[Plaintiff, Retrial Plaintiff] Plaintiff 1 (Attorney Park Woo-dong of Lee & Ko for the Litigation Representative)
[Defendant, Retrial Defendant] Defendant School Foundation (Attorney Kim Hyung-ki for the Litigation Representative)
[Judgment Subject to Retrial] Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 rendered on April 7, 1995
[Order]
All retrial claims are dismissed. The costs of the retrial litigation shall be borne by the Plaintiffs (Retrial Plaintiffs).
[Reasoning]
1. On the Existence of Grounds for Retrial
Under Article 7(1) of the Court Organization Act (법원조직법), the adjudicative authority of the Supreme Court shall be exercised by an en banc panel composed of at least two-thirds of all Supreme Court Justices; provided, however, that unless the case falls under any of the items of the same paragraph, the case may first be examined by a division composed of three or more Justices, and only where the opinions of the Justices in that division are unanimous may the division render judgment on the case. Item 3 of the same paragraph provides for "cases where it is recognized that there is a need to change an opinion previously rendered by the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation and application of the Constitution, statutes, orders, or rules." Accordingly, where the opinion set forth in the judgment subject to retrial concerning the interpretation and application of a statute, etc. constitutes a change to an opinion set forth in a prior Supreme Court judgment, but the judgment subject to retrial was rendered by a division composed of fewer than two-thirds of all Justices, this constitutes a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법), namely, "where the court that rendered the judgment was not constituted in accordance with the law" (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 81Sa9 rendered on September 28, 1982; Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Jaeda260 rendered on April 25, 1995, etc.).
The judgment subject to retrial in this case was rendered by a division composed of four Justices, which examined the case and held as follows: pursuant to Article 53-2(2) of the former Private School Act (사립학교법) (before amendment by Act No. 4226 of April 7, 1990), a professor appointed for a fixed term automatically loses his or her status as a professor upon expiration of the term of appointment, unless there exists a provision in the articles of incorporation of the school foundation or the personnel regulations for university faculty that imposes an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired; that the Plaintiffs (Retrial Plaintiffs; hereinafter referred to simply as "the Plaintiffs") likewise lost their status as professors upon the expiration of their respective terms of appointment; that, accordingly, the claim seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case amounts to nothing more than a claim for confirmation of a past legal relationship; that, unlike cases of removal or dismissal by disciplinary action, there is no statutory restriction whatsoever on appointment to public office or as a faculty member in the case of suspension from position or dismissal, and even if having such a prior record operates as a disadvantageous impediment, compared to persons without such a record, in being appointed to public office or as a faculty member, this alone cannot be deemed an infringement of a legal interest; and that, therefore, the Plaintiffs' action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case lacks the interest in confirmation and should be dismissed as unlawful. On this basis—finding that the lower court, having accepted the Plaintiffs' claims or having upheld the first instance judgment that accepted such claims, committed an error of law concerning the interest in confirmation that affected the judgment—the judgment subject to retrial accepted the Plaintiffs' appeal, reversed the lower court's judgment (which had accepted the claims or upheld the first instance judgment accepting the claims), and dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' actions.
However, in Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991, the Court expressed the view that even where the plaintiff, an associate professor at a university, was not reappointed beyond the term of appointment for associate professors under the Private School Act and the foundation's articles of incorporation, this fact alone does not mean that the plaintiff—who received a dismissal disposition prior to the expiration of the term of appointment—lacks an interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of that disposition; furthermore, that if the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff is invalid, then, absent special circumstances, the plaintiff's status should be deemed to continue as before.
Given this, the opinion set forth in the judgment subject to retrial in this case—regarding whether a faculty member appointed for a fixed term who received a disadvantageous disposition such as dismissal prior to the expiration of the term of appointment retains his or her status despite the expiration of that term, and whether there is an interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of such disadvantageous disposition—constitutes a change to the opinion set forth in the above-cited Supreme Court judgment. Since it is clear that the judgment subject to retrial was rendered by a division rather than by the en banc panel, the judgment subject to retrial contains a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act.
2. On the Merits of the Grounds for Appeal
Where a faculty member appointed for a fixed term pursuant to Article 53-2(2) of the former Private School Act receives a disadvantageous disposition such as removal, dismissal, or discharge prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, and the term of appointment subsequently expires, then even if the disadvantageous disposition is invalid, the faculty member automatically loses his or her status as a faculty member upon the expiration of the term of appointment, unless there exists a provision in the articles of incorporation of the school foundation or the personnel regulations for university faculty imposing an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da1134 rendered on June 25, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 93Da5093 rendered on April 23, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 92Da40587 rendered on July 27, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 95Da11696 rendered on February 27, 1996, etc.).
Therefore, if the facts are as lawfully determined by the lower court, then all of the Plaintiffs, as professors appointed for a fixed term at the university operated by the Defendant (Retrial Defendant), lost their status as professors upon the expiration of their respective terms of appointment prior to the closing of oral argument at the lower court. Accordingly, even if the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case are invalid, the Plaintiffs cannot recover their status as professors, and the claim seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case amounts to nothing more than a claim for confirmation of a past legal relationship.
Meanwhile, even with respect to a past legal relationship, where that relationship continues to affect a present right or legal status, and obtaining a declaratory judgment concerning that legal relationship is recognized as an effective and appropriate means of removing danger or uncertainty concerning the present right or legal status, the action for confirmation of that legal relationship should be deemed to have the interest in immediate confirmation; and this view is also consistent with the dispute-resolution and dispute-prevention functions of confirmation actions (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da1134 rendered on June 25, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Da40587 rendered on July 27, 1993, etc.). However, unlike cases of removal or dismissal by disciplinary action, there is no statutory restriction whatsoever on appointment to public office or as a faculty member in the case of suspension from position or dismissal. Furthermore, under the former statutory regime—which, unlike the current Private School Act, did not contain a mandatory provision requiring deliberation by a faculty personnel committee to determine whether to reappoint a faculty member upon expiration of the term of appointment—even if having such a prior record operates, as a practical matter, as a disadvantageous impediment, compared to persons without such a record, to the Plaintiffs (who are faculty members of the private school at issue in this case whose terms of appointment have expired) in being appointed to public office or as faculty members, this alone cannot be deemed an infringement of a legal interest. Accordingly, there is no interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dispositions (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da4011 rendered on April 11, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 95Nu12347 rendered on December 5, 1995, etc.).
The other precedents cited in the complaint for retrial concern matters different from the case at hand and are not appropriate to be invoked in this case.
Furthermore, as in this case, where the term of appointment has already expired and the position cannot be legally restored as a result of the litigation, confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions alone cannot be said to serve the function of relief of rights sought in the litigation at issue. Since there exists a direct means of relief of rights—namely, a performance action such as a claim for payment of the infringed wage claim or a claim for damages premised on defamation—for recovering the infringed wage claim or de facto reputational harm, an action for confirmation of invalidity cannot be deemed an appropriate means of relief of rights, and thus fails to satisfy another requirement for a confirmation action. Moreover, disallowing an action for confirmation of invalidity where such a direct means of relief of rights exists does not thereby foreclose the parties' relief of rights. Given that the importance of reputation is equal for all persons, not only faculty members but also corporate officers, employees, and others, it would not be appropriate to treat faculty members differently in this respect while denying the interest in confirmation in relation to others.
Accordingly, the above Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991—which took a different view and expressed the opinion that where a private school faculty member appointed for a fixed term receives a dismissal disposition prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, and that dismissal disposition is invalid, the faculty member retains his or her status despite the expiration of the term of appointment, or that there is a legal interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal disposition even after the expiration of the term of appointment—shall be overruled.
In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case lacks the interest in confirmation and should be dismissed as unlawful; nevertheless, the lower court, taking a different view, accepted the Plaintiffs' appeal and accepted their claims, or upheld the first instance judgment accepting such claims. Accordingly, the lower court's judgment contains an error of law concerning the interest in confirmation, and it is clear that this error affected the judgment. Therefore, the appeal is well-founded insofar as it points out this error.
Accordingly, the lower court's judgment is reversed, and since this Court finds it sufficient to render judgment directly based on the facts as determined by the lower court, this Court dismisses all of the Plaintiffs' actions for the reasons set forth above; however, since the conclusion of the judgment subject to retrial is correct, pursuant to Article 430 of the Civil Procedure Act, all of the retrial claims in this case are dismissed, and the costs of the retrial litigation shall be borne by the losing party, as set forth in the Order. This judgment is rendered with the concurrence of the participating Justices, except for the dissenting opinions of Justice Lee Yong-hoon, Justice Cho Mu-je, Justice Yoo Ji-dam, and Justice Lee Yong-woo.
3. The dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Yong-hoon, Justice Cho Mu-je, Justice Yoo Ji-dam, and Justice Lee Yong-woo is as follows:
A. We dissent from the majority opinion's determination on the existence of grounds for retrial.
The majority opinion holds that there is a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, on the basis that the opinion set forth in the judgment subject to retrial in this case constitutes a change to the opinion set forth in Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991.
However, while it is true, as pointed out by the majority opinion, that Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991 and the judgment subject to retrial in this case reach different conclusions on the question of whether a university faculty member appointed for a fixed term who received a disadvantageous disposition such as dismissal prior to the expiration of the term of appointment retains his or her status despite the expiration of that term, the judgment subject to retrial in this case held that a faculty member appointed for a fixed term automatically loses his or her status upon expiration of the term of appointment on the premise that "there is no provision in the articles of incorporation of the school foundation or the personnel regulations for university faculty imposing an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired." By contrast, the above Decision 91Da12820 held that even though the plaintiff, an associate professor at a university, was not reappointed beyond the term of appointment for associate professors "under the Private School Act and the Defendant foundation's articles of incorporation, etc.," "since the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff is invalid, absent special circumstances, the plaintiff's status should be deemed to continue as before," thereby leaving open the possibility that, where special circumstances different from those premised in that case exist, it could be determined that the faculty member's status is lost upon expiration of the term of appointment despite the invalidity of the dismissal disposition. Since it is not clearly apparent from the language of that judgment's holding that the circumstances premised in Decision 91Da12820 concern a case, as in the judgment subject to retrial in this case, where "there is no provision in the articles of incorporation or personnel regulations imposing an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired," it cannot be said that the judgment subject to retrial in this case changes the opinion set forth in Decision 91Da12820.
Accordingly, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's premise that the opinion set forth in the judgment subject to retrial in this case changes the opinion set forth in Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991, and its conclusion that the judgment subject to retrial contains a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The Plaintiffs' retrial claims in this case should be dismissed solely on the ground that there is no ground for retrial, without any need to further determine whether the Plaintiffs' action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case is an action having the interest in confirmation. Of course, if the retrial claims in this case are dismissed, the judgment subject to retrial will remain in force as is, and the precedent that conflicts with the dissenting opinion on the merits of the grounds for appeal will likewise remain in force—a defect that must be resolved through other means on another occasion. This is where we first differ from the majority opinion.
B. We also dissent from the majority opinion's determination on the merits of the grounds for appeal.
As stated above, the judgment subject to retrial in this case does not contain a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)(1) of the Civil Procedure Act; however, even assuming, arguendo, that we were to accept the majority opinion's view that the judgment subject to retrial contains a ground for retrial, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's view that the Plaintiffs' action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case is an unlawful action lacking the interest in confirmation, and we differ from the majority opinion on this point as well. The reasons are as follows.
(1) As pointed out by the majority opinion, where a faculty member appointed for a fixed term pursuant to Article 53-2(2) of the former Private School Act receives a disadvantageous disposition such as removal, dismissal, or discharge prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, and the term of appointment subsequently expires, then even if the disadvantageous disposition is invalid, the faculty member automatically loses his or her status as a faculty member upon the expiration of the term of appointment, unless there exists a provision in the articles of incorporation of the school foundation or the personnel regulations for university faculty imposing an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired.
Accordingly, in this case, where there is no provision in the articles of incorporation or personnel regulations imposing an obligation of reappointment upon faculty members whose term of appointment has expired, if the terms of appointment of the Plaintiffs, who are faculty members appointed for a fixed term at the university operated by the Defendant (Retrial Defendant; hereinafter referred to simply as "the Defendant"), all expired prior to the closing of oral argument at the lower court, then, regardless of the validity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case, the Plaintiffs would thereby automatically lose their status as faculty members. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claim in this case seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions is, from the standpoint of recovering faculty status, nothing more than a claim for confirmation of a past legal relationship, such that it may be said that there is no longer an interest in confirmation.
However, as the majority opinion itself acknowledges, even with respect to a past legal relationship, where that relationship continues to affect a present right or legal status, and obtaining a declaratory judgment concerning that legal relationship is recognized as an effective and appropriate means of removing danger or uncertainty concerning the present right or legal status, the action for confirmation of that legal relationship should be deemed to have the interest in immediate confirmation. The continued existence of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case not only infringes upon the Plaintiffs' procedural rights concerning reappointment, which a faculty member whose term of appointment has expired may enjoy, but also damages the Plaintiffs' social reputation and, furthermore, operates as a disadvantageous impediment to the Plaintiffs being reappointed as faculty members, thereby actually affecting the Plaintiffs' rights concerning their personal dignity interests and their legal status regarding potential appointment as faculty members. Such danger or uncertainty concerning the aforementioned rights or legal status can be fundamentally removed only by obtaining confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claim in this case must be deemed to have the interest in immediate confirmation in this respect, and it is precisely on this point that we differ from the majority opinion.
(2) The majority opinion holds that the Plaintiffs' claim for confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case is an unlawful action lacking the interest in confirmation, on the ground that, unlike in cases of dismissal by disciplinary action, there is no statutory restriction whatsoever on appointment to public office or as a faculty member in the case of suspension from position or dismissal, and that even if having such a prior record operates as a disadvantageous impediment, compared to persons without such a record, in being appointed to public office or as a faculty member, this alone cannot be deemed an infringement of a legal interest.
However, Article 53-2(4) of the Private School Act (as amended by Act No. 6004 of August 31, 1999) provides that where the term of appointment of a faculty member appointed for a fixed term ends, the appointing authority must determine whether to reappoint the faculty member concerned after deliberation by the faculty personnel committee. This provision imposes upon the appointing authority an obligation to determine whether to reappoint a faculty member after deliberation by the faculty personnel committee, and simultaneously confers upon a faculty member whose term of appointment has ended the right to receive deliberation by the faculty personnel committee regarding reappointment and the right to demand that the appointing authority determine whether to reappoint the faculty member after such deliberation. Accordingly, a faculty member who has lost his or her status due to the expiration of the term of appointment is in a different legal position from a faculty member who has lost his or her status due to a disadvantageous disposition such as dismissal. Therefore, the Plaintiffs, who lost their status due to the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions, must be deemed to have a legal interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of those dispositions, in order to secure their right to receive deliberation by the faculty personnel committee regarding reappointment and their right to demand that the appointing authority determine whether to reappoint them after such deliberation, notwithstanding the expiration of their terms of appointment.
Moreover, in this case, all of the Plaintiffs except Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 are associate professors or assistant professors at the university operated by the Defendant. In order for them to be promoted and appointed as professors or associate professors, they must meet the qualification standards for years of research achievements and years of teaching experience set forth in Article 2(1) of the Regulation on Standards for Professorial Qualifications (교수자격기준등에관한규정) and the attached table thereto (a university professor requires 4 years of research achievements and 6 years of teaching experience; a university associate professor requires 3 years of research achievements and 4 years of teaching experience). Since these Plaintiffs may, depending on the circumstances, fail to satisfy the qualification standards for professor or associate professor because they are not credited with teaching experience from the date of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case onward, the majority opinion's uniform conclusion that there is no statutory restriction on the Plaintiffs being appointed as faculty members is also subject to criticism as improper in this respect.
Meanwhile, Article 77(3) of the former Education Act (교육법) (abolished pursuant to Article 2 of the Addenda to the Framework Act on Education (교육기본법), Act No. 5437 of December 13, 1997), which was in effect at the time of the closing of oral argument at the lower court, comprehensively provided disqualifying grounds for faculty appointment by stating that a person recognized as having poor conduct shall not become a faculty member. Article 54(3) of the former Private School Act provided that, with respect to a person having such disqualifying grounds for faculty appointment, the competent authority could demand that the appointing authority discharge the faculty member concerned. If a faculty member, who must possess professional knowledge, teaching ability, and strict moral standards, received a suspension from position and dismissal disposition precisely on grounds denying such qualifications, that faculty member is very likely to be found to fall under the disqualifying grounds for faculty appointment under Article 77(3) of the former Education Act, and thus may well be unable to be reappointed as a faculty member. Accordingly, the continued existence of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case, which were based on grounds of insufficient job performance ability or poor performance record, must be regarded as a factor causing danger or uncertainty to the Plaintiffs' legal status regarding potential reappointment as faculty members. Furthermore, given that such exclusion from faculty appointment is based on the disqualifying grounds for faculty appointment prescribed under the former Education Act, such danger or uncertainty is direct, concrete, and actual, and cannot be dismissed as merely indirect or factual. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs must be deemed to have had, even at the time of the closing of oral argument at the lower court, a legal interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dispositions in order to remove such danger or uncertainty. Therefore, even if the existence of the interest in bringing the action is determined as of the time of the closing of oral argument at the fact-finding court, the conclusion that the Plaintiffs' action in this case is an action having the interest in immediate confirmation does not change.
(3) Furthermore, the majority opinion holds that since the reputational damage suffered by a faculty member due to a suspension from position and dismissal disposition can be remedied by way of a claim for damages premised on defamation, seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions on the ground of the need for restoration of reputation cannot be deemed an appropriate means of relief of rights, and thus fails to satisfy the requirements for a confirmation action.
However, our Constitution guarantees the right to education as one of the fundamental rights by providing that all citizens shall have an equal right to education according to their abilities (Article 31(1) of the Constitution). In order to guarantee this right to education in a substantively effective manner, it is necessary not only that the authority of faculty members be respected in the course of educating and guiding students, but also that a social atmosphere be fostered in which faculty members are respected, so that they may carry out their educational activities with a high sense of pride and mission (Article 2 of the Act on the Improvement of Status of Teachers (교원지위향상을위한특별법)).
Accordingly, there is a particular need to protect the social reputation of faculty members, and this need for special protection cannot be satisfied unless, when an event damaging a faculty member's reputation occurs, the restoration of that reputation is achieved promptly and completely. Where there is a reputation-damaging disadvantageous disposition against a faculty member, such as removal, dismissal, or discharge, seeking damages after the fact alone can hardly ever constitute prompt and complete relief of rights; rather, declaring the disadvantageous disposition itself invalid is the most effective and appropriate means of promptly and completely restoring the reputational damage caused thereby. This is precisely the reason why, where there is a reputation-damaging disadvantageous disposition against a faculty member, the interest in the need for restoration of reputation itself—separate from the interest in the recovery of faculty status—must be regarded as an independent legal interest worthy of relief through confirmation of the invalidity of the disposition. Denying the interest in bringing an action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of a reputation-damaging disadvantageous disposition against a faculty member, on the sole ground that the faculty member's term of appointment has expired and faculty status cannot be recovered, amounts to a total denial of the aforementioned need for prompt and complete restoration of the damaged reputation of the faculty member, and cannot be accepted.
In the case of infringement of personal dignity interests such as a person's reputation, due to the diversity of the manner in which such infringement occurs, there are cases in which monetary compensation alone cannot provide sufficient satisfaction. Accordingly, Article 764 of our Civil Act (민법) provides that, with respect to a person who has damaged another's reputation, the court may, at the request of the injured party, order measures appropriate for the restoration of reputation in lieu of or together with damages. Under our legal system, in which an apology advertisement is not permitted as one of the measures appropriate for restoration of reputation, obtaining confirmation of the invalidity of a reputation-damaging disadvantageous disposition against a faculty member, with respect to the disposition itself, can constitute a "measure appropriate for restoration of reputation" as referred to in Article 764 of the Civil Act. Accordingly, the above interpretation is also consistent with the purport of the provisions of our Civil Act.
(4) Furthermore, while judicial action is a passive and reactive state function in the sense that it is activated only upon the filing of an action by a party where a specific legal dispute has arisen, the resolution of legal disputes is also the duty and raison d'être of the courts. Accordingly, so long as a request for adjudication has been made concerning a dispute related to the citizens' legal life, the courts must, as far as possible, actively accommodate such requests and make every effort necessary to substantively resolve the dispute, and this is also the path toward achieving democratization of the judiciary. The demand for democratization, which seeks to expand the freedoms and rights of citizens, is no exception in the field of the judiciary, and the democratization of the judiciary must begin by easing procedural constraints so that citizens may more easily access the courts' dispute-resolution procedures. The conventional concept of the interest in bringing an action needs to be reexamined precisely from this perspective.
The concept of the interest in bringing an action was originally devised from a state and public-interest perspective, seeking to reduce the burden on the courts by controlling the use of the litigation system for futile purposes. However, in an era such as the present, in which the protection of citizens' fundamental human rights is emphasized and the status of citizens vis-à-vis the state is regarded as particularly important, it can no longer be tolerated to restrict citizens' right to use the litigation system solely on the basis of the state interest in reducing the burden on the courts. Excessively narrowing the scope of the interest in bringing an action in the name of preventing abusive litigation results in the courts refusing adjudication by determining that there is no legal dispute even though a substantive dispute exists, thereby fundamentally infringing upon citizens' right to receive a trial. The concept of the interest in bringing an action should no longer function as a constraint or barrier that makes it difficult for citizens to access the opportunity for dispute resolution by the courts; rather, discussions concerning the interest in bringing an action must, in all respects, be focused on opening the way for citizens to resolve, as far as possible, the disputes they assert through adjudication.
From this perspective, the majority opinion, adhering to the conventional notion of the interest in bringing an action, holds that the disadvantage suffered by a faculty member who has been suspended from position or dismissed, in the form of restricted opportunities for re-employment, is merely a de facto disadvantage, and that there is a separate means of relief through a damages action for the reputational damage caused by the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions; on these grounds, the majority opinion concludes that whenever a faculty member's term of appointment has expired such that faculty status cannot be recovered, the interest in bringing an action for confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions is always denied. In so holding, the majority opinion overlooks the aforementioned considerations that must be taken into account in discussing the scope of the interest in bringing an action, and thus fails to thoroughly ensure the relief of citizens' rights. The attempt to expand the scope of the interest in bringing an action, so as to broaden citizens' opportunities for relief of rights, is an appropriate stance suited to the tendency toward expanding the scope of rights protection in contemporary society and the persistent demand therefor, and this attempt must continue to develop.
(5) In this case, even though the terms of appointment of all the Plaintiffs have expired, making it impossible for the Plaintiffs to recover their faculty status, the Plaintiffs—whose procedural rights concerning reappointment and personal dignity rights concerning social reputation have been infringed by the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case, and whose opportunities for re-employment have furthermore been restricted—must be deemed to have the interest in immediate confirmation in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case. Accordingly, the lower court's action of proceeding to determine the merits on this premise is justified.
Therefore, in the event that the majority opinion's view that the judgment subject to retrial in this case contains a ground for retrial is adopted, rather than dismissing the Plaintiffs' retrial claims on the ground that the conclusion of the judgment subject to retrial—which dismissed as unlawful the Plaintiffs' action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the suspension from position and dismissal dispositions at issue in this case—is correct, as the majority opinion does, the Court should instead proceed to determine the Defendant's grounds for appeal on the premise that the Plaintiffs' action is lawful. Furthermore, since Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 rendered on July 23, 1991, which the majority opinion decides to overrule, concerns a matter different from this case, that judgment should not be overruled; but even assuming, as the majority opinion does, that the matter is the same, the portion thereof affirming the interest in bringing the action should be maintained as is, and rather, the judgment subject to retrial in this case, which the majority opinion decides to uphold, should instead be overruled.
Chief Justice Choi Jong-young (Presiding Justice)
Justice Lee Don-hee (Justice in Charge)
Justice Kim Hyung-sun
Justice Ji Chang-kwon
Justice Shin Seong-taek
Justice Lee Yong-hoon
Justice Lee Im-su
Justice Song Jin-hoon
Justice Seo Seong
Justice Cho Mu-je
Justice Yoo Ji-dam
Justice Yoon Jae-sik
Justice Lee Yong-woo