[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Attorneys Kim Cha-gon and 1 other, Counsel for the plaintiffs)
[Defendants, Appellees] Kia Motors Corporation and 1 other (Bae, Kim & Lee LLC and 1 other, Counsel for the defendants)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2015Na2067268 decided August 18, 2016
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 1's claim for a declaration of consent against the Defendants, among the part in which Plaintiff 1 lost, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and the entirety of Plaintiff 2's appeal are all dismissed. The costs incurred as a result of Plaintiff 2's appeal shall be borne by said Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for appeal (to the extent that the supplementary appellate brief submitted after the deadline for submission of the grounds for appeal supplements the grounds for appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Course of the case
A. The deceased Nonparty (hereinafter "the Deceased") was employed by Defendant Kia Motors Corporation (hereinafter "Defendant Kia Motors") on February 1, 1985, and worked at Defendant Kia Motors' Sohari Plant and the simple mold section of the Siheung Research Institute, among other places, before being transferred to work at the Namyang Research Institute of Defendant Hyundai Motor Company (hereinafter "Defendant Hyundai Motor") around February 2008.
B. On August 25, 2008, the Deceased was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (hereinafter "the instant disease"), and died from the instant disease on July 19, 2010.
C. The Deceased's spouse applied to the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service for survivors' benefits, etc., under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter "the Industrial Accident Insurance Act"). On October 11, 2013, the Seoul Occupational Disease Adjudication Committee under the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service determined that "the Deceased was exposed to benzene for at least 15 years at Defendant Kia Motors, and since the causal relationship between the instant disease and benzene is clear, the disease for which the Deceased's spouse claimed survivors' benefits is recognized as an occupational disease under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act." Pursuant to this determination, the Deceased's family received various benefits provided under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
D. Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the collective agreement concluded between Defendant Kia Motors and its labor union, which the court below found applicable to this case, provides: "In principle, when making new hires pursuant to its manpower supply plan, the Company shall give preferential hiring, where appropriate under the hiring regulations, to in-house non-regular employees, one lineal relative of a union member who died of illness while employed, and children of retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and long-service employees (25 years or more of service). Provided, however, that specific matters shall be determined separately with the union." Paragraph 2 thereof provides: "The Company shall specially hire one lineal relative of a union member who died from an occupational accident or who retired due to a disability of Grade 6 or higher, within six months from the date of request, unless there is a disqualifying reason." Article 97 of the collective agreement concluded between Defendant Hyundai Motor and its labor union provides: "The Company shall specially hire one of the lineal relatives or the spouse of a union member who died from an occupational accident or who retired due to a disability of Grade 6 or higher, within six months from the date of request, unless there is a disqualifying reason." (The special hiring provisions in each collective agreement, which provide for the special hiring of one lineal relative, etc., in the event a union member dies from an occupational accident, are hereinafter referred to as "the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims.")
The Defendants have each repeatedly included provisions with substantially similar content to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in their respective collective agreements since the mid-1990s. Additionally, Defendant Kia Motors' personnel regulations provide that a special hiring process may be conducted "where a lineal relative of an employee who died from an occupational accident or retired due to a disability of Grade 6 or higher is to be hired" [Article 7, Paragraph 4, Item (ra)].
E. The Plaintiffs are the Deceased's children and joint heirs. Plaintiff 1, based on the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, seeks a declaration of acceptance of an offer to enter into an employment contract, primarily against Defendant Kia Motors and, in the alternative, against Defendant Hyundai Motor. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek compensation for damages suffered by the Deceased from Defendant Kia Motors, asserting that the said Defendant breached its duty of care for safety and thereby caused the Deceased's death.
2. Determination on the validity of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims (Grounds for Appeal Nos. 2 and 3)
A. Issue
According to the Plaintiffs' grounds for appeal, the issue in this part is whether the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act (민법).
B. Judgment of the court below
The court below determined that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act because it significantly restricts the employer's freedom to enter into employment contracts, results in the "inheritance of jobs" contrary to our society's sense of justice, and confers excessive benefits on bereaved families by uniformly imposing on the employer an obligation to hire one lineal relative, etc., without regard to the necessity of ensuring the bereaved family's livelihood or employment qualifications.
C. Judgment of the Supreme Court
1) Matters to be considered in determining whether a collective agreement is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act
A) Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution guarantees the constitutional rights of workers to organize autonomously, and of the labor union, as such an autonomous organization, to freely negotiate with the employer on matters necessary for maintaining and improving working conditions and promoting workers' welfare and other social and economic status, and to engage in collective action to achieve their demands. The purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of the three labor rights as fundamental rights is to enable workers to autonomously conclude collective agreements through collective bargaining on an equal footing with the employer, thereby realizing genuine labor-management autonomy with respect to working conditions. Ultimately, Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution can be seen as guaranteeing so-called "agreement autonomy" by granting labor and management the authority to reasonably regulate working conditions, etc., under their own responsibility through collective agreement.
The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter "the Trade Union Act"), enacted to more specifically guarantee the constitutional three labor rights, also reflects this and establishes a regulatory framework to realize the purpose of recognizing and respecting agreement autonomy between labor and management. For example, ① while regulating various matters concerning collective bargaining and collective agreements, the Act does not provide that certain content must or must not be included in a collective agreement, thereby allowing labor and management to autonomously determine the specific content of a collective agreement through bargaining; and ② while providing various provisions regarding the entities and procedures for concluding collective agreements, the Act also enables criminal punishment of those who violate specific matters, such as "matters concerning safety, health, and disaster relief," in a collective agreement lawfully concluded pursuant to such provisions (Article 92, Item 2), thereby strengthening the normative force of collective agreements autonomously formed by labor and management.
B) A collective agreement cannot be excluded from the application of Article 103 of the Civil Act, and thus if the content of a collective agreement violates good morals or other social order, its legal effect must be excluded. However, in determining whether a collective agreement violates good morals or other social order, as noted above, courts must exercise greater caution in their paternalistic intervention, considering that a collective agreement is the result of the exercise of the right to collective bargaining, a fundamental right directly guaranteed by the Constitution, and the product of agreement autonomy between labor and management, which is institutionally guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as the fact that its performance is specially enforced under the Trade Union Act.
C) Based on the freedom of occupation choice under Article 15 of the Constitution and the property rights under Article 23, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, an employer has the freedom to freely decide which workers to hire and by what standards and methods. However, since the employer may voluntarily restrict this freedom, the employer may freely conduct collective bargaining with a labor union regarding worker hiring and conclude a collective agreement, and as long as the content does not violate mandatory laws or good morals or other social order, the effect as a collective agreement is recognized.
If an employer, through collective bargaining with a labor union, has concluded a collective agreement providing that, upon the occurrence of certain events such as death from an occupational accident, the lineal relatives, etc., of a union member shall be hired, such a collective agreement cannot be deemed to violate good morals or other social order unless there are special circumstances such that the agreement reaches the degree of excessively restricting the employer's freedom to hire or results in significantly undermining the fairness of hiring opportunities. Whether such a collective agreement reaches the degree of excessively restricting the employer's freedom to hire or results in significantly undermining the fairness of hiring opportunities must be determined comprehensively by considering various circumstances, including the reasons and background for concluding the collective agreement, the appropriateness of the means to the purpose sought to be achieved through such collective agreement, the existence and content of qualifications required of hiring candidates, the existence of similar employment rules within the workplace, the duration of the collective agreement's maintenance and compliance therewith, and the impact on the employer's general hiring practices and the degree of disadvantage to job seekers, as discernible from the form of hiring prescribed by the collective agreement and the number of workers hired pursuant to the collective agreement.
2) Determination in this case
A) Examining the following circumstances, ascertainable from the facts found above and the record, in accordance with the above legal principles, it is difficult to recognize special circumstances showing that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims reached the degree of excessively restricting the Defendants' freedom to hire or resulted in significantly undermining the fairness of hiring opportunities. Therefore, it cannot be deemed void as violating good morals or other social order.
(1) The Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), enacted for the purpose of establishing standards for working conditions pursuant to the Constitution, prescribes the specific content of the compensation liability borne by an employer for occupational accidents. Although the employer's compensation liability is primarily discharged pursuant to the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, compensation for occupational accidents need not be limited to the content prescribed by statute. The question of what content or level of compensation is to be provided for an occupational accident is itself an important working condition. It is understood that the Defendants' labor unions demanded the conclusion of collective agreements including the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and enhancing the workers' economic and social status, by agreeing to receive additional compensation, beyond that provided by law, for occupational accidents. And it appears that the Defendants, by accepting the labor unions' demands and concluding collective agreements including the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, thereby induce fidelity to their duties among the union member workers and gain the benefit of maintaining smooth relations with the labor unions.
(2) (A) Unlike agreements to specially or preferentially hire the children of retirees who reached mandatory retirement age or of long-service employees, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is a provision aimed at providing employment opportunities to the family of a worker who died from an occupational accident, thereby providing compensation commensurate with the special sacrifice of the worker who lost their most precious life, and protecting or caring for a socially vulnerable group so as to resolve the family's livelihood difficulties.
Compensation under the Labor Standards Act and the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is merely minimal and can hardly be regarded as sufficient protection or care. It can ordinarily be anticipated that when a worker who was responsible for supporting the family dies, the bereaved family will suffer livelihood difficulties. Considering these difficulties, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, which supplements or expands the employer's disaster compensation liability, can be evaluated as contributing to achieving substantive fairness by caring for the socially vulnerable.
(B) Article 32, Paragraph 6 of the Constitution provides that "persons of distinguished service to the State," "persons disabled in war or on duty," and "bereaved family members of soldiers or police who died in action" who rendered special sacrifice for the State and the people shall be given preferential opportunities to work. Based on this constitutional provision and legislative policy discretion grounded in the necessity of compensation or social protection for persons of distinguished service, etc., statutes have been enacted that prescribe an employment obligation for the bereaved families of soldiers or police who died in action, persons of distinguished service or their families, etc., or that provide employment support for them (the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the State, etc. (국가유공자 등 예우 및 지원에 관한 법률), the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service for Independence (독립유공자예우에 관한 법률), the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service to the May 18 Democratization Movement (5·18민주유공자예우에 관한 법률), the Act on Support for Persons Eligible for Veterans' Compensation (보훈보상대상자 지원에 관한 법률), the Act on the Honorable Treatment of Persons of Distinguished Service in Special Missions and the Establishment of Related Organizations (특수임무유공자 예우 및 단체설립에 관한 법률), etc.). Providing hiring opportunities to a specific range of persons for purposes of compensation and protection, in this manner, is a means contemplated by the legal order.
The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims autonomously realizes, at the corporate level, the purpose and spirit of Article 32, Paragraph 6 of the Constitution and the statutes noted above. By providing a hiring opportunity to one of the deceased worker's bereaved family members, the bereaved family is enabled to maintain a level of living similar to that before the worker's death. Accordingly, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims can be said to be an effective and appropriate means for achieving the purposes of compensation and protection.
(3) The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims represents a "self-binding promise" whereby labor and management autonomously determined in advance, "under what conditions" and "whom" the employer would hire, and this is entirely different in character from, and cannot be equated with, the State compelling an employer to hire a particular person and thereby restricting the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to hire.
The court below, as one of the grounds for its determination that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act, cited the point that the provision compels the conclusion of an employment contract with an unspecified person at an unspecified future time, thereby significantly restricting the employer's freedom to hire. However, the essence of freedom rights is, in principle, their negative character of not being infringed by State power; and since the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims was not compelled by the State but was concluded by the Defendants of their own volition through agreement with the labor unions, the above determination of the court below misunderstands the nature of freedom rights. In this case, the Defendants' agreement to the special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims was the result of their affirmative exercise of the freedom to hire granted to them. If a court, without fully considering the Defendants' intent at the time the collective agreement was concluded, declares the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims void, it may in some cases result, not in the provision itself, but rather in the court unduly restricting the Defendants' freedom to hire.
Moreover, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims applies only when death from an occupational accident occurs at the Defendants' workplaces, which is extremely rare, and limits hiring candidates to workers without disqualifying reasons, such that persons within a certain range who lack even the minimum ability to perform the work, etc., cannot be hired. Accordingly, it also cannot be said that the provision compels the employer to conduct special hiring comprehensively, uniformly, and unconditionally, thereby excessively restricting the employer's freedom to hire.
(4) Since first concluding a collective agreement including the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in the 1990s, the Defendants have continuously included the provision each time a new collective agreement was concluded through biennial negotiations with the labor unions. Defendant Kia Motors has a provision to the same effect as the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in its employment rules (personnel regulations).
In fact, pursuant to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, Defendant Kia Motors has specially hired 9 bereaved family members, and Defendant Hyundai Motor has specially hired 52 bereaved family members. In the case of Defendant Kia Motors, even in 2016, while this case was pending, 2 bereaved family members were specially hired.
As such, it can be seen that at the Defendants' workplaces, labor and management have, over a long period, shared the same view not only as to the validity but also as to the utility of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims and have implemented it accordingly, making it all the more difficult to evaluate the provision as excessively restricting the freedom to hire.
(5) As of the end of 2019, Defendant Kia Motors' sales revenue was approximately KRW 33 trillion, with at least approximately 35,600 employees, and Defendant Hyundai Motor's sales revenue was approximately KRW 49 trillion, with at least approximately 70,000 employees. From 2013 to 2019, the number of workers newly hired by Defendant Kia Motors was 5,281, of which 5 were hired pursuant to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, a ratio of approximately 0.094%. During the same period, the number of workers newly hired by Defendant Hyundai Motor was approximately 18,000, of which 11 were hired pursuant to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, a ratio of approximately 0.061%.
Considering the Defendants' business scale, the ratio of bereaved family hires under the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims relative to the number of newly hired workers, and further considering that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not provide for preferential hiring of bereaved family members in the Defendants' open competitive hiring processes but rather contemplates a separate special hiring procedure, it is also difficult to conclude that hiring pursuant to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims has a significant impact on the hiring opportunities of job seekers with respect to the Defendants.
Ultimately, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendants' freedom to hire other workers is significantly restricted by the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, nor can it be said that job seekers suffer significant actual disadvantage.
(6) In light of the circumstances that the Defendants and their respective labor unions have continued to include the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims each time a collective agreement was concluded through regular collective bargaining over a long period, and that special hiring based on this provision has actually been continuously implemented, it becomes even clearer, from the perspective of agreement autonomy as well, that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims should be deemed valid.
B) Nevertheless, the court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is void as violating good morals or other social order. Such determination by the court below contains an error that misunderstands the legal principles concerning the principle of agreement autonomy and Article 103 of the Civil Act, and this error affected the judgment. The grounds for appeal pointing this out are well-founded.
3. Determination on the appropriateness of comparative negligence or limitation of liability (Ground for Appeal No. 1)
In a case for damages arising from breach of obligation, the fact-finding regarding the grounds for comparative negligence or limitation of liability and the determination of the ratio thereof fall within the exclusive authority of the court that determines the facts, unless found to be significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Da249557, decided June 8, 2017).
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the fact-finding and ratio determination made by the court below regarding the grounds for comparative negligence or limitation of liability are deemed proper and acceptable, and there is no error therein such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning comparative negligence or limitation of liability.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for a declaration of acceptance against the Defendants, within the part where Plaintiff 1 lost, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. The remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and Plaintiff 2's appeal are all dismissed, and the costs arising from Plaintiff 2's appeal are to be borne by the said Plaintiff. It is so decided as stated in the Order. Regarding the validity of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims (Section 2 above), there is a dissenting opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taek and Justice Min Yu-sook, while the opinions of the participating Justices otherwise concurred; there is also a supplementary opinion by Justice Kim Jae-hyung to the majority opinion, and a supplementary opinion by Justice Kim Seon-su and Justice Kim Sang-hwan.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek and Justice Min Yu-sook on the validity of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims
A. The reason the dissenting opinion considers the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims to be invalid is not because it regards restoring, as closely as possible, damage caused by an occupational accident to its original state as undesirable, nor because it lightly regards the necessity of protecting an injured worker and their family, etc. It goes without saying that the employer, and indeed our society as a whole, must make its best efforts so that a deceased worker who suffered a special sacrifice due to an occupational accident and their bereaved family may recover and heal from the damage caused by the accident. Nor is it to be faulted that the Deceased's bereaved family in this case, judging that this was rightfully their entitlement under the express provisions of the collective agreement, sought to realize that entitlement by claiming hiring against the Defendants.
While it is commendable for labor and management to establish measures to protect the family of a worker who died from an occupational accident, such measures must be substantively fair and consistent with the legal order. The dissenting opinion wishes to make clear that such measures must not sacrifice job seekers who, in circumstances similar to those of the bereaved family, are desperately seeking employment, nor should they take the form of protecting only the bereaved families of some deceased workers while excluding the bereaved families of others from protection.
B. The majority opinion states that, in determining whether a collective agreement is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act, it is necessary to exercise caution regarding the court's paternalistic intervention, considering that the Constitution and the Trade Union Act guarantee agreement autonomy. However, insofar as the purpose of the constitutional three labor rights lies in achieving social balance in the formation of labor-management relations and guaranteeing genuine autonomy between labor and management with respect to working conditions, it cannot be said that even a labor-management agreement on matters unrelated to the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the promotion of workers' welfare and other social and economic status receives special protection under the Constitution.
The majority opinion asserts that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims prescribes compensation for occupational accidents and is therefore itself an important working condition.
A working condition refers to any condition regarding a worker's provision of labor, and presupposes an already-formed employment relationship, such as wages, working hours, the content of work, the working environment, welfare benefits, and the grounds or procedures for termination of the employment relationship. The question of with whom the employer will establish a new employment relationship in the future does not constitute a working condition. The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not apply to union members themselves but is intended to establish an employment relationship between the employer and the family of a deceased union member; therefore, even taking into account the purpose of compensation, it cannot be regarded as related to the conditions attached to a union member's provision of labor. The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims falls outside the scope specially protected by Article 33 of the Constitution or the Trade Union Act.
C. The court below, in determining that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is void under Article 103 of the Civil Act, cited as one of its grounds the point that the employer's freedom to hire is infringed. In response, the majority opinion determined that while a labor-management agreement that excessively restricts the freedom to hire may be void under Article 103 of the Civil Act, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims cannot be deemed to excessively restrict the Defendants' freedom to hire. The principle that one is legally bound by one's own promise is grounded in the principle of self-responsibility, and, absent special circumstances, cannot be said to infringe upon either party's freedom. We agree with the part of the majority opinion holding that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not infringe the Defendants' freedom to hire.
However, the majority opinion overlooks the fact that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims discriminates against job seekers without reasonable grounds, and is inappropriate and unfair as a means of compensation or protection for occupational accidents.
D. 1) In principle, a corporation may determine hiring candidates according to standards it sets. Accordingly, the mere fact that a corporation eliminates certain candidates and selects others based on certain standards cannot in itself be deemed unlawful. This is all the more so in the case of a private enterprise.
However, even a private enterprise is not free to set hiring standards without any limitation whatsoever. Constitutional fundamental rights are, in the first instance, defensive rights intended to protect an individual's free sphere from infringement by public authority; but, on the other hand, as a concretization of the objective value order that is a fundamental decision of the Constitution, they exert influence across all areas of law, including private law, such that private legal relations between private individuals must also be regulated in a manner consistent with constitutional fundamental rights provisions. However, except in exceptional cases where a fundamental rights provision is, by its nature, directly applicable to private legal relations, such provisions indirectly take effect in private legal relations by shaping and serving as an interpretive standard for the content of Articles 2, 103, 750, and 751 of the Civil Act, which set forth general principles of private law (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Da38288, decided April 22, 2010). Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides: "All citizens shall be equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social, or cultural life on account of sex, religion, or social status," thereby declaring the principle of equality and simultaneously guaranteeing the right to equality to all citizens. Since it is an essential part of the realization of personality rights for an individual within the social community to engage in social and economic activities according to their hopes and aptitude without suffering unreasonable discrimination, the infringement of the fundamental right to equality by a corporation may be discussed in concrete terms as a violation of social order through Article 103 of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da19864, decided January 27, 2011).
Accordingly, where labor and management have agreed to adopt hiring standards unrelated to the necessity of the enterprise or to work performance ability in order to achieve a specific purpose, and where such standards, in light of the enterprise's scale and number of workers, the enterprise's general hiring practices, the appropriateness of the hiring standards to achieve the specific purpose, relevant statutory provisions, and social perceptions regarding the fairness of hiring opportunities, discriminate without reasonable grounds against job seekers or other union members with respect to that enterprise, and thereby depart from the sense of justice and the legal order concerning fair hiring, this may be evaluated as a juristic act violating the social order prescribed by Article 103 of the Civil Act.
2) The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims discriminates against job seekers without reasonable grounds and thereby departs from the sense of justice and the legal order concerning fair hiring.
A) The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims constitutes a case in which labor and management agreed upon discriminatory hiring standards that have no relation whatsoever to the Defendants' individual needs or to hiring candidates' work performance ability.
B) The Defendants are large enterprises belonging to the Hyundai Motor Group, listed companies representing the Republic of Korea's automobile industry. Considering the Defendants' business scale and number of workers, the Defendants bear a social responsibility to carry out hiring procedures in a fair manner.
C) Depending on circumstances such as manpower needs, the Defendants at times conduct large-scale open competitive hiring at specific times, and at other times adopt methods of continuous or special hiring; but in either case, the Defendants' basic principle is to first determine the required conditions and number of personnel needed, and then decide whether to hire based on interviews or examinations of qualified job seekers—in other words, to guarantee equal hiring opportunities to job seekers based on the Defendants' needs.
In light of this principled hiring method of the Defendants and the Defendants' business scale, it can be evaluated that job seekers hold a legitimate expectation that the Defendants will conduct hiring based on qualifications, work performance ability, and enterprise needs, and that if job seekers possess the abilities or qualifications the Defendants require, they may be hired by the Defendants through a fair process.
D) Among individual statutes, there are provisions that explicitly prohibit discriminatory treatment in hiring workers. Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Act on Employment Policy (고용정책 기본법) provides: "An employer shall not discriminate, without reasonable grounds, on the basis of sex, religion, age, physical condition, social status, place of origin, educational background, school of graduation, marriage, pregnancy, or medical history, etc., when recruiting or hiring workers, and shall guarantee equal employment opportunities." Article 2 of the Employment Security Act (직업안정법) provides: "No person shall be subjected to discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex, age, religion, physical condition, social status, or marital status, etc., in receiving job placement services or vocational guidance, or in determining an employment relationship." These provisions declare the legal principle that hiring opportunities must be equally afforded in our country, and thus constitute part of the content of the legal order prescribed by Article 103 of the Civil Act. The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims requires the Defendants, as employers, to engage in discriminatory treatment when hiring workers, and thus appears to violate the purposes of the aforementioned statutory provisions.
Meanwhile, the majority opinion cites, as examples, statutes providing employment support for persons of distinguished service or their families, and asserts that providing hiring opportunities for purposes of compensation and protection is a means contemplated by the legal order. However, as the court below pointed out, the employment support provisions in the statutes cited by the majority opinion were enacted in statutory form pursuant to social consensus, and presuppose a certain level of competition, such as by awarding extra points in hiring examinations; in this respect, they differ from the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, which compels hiring absent disqualifying reasons.
E) Social perceptions of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims must also be considered.
Collective agreements with content similar to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims are more likely to be adopted by labor unions of blue-chip companies that many young people wish to join, and it is also more likely that, in fact, bereaved families will seek to apply this provision at blue-chip companies. However, given the reality that the expanded youth unemployment rate according to "Employment Auxiliary Indicator 3" published by Statistics Korea reached as high as 22.9% as of 2019, such a special hiring provision may send a signal that a child's job may be determined by the parent's job, thereby frustrating the expectations and hopes of young people seeking employment for fair hiring opportunities. Although individual enterprises or labor unions do not bear direct responsibility for solving the unemployment problem, the Defendants are, at the very least, social actors with a responsibility to carry out hiring procedures in a fair manner. The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, in abandoning this responsibility, is tantamount to treating the status of job seekers—which is not subject to disposition at the discretion of labor and management—as an object of bargaining.
F) Aligning labor-management relations legislation and various systems with international standards is both a national task our country currently faces and a persistent demand of the labor sector. However, the method exemplified by the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, of passing jobs down to union members' bereaved families, appears to be far removed from international standards. Although many countries guarantee certain benefits to bereaved families through social insurance schemes for occupational accidents, which is not significantly different from our country's disaster compensation system, it is difficult to find examples of collective agreement provisions with the same or similar purport as the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims. The Ministry of Employment and Labor has also expressed a negative view of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims.
These circumstances demonstrate that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is distant from universal international standards and our country's policy direction.
G) The instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not provide for preferential hiring of, or additional points for, bereaved families in the open competitive hiring process, but rather provides for separate special hiring where requirements are met. For this reason, it is true that it is difficult to specify a "person who was not hired due to the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims," making it difficult to seek confirmation of employee status or damages, etc., against the Defendants.
However, the fact that it is difficult for job seekers to pursue specific litigation procedures has no essential bearing on whether the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims violates the social order. As discussed above, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims violates the social order not because it infringes upon job seekers' concrete right to claim hiring, but because it discriminates against them without reasonable grounds.
Rather, precisely because job seekers subjected to discriminatory treatment find it difficult to exercise their rights through litigation, the need for judicial intervention is all the greater in a case such as this, where one party to the collective agreement asserts the invalidity of the collective agreement.
3) The majority opinion asserts that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not violate the social order because it is aimed at compensating for the special sacrifice of a worker who died from an occupational accident and protecting the bereaved family's livelihood. However, based on another value of fairness that the majority opinion has failed to sufficiently examine, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is extremely inappropriate and unfair as a method of imposing liability on the employer for occupational accidents, or as a means of compensating the deceased worker or protecting the family.
A) (1) The damage suffered by the bereaved family due to the accident can be presumed to amount to roughly the sum obtained by subtracting "the amount received as disaster compensation" from "the equivalent amount of wages had the deceased worker continued working until reaching mandatory retirement age." However, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims causes the retirement age and wage amount to be newly set based on the age of the newly hired bereaved family member, regardless of the deceased worker's remaining period of service or wage level prior to death. As a result, it is not the deceased worker but the newly hired bereaved family member who becomes the standard, causing the level of compensation to vary accordingly.
(2) If the deceased worker has only lineal ascendants as bereaved family, it is highly likely that, in light of their age or career, they would be unable to be hired, or that the period during which they could be hired and work would be short. The same is true, to some degree, of the deceased worker's spouse (in the case of Defendant Hyundai Motor). Such bereaved family members would appear to have received little protection under the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, despite their need for protection. Moreover, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims provides that special hiring is possible only where there is no disqualifying reason. Even though the need for protection would be greater where there is a disqualifying reason severe enough to fail a physical examination, etc., the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims protects only those cases where there is a "family member who is physically healthy and able to work normally."
The fact alone that, since the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims was included in the collective agreement, the number of bereaved family members hired by Defendant Kia Motors falls short of one-third of the number of deaths from occupational accidents, and that two bereaved family members failed physical examinations and were not hired, shows that, even under the same collective agreement, the benefits of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims were discriminatorily granted among the families of workers who died from occupational accidents.
B) The majority opinion argues, on the ground that the Defendants concluded collective agreements including the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims over a long period and have in fact specially hired bereaved family members, that special hiring is justified; we cannot agree with this.
Good morals and other social order represent constantly evolving value conceptions, and even where a practice has been repeated in the past, if the conviction as to the legality of such practice has wavered or weakened with changing times such that it no longer conforms to the overall legal order, its validity cannot but be denied. Even if a method of compensation and protection premised on the traditional family form, in which a single head of household supports the family, has been maintained for a long period within the Defendants' workplaces, it cannot be permitted if it lacks legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the overall legal order.
In the past, family forms in our country consisted of a couple and their children, with the male spouse bearing responsibility for the family's livelihood and support. However, modern family forms are increasingly diversifying. There are a considerable number of so-called unmarried single-person households, comprising individuals who, after becoming independent from their parents, live without marrying, as well as married couples who choose not to have children even after forming a marital relationship.
Even taking the time of the Deceased's death, around 2010, as the reference point, the proportion of workers who died at the Defendants' workplaces without being the head of household or without having lineal descendants would have significantly increased; nevertheless, the Defendants and the labor unions, by presuming that the deceased worker was "a head of household with lineal descendants" and treating the hiring of a lineal descendant as constituting compensation for the deceased worker and protection of the deceased worker's bereaved family, created significant inequality even among the deaths from occupational accidents and their families.
C) A substantial portion of the income of a household with minor children is spent on childcare and education expenses until the children complete their education and become capable of earning income on their own. For this reason, when a parent with minor children dies from an occupational accident, ensuring livelihood security during this period is urgently needed. However, the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims comes to play the role of guaranteeing the child's livelihood from around the time that period ends and the child becomes capable of earning income on their own, until the child reaches retirement age. In this case as well, it appears that Plaintiff 1, who was a minor at the time of the Deceased's death, sought hiring against the Defendants only after graduating from university. If so, it is reasonable to view the actual purpose of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims as being the inheritance of jobs, rather than the guarantee of the bereaved family's livelihood.
E. Considering the following circumstances as well, it is all the more difficult to accept the majority opinion's view that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is valid.
1) The majority opinion appears to take the position that the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims differs from cases of special or preferential hiring of the family, etc., of retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and long-service employees. However, following the reasoning of the majority opinion, it would be logical to also regard such special or preferential hiring as valid.
Since the majority opinion cites agreement autonomy as an important ground, collective agreements providing for special or preferential hiring of the family, etc., of retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and long-service employees should also be respected to the fullest extent possible under the banner of agreement autonomy. Furthermore, such provisions could be seen as aimed at compensating workers who contributed to the Defendants over a long period through long service and caring for their families, a purpose not significantly different from that of the instant special hiring provision for bereaved families of industrial accident victims.
According to the Defendants' assertions, Defendant Kia Motors still maintains a provision for preferential hiring of long-service employees, etc. The majority opinion, absorbed in the benevolent purpose, has arrived at a result that even protects such a provision, which cannot but be criticized as job inheritance.
2) The criticism that, despite our country's high mortality rate from occupational accidents or diseases, the sentencing guidelines for violators of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (산업안전보건법) are excessively lenient, and the criticism that the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is insufficient to protect injured workers or their bereaved families, must be humbly accepted by all state institutions, including the judiciary.
According to statistics on "civil damages litigation" in the Judicial Yearbook published annually by the courts, industrial accident damages lawsuits filed in recent years, as of 2018, excluding small claims cases, number around 1,000 per year. This considerable number shows that, even where a worker or bereaved family has received industrial accident insurance benefits, there exists damage not compensated by such insurance benefits, and that it is not uncommon in reality for such persons to file civil damages claims against employers to be compensated for such damage. In this case as well, the Plaintiffs had no choice but to seek damages against the Defendants to be compensated for damage not covered by insurance benefits, and a portion of their claimed amount was granted. The same holds true for insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, as it is not uncommon for workers or bereaved families to have to engage in lengthy litigation to obtain approval from the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service.
[Reasoning] (continued)
In order to improve this reality, it is essential to reform the system so as to strengthen on-site safety measures, ensure that those responsible bear legal responsibility commensurate with their wrongdoing, and enable injured workers or bereaved families to receive fair and sufficient compensation without having to go through difficult procedures. However, it is difficult to see the special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims at issue in this case (hereinafter "the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims") as being particularly related to such systemic improvement.
During the public oral argument and trial proceedings in this case, counsel for the Plaintiffs argued that "labor and management, after concluding the collective agreement at issue in this case, sought to resolve civil issues arising from the occurrence of a serious industrial accident by granting an employment opportunity to one of the bereaved family members, while simultaneously seeking to enjoy exemption from criminal liability or a benefit in sentencing by submitting the bereaved family's petition (statement of non-punishment, etc.) in the criminal case." There is concern that providing the benefit of employing bereaved family members in this manner may instead induce the parties to gloss over discussions on proper compensation or the investigation of responsibility and causes for industrial accidents.
F. It would be desirable for labor and management to autonomously amend the collective agreement to delete the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims and to devise other means of compensation through labor-management agreement. However, insofar as the Defendants and the labor union, despite repeatedly concluding collective agreements over a long period, made no autonomous effort to abolish the special employment clause, the court has no choice but to make a normative determination denying the validity of the instant clause in order not to undermine the value of a fair legal order.
G. To emphasize once again, the dissenting opinion holds that the method by which an employer compensates for industrial accidents should not be based on the sacrifice of a third party such as a job seeker; it does not take the position that the employer's liability for industrial accidents should be reduced. The Defendants themselves also appear to be sympathetic to bearing compensation liability through other means, as they stated during the Supreme Court's oral argument proceedings that, if the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims were declared invalid, they intend to devise an appropriate compensation measure corresponding thereto.
H. In conclusion, the court below's judgment, which determined that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is invalid pursuant to Article 103 of the Civil Code (민법), contains no error, as alleged in the grounds for appeal, of exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of failing to conduct the necessary deliberation due to a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the principle of autonomy of collective agreements and Article 103 of the Civil Code.
For the reasons stated above, we express our dissent from the majority opinion with respect to the above portion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung Supplementing the Majority Opinion
A. First, I examine the basic structure of judgment in this case.
In this case, the issue is whether the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, which is part of the collective agreement, violates Article 103 of the Civil Code, which provides for the invalidity of juristic acts that violate social order. In order to determine whether Article 103 of the Civil Code, which sets the limits of private autonomy, applies to collective agreements, it is necessary to examine the relationship between private autonomy and the autonomy of collective agreements, whether a collective agreement can be regarded as a juristic act, and whether the provisions concerning juristic acts apply to collective agreements as they are.
1) All human beings, as equal subjects possessing dignity, may form their private life relationships through their own autonomous decisions, free from state interference. The principle of private autonomy, which forms the foundation of the private law order, means that individuals may shape their legal relationships according to their own free will. The main text of Article 10 of the Constitution (헌법), which guarantees human dignity and worth and the right to pursue happiness, and Article 119(1) of the Constitution, which provides that respect for the economic freedom and creativity of individuals and enterprises shall be the basis of the economic order, constitute the constitutional grounds for the principle of private autonomy.
However, where there is an economic or social disparity of power between the parties forming a legal relationship, the party in the inferior position cannot freely determine its own will on an equal footing with the other party. This is most conspicuous in employment relationships, where the worker is inevitably in a subordinate relationship in which working conditions, etc. are determined by the unilateral decision of the employer. Article 33 of the Constitution guarantees the three labor rights so that workers may recover a position equal to that of the employer through the collective strength of a union of many workers. The autonomy of collective agreements based on these three labor rights is intended to substantively realize private autonomy between employer and workers by allowing workers to organize labor unions, collectively bargain with employers, and conclude collective agreements.
2) A juristic act is the legal means by which the principle of private autonomy is realized. A juristic act causes a certain legal effect to occur as intended by the actor, and the private law order may be described as a system that helps individuals determine and freely shape their legal relationships as they themselves wish. However, this cannot be recognized without limit. Where a juristic act violates good morals or other social order—in other words, the general norms that the general public must necessarily observe—its validity cannot be recognized. The specific content of social order is clarified through adjudication in individual cases, thereby serving to draw the limits of private autonomy.
As seen above, since the autonomy of collective agreements guaranteed under the three labor rights is a principle oriented toward substantive private autonomy, it is only natural that, just as private autonomy has its limits, the autonomy of collective agreements also has its limits. It cannot be permitted, in the name of realizing the autonomy of collective agreements, to conclude a collective agreement whose content violates mandatory statutes or social order. It would produce an unjust result if, while the content of an employment contract, which is clearly a juristic act, can be controlled on the grounds of violation of mandatory statutes or social order, no control whatsoever could be exercised over a collective agreement that determines the principal contents of the employment contract.
3) Since Article 103 of the Civil Code provides that a juristic act is void when its content violates good morals or other social order, it must first be examined whether a collective agreement constitutes a juristic act.
A collective agreement refers to an agreement concluded between a labor union with the capacity to conclude collective agreements and an employer or an employers' association concerning working conditions and other standards for the treatment of workers, and various matters relating to labor-management relations. The formation of a collective agreement takes the form of a contract concluded by agreement between the parties, and in that the parties are bound by such agreement, it is no different from a general contract.
However, a collective agreement has characteristics that cannot be regarded as those of a general contract. The content of the agreement concluded by the representative of the labor union has the effect of directly creating the rights and obligations of the member workers. Article 33 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter "the Trade Union Act") provides that the portions of rules of employment or an employment contract that violate the standards concerning working conditions and other treatment of workers set forth in the collective agreement shall be void (paragraph 1), thereby recognizing normative effect, and that matters not stipulated in the employment contract, or portions rendered void pursuant to paragraph 1, shall be governed by the standards set forth in the collective agreement (paragraph 2), thereby recognizing direct effect. A unionized worker is restricted in the freedom to make an individual agreement on terms below the standards of the collective agreement with respect to the treatment of workers. Based on this special effect of collective agreements, there is also a view that a collective agreement is not a contract but a legal norm itself.
Article 35 of the Trade Union Act provides that where more than half of the workers of the same kind ordinarily employed at one place of business or workplace come to be covered by one collective agreement, that collective agreement shall also apply to other workers of the same kind employed at that place of business or workplace, thereby recognizing so-called general binding force within a certain scope. This general binding force, which directly creates rights and obligations even for non-union members who have not even joined the labor union, also demonstrates that a collective agreement has a character very different from that of a general contract.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, notwithstanding the special nature of its effect, a collective agreement has the character of a juristic act in that it is a legal requirement whose essential element is a declaration of intent aimed at bringing about a certain legal effect. In that a collective agreement determines the respective rights and obligations of opposing parties through their mutual agreement, it is difficult to treat it as fundamentally different from a contract. Nor does the Trade Union Act regulate in detail all matters concerning the conclusion and content of collective agreements. However, because a collective agreement is concluded through collective bargaining, sometimes following industrial action, and because, as seen above, its effect has a special character unlike that of an ordinary contract, there are cases in which the Civil Code provisions on juristic acts and declarations of intent do not apply, or must be applied with modification. Ultimately, the core of the discussion is to what extent the Civil Code's provisions on juristic acts should be applied, based on the special characteristics of collective agreements, and which portions should be applied with modification.
The Supreme Court has traditionally regarded a collective agreement, or the act of concluding a collective agreement, as a juristic act (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du896 delivered on September 9, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2016Da26532 delivered on March 22, 2017, etc.). Furthermore, it has developed its legal reasoning on the premise that, where the requirements set forth in the Civil Code are met, a collective agreement may constitute an act contrary to social order under Article 103 of the Civil Code, or an unfair juristic act under Article 104 of the Civil Code (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da14786 delivered on July 28, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2007Da18584 delivered on December 14, 2007, etc.).
If we apply, to collective agreements, examples of juristic acts generally considered void on grounds of violating social order, we can also recognize the need to regulate collective agreements under Article 103 of the Civil Code. For example, one may envision cases where one party agrees to commit a criminal act, where a clause provides that union members shall never resign, where union members providing the same labor are agreed to be discriminated against without reasonable grounds, or where it is agreed that a worker shall retire upon marriage. In determining the validity of such collective agreement clauses, one conceivable method is to take constitutional fundamental rights provisions into account through the medium of Articles 2 and 103, etc. of the Civil Code (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Da38288 delivered on April 22, 2010); however, this method cannot resolve cases where no infringement of fundamental rights is at issue, and may therefore be more limited than the method of determining violation of social order under Article 103 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, even though a collective agreement has special characteristics in terms of its effect, since it has the character of a juristic act, it is desirable to determine the validity of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, which is part of the collective agreement, by examining whether it violates social order under Article 103 of the Civil Code. However, because a collective agreement has characteristics different from those of an ordinary juristic act, caution must be exercised in determining that a collective agreement violates social order.
B. In order to determine whether the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is invalid under Article 103 of the Civil Code, the content of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims must first be established.
1) Article 103 of the Civil Code governs cases where the "content" of a juristic act violates social order. Accordingly, it is only after clarifying what the content of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is that one can determine whether it violates social order.
The content of a juristic act refers to the legal effect that the actor intends to bring about through the juristic act, and the occurrence of that effect is determined according to the content of the declaration of intent, that is, the content of the intent to bring about the effect. Under the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, when a certain fact occurs—namely, the death of a union member due to an industrial accident—the employer must, unless there is a disqualifying cause, specially employ one person, such as a lineal relative, among the deceased union member's bereaved family. Since special employment refers to the hiring of an employee through a separate selection process that limits competition, when the above fact occurs, the employer bears the obligation to proceed with the special employment procedure.
In that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims sets forth an employer's obligation corresponding to the occurrence of the serious result of death due to an industrial accident, regardless of any fault attributable to the employer, it can be viewed as providing, based on the employer's liability for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), additional compensation beyond that provided under the Labor Standards Act, by a means other than money.
2) The purpose of the accident compensation system under the Labor Standards Act is a kind of no-fault compensation system intended to have the employer, who places workers providing labor under its control and operates an enterprise inherently carrying accident risk, compensate for the damage suffered by a worker due to the occurrence of an accident, regardless of fault (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 81Daka351 delivered on October 13, 1981). The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is an agreement made in advance by labor and management, in preparation for the death of a union member due to an industrial accident, to provide additional compensation by the method of special employment.
Article 394 of the Civil Code provides, with respect to the method of damages, that "unless otherwise expressed, damages shall be compensated in money," and this provision applies mutatis mutandis to damages arising from tort (Article 763 of the Civil Code). Accordingly, while the method of compensating damages arising from non-performance of an obligation or tort is, in principle, monetary compensation, it is also permissible to agree to compensate damages by another method. The same applies where the parties agree on the method of accident compensation. Although it is rare for the parties to agree on non-monetary compensation for damages or losses, such a method is also contemplated under the Civil Code. An agreement to compensate damages by a non-monetary method, such as the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, may be regarded as falling within this category.
In this respect, the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is clearly distinguishable from clauses providing for the special or preferential employment of the children of retirees or long-term employees. If, without making such a distinction, all such clauses are uniformly labeled as "job inheritance," this may amount to an oversimplification of the issue or a fallacy of overgeneralization that fails to consider the differences and relative gravity of the situations involved.
C. We now examine whether the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims becomes void on the ground of violation of social order.
1) An act violating social order that becomes void under Article 103 of the Civil Code includes not only a case where the content of the rights and obligations that are the object of the juristic act itself violates good morals or other social order, but also a case where, even though the content itself does not violate social order, the juristic act takes on a character contrary to social order because its performance is legally compelled, or because a condition or monetary consideration contrary to social order is attached to the juristic act, as well as a case where the motive for the juristic act, when expressed or made known to the other party, violates social order (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da23858 delivered on July 28, 2005, etc.). Although these categories do not encompass all acts violating social order, it can be said that most juristic acts, if they do not fall within the above categories, do not have content contrary to social order.
The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims sets forth a non-monetary method of additional compensation intended to supplement the employer's obligation of accident compensation, and its central content is to conclude an employment contract with one person, such as a lineal relative, of the worker who died due to an industrial accident, unless there is a disqualifying cause. Since the content of the obligation borne by the employer is to conclude an employment contract when, in the future, a cause satisfying the above condition arises, it cannot be concluded that the content itself violates social order. Moreover, there are no circumstances indicating that the content of the rights and obligations set forth by the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, whose purpose is compensation for an accident, violates social order. Nor is any consideration or condition attached to the performance of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims. Since the motive for including the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in the collective agreement is accident compensation, the motive likewise cannot be said to violate social order.
2) Our legal order takes private autonomy or the autonomy of collective agreements as its principle. Restrictions thereon are recognized only where, even absent a violation of a mandatory statute, the act exceeds the limits that the community as a whole cannot generally tolerate, in light of the entire legal order. Whether such limits have been exceeded must be determined, in each individual case, through a weighing of the conflicting legal interests concerning the particular juristic act at issue.
A) The question arises whether the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims infringes the employer's freedom. As a general rule, an employer has the freedom of employment. So long as it does not violate statutes, an employer may freely decide when, whom, and by what method to employ. This is all the more true in the case of a private enterprise that is not a public enterprise.
Since the Defendants, as employers, agreed to the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in concluding the collective agreement with the labor union according to their own free will, recognizing the validity of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims accords with the will of the employers. The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims may be seen not as infringing the employer's freedom of employment but rather as realizing it, and it does not infringe the freedom not to conclude an employment contract, so-called the freedom of non-employment, either. It cannot be said that, after a party has concluded a contract according to its own will, the principle of freedom of contract is infringed by reason of the binding force of the contract.
Of course, a contract intended to excessively restrict an individual's freedom may become void on the ground of violating social order. An example would be an agreement that a worker, after retirement, shall not engage in a certain business without limitation. This mainly raises problems in the case of agreements disadvantageous to workers, and caution must be exercised in recognizing a violation of social order on the ground that the employer's freedom is excessively restricted. The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims provides that, as compensation for an industrial accident, one of the bereaved family members of a deceased worker shall be specially employed where there is no disqualifying cause. Since the employer retains the authority not to employ where the bereaved family member has a disqualifying cause, it cannot be concluded that this clause is an agreement that excessively restricts the employer's freedom.
B) The question arises whether the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims can be considered to violate social order on the ground that it infringes the interests or rights of third parties, such as job seekers.
It is difficult to specifically identify whether, in the case of employing one of the bereaved family members of a worker who died due to an industrial accident pursuant to the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, the interests or rights of a third party are infringed. It is unclear which job seeker, and when, would as a result fail to be employed because of this special employment procedure. Such a clause cannot be equated with an agreement to exclude a certain category of persons from employment on grounds of sex, race, religion, national origin, etc. This is because, while such an agreement directly affects the interests or rights of the persons concerned, the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims applies only in the case of death due to an industrial accident, and it is the bereaved family member, rather than the deceased, who is employed in the deceased's place, so that the effect on third parties is limited.
In determining whether a juristic act violates social order, the interests or rights of third parties may be considered in addition to the public interest or common social notions; however, in order to hold that social order has been violated by taking into account the interests or rights of a third party, the juristic act must directly affect, or clearly be likely in the future to affect, the interests or rights of a specific third party. Where, as in this case, it is not even clear whether a third party exists, it is difficult to hold that the juristic act violates social order on the ground that it infringes the interests or rights of a third party.
C) As noted in the majority opinion, the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is a means of protecting the livelihood of bereaved families as compensation for the special sacrifice of death due to an industrial accident. To hold the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims invalid would result in betraying the expectation and right to employment held by the bereaved family of a person who died due to an industrial accident. Since the bereaved family had no involvement whatsoever in the formation of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, there must be a legitimate ground for depriving the bereaved family of such expectation and right. The bereaved family would have relied on the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims and made life plans accordingly, and such reliance is worthy of protection.
D) In our society, the expected level of fairness is rising day by day. As youth unemployment has reached a serious level, fairness in hiring is recognized as an important value. It is desirable for both employers and labor unions to strive to ensure that hiring is conducted fairly. However, whether an agreement to specially employ one of the bereaved family members who has no disqualifying cause, as a method of compensating the bereaved family of a worker who died due to an industrial accident, should be held invalid on the ground that it violates social order is a separate question. The validity of a collective agreement clause of a certain content cannot be denied merely because that content is undesirable.
The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is a provision, in a collective agreement concluded through bargaining conducted by labor and management pursuant to the Trade Union Act, to employ one of the bereaved family members of a worker who died due to an industrial accident. Viewed from the present point in time, an evaluation could be made that maintaining the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is undesirable in that it undermines the value of fairness in hiring. It is clear that, given that the accident compensation system has been established, there is an undesirable aspect to continuing to maintain such a clause. However, to hold the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims void, absent a clear ground that it violates social order, would result in excessively curtailing the sphere of autonomy guaranteed to labor and management.
The foregoing supplements the grounds of the majority opinion.
7. Concurring Opinion of Justices Kim Seon-su and Kim Sang-hwan Supplementing the Majority Opinion
A. Introduction
The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims may amount to unreasonable discrimination against job seekers and union members. In focusing on the public character of employment and articulating the principle that the Defendants, though private enterprises, bear a social responsibility to realize fairness in hiring and are thus bound by certain legal principles in relation to the employment of workers, the dissenting opinion carries important meaning that deserves careful attention. Nevertheless, we wish to supplement the majority opinion by elaborating on the point that the grounds presented by the dissenting opinion are insufficient to warrant evaluating as invalid the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, which was devised through the autonomous agreement of labor and management as a measure to address "a situation in which a worker dies due to an industrial accident."
B. Regarding Content Control of Collective Agreements Based on Article 103 of the Civil Code
1) When a court examines the content of a collective agreement based on Article 103 of the Civil Code and determines its invalidity, it needs to bear in mind that a collective agreement functions as an autonomous norm of labor and management grounded in the Constitution.
The three labor rights specified in Article 33 of the Constitution do not merely have the character of a passive right of defense against infringement by state power, but also carry meaning as an objective constitutional value that should be actively reflected in shaping the legal order of the relevant field. Accordingly, a collective agreement, as the product of the realization of the three labor rights, functions as an autonomous norm in labor-management relations, rather than merely being a general agreement between parties with conflicting interests that binds only them. Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act, which provides that portions of rules of employment or an employment contract that violate the standards on working conditions and other treatment of workers set forth in the collective agreement shall be void, recognizes normative effect, and paragraph (2), which provides that matters not stipulated in the employment contract, or portions rendered void pursuant to paragraph (1), shall be governed by the standards set forth in the collective agreement, recognizes direct effect; these can be understood as provisions grounded in the normative status of collective agreements contemplated by the Constitution.
In light of the fact that a collective agreement thus functions, pursuant to the Constitution and the statutes giving it concrete effect, as an autonomous norm within a partial society (an enterprise), the court needs to take, in principle, a position of respecting the three labor rights and the autonomy of collective agreements as a legal order formed by the Constitution, when controlling the content of a collective agreement based on Article 103 of the Civil Code.
In particular, given that it is the employer who is in an economically and socially superior position, if the court were to subsequently deny, based on the general clause of Article 103 of the Civil Code, the validity of matters that the employer itself agreed to concede in some measure through bargaining with the labor union for the promotion of workers' welfare and other improvements in their social and economic status, this could run counter to the purpose of the Constitution and labor relations statutes, which seek to achieve substantive equality through the protection of the economically and socially weak; for this reason as well, the court's paternalistic intervention should be exercised with even greater restraint.
Accordingly, in order to entirely negate the effect, under Article 103 of the Civil Code, of the content of a collective agreement concerning working conditions, etc., on the ground that it violates "good morals or other social order," special circumstances must be presented showing that, even taking into account the above constitutional significance of the three labor rights, the content of the collective agreement in question can be seen as excessively restricting, beyond a level that can be socially accepted as reasonable, the constitutional fundamental rights or other constitutional legal interests or values of the persons concerned.
2) The majority opinion is also a conclusion that takes into account the meaning and function of Article 103 of the Civil Code.
It is not easy to evaluate whether a collective agreement, which has the character of an autonomous norm created by the parties according to their own will, accords with, or violates, "good morals or other social order" as provided in Article 103 of the Civil Code. This is because the concept of "good morals or other social order" itself is one that may change with the times, and is also a highly indeterminate and abstract value concept that inevitably gives rise to diverse interpretations depending on the social experience, perspective, or interests of the members of our society.
Under these circumstances, in order for the court's determination regarding Article 103 of the Civil Code to be stable and to guarantee predictability for the parties, the court needs to adopt a more objective and normative viewpoint. If the court, through the medium of Article 103, were to examine one by one whether a given juristic act has desirable content and direction in light of the social conditions of the time, it would not only be difficult to reach a universally acceptable conclusion, but there would also be a risk that this would lead to excessive paternalistic intervention in the parties' freedom to shape their legal relationships according to their autonomous will and interests, that is, the principle of private autonomy.
Accordingly, it is appropriate for the court, in principle, to interpret and apply Article 103 of the Civil Code from the viewpoint of whether a given juristic act violates the objective order of values that the Constitution pursues or contemplates through its fundamental rights provisions, etc. This accords with the legislative purpose of Article 103 of the Civil Code, which seeks to ensure that at least the core values of the entire legal order are realized even in private legal relationships.
C. Rebuttal to the Grounds of the Dissenting Opinion
1) The dissenting opinion states that, since the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is intended to create a legal relationship between the bereaved family and the employer, rather than concerning working conditions between union members and the employer, it is difficult to view it as falling within the scope of special protection based on the three labor rights.
However, this focuses excessively on the fact that a new legal relationship is created, thereby understanding "working conditions" too narrowly, and we find it difficult to agree. The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims was established as part of the compensation for a union member who died due to an industrial accident, and there can be no disagreement that provisions concerning accident compensation fall within "working conditions."
Even if, adopting the strictest view as to the scope of "working conditions," one were to hold that the content of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims does not fall within "working conditions," the viewpoint of the dissenting opinion is still difficult to accept. The instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is an agreement reached through bargaining with the labor union concerning matters within the disposable authority of the Defendants as employers, for the purpose of promoting workers' welfare and other improvements in their social and economic status, and at the very least falls within the obligatory part of the collective agreement; the obligatory part of a collective agreement likewise falls within the scope of protection under Article 33 of the Constitution and the Trade Union Act.
2) The dissenting opinion states that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims constitutes a case of adopting hiring criteria unrelated to the enterprise's need for hiring or to work capability.
It is indeed true that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims requires, as a condition, that the person be a bereaved family member of the deceased worker. However, it is excessive to regard it as a hiring criterion that takes no account whatsoever of the enterprise's need for hiring or work capability. Viewed from the standpoint of filling a vacancy created by the worker's death, there does exist a need for hiring on the part of the enterprise. Moreover, in order to be employed under the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, the person must have no "disqualifying cause," and since the person, once employed, is assigned by the Defendants to a suitable position, it cannot be said that this is a method of hiring unrelated to work capability.
3) While we deeply sympathize with the portion of the dissenting opinion emphasizing the real difficulties faced by job seekers, it is nonetheless difficult to see this as being directly connected to the validity of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims.
A) Before rebutting the grounds of the dissenting opinion, we wish to emphasize that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims has its own meaning and value that cannot easily be dismissed. The significance of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims—that it was devised through labor and management's shared recognition of the painful weight of "a situation in which a worker dies due to a cause attributable to the employer or for reasons connected with work"—must itself be taken seriously. This is the fundamental reason why the suspicion that "is this not simply the handing down of a job without any legitimate justification whatsoever?" is not well founded.
It is common knowledge that, even though the death of a working person due to an industrial accident is something that must never occur, our country's death rate due to occupational accidents or diseases remains considerably high by global standards. Even in recent years, industrial accidents too numerous to individually name have occurred, and precious lives have been lost. This can be said to be the result of our society, and our laws and institutions, having turned a blind eye to, neglected, and left unattended the working environment and safety of workers.
The state and the entire community must keep workplaces safe. However, it goes without saying that the most important and primary responsibility lies with the employer. Where an accident occurs because the employer has failed to fulfill that responsibility, and in particular where the irreversible result of a worker's death occurs, it is entirely appropriate that the cause be investigated and the fault determined so as to establish whose wrongdoing gave rise to the harm, and that every possible effort be made so that the worker and bereaved family who suffered the special sacrifice may recover from and be healed of the harm suffered as a result of the accident.
Although the Labor Standards Act provides for the employer's obligation to compensate for industrial accidents, and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법) enables workers and their bereaved families to receive various benefits, it is difficult to assert that the protection and compensation provided for by law amount to complete recovery from the harm suffered due to an industrial accident. Accordingly, it should be encouraged, rather than viewed negatively merely because it is not a method guaranteed by statute, for the employer, who fundamentally bears the liability for accident compensation, to seek additional methods beyond what is legally guaranteed and, through labor-management agreement, to supplement or expand the accident compensation liability it bears.
Having the bereaved family succeed to the occupation performed by the worker who died due to an industrial accident, for the sake of maintaining the family as a support community, may be regarded as the method closest to restoring the harm to its original state.
B) It goes without saying that the problem of youth unemployment in our society has reached a serious level, such that the fundamental right to work cannot be properly realized, and that all of society's capabilities must be devoted to resolving this. The state bears a constitutional duty to resolve the problem of youth unemployment and to strive to promote the employment of workers, and the Defendants, as so-called "national enterprises" that have grown in our society with the contribution of the state and members of society, likewise cannot deny their responsibility to strive to resolve the social problem of youth unemployment.
However, no ground can be found for viewing the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims—devised as a form of compensation and support for a family member who died due to an industrial accident—as constituting any obstacle to establishing fundamental measures for, and properly resolving, the problem of youth unemployment. The scale and actual state of employment under the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims to date, together with the following circumstances, clearly demonstrate this point.
In hiring workers, the Defendants adopt, as a general rule, open recruitment giving equal opportunity to numerous applicants, but conduct special employment through special selection processes where certain circumstances exist. Article 7(4) of Defendant Kia Motors' Personnel Regulations provides that special employment may be conducted not only in cases falling under the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, but also in cases of hiring a small number of persons with extensive experience and ability for an intended position, cases pursuant to an employment order under statute, cases of hiring the necessary personnel for urgent staffing needs, and other cases where a person is recognized as difficult to hire through open competition.
Since various forms of special employment, distinguished from open recruitment, are thus recognized, it is difficult to accept the dissenting opinion's view that special employment under the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims in itself amounts to unreasonable discrimination against job seekers.
C) In this case, the Defendants primarily advance "the right of job seekers to be fairly hired" as the main ground for their argument, and the dissenting opinion accepted this. However, it is doubtful, first of all, whether the Defendants themselves actually recognize "a specific right of job seekers to be fairly hired by themselves."
Whether, if job seekers were to demand that the Defendants hire them fairly, or were to seek confirmation of employee status or damages on the ground that they failed to be hired due to unfair hiring criteria or procedures, the Defendants would in fact comply with such demands, and whether, if the Defendants refused and the job seekers proceeded to litigation, the court could grant such claims, are extremely difficult questions.
It is not justified to invalidate the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims—which can be evaluated as a legal right created by agreement between labor and management—on the basis of "the expectation or hope of job seekers that they will be fairly hired," which, though earnest, appears difficult to recognize as a concrete legal right.
4) The dissenting opinion's point that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims fails to provide sufficient compensation in all cases, including various forms of family, and that it also fails to properly keep pace with the trend of social change, is a point worth heeding.
However, on the premise that the purpose is to guarantee the livelihood of the bereaved family as compensation for death due to an industrial accident, it is difficult to say that it is necessarily wrong for different compensation to be given depending on the circumstances of the bereaved family. Given that the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act likewise calculates the survivor benefit pension differently according to the number of eligible recipients of the survivor benefit pension who were dependent on the worker who died due to an industrial accident, the mere fact that the bereaved family of a worker with lineal descendants and the bereaved family of a worker without such descendants receive different compensation cannot in itself be regarded as wrong.
Moreover, the other problems inherent in the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims can be resolved by fully taking into account various circumstances and appropriately supplementing the clause in line with social change. Denying the validity of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims cannot be said to be the solution. No system of social welfare or support is perfect, and there may be shortcomings. It would be putting the cart before the horse to eliminate the benefit for everyone merely because some people fail to receive the benefit, or receive it unfairly.
D. On the Dissenting Opinion's Words of Counsel
1) We fully agree with the dissenting opinion's counsel that the judiciary, together with all state institutions, must humbly accept the criticism that, given our country's high rate of industrial accident deaths, the sentencing guidelines for violators of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (산업안전보건법) are excessively lenient, and the criticism that the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act is insufficient to protect injured workers or their bereaved families. We also agree with the dissenting opinion that systemic improvement is essential, in order to improve this reality, so as to strengthen on-site safety measures, ensure that those responsible bear legal responsibility commensurate with their wrongdoing, and enable injured workers or bereaved families to receive fair and sufficient compensation without having to go through difficult procedures.
However, we cannot agree with the view that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims has a negative effect on the above problem awareness and the direction of systemic improvement. The dissenting opinion's concern that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims may induce the parties to gloss over discussions on proper compensation or the investigation of responsibility and causes for industrial accidents appears to be nothing more than an unfounded fear. Thorough investigation of causes and punishment of those responsible is a matter that can be addressed by strictly enforcing the relevant statutes and, if these prove inadequate, by enacting or amending and enforcing the relevant statutes. The view suggesting that the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims may be a cause or a result of the problem of failing to properly address industrial accidents is difficult to accept.
2) The dissenting opinion argues that, because a collective agreement such as the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims is difficult to find in other countries, it is far removed from international standards. However, it is only natural that the content of collective agreements differs by country, by region, by industry, and by workplace, depending on the tradition of labor-management relations and the influence of various legal systems. The existence or non-existence of a particular content cannot be concluded to constitute an international standard. Rather, in light of the doubt as to whether there are cases in other countries in which the validity of a collective agreement autonomously concluded by labor and management has been denied on the ground of violating public order and good morals, it may be said that denying the validity of the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims by invoking Article 103 of the Civil Code is itself what runs contrary to international standards.
3) The fact that the Defendants and the labor union have maintained the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims for a long period of time is because both sides agreed on its necessity or utility. If there is anything unreasonable about the instant special employment clause for bereaved families of industrial accident victims, labor and management can improve it. Indeed, Defendant Hyundai Motor Company and the labor union, in amending their collective agreement, deleted the provision granting preferential employment to the children of retirees or long-term union members. This demonstrates that labor and management have the capacity to improve their collective agreement by taking social responsibility into account as well. We believe that, even without the court's paternalistic intervention, the Defendants and the labor union will be able to sufficiently take into account the various problems raised against them and operate the relevant system accordingly.
The foregoing sets forth the concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan (Justice in Charge), Justice Noh Tae-ak