparty who has acted in reliance on a promise does not fall within the realm of autonomy. There is no right anywhere in the legal order, including the Constitution, guaranteeing such conduct.
Generally, civil remedies such as claims for performance or damages are used in response to acts violating a contract, but in certain cases, the State's power to punish also intervenes. Breach of trust and a few other criminal offenses are precisely crimes that provide for criminal sanctions in response to certain acts of contract violation arising within the realm of private autonomy. The Supreme Court has affirmed the establishment of breach of trust with respect to double sales and double mortgages of real estate, which constitute typical acts of betrayal amounting to essential infringements of the relationship of trust, and this cannot be characterized as excessive intervention by the State's power to punish.
2) There is no reason to treat double sales and double mortgages of real estate differently with respect to whether breach of trust is established.
The concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion explains that "the social and economic utility obtained through the criminal sanction of breach of trust differs between the two." It states that in the case of double sale, the purpose of the contract cannot be achieved through mere subsequent monetary damages, such that there is a need to compel performance of the contract, whereas double mortgage merely secures the creditor's monetary claim, such that there is no need for criminal sanction. However, this concurring opinion is out of touch with the reality of transactions and with the legal sentiments of the public.
Both double sale and double mortgage of real estate are the same in that the purpose of the contract cannot be achieved due to the violating act of the seller or debtor. Considering the following adverse social and economic effects that the majority opinion, which denies the establishment of breach of trust with respect to double mortgages of real estate, would have, the social and economic utility obtained through criminal sanction of double mortgages of real estate cannot be said to be any less than that of double sales of real estate, and should rather be regarded as greater.
In practice, unless a mortgage registration is secured before or simultaneously with the exchange of money under a loan for consumption (소비대차), there may be no other proper means of securing a security interest. A security interest is secured through the performance of the party providing the security, and there is no way for the creditor to secure the security interest on its own. If such a security interest is not obtained, the claim in question becomes an unsecured claim, and if the debtor has no other means, there is a high likelihood that the claim will become an empty one.
Even if a creditor holds, in addition to a claim for the loaned money, a claim for damages arising from the debtor's default, this provides no assistance whatsoever in the vindication of the creditor's rights. It is difficult to understand what meaning it has to hold another monetary claim in a situation where even the loaned money cannot be recovered.
The supplementary opinion to the majority opinion, which asserts that the creditor is always the socially stronger party or is in a superior position compared to the debtor, either fails to understand the various aspects of secured lending that occur within a complex social structure, or deliberately turns away from reality. For example, it is not difficult to find cases in which, during the construction of an apartment or officetel, a party agrees to establish a mortgage on the entire building upon completion, receives a loan from a bank on that basis, and then, in breach of that agreement, obtains a loan from another bank and grants a mortgage to that other bank, thereby causing large-scale harm. There are also cases in which a person who has purchased a pre-sale unit or real estate takes out a loan to pay the interim or final installment, receives ownership transfer registration, and then, having agreed to establish a mortgage in favor of the creditor, instead provides the real estate as security to or transfers it to a third party. In such cases, the creditor cannot first obtain the mortgage and only then extend the loan. If the courts were to hold that no crime of breach of trust is established for such disloyal conduct by a seller of pre-sale units or similar parties who have agreed to provide security, banks would refuse to extend loans until the security interest has been established in their favor. Such harm would ultimately and inevitably be passed on to bona fide debtors.
It may appear that not imposing criminal punishment for double mortgaging of real estate guarantees the principle of private autonomy, but in reality, this may cause secured lending based on relationships of trust to no longer function smoothly, and credit tightening may prevent debtors from obtaining necessary loans in a timely manner, ultimately leading to their bankruptcy.
3) A loan-for-consumption contract and a mortgage establishment contract are separate contracts. The fact that performance under the loan-for-consumption contract subsequently occurs cannot retroactively resolve the issue of criminal liability arising from the breach of the mortgage establishment contract, which brought about an unsecured state.
The supplementary opinion to the majority opinion argues that, even if the creditor becomes unable to receive the mortgage registration under the mortgage establishment contract due to the debtor's disloyal act, the creditor can, in effect, achieve the purpose sought through the mortgage establishment contract by receiving payment of the secured claim from the debtor, and therefore the debtor should not be punished for breach of trust.
However, whether a property crime under the Criminal Code (형법) is established must be determined irrespective of whether the loss was subsequently compensated. For example, where a person borrows money by deceitfully representing that he or she has the ability and intention to repay it, the crime of fraud is established, and the fact that the victim later receives repayment of that money does not change whether the crime of fraud was established. If a debtor has placed a creditor in an unsecured position through double mortgaging constituting disloyal conduct, the crime of breach of trust is established, and there is no reason why whether the crime of breach of trust is established should change merely because the creditor later receives repayment.
The creditor entered into the mortgage establishment contract in order to obtain security for the claim. To say that, even after the security has disappeared, the purpose of the mortgage establishment contract is achieved as long as repayment is received from the debtor's general assets is tantamount to rendering meaningless the mortgage establishment contract itself as a security contract. The acquisition and preservation of a security interest carries important significance for the parties to a transaction, whether legally or economically, and there is no basis for treating this as merely incidental only when determining whether the crime of breach of trust is established.
4) The supplementary opinion to the majority opinion argues that punishing double mortgaging of real estate as breach of trust infringes upon the principle of private autonomy and thereby causes the wholesale criminalization of civil matters. However, if one were to follow the reasoning of the above supplementary opinion, it is doubtful what kind of contractual breach could ever be recognized as warranting criminal sanction. For example, the relationship between a representative director and a company is also essentially within the domain of private autonomy and is a legal relationship under civil law in the nature of an employment or mandate contract. The essence of most criminal cases in which a representative director is punished for breach of trust for acting contrary to the company's interests likewise lies in a breach of contract. Property crimes under the Criminal Code inevitably bear a close relationship to civil law. Even in areas where private autonomy is permitted, civil law and criminal law each have their own respective roles, and the extent to which criminal law may intervene is a matter of interpretation and application of penal statutes.
None of the circumstances cited above in the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion can serve as grounds for denying the establishment of the crime of breach of trust with respect to double mortgaging of real estate.
Da. In conclusion, where a debtor who has entered into a mortgage establishment contract with respect to real estate betrays the relationship of trust and disposes of the real estate to a third party, thereby making it impossible or significantly difficult for the creditor to acquire the mortgage on the real estate, such conduct constitutes a violation of the essential and typical relationship of trust arising from the mortgage establishment contract, and thus constitutes the crime of breach of trust. This interpretation is consistent with the established interpretive doctrine of precedent recognizing the crime of breach of trust in cases of double sales of real estate and with the essential nature of the crime of breach of trust.
The foregoing supplements the grounds of the dissenting opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Min Yu-sook to the Dissenting Opinion
Ga. The various Supreme Court en banc decisions concerning a debtor's disloyal act of double disposition, and the scope of precedent altered thereby, are simply confusing.
The issue in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do9756, decided February 20, 2020, is limited to cases where the property at issue is movable property and the timing of disposition is after the establishment of a security-by-transfer (양도담보권). The issue in the present case is limited to cases where the property at issue is real estate and the timing of disposition is after receipt of the borrowed money but before the establishment of the mortgage. Therefore, since the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do9756 and the present case differ both as to the property at issue and as to the timing of disposition, there is no reason for their conclusions to be unified.
Na. Meanwhile, in a case involving double sale of real estate, the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, decided May 17, 2018, was rendered, upholding the existing precedent that a seller who has received even the interim payment falls within the category of "a person who administers another's affairs" as referred to in the crime of breach of trust.
Supreme Court Decision 2018Do15584, decided January 10, 2019, and Supreme Court Decision 2019Do13730, decided November 28, 2019, upheld the lower court judgments finding guilt for breach of trust in cases where a person, having agreed to establish a mortgage registration as security for a debt, instead completed a mortgage registration in favor of a third party. In the lower court judgments in both of these cases, arguments that "the obligation to establish a mortgage is merely an ancillary matter for securing the other party's claim and thus does not constitute another's affairs" or that "under the legal principles of the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363, decided August 21, 2014, concerning a promise of payment in kind through real estate, this cannot be regarded as another's affairs" were both rejected, premised on the legal principle from the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027 that the debtor who establishes the mortgage is a person who administers another's affairs, and the Supreme Court likewise upheld the lower courts' determinations as they stood.
The above two Supreme Court decisions must be included among the "Supreme Court decisions to the same effect," for which case numbers are not specified, among the decisions subject to alteration under the majority opinion.
Even though the above two Supreme Court decisions upheld the lower courts' recognition of the crime of breach of trust with respect to the act of arbitrarily disposing of the real estate subject to the mortgage establishment contract, without setting forth an explicit legal principle concerning double mortgaging of real estate, since whether to find guilt is a matter subject to ex officio determination, the above two Supreme Court decisions—rendered on the premise of the existing legal principle that an act of disposing of property to a third party without performing the obligation to complete a mortgage registration, on the premise that such obligation constitutes another's affairs, constitutes the crime of breach of trust—must also be regarded as subject to the alteration of precedent.
In the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Do1228, decided November 18, 2004, as well, in altering the existing precedent concerning "whether the act of transporting passengers for compensation by cargo vehicle without obtaining a passenger transport business license, etc. under the Passenger Transport Service Act (여객자동차 운수사업법), violates the Passenger Transport Service Act," the Court also included, among the decisions subject to alteration, Supreme Court precedents that had recognized violations of the Passenger Transport Service Act with respect to such conduct without setting forth a separate legal principle.
Accordingly, the majority opinion in the present case seeks to alter Supreme Court decisions rendered merely six months to a year earlier.
Da. Even assuming that the above two Supreme Court decisions are not explicitly subject to alteration of precedent, it is clear that they adopted the conclusion that non-performance of the obligation to complete a mortgage registration, having the same legal structure as the double sale of real estate addressed in the immediately preceding Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do4027, likewise constitutes the crime of breach of trust in the same manner as double sale of real estate. Such a stance of the Supreme Court, even absent an explicit statement of legal principle, functions as a guiding standard of interpretation not only for courts at every level but also for investigative agencies. In practice at the lower court level as well, in cases of double mortgaging of real estate, arguments that "under the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do3363, the obligation to establish a mortgage is also not another's affairs" have been rejected, and the establishment of the crime of breach of trust continues to be affirmed.
The majority opinion has reversed this stance merely about six months after the above two Supreme Court decisions were rendered, which raises concern that it will bring confusion to practice at the lower courts and elsewhere and will run counter to confidence in Supreme Court decisions. It cannot be said that, within such a short period, there was any change in circumstances or in the realities of transactions such that a debtor's obligation to establish a mortgage on real estate, having entered into a mortgage establishment contract, should now be regarded as not constituting another's affairs.
The foregoing supplements the grounds of the dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyeong, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang (Justice in Charge), Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak