[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Attorneys of the Law Firm Namsan and 6 others, Counsel for the plaintiffs)
[Defendants, Appellees] ○○ Foundation and 1 other
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2018Na2006493 Decided June 20, 2018
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case and Issues
A. Overview of the Case
The following facts can be ascertained from the reasoning of the judgment below and the record.
1) The Plaintiffs are the spouse, eldest daughter (born 1994), and second daughter (born 2000) of the deceased Nonparty 1. While Nonparty 1 was in a marital relationship with Plaintiff 1, he had an eldest son, Nonparty 2 (born 2006), with Defendant 2 around November 2006.
2) When Nonparty 1 died on April 16, 2017, Defendant 2 cremated the remains of Nonparty 1 and enshrined the ashes in a charnel house within a memorial park operated by Defendant Foundation ○○. The Plaintiffs accordingly filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendants seeking delivery of Nonparty 1's remains to the Plaintiffs.
3) The court below held that the eldest son, Nonparty 2, as the person presiding over ancestral rites (제사주재자), holds the right to Nonparty 1's remains, and that Defendant 2, as the statutory representative (mother with parental authority) of Nonparty 2, possesses and manages the remains. On this basis, the court below upheld the judgment of the first instance, which dismissed in full the Plaintiffs' claims premised on the Plaintiffs having the right to the remains.
B. Issues
The issue in this case is which of the co-heirs holds the right to the remains of Nonparty 1, which were placed in an urn and enshrined after the funeral. This concerns whether to maintain the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Da27670 delivered on November 20, 2008 (hereinafter the "2008 En Banc Decision"), which held that the body and remains of a decedent are to be treated in a manner analogous to property for ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code (민법), succeeded to by the person presiding over ancestral rites, and that where the co-heirs fail to reach agreement, such person is to be the eldest son or eldest grandson or other male heir, absent special circumstances precluding him from maintaining that status; and, if that decision is not to be maintained, how the person presiding over ancestral rites should instead be determined.
2. Method of Determining the Person Presiding Over Ancestral Rites
A. Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code provides: "Ownership of forest land not exceeding one jeongbo (町步) reserved for the protection of graves, farmland not exceeding 600 pyeong used for grave-related purposes, genealogical records, and ritual implements, all belonging to a grave, shall be succeeded to by the person presiding over the ancestral rites (제사를 주재하는 자)," but does not specify who qualifies as the "person presiding over the ancestral rites." Article 1 of the Civil Code provides: "In civil matters, where there is no applicable statutory provision, customary law shall apply, and where there is no customary law, reason (조리) shall apply." In the past, the Supreme Court, based on the custom that the legitimate eldest son was given priority as the successor to ancestral rites, held that where there is an heir who is the head of the head family (종손) among the co-heirs, he becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites absent special circumstances precluding him from maintaining that status (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da649 delivered on July 22, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 95Da51182 delivered on September 5, 1997, etc.). Subsequently, in the 2008 En Banc Decision, the Supreme Court held that the former custom no longer accorded, in principle, with the transformed family system based on individual dignity and equality, and that the legal conviction of members of our society regarding it had substantially weakened, such that it could no longer maintain its effect as customary law; accordingly, the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites should be determined by reason (조리), comprehensively considering the general principles of the Civil Code, the nature of property for ancestral rites, the legislative purpose of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code, and the historical and social significance of ancestral rites. On this basis, the 2008 En Banc Decision held that the person presiding over ancestral rites is to be determined, in the first instance, by agreement among the decedent's co-heirs, and where no agreement is reached, the decedent's eldest son (or, if the eldest son has already died, the eldest grandson) becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites, absent special circumstances precluding him from maintaining that status; and where there is no son among the co-heirs, the decedent's eldest daughter becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites.
B. However, the legal doctrine of the 2008 En Banc Decision concerning the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, where no agreement is reached among the co-heirs, can no longer be regarded as consistent with reason (조리) and thus cannot be maintained. The reasons are as follows.
1) Reason (조리) is generally understood as the nature of things, fundamental principles, or, giving weight to social significance, is interpreted as the norms of communal social life, general principles of law, social reasonableness, equity, and justice as conceived on the basis of human reason and conscience (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Da228007 delivered on April 29, 2021). Legal norms based on such reason must conform to the entire legal order with the Constitution as the highest norm, while also being socially accepted and recognized. Just as changes in social perception and legal consciousness affect the legal order, legal norms based on reason are likewise not fixed and immutable, but may change to suit the circumstances of the present era in accordance with changes in social perception and legal consciousness. Accordingly, even a legal norm that conformed to reason in the past may, due to changes in social perception and legal consciousness, come to be inconsistent with the entire legal order having the Constitution as its highest norm; in such a case, the Supreme Court must, by excluding the portion inconsistent with the entire legal order or by other means, ensure that such legal norm conforms to the present legal order.
2) Giving priority, absent special circumstances, to a male heir such as the eldest son or eldest grandson as the person presiding over ancestral rites where the co-heirs fail to reach agreement is inconsistent with the spirit of Article 11(1) of the Constitution (헌법), which prohibits discrimination based on sex, and Article 36(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the formation and maintenance of marriage and family life based on individual dignity and gender equality, for the following reasons.
A) The principle of equality referred to in Article 11(1) of the Constitution essentially prohibits arbitrarily treating things that are inherently the same differently, and means relative equality in the sense that, in legislating and applying law, discrimination without reasonable grounds must not be made (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du14417 delivered on October 29, 2007, etc.). Since Article 36(1) of the Constitution declares equal treatment of the sexes in marriage and family life, discrimination on the basis of sex is in principle prohibited, and differential treatment based on sex is justified only in exceptional cases necessary to resolve problems that, by their nature, arise uniquely with respect to only men or only women. Discrimination stemming from the fact or notion that, traditionally, the life relations of men and women have historically been formed in a certain manner—that is, discrimination based on fixed stereotypes about gender roles—is not permitted (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ga9, etc., delivered on February 3, 2005).
B) Under the 2008 En Banc Decision, a female heir cannot become the person presiding over ancestral rites without the consent of a male heir such as the eldest son or eldest grandson, making it difficult for substantive negotiation to take place on an equal footing among the co-heirs in determining the person presiding over ancestral rites. Moreover, where no agreement is reached among the co-heirs concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites, a female heir is excluded from succession to property for ancestral rites regardless of her own will, merely because the decedent has a son or grandson. In this way, a female heir is placed in an inferior position relative to a male heir on account of sex when determining the person presiding over ancestral rites.
This has not fully escaped the conceptual thinking of ancestral rites grounded in male-centered lineage succession. Such discrimination between male and female heirs in the succession of property for ancestral rites lacks reasonable grounds to justify it, and does not fall within the exceptional case necessary to resolve a problem arising uniquely with respect to only men or only women. In particular, as funeral methods have diversified today, with cremation and the like replacing traditional burial, the issue of the attribution or management of the decedent's body or remains may arise all the more, and it is even harder to find justification for the priority attribution of even such body or remains of the decedent to a male heir. Accordingly, giving priority, absent special circumstances, to a male heir over a female heir as the person presiding over ancestral rites where the co-heirs fail to reach agreement is inconsistent with the ideal of gender equality set forth in Articles 11(1) and 36(1) of the Constitution.
C) It is also difficult to regard it as justified that a male heir, rather than a female heir, should bear exclusively the duties accompanying the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites. The scope of property for ancestral rites, such as forest land for grave protection and grave-related farmland, is substantially limited to the portion actually used for the performance of ancestral rites; in modern society, as the number of households that do not perform ancestral rites for various reasons, including religious belief, increases, and the significance accorded to ancestral rites gradually diminishes, the existing property for ancestral rites itself tends to decrease. Nevertheless, the person presiding over ancestral rites bears not only the costs actually incurred for the rites, but also the duties relating to the management of the body, remains, or grave; it is no longer reasonable that a male heir should bear such burdens or duties preferentially merely because he is male.
3) The person presiding over ancestral rites as defined in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code means "the person properly entitled to preside over ancestral rites." This requires an examination of the significance of ancestral rites. In the traditional system of ancestral rites, importance was placed on the meaning of male-centered lineage succession through paternal blood relatives. It was for this reason that Article 996 of the former Civil Code, enacted as Act No. 471 on February 22, 1958, provided that property for ancestral rites was to be succeeded to by the heir to the headship of household (호주상속인). However, when the Civil Code was amended by Act No. 4199 on January 13, 1990, the term "heir to the headship of household" was replaced with "person presiding over the ancestral rites," as in the current Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code, which can be interpreted as reflecting the legislature's intent to disassociate the succession of property for ancestral rites from male-centered lineage succession through paternal blood relatives. Thereafter, the Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 7427 on March 31, 2005, abolished the household headship system (호주제도), which was based on the formation and succession of a household (家) centered on male paternal blood relatives, and permitted a child to follow the mother's surname and clan seat as an exception to the principle of following the father's surname, where the parents so agreed at the time of marriage registration (proviso to Article 781(1)).
Today, there is no difference between the roles of sons and daughters in commemorating ancestors or supporting parents. In funeral methods as well, the proportion and preference for cremation followed by enshrinement or natural burial is increasing, in place of the traditional burial and grave construction. The format and procedures of ancestral rites are also gradually being simplified, such as by reducing the scope of ancestors commemorated to those with whom one lived together or whose faces one remembers, in place of the traditional "four-generation service" extending to great-great-grandparents, or by reducing the frequency of rites by jointly commemorating two or more ancestors at once. In this way, in the ancestral rites of modern society, the significance of male-centered lineage succession through paternal blood relatives has substantially faded, while the significance of affection and commemoration for the deceased has become more important.
Considering the current legal order, the changed consciousness, sentiment, and lifestyle of the people, and the like, it cannot be said that a male heir such as the eldest son or eldest grandson is more properly entitled to be the person presiding over ancestral rites than a female heir, or that his status should be recognized preferentially.
4) Nor can it be said that giving priority to a male heir such as the eldest son or eldest grandson as the person presiding over ancestral rites is a tradition to be preserved, or is justified under Article 9, etc., of the Constitution. The terms "tradition" and "traditional culture" referred to in the Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution are concepts bearing historical and temporal character and must be understood in a contemporary sense; if a traditional family system contravenes the individual dignity and gender equality required by Article 36(1) of the Constitution, its constitutional legitimacy cannot be asserted on the basis of Article 9 of the Constitution (see the aforementioned Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ga9, etc.). While the system of ancestral rites and succession to property for ancestral rites is grounded in the tradition of ancestor worship, it has the limitation that it must be operated in harmony with the constitutional ideals of individual dignity and gender equality. Placing a female heir in an inferior position when determining the person presiding over ancestral rites does not conform to this contemporary sense of tradition. Nor can it be said that failing to give priority to a male heir as the person presiding over ancestral rites would undermine the traditional culture or good customs embodied in the system of ancestral rites, such as reverence for ancestors and filial respect for elders.
The Supreme Court has already rendered decisions denying the effect of aspects of the head-family (종중) system, which is related to tradition and custom, that are contrary to gender equality. That is, the Supreme Court held that the former customary law, which limited membership in a head family to adult males, was no longer consistent with the ideal of gender equality pursued by our legal order, and denied its legal effect, holding that adult descendants sharing the same surname and clan seat as the common ancestor become members of the head family regardless of sex (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da1178 delivered on July 21, 2005, etc.). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that resolutions adopted at a head-family general meeting held without giving notice of convocation to female members were invalid (see Supreme Court Decisions 2007Da34982 delivered on September 6, 2007; 2009Da83650 delivered on February 11, 2010, etc.), and further held that a resolution distributing head-family property that differentiated the ratio, method, or content of distribution simply on the basis of the distinction between male and female members was invalid (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da74775 delivered on September 30, 2010), and that female members must not be excluded when determining the eldest surviving member by relationship (연고항존자) who has the authority to convene a head-family general meeting (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da26596 delivered on December 9, 2010). The Supreme Court has also held that an adult child who follows the mother's surname and clan seat likewise becomes a member of the head family to which the mother belongs (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Da260940 delivered on May 26, 2022). In light of this trend of Supreme Court decisions seeking harmony between tradition and custom on the one hand and the ideal of gender equality on the other, the 2008 En Banc Decision, which has not fully escaped the patriarchal lineage-law (종법) ideology centered on the legitimate eldest son, can no longer be maintained.
C. Where the co-heirs fail to reach agreement, it accords most with reason (조리) to hold that, absent special circumstances precluding recognition of the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites, priority as the person presiding over ancestral rites is given to the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the closest degree of kinship, regardless of sex or legitimacy/illegitimacy. The reasons are as follows.
1) In order to secure legal stability and the normative force of precedent, even where it is unavoidably necessary to change existing precedent, the scope of such change should be limited as far as possible (see the separate opinion in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Do10500 delivered on February 21, 2013). In particular, with respect to a system such as ancestral rites that is grounded in custom, caution should be exercised in newly adopting a wholly different approach from the traditional one, considering the existing lifestyle and general social perception thereof. If the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, which the 2008 En Banc Decision found to accord with reason, is no longer in harmony with the current legal order, it is necessary to establish a clear and reasonable standard by making incremental modifications and adjustments in continuity with the existing legal norm, so as to bring it into conformity with the current legal order.
2) Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code, in consideration of the special nature of property for ancestral rites, provides for special succession separate from ordinary inherited property, in order to preserve and maintain such property and to simplify the legal relations concerning its succession. Considering this purpose, there is a need to designate a specific single person as the person presiding over ancestral rites who is, to some extent, predictable and who can be recognized as properly qualified as such under prevailing social norms. In particular, where co-heirs each assert rights to the decedent's body over disputes concerning the method of funeral or burial site, recognizing multiple co-presiding parties would not be helpful in resolving the dispute.
3) Since ancestral rites fundamentally have the character of a commemorative ritual performed by descendants for their ancestors, it is natural to consider the degree of close kinship between the decedent and his or her lineal descendants when determining the person presiding over ancestral rites. However, where there are multiple persons among the lineal descendants who are of the closest degree of kinship, a standard is needed to determine priority among them, and age can serve as the minimum objective standard for identifying a specific person among those of equal rank. Giving priority to the elder among persons of the same status and condition is not only consistent with our traditional good customs, but is also consistent with our culture and general social perception in that, in actual funerals and ancestral rites, it is the elder among the lineal descendants who typically serves as chief mourner or presides over the rites.
The practice of giving priority to the elder among persons of equal rank when a certain legal status is to be conferred within a family community is already reflected throughout our legal order. Article 2, Subparagraph 16 of the Act on Funeral Services, etc. (장사 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Funeral Services Act") provides, with respect to the order in which a person with a special relationship (연고자) exercises rights and duties, that where there are two or more children or lineal descendants of the same rank, the eldest among those of the closest degree of kinship has priority. Article 12(3) of the Act on Organ Transplant, etc. (장기 등 이식에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Organ Transplant Act") likewise provides that, in determining the single person with priority among family members or bereaved family members who may consent to the donation of organs, etc. under Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph (1) and Paragraph (2) of the same Article, or who may express an objection to the removal of organs, etc. from a brain-dead person or a deceased person, where there are two or more persons falling within that category, priority is given to the person of the closest degree of relationship and, among those of equal degree, to the eldest (degree of relationship taking precedence). Similar provisions exist in Article 16 of the Bioethics and Safety Act (생명윤리 및 안전에 관한 법률) and Article 16 of the Act on the Safety and Support of Advanced Regenerative Medicine and Advanced Biological Medicinal Products (첨단재생의료 및 첨단바이오의약품 안전 및 지원에 관한 법률), among others. The purpose of Article 877 of the Civil Code, which prohibits adopting an ascendant of the adoptive parents or a person older than the adoptive parents, likewise reflects the basic order based on age within family relations, and it is a general custom of our society (see Supreme Court Decisions 83Da119, 83Dakka341 delivered on May 29, 1984; 98Da50722 delivered on April 13, 1999, etc.) that, absent head-family regulations or established practice concerning the selection of the head or elder of a head family, the surviving head-family member of the highest generation and greatest age (연고항존자) becomes the head or elder of the head family, which likewise reflects the tradition of giving priority to elders within a clan group.
Furthermore, the person presiding over ancestral rites holds rights to property for ancestral rites, such as forest land for grave protection and grave-related farmland, while simultaneously bearing duties relating to the disposal of the body or remains or the management of the grave, and actually bears the costs relating to the ancestral rites; going forward, as consciousness of ancestral rites gradually weakens, the tasks and burdens borne by the person presiding over ancestral rites are bound to become more prominent. In that case, it is difficult to conclude that general social perception in our society would not tolerate giving priority to the elder among lineal descendants of the same degree of kinship in determining the person presiding over ancestral rites.
Ultimately, giving priority to the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the closest degree of kinship as the person presiding over ancestral rites can be said to accord with the current legal order and the general legal perception common to society at large.
4) Meanwhile, even where a person is the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the closest degree of kinship, there may be special circumstances precluding recognition of that person's status as the person presiding over ancestral rites. Such special circumstances include, as set forth in the 2008 En Banc Decision, cases where it is recognized that the person lacks the intent or capacity to normally preside over ancestral rites due to, among other things, long-term residence abroad, habitually abusing, insulting, or inflicting harm on the parents, failing to protect and maintain ancestral graves or refusing to perform ancestral rites, or acting in a manner significantly contrary to the parents' wishes or last instructions without reasonable grounds; and also include cases where, considering the decedent's express or presumed intent, the intent of the majority of the co-heirs, and the living relationship with the decedent during the decedent's lifetime, it can be found that it would be manifestly unjust for that person to become the person presiding over ancestral rites.
D. The 2008 En Banc Decision, which held that, absent special circumstances, a male heir such as the eldest son or eldest grandson has priority as the person presiding over ancestral rites where the co-heirs fail to reach agreement on determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, is hereby modified to the extent it conflicts with the view expressed in this decision.
E. This change in the Supreme Court's view regarding the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites in this manner alters the very foundation of the customary system of ancestral rites, which had placed emphasis on male-centered lineage succession through paternal blood relatives. However, if the new legal doctrine were applied retroactively, it would directly affect the validity of the succession to property for ancestral rites that has already been established in reliance on the prior en banc decision, contrary to legal stability and the protection of the parties' reliance interests. Accordingly, it is appropriate to hold that the new legal doctrine applies only where the succession to property for ancestral rites takes place after the pronouncement of this decision. (Since the 2008 En Banc Decision likewise held that the new legal doctrine concerning the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites applies only where the succession to property for ancestral rites takes place after the pronouncement of that decision, the legal doctrine of the 2008 En Banc Decision continues to apply to cases in which the succession to property for ancestral rites took place between the date of pronouncement of that decision, November 20, 2008, and the date preceding the pronouncement of this decision.)
However, since the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the new legal doctrine is intended to serve as the norm of adjudication for this case, the new legal doctrine must be applied retroactively to this case (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da1178 delivered on July 21, 2005; the 2008 En Banc Decision).
3. Determination as to This Case
The court below, in this case where no agreement was reached concerning the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites among Nonparty 1's co-heirs, upheld the judgment of the first instance, which dismissed in full the claims of the Plaintiffs, including the eldest daughter, the eldest among the children, for delivery of the remains, on the ground that Nonparty 1's eldest son, as the person presiding over ancestral rites, holds the right to the remains.
However, the court below should have examined, where no agreement was reached concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites among the co-heirs, whether priority as the person presiding over ancestral rites should be given to the eldest among Nonparty 1's lineal descendants of the closest degree of kinship, regardless of sex, and whether there exist grounds rendering it manifestly unjust for that person to become the person presiding over ancestral rites, and thereby determined who is the person presiding over ancestral rites for Nonparty 1. The judgment of the court below contains an error in misunderstanding the legal doctrine concerning the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites and failing to conduct the necessary examination, which affected the judgment. The Plaintiffs' argument in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Except for the separate opinion of Justices Min Yu-suk, Kim Seon-su, Noh Jeong-hee, and Lee Heung-gu, the Justices participating in this decision are unanimous, and there are concurring opinions of Justices Cho Jae-yeon, Noh Tae-ak, and Oh Kyung-mi supplementing the majority opinion, and a concurring opinion of Justice Min Yu-suk and a concurring opinion of Justice Kim Seon-su supplementing the separate opinion.
5. Separate Opinion of Justices Min Yu-suk, Kim Seon-su, Noh Jeong-hee, and Lee Heung-gu
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
We agree with the majority opinion insofar as it modifies the 2008 En Banc Decision and recognizes that such modification of precedent has, in principle, only prospective effect. However, we cannot agree with the portion holding that, absent special circumstances precluding recognition of the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites, priority as the person presiding over ancestral rites should be given to the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the closest degree of kinship.
Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code, concerning succession to property for ancestral rites, applies to the attribution of rights and duties relating to the body or remains of the deceased. Where, due to a failure of the co-heirs to reach agreement, there is a dispute over the attribution of rights and duties relating to the body or remains of the deceased, the court must determine, on an individualized and specific basis, who is most properly qualified as the person to whom the body or remains should be attributed, comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances, including the deceased's express or presumed intent, the living relationships the deceased formed with the co-heirs during the deceased's lifetime, such as cohabitation, support, contact, and communication, the circumstances of the funeral and the state of management of the body, remains, or grave thereafter, the intent of the co-heirs and the circumstances in which agreement failed to be reached, and the willingness, capacity, and sustainability of future management of the body, remains, or grave. Accordingly, contrary to the majority opinion, this category includes the spouse.
[Reasoning]
나. The validity of the approach whereby the court determines the person to whom the remains are attributed by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances
1) This approach is consistent with the legislative history of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act (민법).
가) The Civil Act, enacted by Act No. 471 on February 22, 1958, adopted the system of joint succession with respect to inheritance of property (Article 1000(2)), but, reflecting the fact that property used for ancestral rites had customarily been the exclusive privilege of the head-of-household successor, provided that such property would be solely succeeded to by the head-of-household successor (Article 996).
The Civil Act as amended by Act No. 4199 on January 13, 1990 maintained the head-of-household system but abolished the system aimed at succession to headship of household and changed "succession to headship of household" into "succession of headship." It also abolished Article 996, which had provided for the sole succession of property used for ancestral rites by the head-of-household successor, and changed "head-of-household successor" into the abstract concept of "person who presides over ancestral rites," which came to be governed by Article 1008-3 concerning the general effect of inheritance. The fact that the amended Civil Act abandoned the former regulatory structure under which the "head-of-household successor" was designated as the successor to property used for ancestral rites, and instead recognized the "person presiding over ancestral rites" as the successor to such property, presupposes a conceptual shift whereby succession is recognized not for a specific person who automatically becomes the successor by virtue of his status, but for the "person who actually presides over, or is to preside over, the ancestral rites."
The Civil Act as amended by Act No. 7427 on March 31, 2005 completely abolished the head-of-household system and also deleted Articles 984 and 985, which concerned the order of succession to headship. As a result, once succession to property used for ancestral rites takes place after the effective date of the amended Civil Act, it has become difficult to find any statutory basis for the interpretive theory that grants the eldest grandson of the main line (the eldest son or eldest grandson), who corresponded to the first-priority head-of-household successor under the former system, the status of successor under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act.
나) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, despite the amendments to the Civil Act, continued to interpret the successor to property used for ancestral rites as the "eldest grandson of the main line" (see the above Supreme Court Decision 95Da51182, etc.), and even in the 2008 en banc decision, granted the status of person presiding over ancestral rites to the eldest son or eldest grandson. This is an interpretation that merely transplants the already-abolished first-priority head-of-household succession.
The fact that the enacted Civil Act, while adopting the system of joint succession with respect to inheritance of property, permitted only the head-of-household successor to succeed to property used for ancestral rites was itself a privilege of the head of household, and the fundamental purpose of abolishing the head-of-household system was to eliminate this privileged status. If so, the 2008 en banc decision should have taken the process and significance of the Civil Act amendments seriously and interpreted the law accordingly. Therefore, before discussing what status a specific person holds, the very interpretation of automatically granting the status of successor to a specific person must itself be changed. It is consistent with the purpose of the Civil Act amendments to recognize as successor not a specific person determined by an inherent (birth-related) factor, but a person who has actually performed the role of presiding over ancestral rites, or a person identified as fitting that role.
2) The developments and changes in society, the economy, and culture must be reflected.
가) Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act has as its primary purpose the maintenance and preservation of property used for ancestral rites. Traditionally, our society, based on a burial culture, buried remains, established graves, guarded and managed them, and made them objects of ancestral rites and commemoration. Since a grave requires the land on which it is located, graves, forest land for grave protection (금양임야), and land for grave maintenance (묘토) were important objects of succession. However, as burial culture has declined and funeral methods such as cremation and natural burial have come to be chosen, rights concerning graves and the land underlying them are no longer at issue.
By contrast, the remains of the deceased, as both the object and the result of funeral rites, and as the object of the bereaved family's commemoration and remembrance, have come to hold an increasingly important meaning. Even in households that do not perform ancestral rites, disputes may arise among bereaved family members over the attribution and management of remains, in which case a standard for determining such attribution is necessary, and the court must determine who is entitled to the remains in such legal disputes. This case, too, concerns the right to the remains of Nonparty 1, which were cremated and enshrined in an urn after the funeral. The urn containing the remains, being movable, does not require any right to fixed land; instead, what becomes important is the contract for the use of funeral facilities concluded with the person who installs and manages the funeral facility where the urn is kept and managed. Furthermore, whether burial or another funeral method is chosen may change over time and with circumstances even within a single family. Ultimately, unlike the traditional succession of forest land for grave protection and land for grave maintenance by a specific person of superior status within the family lineage across generations, a more flexible determination is required with respect to the attribution of remains.
나) As more households simplify or omit the procedures for ancestral rites, the significance that such rites carry has gradually diminished, and the importance of the traditional etiquette, formality, and order of priority regarding ancestral rites has likewise diminished, such that the customs and traditions surrounding "ancestral rites" have inevitably weakened or been transformed. In households that do not perform ancestral rites, the rituals or events that replace traditional ancestral rites take different forms depending on each family's religious and cultural background and circumstances. Consideration must be given to this social reality, in which, departing from the traditional notions concerning the procedures and forms of ancestral rites, diverse practices and conceptions concerning ancestral rites have emerged in modern society, differing from household to household.
3) The various forms that disputes may take must be considered.
Disputes over the attribution of remains take diverse types and forms. Depending on whether the object of the dispute is a traditional grave, forest land for grave protection, or land for grave maintenance, or instead remains or an enshrinement facility; whether the dispute arose over funeral procedures or, thereafter, over the management and disposal of the remains or grave; whether the order and identity of who presides over the rites constitute an important part of the dispute, or the dispute instead concerns a household that has adopted a new memorial ritual to replace ancestral rites; whether the dispute is among co-heirs over the attribution of the remains, or instead concerns, in relation to a third party, which of the co-heirs bears the obligations attendant on the status of person presiding over ancestral rites (e.g., the obligation to pay management costs, the obligation to accept remains, the obligation to exhume a grave, or the obligation to pay rent for the land, etc.) — depending on all these variations, in order to resolve the dispute appropriately, it is more desirable for the court, rather than relying on a specific person uniformly determined by status within the family, to comprehensively consider the important factors in each individual dispute and determine who is suited to manage the remains and preside over ancestral rites or other memorial rituals, thereby reaching a conclusion that accords with concrete fairness.
다. Specific content of the "comprehensive consideration and determination" approach
1) "Person presiding over ancestral rites" means "the person who actually presides, or is to preside, over ancestral rites."
Since the "person presiding over ancestral rites" under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act means "the person among the co-heirs who is most suitable to succeed to the property used for ancestral rites and preside over such rites," the question of who among the co-heirs falls into this category must ultimately be determined normatively by comprehensively considering the various relevant factors. This determination is a natural function of the courts in resolving legal disputes between private parties.
Where, upon examining the specific circumstances of an individual case, the court can recognize that an agreement exists among the co-heirs, it may determine "the person who is the person presiding over ancestral rites" in accordance with that agreement; where no agreement can be recognized, the court may determine "the person suitable to be the person presiding over ancestral rites" based on findings of fact concerning the existence of the factors for consideration discussed above. Specifically, where a party makes a claim based on the authority attendant on the premise that he or she holds the status of person presiding over ancestral rites, this will be a case in which the court determines whether that assertion is well founded. In such litigation, the court determines who the person presiding over ancestral rites is, and, as an effect of the judgment, res judicata and executory force arise, but the judgment does not have the effect of creating (constituting) the status of person presiding over ancestral rites. A court dealing with a dispute over the succession to property used for ancestral rites or the attribution of remains must, as a premise for resolving the dispute in the individual case, examine and determine who is or would be suitable to preside over the ancestral rites, and comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances as the criterion for that determination is justified in light of reason (조리), justice, and the principle of equity.
However, since Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act does not expressly provide for the procedure by which the court is to determine the person presiding over ancestral rites, the most ideal solution would ultimately be for the law to expressly provide for the procedure for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites.
2) The factors to be considered in making the specific determination are as follows.
가) Since the autonomous will of the co-heirs should be reflected to the maximum extent possible in this family-internal matter of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, agreement among the co-heirs takes first priority, and this includes cases in which an implied agreement is recognized. It may be inferred that an implied agreement has been reached among the co-heirs based on circumstances such as who among the co-heirs took the lead in handling the funeral procedures for the deceased, how much each contributed and endeavored, after the funeral, to manage the remains or to perform ancestral rites or memorial rituals for the deceased, who concluded the contract for use with the installer/manager of the funeral facility and bore the costs thereof, and how the co-heirs responded to these matters.
Even where no agreement is reached among the co-heirs, the court must, in making its determination, consider their respective intentions and the circumstances under which the agreement failed to be reached. For example, where a contract for the use of a funeral facility was concluded with the installer/manager of the funeral facility in the name of one of the co-heirs, and such a contract for use was concluded without even the implied consent of the other co-heirs, or sometimes even over their objection, the circumstances thereof must be examined. Furthermore, consideration should also be given to whether there is the intention and ability to continuously manage the remains, or to continuously perform ancestral rites or other memorial rituals, in the future.
나) Where the deceased, during his or her lifetime, designated the person to preside over ancestral rites or the person to whom his or her remains would be attributed, the court must give significant weight to that express intention; where there is no such expressed intention, the court must give significant weight to the deceased's presumed intention. In determining the deceased's presumed intention, the circumstances of the life relationships that the deceased formed during his or her lifetime may be considered.
The deceased's designation, during his or her lifetime, of the person to whom his or her remains will be attributed after death is not a matter that can be the subject of a statutory will, and therefore has no legal binding force. However, a person has, during his or her lifetime, the right of self-determination over his or her own body, and the right of self-determination that a person has over his or her own remains after death may be viewed as an extension of this personality right. Accordingly, the deceased's intention concerning the designation of the person to whom his or her remains will be attributed also falls within the scope that may be protected as the personality right of the deceased. It is also worth noting that there are foreign statutes or precedents that guarantee that the disposition of remains may be determined in accordance with the deceased's intention expressed during his or her lifetime. If the primary meaning of ancestral rites lies in commemorating the deceased, it naturally follows that the deceased's intention should be actively reflected in determining the person to whom his or her remains are attributed.
다) Where a third party seeks to claim, against the person having the right to manage and dispose of the remains or grave, the acceptance of remains or the exhumation of a grave, it may be difficult to know which of the co-heirs bears that obligation.
The Act on Funeral Services, Etc. (장사 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Funeral Services Act") primarily provides for matters concerning the disposal of remains or graves in relation to the competent authority or the installer of the cemetery, such as the method of funeral services and the installation, creation, and management of funeral facilities—that is, the treatment of graves whose installation period has expired, the procedures for installing cemeteries or restrictions on the area in which they may be installed or on the occupied area of a grave, and orders for relocation of cemeteries in violation thereof.
Article 2, Subparagraph 16 of the Funeral Services Act is a provision that establishes the order of priority among interested parties who may take certain actions concerning remains or graves in relation to the competent authority, etc., as discussed above, and it does not apply to the attribution of private-law rights and obligations concerning remains or graves as between private parties. Nevertheless, where a third party claims, against the person with the right to manage and dispose of remains or a grave, the acceptance of remains or the exhumation of a grave, this is structurally similar to the situation under Article 27 of the Funeral Services Act, whereby a landowner may, without the consent of the person who installed a grave on that land without the landowner's consent, obtain permission from the competent authority, notify the interested party of the grave, and then exhume and remove the body or remains buried in the grave. Accordingly, the court may consider the order of priority among interested parties provided in Article 2, Subparagraph 16 of the Funeral Services Act in determining who bears the obligation toward the third party.
Furthermore, since it is extremely difficult for a third party to prove the existence of an internal agreement among the co-heirs, the person named in the contract for use of the funeral facility, or the person actually managing the grave, may be presumed as a matter of fact to be the person presiding over ancestral rites, with the burden of rebutting that presumption placed on the party disputing it. This also secures a certain degree of predictability in legal relations, thereby fully ensuring protection of third parties.
라. Rebuttal of the majority opinion
1) The view that recognizes the status of person presiding over ancestral rites as belonging to a specific person lacks a sound legal basis.
가) It appears that the 2008 en banc decision gave priority to agreement among the co-heirs because it recognized, at least to some extent, the problems arising from recognizing a specific person (such as the eldest son or eldest grandson) as the person presiding over ancestral rites. However, this gives rise to a doctrinal contradiction.
나) The doctrine that gives legal effect to an agreement among co-heirs presupposes that some form of right to the deceased's remains is vested in the co-heirs. Otherwise, the co-heirs would not even be recognized as having the right to agree on the attribution of the remains, since persons without any right cannot determine a lawful successor by agreement. However, the mere fact that no agreement has been reached cannot result in the vesting of that right in a specific person absent any basis in statute or customary law. Given that the co-heirs have the right to determine the successor by agreement, it is difficult to find a logical basis for the interpretation that, simply because no agreement was reached, the remaining heirs other than the specific person are deprived of their right or excluded from succession.
다) This problem becomes clearer when examined in light of the Civil Act's provisions on similar legal relationships. While the Civil Act gives legal effect to an agreement reached between the parties, where no agreement is reached, it does not exclusively grant legal status to a specific person; rather, it allows the parties to make claims to the court on an equal footing, and provides that the court is to adjudicate on such claims.
Co-heirs may, at any time, partition the inherited property by agreement, and, as in the case of partition of co-owned property, where no agreement on partition is reached, they may claim partition from the court (Articles 1013 and 269(1) of the Civil Act). That is, the mere fact that no agreement on partition has been reached does not result in the right to partition being exclusively vested in, or given priority to, a specific co-heir or co-owner. Similarly, the place of cohabitation of a married couple or the exercise of parental authority over a minor child is first determined by agreement between the spouses or parents, but where no agreement is reached, the family court determines the matter upon the request of a party (Articles 826(2) and 909(2) of the Civil Act). In all these cases, agreement between the parties takes priority, but where there is no agreement, instead of the former regulatory approach of uniformly and mechanically fixing the place of cohabitation at the husband's domicile or residence, or having the father exercise parental authority, the court is empowered to determine the appropriate place of cohabitation and method of exercising parental authority on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the interpretation that grants status to a specific person solely in the case of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites when no agreement is reached is inconsistent with the overall system of the Civil Act.
2) Determining a specific person as successor based on an inherent (birth-related) status is also substantively unreasonable.
가) The matters to be considered in determining who is suitable as successor to property used for ancestral rites differ from case to case and from household to household. Nevertheless, a standard that uniformly and mechanically gives priority to a specific person, as in the majority opinion, may lead to conclusions that run contrary to concrete fairness in individual cases.
Looking at the actual forms that disputes among children over property used for ancestral rites take, many disputes arise between siblings of the same sex, such as the eldest son and the second son. If, as in the majority opinion, the standard giving priority to a specific person is maintained and that standard is age, then in disputes between siblings, there is no difference from the traditional standard giving priority to the eldest son.
나) Granting the status of successor, where no agreement is reached, to a specific person predetermined in a uniform manner, runs directly counter to the very purpose of allowing each household to autonomously determine the successor by giving priority to agreement. It becomes a question with a predetermined answer—namely, that "the successor will be the eldest child regardless"—so that there is no genuine reason for the co-heirs to engage in sincere negotiation among themselves; moreover, since a specific status takes priority over whether one supported the decedent during his or her lifetime or over the decedent's own intention, there is no particular incentive to faithfully support the decedent during his or her lifetime.
다) Article 36(1) of the Constitution (헌법) makes clear that marriage and family life shall be entered into and maintained on the basis of individual dignity. Marriage and family life constitute the most fundamental and private sphere of human life, and the requirement to guarantee individual dignity in this sphere means that individuals must be respected as independent personalities within marriage and family life, and that the autonomous decision-making authority of individuals and families as to how to conduct their marriage and family life must be respected (see the above Constitutional Court en banc decision on Case No. 2001Hun-Ga9, etc.). However, if a person automatically becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites by operation of law solely by virtue of an inherent status such as being the eldest, regardless of his or her own intention, this may, in some cases, result in the unjust outcome of forcibly conferring on an individual, against his or her will, the status of person presiding over ancestral rites under family law.
3) Nor can the majority opinion's interpretation be regarded as one that harmonizes with tradition.
Those who emphasize the preservation of tradition will criticize the majority opinion on the ground that, since the person is not the eldest son or eldest grandson in any event, succession through a daughter's line of descent (외손봉사) departs from the paternal-blood-line-centered continuation of the family lineage.
Meanwhile, having changed the traditional, male-centered method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites on the ground that it is inconsistent with the constitutional principle of equality, it is difficult for the majority opinion to escape criticism for nonetheless adopting the standard of seniority in age in the name of harmonizing with tradition.
Tradition means that which has been reinterpreted in today's terms in accordance with constitutional ideals and universal human values. The perception that seniority in age should take priority is likewise nothing more than a vestige of the paternal-blood-line-centered continuation of the family lineage. It is difficult to conclude that, among lineal descendants, the elder necessarily has a stronger feeling of commemoration toward the deceased, and therefore it cannot be said that the elder is more suitable as the person presiding over ancestral rites. In particular, among siblings, there are many cases in which the age difference is not so significant as to warrant treating their intention and ability to preside over ancestral rites differently, and depending on occupation or the extent of property held, the elder may in fact be in an inferior position. In today's society in general, it is not always the case that the elder among lineal descendants actually presides over ancestral rites or memorial rituals. Accordingly, giving priority to the elder among lineal descendants amounts to discrimination based on age, an inherent (birth-related) factor, among them, and, just as with the sex-based discrimination that the majority opinion seeks to change, this may itself be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution; it cannot be regarded as consistent with reason (조리).
4) In particular, it is extremely unjust to completely exclude the surviving spouse.
가) Under our legal system, there are cases in which the property interests arising from the death of a decedent are not inherited by the co-heirs in accordance with the principle of joint succession under the Civil Act, but instead vest solely in a specific person (such a legal effect being possible only through legislative formation within the legislature's discretion); where individual statutes, with respect to the right of bereaved family members to receive benefits, do not follow the principle of inheritance but instead grant rights to a specific person in accordance with the legislative purpose of the relevant statute, the spouse among the bereaved family members is uniformly given the highest priority. The spouse is given the highest priority among the persons entitled to bereaved family benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), the Military Pension Act (군인연금법), and the Private School Teachers and Staff Pension Act (사립학교교직원 연금법), among the persons entitled to a survivor's pension under the National Pension Act (국민연금법), and in the order of priority of bereaved family members entitled to compensation under the Act on the Honorable Treatment of and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (국가유공자 등 예우 및 지원에 관한 법률). Even Article 5(1) and (3) of the Act on the Establishment and Management of National Cemeteries (국립묘지의 설치 및 운영에 관한 법률) recognizes that, in the case of a person eligible for interment in a national cemetery, such as a person of distinguished service to independence or a person of distinguished service to the state, that person's spouse is eligible to be interred jointly with the person eligible for interment; and even Article 15(2) of the Sound Family Ritual Standards (건전가정의례준칙), a Presidential Decree enacted pursuant to delegation under Article 5(4) of the Act on the Settlement and Support of Sound Family Rituals (건전가정의례의 정착 및 지원에 관한 법률), the abolition of which has been under considerable debate, provides that "the person who presides over the procedures of a funeral ritual shall be the spouse or the eldest son." All of these legislative provisions reflect the legal system's recognition of the fact that the spouse ordinarily had the closest life relationship with the deceased during his or her lifetime.
The majority opinion, in Section 2.다.3), cites various statutes for the proposition that the principle of priority for the elder is reflected in positive law. However, Article 2, Subparagraph 16 of the Funeral Services Act, cited by the majority opinion, which establishes the order of priority among interested parties, and Article 4, Subparagraph 6 of the Act on Organ Transplantation, Etc. (장기등 이식에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Organ Transplantation Act"), which establishes the order of priority among family members or bereaved family members who may consent to, or express refusal of, the donation or removal of organs, both expressly designate the spouse as the person with the highest priority. The majority opinion's interpretation excluding the spouse, even while relying on these very statutes as its basis, is in fact contrary to the provisions of the current statutes cited above. Furthermore, Article 877 of the Civil Act, also cited by the majority opinion, is unrelated to the issue in this case, so that, in the end, the only remaining basis for the majority opinion is the traditional custom in a clan (종중) of granting the status of clan head to the most senior related person (연고항존자).
나) The Supreme Court has recently made clear that our Civil Act does not recognize a system of blood-line inheritance from which the spouse is excluded. From the time of its enactment, our Civil Act has never provided for spousal inheritance as a special form of inheritance distinct from blood-line inheritance. Under the former customary law on inheritance as well, the spouse became the sole heir only in certain cases, but blood-line inheritance and spousal inheritance were not specially distinguished. Accordingly, both under the former customary law and from the time of the enacted Civil Act to the present, the spouse is one of the heirs and has no difference in legal status from the other blood-line heirs (see the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2020Geu42, decided March 23, 2023, etc.).
Succession under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act belongs essentially to inheritance, and constitutes a special provision within the law of inheritance intended to enable the continuation of a family's ancestral rites (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da45452, decided July 4, 2006, etc.). The legislative purpose whereby, under the Civil Act, the spouse is not only one of the co-heirs but also receives an additional 50% of the statutory share of inheritance compared to the other co-heirs, must also be reflected in the succession to property used for ancestral rites.
다) In modern society, family forms centered on the nuclear family have become predominant, family relationships are increasingly formed around the married couple, and the number of children continues to decline. As the meaning of ancestral rites shifts from the traditional continuation of the family lineage toward an emphasis on commemoration, the sense that ancestral rites must necessarily be assumed by the next generation is also gradually weakening. With the decline of burial culture, the need to pass forest land for grave protection and land for grave maintenance on to blood relatives has likewise inevitably diminished. Moreover, it may be inferred, in light of common experience, that the surviving spouse, given the degree of relationship with the deceased and the life relationship during the deceased's lifetime, holds the strongest feeling of commemoration toward the deceased. Even without invoking the traditional concept of filial piety, it is inconsistent with social norms for a child to arbitrarily determine the method of disposing of the deceased's remains against the will of the surviving spouse.
5) There are limits to the interpretation that provides for exceptions based on "special circumstances."
The majority opinion states that, if it would be clearly unjust for the senior person among the closest lineal descendants of the decedent to serve as the person presiding over ancestral rites, that status may exceptionally not be recognized as belonging to that person.
[Reasoning] (continued)
The exception based on special circumstances is a legal doctrine that had already been recognized in the 2008 en banc Supreme Court decision and in prior Supreme Court precedents. The Supreme Court has held that even where a person is a permanent resident of a foreign country and has resided abroad for a long period, this does not constitute a special circumstance unless the person is unsuited to perform the role of the person presiding over ancestral rites (제사주재자) in the future (see Supreme Court Decision 96Nu18069, delivered November 28, 1997), and it upheld a lower court's determination that being unmarried and in an as-yet insufficient economic condition could not be deemed a special circumstance (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da14006, delivered September 26, 2000). In this way, prior precedents strictly limited the scope of "special circumstances" to cases where the role could not be expected to be performed due to a cause attributable to the person presiding over ancestral rites. This stems from the legal principle that, since depriving a person who has been granted priority status as the person presiding over ancestral rites of that status infringes upon a vested right, such deprivation should be recognized only under strict requirements—a principle consistent with Article 1004 of the Civil Act (민법) concerning grounds for disqualification of an heir.
However, the Majority Opinion goes further and asserts that persons who cannot be recognized as the person presiding over ancestral rites should be identified by considering even circumstances unrelated to fault, such as the intent of the decedent and co-heirs, or their living relationships. Even if many considerations are enumerated in this way, the core issue remains the determination of whether "becoming the person presiding over ancestral rites would be markedly unjust." If "markedness" is interpreted strictly, there is little difference from the scope of special circumstances recognized in prior precedents or in the 2008 en banc decision. On the other hand, if it is interpreted broadly, the Majority Opinion not only contradicts and conflicts with precedents that strictly interpreted "special circumstances under which the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be maintained," but may also violate the general legal principle that "deprivation of vested rights" must be strict. As a result of excessively broadening the exceptional grounds, it becomes unclear whether the status of person presiding over ancestral rites can be recognized at all. The Majority Opinion's approach has the merit of securing predictability and legal stability by giving priority to a specific person as the person presiding over ancestral rites, but this merit is offset as a result.
6) The core issue concerns the form of the trial and the object of examination.
Fundamentally, the Majority Opinion's method of interpretation degrades the trial into an arena for casting blame on the opposing party. Under the Majority Opinion, the central issue in litigation becomes whether the person with priority succession asserts and proves grounds disqualifying them from being the person presiding over ancestral rites. Consequently, in litigation between co-heirs, the examination becomes focused on disparaging the opposing party in order to highlight the opposing party's unsuitability.
However, litigation concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites should not become a contest over disputing each other's unsuitability. The trial should be one that determines "who is the appropriate person to manage the decedent's remains and preside over ancestral rites and other memorial ceremonies among the bereaved family," and to this end, the party claiming to be the appropriate person should actively prove the decedent's intent, their relationship with the decedent during the decedent's lifetime, and their willingness and ability to continue management in the future, and appeal to this before the court—this should be the core of the proceeding.
The Separate Opinion squarely confronts the reality that, under the Majority Opinion, litigation concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites will inevitably continue in its current form of wounding blood relations and turning them into enemies, and represents an expression of the will to move forward and improve this in a positive direction.
(e) Determination on this case
We examine this case. Where a dispute arises because co-heirs failed to reach agreement on the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites, the court below should have examined various circumstances, including the express or presumed intent of Nonparty 1, the living relationships during his lifetime, the degree of effort made by the co-heirs to manage the remains, the willingness and ability regarding future management, and the intent of the co-heirs, and then determined which party—among the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2's side—was appropriate as the person entitled to Nonparty 1's remains. Nevertheless, the court below, without sufficiently examining these various circumstances, upheld the judgment of the court of first instance, which dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the eldest son, having priority status as the person presiding over ancestral rites, held the right to Nonparty 1's remains. The judgment of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal doctrine regarding the method of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites and failed to conduct the necessary examination.
For the foregoing reasons, although we reach the same conclusion as the Majority Opinion, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion because we reach that conclusion on different grounds, and we therefore state this Separate Opinion.
6. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Noh Tae-ak, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi Concerning the Majority Opinion
(a) The Majority Opinion establishes a minimum objective standard giving priority, in cases where co-heirs fail to reach agreement, to the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the nearest degree of kinship as the person presiding over ancestral rites. This is appropriate as a conclusion that secures legal stability and guarantees the autonomy of family life in interpreting the person presiding over ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act (민법), while conforming to the overall legal order with the Constitution as the highest norm, and being a conclusion that can be socially accepted and approved. The reasons are supplemented as follows.
1) Both the Majority Opinion and the Separate Opinion take the position, in accordance with the 2008 en banc decision, that "the decedent's remains are succeeded to by the person presiding over ancestral rites in the same manner as property for ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act." Given that this position treats the decedent's remains, without separating them from property such as forest land for ancestral rites (금양임야) or grave land (묘토), within a single concept of "property for ancestral rites" through the interpretation of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, determining the person presiding over ancestral rites is not only a matter of determining who is entitled to the decedent's remains, but also a matter of determining the successor to property for ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act—that is, real property or the like having a specific purpose. Since the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites relates to the inheritance system, securing legal stability is extremely important, and the Majority Opinion determined that it is desirable to present an objective standard for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites in accordance with reason and common sense for this purpose.
(A) Succession to property for ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act is essentially inheritance in nature (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2005Da45452; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da88699, delivered September 13, 2012, etc.). Since inheritance-related systems and legal relationships require the promotion of legal stability more than any other field, there is a very great need to present a clear and objective standard by which the successor can be known both internally and externally as soon as the cause for succession arises, even with respect to property for ancestral rites. If, as the Separate Opinion suggests, the court were required to determine the person presiding over ancestral rites on a case-by-case basis whenever a dispute arises over property for ancestral rites, the parties concerned would be placed in an indeterminate legal relationship for a prolonged period, unable to know who the person presiding over ancestral rites is until the court's judgment becomes final, thereby threatening legal stability.
(B) In particular, from the perspective of the external relationship between co-heirs and third parties, if the person presiding over ancestral rites is not determined at the time of the decedent's death and is only determined by a court's judgment each time a dispute arises, there is a great risk of undermining legal stability. A third party who has newly formed a legal relationship through the disposition of real property, such as forest land for ancestral rites or grave land, among the property for ancestral rites, may face a situation in which they must accept the result that their legal interests are retroactively infringed by the subsequent determination, through a court's judgment, of the person presiding over ancestral rites who succeeded to that real property.
Where a contract such as a facility use agreement for burial has been concluded in the external relationship, that contractual relationship may govern; however, where there is no contractual relationship at all, disputes may arise as to who bears the obligation to receive remains that have been interred, or the obligation to pay costs incurred in that process, and in most cases involving issues such as the exhumation of an already-installed grave or the obligation to return unjust enrichment arising from the use of the land, there is no contractual relationship, making it necessary to have a standard for identifying the primary counterpart for negotiation to resolve the dispute. Although Article 2, Subparagraph 16 of the Act on Funeral Services, Etc. (장사 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "장사법") provides a definition regarding a person with a special relationship (연고자), which can serve as a reference, it is insufficient to directly adopt this as the standard for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act in relation to third parties. Moreover, if the external relationship with third parties is governed primarily by the named party to such contracts or the person with a special relationship under the 장사법, the external relationship and the internal relationship among co-heirs may become separated, potentially complicating legal relationships.
(C) Under the Majority Opinion, it is easier to secure procedural stability and predictability in litigation concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites. Without a standard for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, a third party seeking exhumation of a grave would have difficulty knowing which of the co-heirs is the person presiding over ancestral rites who guards and manages that grave, inevitably encountering considerable difficulty in identifying the defendant. If, as under the Separate Opinion, the court determines who the person presiding over ancestral rites is by comprehensively considering all circumstances in individual cases, a gap may arise in the prompt relief of third parties' rights due to the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites. A third party unfamiliar with the internal circumstances of the co-heirs would find it difficult to prove, even after filing suit against a specific person as defendant on the assertion that this person is the person presiding over ancestral rites, that the defendant is the person among the co-heirs who is appropriate to preside over the ancestral rites. Nor would it be easy, structurally, for the court to devise a method to appropriately examine the intent or circumstances of other co-heirs who are not involved in the proceedings. Ultimately, contrary to the original intent of the Separate Opinion, which seeks to promote concrete appropriateness suited to individual family circumstances, there is a considerable possibility that neither the goal of prompt relief of rights nor that of concrete appropriateness can be achieved in disputes between third parties and co-heirs. Moreover, where multiple lawsuits are filed among co-heirs or between co-heirs and third parties, the determination regarding the person presiding over ancestral rites may become mutually inconsistent across the individual suits due to differences in the content of the parties' assertions or the degree of proof.
2) Since the question of determining the person presiding over ancestral rites belongs to the sphere of family life, in which the autonomy of family members should be respected to the maximum extent and state agencies should refrain from intervention as much as possible, it is appropriate, rather than having the court intervene immediately in all cases where agreement is not reached, to first present a principle that can be applied so as to promote the autonomous resolution of disputes based on that standard.
(A) The question of who among family members should be the person presiding over ancestral rites is also a matter of succession to real property constituting property for ancestral rites, but is fundamentally a matter in which aspects of family custom and tradition surrounding the handling of remains such as funerals, the performance of ancestral rites, and the management of graves are prominent, and is thus a matter that should be determined autonomously within each individual family, requiring the court's intervention to be minimized as much as possible. Having the court intervene immediately to determine the person presiding over ancestral rites simply because agreement on this determination has not been reached may undermine the autonomy of family life.
(B) The method for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites adopted by the Majority Opinion functions as a certain norm of conduct in situations where agreement among co-heirs is not easily reached. By enabling some prediction of the court's final determination as to who is the person presiding over ancestral rites based on the principled standard presented by the Majority Opinion, it can promote agreement among co-heirs and increase the possibility of autonomous resolution of disputes.
Under the Separate Opinion, since who is the person presiding over ancestral rites can be determined only through a court judgment where agreement among co-heirs is not reached, the parties have no choice but to file suit with the court. This may cause the parties to incur unnecessary expenses and provoke legal disputes. In particular, a situation may arise in which the funeral procedure cannot proceed due to a dispute over entitlement to the remains, and even if a provisional disposition is sought to establish a provisional status, delay in the procedure is unavoidable. Depending on the degree of assertion and proof, a situation may arise in which the conclusion of the provisional disposition and the conclusion subsequently reached in the merits litigation are mutually inconsistent, and such a result is particularly undesirable in relation to the entitlement to remains.
(C) The Separate Opinion criticizes that, under the Majority Opinion, the examination in litigation between co-heirs concerning the person presiding over ancestral rites will concentrate on the "special circumstances" under which the status of person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized, thereby degrading the trial into an arena for casting blame on the opposing party. However, this criticism misunderstands the purport and content of the Majority Opinion.
First, even if co-heirs fail to reach smooth agreement on the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites, the dispute may be resolved in advance according to the standard presented by the Majority Opinion giving priority to a specific person. However, if there is not even a minimal standard for determining the person presiding over ancestral rites, the co-heirs would have no choice but to come to court every time a dispute arises. Ultimately, adopting the Separate Opinion creates room for disputes among co-heirs to come to court more frequently and in greater number.
Moreover, regardless of whether one takes the position of the Majority Opinion or the Separate Opinion, in the course of litigation between co-heirs, assertions and proof that oneself is suitable as the person presiding over ancestral rites while the opposing party is unsuitable will inevitably surface. However, under the Majority Opinion, the impropriety of a specific person as the person presiding over ancestral rites would be contested, whereas under the Separate Opinion, the suitability and unsuitability of all co-heirs would be contested broadly and fiercely, making it more likely that the trial would take the form of wounding relations among family members, and the litigation would inevitably be prolonged.
(D) The Separate Opinion criticizes the Majority Opinion on the ground that, if the status of successor is granted in advance to a specific person in cases where agreement is not reached, co-heirs would have no genuine reason to negotiate in good faith, and no incentive to sincerely support the decedent during the decedent's lifetime. However, we find it difficult to agree with this view. The possibility that granting the status of successor to a specific person according to a predetermined standard, in cases where agreement is not reached, would distort the autonomous resolution occurring within individual families is not great. In our society, most families resolve, without court intervention, matters concerning the support of the decedent during the decedent's lifetime and matters of funeral or ancestral rites after death, autonomously based on affection and trust among family members. Prior to the 2008 en banc decision, the Supreme Court held that the head of the family line (종손) becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites, and in the 2008 en banc decision, the Court held that agreement among co-heirs takes priority, and where agreement is not reached, the eldest son or eldest grandson becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites, thereby granting the status of successor to a predetermined specific person; there is no basis for viewing that this legal doctrine has had a negative effect on the autonomous resolution of matters based on agreement.
3) Since applying only a uniform standard in recognizing the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites may, due to its rigidity, make it difficult to derive an appropriate conclusion in individual cases, the court can secure concrete appropriateness and mitigate rigidity through examination and determination of the special circumstances under which the status of person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized.
(A) The Majority Opinion presents the scope of special circumstances under which such status cannot be recognized, reflecting changes in general social perception and the individual circumstances within each family regarding the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites. Accordingly, the court will be able to satisfy concrete appropriateness by recognizing special circumstances more flexibly than before in individual cases. If such special circumstances exist with respect to the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the nearest degree of kinship, the next person in line may become the person presiding over ancestral rites (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da28865, delivered May 16, 2014).
(B) In determining whether special circumstances exist under which the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized, the same standard does not apply in all cases; rather, concrete appropriateness should be promoted through the evaluation of principal factors suited to the unique characteristics of each individual case. The situation at issue differs between the portion concerning succession to real property constituting property for ancestral rites, such as forest land for ancestral rites or grave land, and the portion concerning entitlement to the decedent's remains, and the scope of persons having a legal interest in the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites also differs. In particular, in the latter situation, the need to consider the decedent's intent and the individual family's customs and traditions becomes greater, so it is necessary to examine, depending on the type of individual case, which of the various factors for determining special circumstances under which the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized should be given greater weight.
Moreover, the issue of entitlement to the decedent's remains and the issue of succession to property for ancestral rites relating to other ancestors may be determined separately. The above Supreme Court Decision 2013Da28865 held that, although the illegitimate eldest son became the person presiding over ancestral rites upon the mother's death, since he relocated only the graves of his own ancestors elsewhere while discontinuing management of the mother's grave, and showed no attitude whatsoever as a person with authority to manage and dispose of the grave in litigation concerning the exhumation of that grave, this constituted a special circumstance under which he could not maintain the status of person presiding over ancestral rites with respect to the mother, and that the eldest daughter, as the new person presiding over ancestral rites, held the right to manage and dispose of the mother's grave—thereby recognizing that the person presiding over ancestral rites for the graves of ancestors and the person presiding over ancestral rites for the mother's grave may differ from each other.
(C) The Majority Opinion does not exclude the surviving spouse from the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites. The decedent's spouse, as one of the co-heirs, may naturally become the person presiding over ancestral rites where there is agreement among co-heirs, and even where special circumstances exist such that none of the decedent's lineal descendants can be recognized as having the status of person presiding over ancestral rites, the spouse may be recognized as the person presiding over ancestral rites. However, where a spouse who is the person presiding over ancestral rites remarries, there is room to evaluate that the spouse has a special circumstance making it difficult to maintain the status of person presiding over ancestral rites, resulting in the loss of that status.
Moreover, since the spouse is generally the person who maintained the closest living relationship with the deceased during the deceased's lifetime, and thus naturally has the greatest affection for and interest in the conduct of the funeral procedure, the performance of ancestral rites, and the guarding of the grave, it is necessary to ensure that the surviving spouse's intent is appropriately reflected when determining special circumstances under which the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized.
(D) Meanwhile, if the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the nearest degree of kinship does not wish to succeed to the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites, it may be considered, absent other circumstances, that special circumstances exist under which that person cannot be recognized as having the status of person presiding over ancestral rites. Accordingly, the Separate Opinion's criticism that "if a specific person naturally becomes the person presiding over ancestral rites by inherent status regardless of that person's own intent, this is improper because the status of person presiding over ancestral rites may be forcibly imposed against the individual's will," is not appropriate. However, in situations such as litigation for exhumation of a grave where the bearing of an obligation toward a third party is at issue, where none of the co-heirs wishes to succeed to the status of person presiding over ancestral rites, and there is no circumstance warranting differentiation among the co-heirs internally regarding the bearing of the obligation, the status of person presiding over ancestral rites as the obligor may inevitably be imposed against that person's will for the purpose of securing legal stability and the realization of third parties' rights; however, this cannot be conclusively regarded as an infringement of individual autonomy.
(E) The Majority Opinion holds that the decedent's express or presumed intent should also be considered in determining whether special circumstances exist under which the status of the person presiding over ancestral rites cannot be recognized. The Separate Opinion likewise holds that, where the deceased designated the person presiding over ancestral rites during their lifetime, that express intent, and where there is no such intent, the deceased's presumed intent, should be given the most important consideration in determining the person presiding over ancestral rites. Although it is not easy, under the current legal system, to recognize legal binding force in the intent left by the deceased regarding the manner of handling their own remains to be left behind after death or the establishment of a grave, it goes without saying that, since the primary meaning and purpose of ancestral rites lies in reverence for and remembrance of the deceased, it is necessary to actively reflect the deceased's intent when determining the person presiding over ancestral rites for the deceased. In this respect, where the handling of the remains or the establishment of a grave after the deceased's death has been peacefully carried out in accordance with the deceased's express or presumed intent, this needs to be respected. We point out that it is not desirable to readily allow a person who performed such posthumous handling, even if not the person presiding over ancestral rites, to be subsequently overridden by a person with priority who, asserting that they are the rightful person presiding over ancestral rites, seeks to exhume the grave that has been appropriately handled and managed in accordance with the deceased's intent and demands delivery of the remains, or seeks to significantly change the manner of managing remains that have been cremated and interred. Rites such as ceremonies expressing reverence for and remembrance of the deceased as the rightful person presiding over ancestral rites can be performed while leaving the already-completed funeral arrangements consistent with the deceased's intent as they are, and if the opposing party interferes with this, the objective can be sufficiently achieved through litigation to prohibit such interference; and where a situation arose in which the person presiding over ancestral rites was excluded from the deceased's funeral or other handling of the remains, it is desirable to resolve this matter in the realm of damages for tort.
(b) There is no difference between the Majority Opinion and the Separate Opinion in that agreement among co-heirs takes the highest priority in determining the person presiding over ancestral rites. Such agreement may be reached not only expressly but also impliedly.
Whether there was an implied agreement among co-heirs regarding the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites should be reasonably determined in light of common social understanding, considering: first, the course of the handling of remains and the conduct of ancestral rites, such as the funeral and the establishment of a grave, that took place among co-heirs after the decedent's death; the motive and circumstances by which a specific person among the co-heirs came to actually manage the remains or the grave; the content and duration of that conduct; the specific person's status within the kinship relationship; the attitude of the other co-heirs; and, together with these factors, whether the person who would have become the person presiding over ancestral rites absent the implied agreement (the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the nearest degree of kinship) knew of such facts yet raised no particular objection, and whether that person suffered any disadvantage due to the specific person's management conduct, etc.
Since the handling of remains such as the funeral, the conduct of ancestral rites, and the management of the grave after the decedent's death are, in many cases, naturally carried out by co-heirs in accordance with family custom and tradition, the agreement regarding the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites is likely, in most cases, to be reached implicitly in the course of that process. Moreover, considering that the manner in which the remains or grave have been peacefully managed for a considerable period after the decedent's death will, in most cases, conform to the intent of the co-heirs and thus deserves respect, and that there is a need to reflect to some extent, in the determination of the person presiding over ancestral rites, the reality that the management of remains or the grave—the role of the person presiding over ancestral rites—has actually been performed, there is no need to recognize implied agreement in an excessively strict manner. Such an interpretation also accords with the purport of giving the highest priority to agreement among co-heirs in determining the person presiding over ancestral rites and reducing the court's intervention as much as possible. For example, where a specific person among the co-heirs has guarded and managed a grave peacefully for a considerably long period, actually performing the ancestral rites, or has asserted a right to use the burial site (분묘기지권) related to the establishment of the grave or received compensation for expropriation, and the eldest among the decedent's lineal descendants of the nearest degree of kinship knew of this yet raised no objection for a considerable period, and the other co-heirs likewise raised no objection, then it may be recognized that an implied agreement was formed, in that the co-heirs, including the eldest of the nearest degree of kinship, are deemed to have impliedly acquiesced in that specific person's performance of the role of person presiding over ancestral rites.
[Reasoning] (continued)
다. Considering the changing patterns of funeral culture and customs, which today show diverse forms in seeking to commemorate the deceased, it should be noted that there is a growing need to establish, through legislation, appropriate standards for handling the attribution of a person's body and remains separately from and in a manner suited to the attribution of property for ancestral rites as provided in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act (민법). Although the Act on Funeral Services, Etc. (장사법, hereinafter "장사법") currently sets out matters concerning the disposition of the body, remains, or grave that a person with a special relationship must perform vis-à-vis the competent authority, as well as the order of priority among such persons, these provisions alone are insufficient to reasonably resolve the various types of disputes that arise regarding private-law rights and obligations concerning the body, remains, or grave, whether among co-heirs or in relation to third parties.
When a person dies, among the co-heirs, the funeral procedures immediately following death, the disposition of the body or remains such as cremation or the establishment of a grave, and thereafter the performance of ancestral rites take place in stages over time, and subsequently the management of the body, remains, or grave continues over a long period. At each stage, the main patterns of dispute and the parties involved differ, and accordingly the factors that must be given importance are not the same. The issue of the attribution of the body and remains is an area in which societal customs or the family traditions and autonomy of individual households are important, and thus it has characteristics different from the issue of succession to property strictly for ancestral rites, such as forest land for tending graves (금양임야) or paddy land for ancestral rites (묘토), as provided in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act. It is therefore not easy to reach conclusions with concrete reasonableness by applying the same standard to both areas. In this way, the situation has arisen in which the interpretation and application of the concept of the person in charge of ancestral rites (제사주재자) as provided in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act alone is no longer sufficient to meet the diverse demands of a changing society. As members of our society become aware that they have the right to self-determination over their own bodies, there is also a tendency for individuals to wish to specifically exercise this right of self-determination, while still alive, with respect to their own body and remains that will be left after death. It should therefore be added that, when relevant laws and regulations are revised, consideration should be given to the view that legal effect should be recognized for, or sufficient reflection given to, the final intention that the deceased clearly expressed during his or her lifetime regarding the manner of his or her funeral or the disposition of his or her body.
The foregoing sets forth the Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Min Yu-suk to the Separate Opinion
This Supplementary Opinion supplements the Separate Opinion by rebutting the following point raised in the Supplementary Opinion of Justices Cho Jae-yeon, Noh Tae-ak, and Oh Kyung-mi to the Majority Opinion (hereinafter the "Majority Supplementary Opinion").
가. In Section 6.가.3)다), the Majority Supplementary Opinion states the view that "the Majority Opinion does not exclude the surviving spouse from becoming the person in charge of ancestral rites. Therefore, if there are circumstances under which none of the decedent's lineal descendants can be recognized as the person in charge of ancestral rites, the surviving spouse may become the person in charge of ancestral rites."
However, the view that a spouse may be recognized as the person in charge of ancestral rites is not included in, nor consistent with, the Majority Opinion. As already stated in the Separate Opinion, under the Majority Opinion, a spouse cannot become the person in charge of ancestral rites. Accordingly, the above view exceeds the scope that may properly be expressed as a Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion. However, since there is no disagreement that a spouse may become the person in charge of ancestral rites through agreement among the co-heirs, the following discussion is limited to cases where no such agreement is reached and the court must determine who is to be the person in charge of ancestral rites.
1) First, we examine the general legal principles concerning the scope within which a Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion may properly be expressed in an en banc Supreme Court judgment.
The main text of Article 7(1) of the Court Organization Act (법원조직법) provides, "The adjudicating authority of the Supreme Court shall be exercised by an en banc panel composed of two-thirds or more of all the Justices, with the Chief Justice presiding as the presiding judge," thereby providing for the case of adjudication by what is called an "en banc Supreme Court judgment," and Article 66(1) provides, "Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or statute, a collegiate judgment shall be determined by a majority." Accordingly, even in the case of an en banc Supreme Court judgment, if there is an opinion supported by a majority, that opinion becomes the so-called "opinion of the court" (법정의견) determined as a result of the exercise of adjudicating authority by the Supreme Court en banc. Meanwhile, Article 15 of the Court Organization Act provides, "In a written judgment of the Supreme Court, the opinions of all Justices who participated in the deliberation shall be indicated," but does not provide any further detailed provisions concerning the method of expressing opinions in the case of adjudication by an en banc Supreme Court judgment.
Accordingly, in past en banc Supreme Court judgments, it has been the customary practice to designate, among the opinions that do not constitute the opinion of the court in the relevant case, an opinion that differs from the opinion of the court in both conclusion and reasoning as a "Dissenting Opinion" (반대의견), and an opinion that reaches the same conclusion as the opinion of the court but differs in reasoning as a "Separate Opinion" (별개의견). Meanwhile, an opinion that supplements or adds to the content and grounds of the reasoning of the Majority Opinion, which constitutes the opinion of the court, or of a Dissenting Opinion or Separate Opinion, respectively, has been designated as a "Supplementary Opinion" (보충의견).
In this way, each Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion, a Dissenting Opinion, or a Separate Opinion naturally presupposes that the Justice expressing the Supplementary Opinion belongs to, and agrees with, the relevant Majority Opinion, Dissenting Opinion, or Separate Opinion.
In particular, the Majority Opinion of an en banc Supreme Court judgment, as the opinion of the court, constitutes "an opinion concerning the interpretation and application of the Constitution, a statute, an order, or a rule as adjudicated by the Supreme Court" as provided in Article 7(1)(3) of the Court Organization Act, "Supreme Court precedent" as provided in Article 4(1)(3) and (4) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Procedure for Appeal (상고심절차에 관한 특례법), and "Supreme Court precedent" as provided in Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedited Trial of Small Claims (소액사건심판법), and Supreme Court precedent functions to present the general standard concerning the interpretation and application of statutes to lower courts adjudicating similar cases.
Therefore, both logically and functionally, an obvious limitation follows: the reasoning or grounds added by a Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion, which is the opinion of the court, must not differ from, or contradict the core logic of, the content and logic of the reasoning expressed in the Majority Opinion, in particular the standard for the interpretation and application of statutes that the Majority Opinion presents with respect to the matters at issue in that very case.
2) We now examine this case.
The legal principle set forth in the 2008 en banc judgment was that "where no agreement is reached among the co-heirs, absent special circumstances, the deceased's eldest son (or, if the eldest son has already died, the eldest grandson) becomes the person in charge of ancestral rites with first priority, the second and subsequent sons with second priority, and the eldest daughter with third priority."
As already pointed out in the Separate Opinion, the 2008 en banc judgment opened the way for co-heirs to reach an agreement among themselves, but where no agreement was reached, it determined the order of priority for the person in charge of ancestral rites according to a scope and order of priority unrelated to the co-heirs under the Civil Act; in particular, that order of priority was similar to that of the head-of-family successor (호주상속인) under the former Civil Act at the time when the abolished family register system and head-of-family succession system were still in effect.
That is, under the former Civil Act in effect before its amendment by Act No. 4199 of January 13, 1990, the head-of-family successor was recognized, among the decedent's male lineal descendants, in order of closest degree of relationship and then seniority in age (Article 984(1), Article 985(1) and (2)), such that the eldest son was the head-of-family successor with first priority, and where the eldest son had died first, the eldest grandson became the head-of-family successor by way of substitute succession (Article 990(1), Article 985). The "second and subsequent sons, and the eldest daughter," recognized by the 2008 en banc judgment as the persons in charge of ancestral rites with second and third priority, were likewise based on an independent classification different from the scope of co-heirs. This is clearly distinguishable from the fact that, at the time the above en banc judgment was rendered (November 20, 2008), under the Civil Act the spouse and children were co-heirs as the property heirs with first priority.
The Majority Opinion, while accepting and maintaining the foregoing premised legal principle of the 2008 en banc judgment, changed only the holding concerning the order of priority for the person in charge of ancestral rites. Since the Majority Opinion states that "among the decedent's lineal descendants, the eldest among those of the closest degree of relationship takes priority as the person in charge of ancestral rites," the scope of persons who may be recognized as the person in charge of ancestral rites and the order of priority set forth in the Majority Opinion are determined by this portion. That is, the person is to be recognized from among "descendants who are lineal blood relatives (excluding lineal ascendants)," with priority determined by degree of relationship and age. Since "lineal descendants" means children and grandchildren (including great-grandchildren), this means that, among them, the person becomes the person in charge of ancestral rites in order of closest degree of relationship and then seniority in age.
In the end, the Majority Opinion does not recognize the person in charge of ancestral rites from among the co-heirs, but instead separately determines the scope and order of priority within the range of "blood relatives," in which there is no room for a spouse to be included. Since, as stated above, the spouse is entirely excluded under the Majority Opinion, the Separate Opinion disputes this point.
3) Furthermore, regardless of whether the Majority Opinion includes the spouse as a person in charge of ancestral rites, it is inherently improper for the spouse to become the person in charge of ancestral rites only with a lower order of priority.
The Majority Opinion adopts a uniform regulatory method of designating a specific person as the person in charge of ancestral rites, while broadly and comprehensively permitting exceptional grounds for excluding that person from the order of priority. This structure of judgment, by focusing the trial on establishing the unsuitability of the person with higher priority, degrades the proceeding into a kind of "trial to prove filial impiety." This problem has already been pointed out in the Separate Opinion.
In addition, if the spouse is included as the person in charge of ancestral rites with the lowest priority, the spouse would have to assert and prove, in order to become the person in charge of ancestral rites, that all of the decedent's lineal descendants with higher priority are unsuitable to be the person in charge of ancestral rites. If those lineal descendants are the biological children of the decedent and the spouse, and their own children, the impropriety is even greater. This means that if the spouse wishes to manage the decedent's body and remains, the spouse must expose in litigation the faults of, and unsuitability as person in charge of ancestral rites of, all of the children and grandchildren whom the spouse bore. This does not accord with social norms and ethical consciousness.
나. For the foregoing reasons, this Supplementary Opinion to the Separate Opinion is set forth.
8. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Kim Sun-soo to the Separate Opinion
I would like to reflect on an amicable and desirable way of resolving this case.
가. From the perspective of the vast and infinite universe and eternal time, the very fact of living together in the same era in this same space called Earth can be regarded as a special bond. It cannot be denied that the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2 and Nonparty 2 (hereinafter Defendant 2 and Nonparty 2 are collectively referred to as "Defendant 2, et al.") are in an even more special, miracle-like relationship formed through Nonparty 1. It would be a tragedy to steer this special relationship between the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. only in a direction that causes pain and hurt. Sublimating their relationship in a direction of mutual respect and consideration may be said to be in accordance with the order of nature.
나. The remains of Nonparty 1 enshrined in the charnel house exist in the form of "ashes remaining after the cremation of the body" and are kept in an urn. There is no proprietary benefit whatsoever in keeping and managing Nonparty 1's remains; rather, expenses must be incurred for their management. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs seek delivery of the remains, and Defendant 2, et al. refuse to comply with the Plaintiffs' claim. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. have consistently asserted in this litigation that they wish to keep and manage the remains in order to honor and commemorate Nonparty 1 as a spouse or as a father, respectively. There appears to be no room for doubt as to the sincerity of their genuine wish to honor Nonparty 1.
The reason the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. continue to pursue this litigation is to have confirmed and recognized that they themselves hold the legal and social status, as the person in charge of ancestral rites, to honor and commemorate Nonparty 1. However, must such legal and social status necessarily be recognized exclusively and monopolistically in favor of only one side? There is no necessity or justification requiring that the honoring and commemoration of Nonparty 1 be monopolized by either the Plaintiffs or Defendant 2, et al. alone, and the fact that both sides honor and commemorate him does not inflict harm or impose disadvantage on the other side. It is entirely possible for the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. each to keep and manage Nonparty 1's remains in their own way and to honor and commemorate him in the manner they wish, at their own respective times and places. If the rigid dogma that "the person in charge of ancestral rites must be limited to one specific individual, and the right to the remains must be recognized for only one of either the Plaintiffs or Defendant 2, et al." is broken and a flexible approach is taken, an appropriate solution satisfactory to all may be reached.
다. Since the remains enshrined in the charnel house are in the form of ashes that can be divided, it is possible for the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. to divide Nonparty 1's remains currently kept there in half, with each side keeping and managing its own half and honoring and commemorating Nonparty 1 in its own way. Human beings accept death, form a new relationship with the deceased, and heal themselves by collecting and honoring the remains of the deceased. Through such rites, the living connect with one another and deepen their bonds. In this respect, for those who commemorate the deceased to divide and share the remains can be sufficiently meaningful in relation to the various communities, large and small, to which they belong, and in relation to the deceased. The Buddhist community has contributed to the spread of Buddhism by distributing the true relics (진신사리) of Sakyamuni Buddha to various places around the world so that believers may venerate them. The Catholic rite of Holy Communion (영성체), in which one receives the body and blood of Jesus into one's own body, may be understood in the same vein. What matters with respect to the remains of the deceased is not their quantity but their symbolic meaning of continuing the connection with the deceased. It cannot be regarded as impermissible, as a mode of commemoration acceptable to our society, for those who shared a good bond with the deceased, without acting contrary to the deceased's wishes, to voluntarily divide and share the deceased's remains and share their feelings of commemoration.
It is possible for the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. each to keep and manage Nonparty 1's remains while maintaining a substantive connection with, and commemorating, Nonparty 1. Doing so would in no way diminish the sentiment of commemoration for Nonparty 1; rather, doing so may be a sincere method of commemoration. Defendant 2, et al. may continue to honor and commemorate Nonparty 1 as they currently do, pursuant to the charnel house use contract with Defendant ○○ Foundation, and the Plaintiffs may keep and manage their divided share of the remains in the manner they wish, while honoring and commemorating Nonparty 1. This could be a good solution that dispels the unreasonable situation in which one side monopolizes the remains while depriving the other side of the opportunity to commemorate the deceased.
라. This case may become a watershed determining whether the special relationship formed between the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. through Nonparty 1 will be sublimated into a good bond or degraded into an ill one. In particular, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and the eldest son, Nonparty 2, made no decision of their own as to being born as children of Nonparty 1, the timing of their birth, or their sex. Nevertheless, a judgment result that decides the matter all-or-nothing (일도양단), recognizing the legal status to commemorate Nonparty 1 in favor of only one side, is excessively harsh for the losing party and can never be the best solution. There is a saying in the moral code of Native Americans: "To wound one is to wound all, and to honor one is to honor all." It cannot be said to be a wise choice to insist on a solution that wounds one party when there exists a solution that respects both the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. A judgment based on legal logic must inevitably present an objective and dispassionate standard of judgment in order to maintain social order, but that does not mean that such a legal judgment always presents the best solution. In a specific case, the best solution may be reached not through adjudication based on legal judgment, but through reconciliation based on the parties' mutual empathy and consideration. For this reason, the 2008 en banc judgment that is the subject of change, as well as both the Majority Opinion and the Separate Opinion in this case, alike give the highest priority to having the person in charge of ancestral rites determined through agreement among the co-heirs.
A dispute among family members over the body and remains of the deceased, as in this case, cannot be treated like a game decided by winning and losing, and it is by no means desirable to reach a conclusion in which the losing side, who may also hold feelings of commemoration for the deceased worthy of legal protection, is entirely deprived of any right to the deceased's body and remains. In particular, it is regrettable indeed if Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and the eldest son, Nonparty 2, who are Nonparty 1's children, are unable to escape hostility toward one another and are made to live resenting one another, rather than being able to cherish the bond they have formed and to live supporting one another. The path lies open before the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. to sublimate their relationship into a good bond through a choice made of their own will. This path cannot be forced upon the parties by anyone; it can only be chosen through the parties' own free will.
마. In this case, this Supplementary Opinion is set forth in the hope that a resolution amicable and desirable to all will be reached, allowing both the Plaintiffs and Defendant 2, et al. to genuinely commemorate Nonparty 1.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding), Cho Jae-yeon (Justice in Charge), Park Jeong-hwa, Ahn Cheol-sang, Min Yu-suk, Kim Sun-soo, Lee Dong-won, Noh Jeong-hee, Noh Tae-ak, Lee Heung-gu, Cheon Dae-yeop, Oh Kyung-mi, Oh Seok-jun