[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Jeongse Law Firm (법무법인 정세), Attorney Choi Jin-hwan and 1 other
[Lower Court Judgment] Suwon District Court Judgment 2020No7245, dated August 11, 2021
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case and Issues
A. Summary of the Charged Facts
While riding a bicycle on November 19, 2018, the Defendant negligently failed to keep watch ahead and, as a result, struck the victim Non-indicted 1 (male, 69 years old), who was walking ahead, with the front wheel of the bicycle without seeing him, causing him to fall. As a result, the Defendant, through occupational negligence, caused the victim to suffer serious injuries including diffuse brain damage without an open intracranial wound.
B. The Adult Guardian's Expression of Intent Not to Punish
1) The victim fell into a coma as a result of the accident, and around June 14, 2019, while under treatment, was diagnosed by the attending physician as being in a vegetative state incapable of expressing intent. The victim had not regained consciousness even by around September 21, 2020, near the date the first-instance court concluded the oral argument.
2) On June 20, 2019, adult guardianship over the victim was commenced by the ruling of the Suwon Family Court in Case No. 2019Neudan50598, and Non-indicted 2, the victim's lawful spouse, was appointed as the adult guardian. The court included "litigation acts" within the scope of the adult guardian's statutory power of representation and provided that the exercise of that power of representation required the court's permission.
3) After receiving a settlement amount from the Defendant's side, Non-indicted 2, before the first-instance judgment was rendered, submitted to the first-instance court on November 10, 2020 a document stating that "the victim has received KRW 40,000,000 and does not wish for the Defendant to be criminally punished."
C. The Judgment Below
The court below held that, because in criminal procedure statutory agency in litigation acts is not permitted absent an express provision, even if the victim lacks the capacity to make decisions, it is not permissible for the victim's adult guardian to express, on the victim's behalf or independently, an intention not to punish or to withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment with respect to a crime subject to prosecution only upon the victim's expressed wish (a crime punishable only against the victim's will), and thus upheld the first-instance judgment finding the Defendant guilty of the charged facts.
D. The Issue in This Case
The issue in this case is whether the victim's adult guardian may, on the victim's behalf, decide on an expression of intent not to punish or withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment with respect to a crime punishable only against the victim's will.
2. Judgment of the Supreme Court
A. Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents (교통사고처리 특례법) provides that a driver of a vehicle who commits an offense under Article 268 of the Criminal Act (형법) due to a traffic accident shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine not exceeding KRW 20,000,000, while Article 3(2) of the same Act provides that "a prosecution may not be instituted against the person against the victim's express wish, for a driver who commits the offense of bodily injury by occupational negligence or bodily injury by gross negligence among the offenses under paragraph (1) as a result of the traffic of a vehicle," thereby designating bodily injury by occupational negligence caused by the traffic of a vehicle as a so-called crime punishable only against the victim's will.
In a crime punishable only against the victim's will, absent an express provision, an adult guardian may not, on behalf of a victim who lacks the capacity to make decisions, decide on an intention not to punish the defendant or the suspect, or withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment. This holds true even where the scope of the adult guardian's statutory power of representation includes ordinary litigation acts, or even where the adult guardian obtained the family court's permission to perform litigation acts as provided in the ruling commencing adult guardianship.
B. The specific reasons are as follows.
1) Literal and Reasonable Interpretation of the Law
Under the literal wording of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents and the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), the decision itself as to whether punishment is not desired must be made by the victim and cannot be delegated to an agent.
A) In interpreting and applying provisions of criminal procedure, procedural stability and clarity are of paramount importance, and thus an interpretation faithful to the objective meaning of the text is essential. In particular, provisions relating to conditions of prosecution, such as the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will, form the basic premise for the exercise of the State's power of prosecution and penal authority, and thus there is an especially great need for an interpretation faithful to the statutory text in order to secure the clarity, stability, and predictability of criminal procedure.
Under Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, a prosecution for the offense of bodily injury by occupational negligence under Article 268 of the Criminal Act, committed by a driver of a vehicle due to a traffic accident, may not be instituted against "the victim's" "express" wish; therefore, it is clear from the text that whether punishment is imposed depends on the "express" intent of the "victim." Accordingly, an interpretation that a third party may form or determine an expression of intent not to punish on the victim's behalf runs contrary to the text of the law.
B) In interpreting penal statutes, analogical or expansive interpretation may be permissible where favorable to the defendant; however, even in such a case, an interpretation exceeding the bounds of the statutory text is permissible only where failing to so interpret would result in an outcome markedly contrary to equity and justice or would give rise to serious unreasonableness, and otherwise the legislature's discretion, grounded in its own basis and rationality, must be respected (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Do4049, decided November 11, 2004).
The legislature is afforded broad discretion in determining whether to classify a particular offense as one prosecutable only upon complaint or as one punishable only against the victim's will (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2018Heonba113, decided April 29, 2021). Matters such as whether to require only the capacity to make decisions with respect to an expression of intent not to punish (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, decided November 19, 2009), or whether to limit the effect of the victim's intent pursuant to the principle of indivisibility (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, decided April 26, 1994), and how to define the requirements and effects of crimes punishable only against the victim's will generally, are matters of legislative policy. The same applies to whether to permit representation by a statutory agent with respect to the formation and expression of the intent not to punish. In particular, litigation capacity in criminal procedure is, in principle, recognized so long as the person has the capacity to make decisions (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, decided November 19, 2009), and this independent principle of criminal procedure derives from the principle of self-responsibility or the principle of discovering substantive truth, such that litigation acts in criminal procedure are, at a fundamental level, incompatible with "representation."
Neither the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, nor the Criminal Act, nor the Criminal Procedure Act contains a provision stating that representation is possible with respect to a victim's expression of intent not to punish in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, or that a statutory agent's power of representation includes the victim's expression of intent not to punish. Accordingly, it must be held that, in principle, representation is not permitted with respect to the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will.
2) The Primacy of the Victim's Intent in Crimes Punishable Only Against the Victim's Will
Considering the purpose and protective function of criminal justice, as well as the status of crimes punishable only against the victim's will as an exception to the principle of State prosecution or the State's monopoly on penal authority, the decision itself, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, not to desire the punishment of the defendant or suspect, or to withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment, must, absent special provision, be made by the victim personally.
A) Current law adopts the principle of State prosecution, or the State's monopoly on penal authority, as a means of ensuring the protective function of criminal justice, whereby a person who has committed a criminal act and ought to be punished is punished commensurately, premised on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
However, crimes punishable only against the victim's will are those in which, with respect to certain types of offenses, the victim's express intent is specially designated as a negative condition of prosecution, in the spirit of maximally respecting the victim's wishes; this represents a portion of our legal order in which the involvement of private persons in criminal procedure is exceptionally recognized. Nonetheless, if the involvement of private persons in criminal procedure is expanded beyond the scope or degree contemplated by the law, this may ultimately weaken the protective function of criminal justice and, as a result, bring about an inequitable exercise of the State's penal authority. Therefore, in interpreting crimes punishable only against the victim's will, consideration must also be given to the grand principles of criminal justice—namely, the fair exercise of the State's power of prosecution and penal authority, the protection of legal interests, and the principle of culpability—so as to prevent the State's public function of punishment from being controlled solely by the victim's unilateral intent.
B) Because a crime punishable only against the victim's will produces the powerful legal effect that the State's criminal procedure, once already commenced, is unilaterally discontinued and extinguished solely upon the victim's unilateral expression of intent, the expression of intent not to punish must be based on the victim's true intent.
Accordingly, where the defendant or suspect does not desire punishment, or where an expression of intent to seek punishment is withdrawn, such intent of the victim must be genuine and free of defect, and must be expressed in a clear and reliable manner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Do1809, decided June 15, 2001). It is for this reason that a court must carefully and meticulously investigate and determine, in light of the victim's age, intelligence, intellectual level, developmental maturity, and social adaptability, whether the victim has the capacity to understand and grasp the meaning of the crime, the circumstances of the victimization, and the meaning, content, and effect of an expression of intent not to punish or of withdrawal of an expression of intent to seek punishment, and whether such expression of intent is genuine (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, decided November 19, 2009). Since the principle of indivisibility among co-offenders, which applies to a complaint in crimes prosecutable only upon complaint, does not apply to the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, decided April 26, 1994), confirming the victim's genuine intent as to whether each individual defendant or suspect is to be punished carries even greater significance.
C) An expression of intent not to punish made by a statutory agent cannot be equated with the intent of the victim personally. This is because the statutory agent's expression of intent is not, in itself, the victim's intent, and there is no guarantee whatsoever that it conforms to the victim's genuine intent. Ultimately, the victim's expression of intent not to punish is not of a nature that may be substituted by another person's expression of intent absent a legislative basis, and thus bears a strictly personal character. It is in this same vein that the Supreme Court has held that, even where an expression of intent not to punish is made through the statutory agent of a minor victim, it must be examined whether the intent expressed by the statutory agent includes the victim's own personal intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do11859, decided December 24, 2009; Supreme Court Decision 2009Do5658, decided May 13, 2010).
3) The Distinction Between Crimes Prosecutable Only Upon Complaint and Crimes Punishable Only Against the Victim's Will
Because the Criminal Procedure Act provides differently for a complaint and withdrawal of a complaint in crimes prosecutable only upon complaint, on the one hand, and for an expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will, on the other, the latter cannot be treated identically to the former.
A) The Criminal Procedure Act contains numerous provisions concerning complaints and their withdrawal, including provisions on persons entitled to file a complaint (Articles 223 through 229), the period for filing a complaint in crimes prosecutable only upon complaint (Article 230), the deadline for withdrawing a complaint and the prohibition on refiling (Article 232(1) and (2)), and the principle of indivisibility (Article 233). In particular, Article 236 of the Criminal Procedure Act expressly provides that "a complaint or its withdrawal may be made through an agent," thereby providing an explicit basis for a complaint or its withdrawal by representation.
By contrast, with respect to crimes punishable only against the victim's will, the Criminal Procedure Act contains only a single provision, Article 232(3), which states that "paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis where, in a case in which a prosecution may not be instituted against the victim's express wish, an expression of intent to seek punishment is withdrawn," applying mutatis mutandis only the provisions on the deadline for withdrawal of a complaint and the prohibition on refiling; it does not contain a provision providing a basis for representation with respect to the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will, nor does it contain a provision applying Article 236 concerning representation in filing or withdrawing a complaint mutatis mutandis.
B) Although crimes prosecutable only upon complaint and crimes punishable only against the victim's will are similar in that the victim's intent constitutes a condition of prosecution, the reasons, methods, and effects of making the victim's intent a condition of prosecution cannot be said to be the same. Crimes punishable only against the victim's will are designed to address situations where, among relatively minor offenses that primarily infringe upon an individual victim's legal interests and that need not be punished in disregard of the victim's wishes and feelings, the degree of infringement of legal interests is nevertheless not so minor that the need for punishment is negligible; if such offenses were made subject to complaint only, victims might hesitate to file a complaint out of psychological pressure or fear of retaliation, resulting in circumstances where the law would have difficulty fulfilling its function (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, decided April 26, 1994); such crimes therefore serve to expand criminal-justice protection for victims. It is also for this reason that the Criminal Procedure Act treats crimes prosecutable only upon complaint and crimes punishable only against the victim's will differently in that, absent an expression of the victim's intent regarding whether the defendant or suspect is to be punished, non-punishment is the principle for the former, while punishment is the principle for the latter.
The fact that the Criminal Procedure Act, unlike with crimes prosecutable only upon complaint, provides no other basis or applicable-mutatis-mutandis provision with respect to crimes punishable only against the victim's will, other than the provision applying mutatis mutandis the rules on the deadline for withdrawal of a complaint and the prohibition on refiling, must be understood as a legislative determination, made in consideration of these characteristics of crimes punishable only against the victim's will, not to apply the legal principles governing complaints and their withdrawal to the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will.
C) The Supreme Court has held that the fact that the Criminal Procedure Act, while providing a provision applying mutatis mutandis the rules on the deadline for withdrawal of a complaint and the prohibition on refiling (Article 232(1) and (2)) to crimes punishable only against the victim's will (Article 232(3)), does not provide a provision applying the rule on indivisibility of complaint and withdrawal of complaint (Article 233) mutatis mutandis, should be understood as reflecting an intention not to apply the principle of indivisibility among co-offenders to the expression of intent not to punish, unlike in crimes prosecutable only upon complaint, rather than as a legislative oversight (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, decided April 26, 1994). This may be seen as an express acknowledgment by the Supreme Court itself that the distinction between crimes prosecutable only upon complaint and crimes punishable only against the victim's will, discernible from the structure and content of the Criminal Procedure Act, is not a mere legislative gap but a deliberate legislative determination.
D) Whether to permit a complaint, withdrawal of a complaint, or an expression of intent not to punish by a third party other than the victim is also a matter of legislative policy, apart from the difference in nature between crimes prosecutable only upon complaint and crimes punishable only against the victim's will. That is, while the Criminal Procedure Act, with respect to complaints, recognizes the right to file a complaint not only in the victim personally (Article 223) but also in numerous third parties, such as the statutory agent (Article 225(1)), the spouse, lineal relatives, or siblings of a deceased victim (Article 225(2)), relatives or descendants in the case of the crime of defamation of the deceased (Article 227), and a designated person entitled to file a complaint (Article 228), and recognizes representation in filing and withdrawing a complaint (Article 236), it does not, with respect to crimes punishable only against the victim's will, separately designate persons other than the victim who may express an intent not to punish or withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment, and does not provide a basis permitting an expression of intent not to punish by representation, nor a provision applying Article 236, concerning representation in filing a complaint, mutatis mutandis. This reveals the legislature's determination that the decision itself to express an intent not to punish, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, must be made by the victim personally, meaning that, in a situation where the victim's own genuine intent cannot be confirmed, it should not be readily presumed that the victim has expressed an intent not to punish.
4) The Limits on Representation of the Expression of Intent Not to Punish by an Adult Guardian
The view that an adult guardian under the Civil Act (민법) may represent the victim in expressing an intent not to punish, with respect to a crime punishable only against the victim's will, in criminal procedure, cannot be said to conform to the guardian's protective role on behalf of the victim personally.
A) The proceedings for the ruling commencing adult guardianship, in which the victim is the person concerned, and criminal procedure, in which the defendant or suspect is a party, are entirely separate proceedings; the family court's appointment of an adult guardian is made from the standpoint of faithfully realizing the values pursued by family litigation, without separate consideration of criminal procedure. To permit an adult guardian to represent the victim even with respect to the expression of intent not to punish in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, in criminal procedure where the victim's own personal intent is of paramount importance, is unrelated to, and there is room to view it as actually running counter to, the realization of the protective function pursued by criminal justice, including the protection of the victim.
B) In crimes other than those punishable only against the victim's will, a settlement with the victim, or the victim's expression of intent not to punish, may constitute a favorable factor in sentencing, and thus the defendant or suspect has an active incentive to reach a settlement with the victim, and such a settlement can, of course, also be reached through an adult guardian. However, to permit an adult guardian to represent the expression of intent not to punish in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, where the victim's genuine intent not to punish has not been confirmed, is excessively skewed toward the interests and perspective of the defendant or suspect, rather than the victim. This is because, in crimes other than those punishable only against the victim's will, even where a settlement is reached through an adult guardian, this merely establishes a favorable sentencing factor, whereas in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, it entirely discontinues and extinguishes the State's penal function by causing a defect in the very condition of prosecution. On the other hand, even if representation of the expression of intent not to punish by an adult guardian is not permitted, it does not appear that this would give rise to any particular problem, or have any negative effect, from the standpoint of the victim's welfare or protection, under the current sentencing guideline system.
C) Because the discontinuation of the State's criminal-justice function through an expression of intent not to punish, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, finds its legitimacy in the fact that it is the "victim's" intent, it cannot be presumed that allowing an adult guardian to decide on the expression of intent not to punish, on behalf of the victim, in a situation where the victim lacks the capacity to make decisions, conforms to the victim's welfare or protection. This is because the genuine intent of a victim who has suffered unwanted harm due to a crime may be understood to include an expectation of just criminal punishment through criminal procedure, together with damages or monetary/economic compensation through civil procedure. This would be all the more so in the case of a crime punishable only against the victim's will, as opposed to an ordinary crime, in light of its legal nature and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act; if prompt compensation and dispute resolution through an adult guardian were achieved without regard to the victim's genuine intent regarding criminal punishment, this could hardly be said to serve the victim's genuine welfare or protection.
In particular, because the provisions of Article 232(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the prohibition on withdrawal of a complaint and refiling apply mutatis mutandis to an expression of intent not to punish, if an adult guardian expresses, on the victim's behalf, an intent not to punish in a situation where the victim lacks the capacity to make decisions such that the victim's genuine intent cannot be confirmed, and the victim subsequently regains the capacity to make decisions and again desires the punishment of the defendant or suspect, the expression of intent not to punish made by the adult guardian cannot be withdrawn. This situation demonstrates that, where the scope of an adult guardian's representative acts on the victim's behalf is extended even to criminal procedure, this could not only render the victim's intent powerless, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will where the victim's intent is of paramount importance, but could also bring about an unjust result running counter to the guardian's protective function intended for the victim's benefit.
D) Criminal justice governs crime, which gives rise to the State's penal authority, and punishment, which is its legal effect, and, by establishing the procedures necessary for the concrete realization of the State's penal authority, pursues the public purposes of protecting legal interests and maintaining order through the fair exercise of the State's penal authority. To what extent the purpose of the adult guardianship system—which performs the function of supplementing capacity to act or adjusting legal relationships for the personal purpose of the ward's welfare and protection—should be reflected in criminal procedure, as opposed to family proceedings, is a matter of legislative policy grounded in the inherent values and legal principles of criminal procedure. To hold otherwise would be no different from uncritically expanding and adopting, even into the domain of criminal adjudication, the ideals of civil litigation aimed at the fair, prompt, and economical conduct of litigation, and the values and legal principles of family adjudication realizing those ideals.
5) "Settlement" as a Sentencing Factor Rather Than a Negative Condition of Prosecution
Crimes punishable only against the victim's will also embody a purpose of promoting and respecting the private resolution of disputes between the parties, such as restitution to the victim. However, criminal procedure that places excessive emphasis on the existence of the victim's expression of intent not to punish may, in reality, become a major cause of social conflict, such as secondary harm to the victim, or of additional legal disputes. This is because a failure to express an intent not to punish may be treated as harsh toward the defendant or suspect, potentially placing the victim in a position of being compelled to make an unwanted expression of intent.
The Supreme Court Sentencing Guidelines that took effect on July 1, 2023 provide differentiated status for "non-punishment" or "settlement" depending on the type of crime, and, by newly reorganizing the definitional provisions, systematically subdivided the function of non-punishment and settlement as sentencing factors. The newly implemented criminal deposit system for compensation enables a deposit to be made for the victim's benefit even where the victim's personal details are not specified, thereby making it possible to secure restitution and a favorable sentencing factor without undermining the criminal-justice purpose of protecting the victim. Considering even these institutional changes, under the current criminal-justice system, including the sentencing guidelines, it suffices for a settlement reached by an adult guardian on behalf of a victim who lacks the capacity to make decisions, with the defendant or suspect, to be considered as a sentencing factor rather than as a negative condition of prosecution.
3. Determination as to This Case
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the foregoing legal principles, the judgment below's determination that, where a victim lacks the capacity to make decisions in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, it is not permissible for the victim's adult guardian to express, on the victim's behalf, an intent not to punish or to withdraw an expression of intent to seek punishment, contains no error affecting the judgment through a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the expression of intent not to punish in crimes punishable only against the victim's will, or through a failure to conduct the necessary examination.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order. This judgment reflects the unanimous agreement of the Justices involved, except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Lee Heung-gu, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi, together with a supplementary opinion by Justice Noh Jeong-hee and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop concerning the majority opinion, and a supplementary opinion by Justice Min Yu-sook concerning the dissenting opinion.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Lee Heung-gu, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi
A. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion
The Criminal Procedure Act contains a legislative gap in that it lacks an explicit provision concerning the expression of intent not to punish, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, in cases where the victim lacks the capacity to make decisions. Even where the victim lacks the capacity to make decisions, it is necessary, in order to realize the victim's right of self-determination and for the victim's welfare and protection, for a third party to make an expression of intent not to punish by way of supporting and supplementing the victim's intent; accordingly, there is a very great need to apply the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act by analogy in a manner favorable to the defendant. This is the interpretation that reflects the purpose of the newly introduced adult guardianship system, which is designed to enable a person to function as a member of normal society to the maximum extent possible while respecting that person's own intent and remaining capacities.
Accordingly, it should be held that, where adult guardianship has been commenced with respect to a victim lacking the capacity to make decisions, in a crime punishable only against the victim's will, the adult guardian may, with the family court's permission, make an expression of intent not to punish.
B. The Legislative Structure Concerning Crimes Punishable Only Against the Victim's Will and the Legislative Gap
The types and functions of crimes punishable only against the victim's will differ from crime to crime, and it is difficult to find a consistent legislative purpose or standard, making a unified interpretation likewise difficult. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to derive the essential or universal characteristics of crimes punishable only against the victim's will and the expression of intent not to punish from the current statutes and use them as the basis for resolving the issue in this case.
1) The system of crimes punishable only against the victim's will, introduced at the time of the enactment of the Criminal Act on September 18, 1953, exists only in our country. It is assessed that the enacted Criminal Act adopted this system in consideration of traditional good customs, while at the same time minimizing the ill effects of the formal and mechanical application of penal statutes and maximally respecting the private and autonomous resolution of disputes between the parties.
2) It is true that the legislature is afforded broad discretion in determining which crimes to designate as crimes punishable only against the victim's will (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2018Heonba113, decided April 29, 2021).
[Reasoning] (continued)
The Supreme Court has held that crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish (반의사불벌죄) are, among the types of crimes that are relatively minor and primarily infringe upon the individual legal interests of the victim, offenses for which there is no need to punish while disregarding the victim's intention or feelings, but which are relatively less minor among such offenses so that the need for punishment is not insignificant; in cases where such offenses would otherwise be made crimes requiring a complaint (친고죄), the system prepares for the situation in which the law would fail to function properly because the victim hesitates to file a complaint out of psychological pressure or fear of retaliation. It has also been held that this includes the purpose of promoting and respecting compensation to the victim or dispute resolution achieved at the personal level between the parties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, decided April 26, 1994).
3) However, the types of crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish that are actually recognized under the Criminal Act (형법) and special statutes are in fact quite diverse. These include some aggravated types of the crimes of assault and intimidation (Article 260, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 283, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 107, Article 108, etc. of the Criminal Act), some types of defamation (Article 307, Article 309 of the Criminal Act, Article 70, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. (「정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률」), etc.), the crime of negligent bodily injury (Article 266, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act), the crime of occupational negligence resulting in bodily injury due to a traffic accident, etc. (Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents (「교통사고처리 특례법」)), and the crimes under the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions for Dishonored Checks (「부정수표 단속법」) for the dishonor of checks or negligent issuance of invalid checks (Article 2, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions for Dishonored Checks), among others.
Nor is it the case that crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish are recognized only for relatively minor offenses. As in this case, the statutory penalty for occupational negligence resulting in bodily injury due to the operation of a vehicle is imprisonment without labor for not more than five years or a fine of not more than 20 million won (Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents). In the case of the crimes of infringement of rights under the Design Protection Act (디자인보호법) (Article 220, Paragraph 1) and the Utility Model Act (실용신안법) (Article 45, Paragraph 1), the statutory penalty is imprisonment for not more than seven years or a fine of not more than 100 million won. As will be seen below, the statutory penalty for the crime of rape of a minor was, for a certain period, imprisonment for a limited term of not less than three years.
4) In particular, in the case of statutes governing sexual violence against children and juveniles, the legal status of the victim's intention with respect to the punishment of the accused or suspect has changed in accordance with changes of the times and social and political demands.
The crimes of rape and indecent act by compulsion, etc. against juveniles, etc. (Article 10) under the former Act on the Protection of Juveniles from Sexual Abuse (「청소년의 성보호에 관한 법률」) (before its amendment by Act No. 8634 of August 3, 2007) were originally provided for as crimes requiring a complaint, but were changed to crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish by the amendment of August 3, 2007 (Article 7, Article 16) as criticism mounted, and were subsequently changed, through further amendments, into offenses entirely free of the complaint requirement. It may be viewed that, in the transitional period of converting complaint-required offenses into offenses not requiring a complaint, the category of crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish was used as a compromise legislative form to mitigate the shock of change.
5) The Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents proclaims, as its legislative purpose, "the prompt recovery from harm," and thereby classifies the crime of occupational negligence resulting in bodily injury by a motor vehicle driver as a crime not prosecuted against the victim's express wish; however, the legislative materials at the time of its enactment reveal that the necessity of promptly disposing of traffic accidents, while exempting the driver who caused the accident from criminal responsibility, was emphasized.
6) In light of the legislative purpose of crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish, the reasons for and manner of making them conditional upon the victim's intention, and the current state of regulation under the Criminal Act and other statutes, crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish, together with crimes requiring a complaint, constitute exceptions to the principle of state monopoly over criminal punishment. Considering the public nature of the State's power to punish, crimes requiring a complaint and crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish are essentially similar in nature, and there is a strong need to treat them uniformly in terms of their legal effects. Nevertheless, the fact that the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), while providing for provisions permitting representation with respect to the filing and withdrawal of a complaint, contains no provision regarding the expression of intent not to seek punishment, constitutes a legislative omission requiring supplementation through interpretation, i.e., a gap in the law.
(c) The Need for Analogical Interpretation of Criminal Procedure Provisions for the Welfare and Protection of Victims
Even where the victim lacks the capacity to form an intent, it is necessary, in order to realize the victim's right of self-determination and for the victim's welfare, for a third party to assist and supplement the victim's intent so that the victim may express an intent not to seek punishment. Although the Criminal Procedure Act does not expressly provide for this, neither does it contain any provision prohibiting it. Through analogical application and utilization of Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for representation in litigation acts by a legal representative within a certain scope where the accused or suspect lacks the capacity to form an intent, and of the newly introduced adult guardianship system, it can be recognized that, where the victim lacks the capacity to form an intent, an expression of intent not to seek punishment may be made by an adult guardian.
1) The Intent Not to Seek Punishment and Capacity to Form an Intent in Criminal Procedure
In a crime not prosecuted against the victim's express wish, if the victim expresses an intent not to seek punishment before the rendering of the first-instance judgment, the court must render a judgment dismissing the prosecution (Articles 232 and 327 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Accordingly, in such crimes, whether the accused is to be punished, up until the time of the first-instance judgment, depends on the victim's expression of intent not to seek punishment, and this is a matter that the court must determine ex officio.
Since the victim's expression of an intent not to seek punishment constitutes, in criminal procedure, a negative condition for prosecution and a litigation act by the victim before the court, the victim must possess litigation capacity, and litigation capacity under the Criminal Procedure Act means the capacity of a party to litigation to validly perform litigation acts, i.e., the capacity to form an intent sufficient to understand one's own procedural status and interests and to act in defense accordingly (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, decided November 19, 2009).
Moreover, since capacity to form an intent must be determined in relation to a specific act, in order for a victim to make a valid expression of intent not to seek punishment, the victim must, at the time of making the expression, understand both the legal meaning and effect of submitting a statement of intent not to seek punishment—namely, that the accused or suspect will be exempted from punishment, and that even if the victim subsequently wishes for punishment, this cannot be reversed.
2) The Gap in the Law Concerning the Victim's Lack of Capacity to Form an Intent
(a) The Criminal Procedure Act contains no provision at all regarding the disposition of cases where the victim of a crime not prosecuted against the victim's express wish lacks the capacity to form an intent. In such a case, it must be determined whether a person lacking such capacity has no means of making a lawful expression of intent not to seek punishment, or whether this may be affirmed by analogical application of other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The Supreme Court has already confirmed, through numerous rulings, the principles of interpretation applicable where a specific provision exists in a statute (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, decided April 23, 2009).
By contrast, where a statute fails to provide a necessary provision for governing a particular matter, such that no solution to the matter can be found even by interpreting the statute to the fullest extent permitted by the meaning of its language—the so-called "gap in the law"—supplementing such a gap through interpretation is a matter of a different order.
Many issues arising in areas of procedural law lacking legal regulation cannot all be left unaddressed as matters of "legislative discretion." There exist areas that may be evaluated as a "gap in the law" susceptible of being supplemented, and in such areas, the necessity of analogically applying other related statutory provisions is recognized.
In particular, while penal statutes are required to be strictly construed in accordance with the principle of legality (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do6992, decided May 19, 2016), teleological interpretation that takes into account the legislative purpose, objectives, and legislative history of the statute is not thereby excluded, so long as it does not depart from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Do6525, decided May 12, 2006).
Rather, interpreting in a manner disadvantageous to the accused by affirming the establishment of a crime on grounds such as the necessity of punishment runs contrary to the principle of legality (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2014Do6992, decided May 19, 2016). If the scope of grounds for exclusion from punishment is analogically applied in a restrictive manner, the scope of the actor's culpability is expanded, to the actor's disadvantage, resulting in the same effect as analogically applying the elements of a crime beyond the possible meaning of the statutory language, which is likewise contrary to the principle of legality and cannot be permitted (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 96Do1167, decided March 20, 1997). The principle that recognizing grounds for retrial through analogical application of the Criminal Procedure Act is permissible as a constitution-conforming interpretation guaranteeing the constitutional right to a trial (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 2015Mo3243, decided May 2, 2018) may likewise be understood in the same context.
(b) The absence, in the Criminal Procedure Act, of a provision concerning representation of the expression of intent not to seek punishment by a victim lacking capacity to form an intent is because, at the time of its enactment, the concept—and the necessity—of "the substantive restoration and exercise of decision-making capacity through the support and supplementation of the right of self-determination" was neither known nor foreseeable (see, to that effect, Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Seu42, decided June 22, 2006). Accordingly, that gap in the law is a legislative void subject to supplementation, not a matter of legislative discretion or legislative decision, and such legislative void was neither intended by the legislature nor the product of a deliberate decision.
3) Analogical Application of Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Which Favors the Accused
(a) Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that, in certain cases, where the accused or suspect lacks the capacity to form an intent, the legal representative shall represent the person in litigation acts. However, it should not be inferred, a contrario, that representation in litigation acts is never permitted absent an express provision. Whether representation in a litigation act is permitted must be determined by comprehensively considering the meaning or purpose of the litigation act, the formal certainty of the procedure, the interests of the parties concerned in the litigation, and the characteristics of the litigation act.
(b) In contrast, while the legal regulation applicable where a victim lacks capacity to form an intent remains a void, the Supreme Court has held, with respect to Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that it is based on the principle unique to criminal procedure that "capacity to form an intent entails litigation capacity," and that this principle applies equally where a third party such as a victim performs a litigation act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, decided November 19, 2009).
(c) Recently, with respect to crimes requiring a complaint, in connection with the right to file a complaint by a legal representative under Article 225, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Supreme Court recognized the right to file a complaint of a property administrator for an absentee, for the protection of the absentee, with respect to a crime concerning property under the administrator's management, where the court has granted permission (see Supreme Court Decision 2021Do2488, decided May 26, 2022).
With respect to crimes not prosecuted against the victim's express wish as well, the need to protect a victim who lacks capacity to form an intent is not significantly different from that in the above Supreme Court decision, in that it can rely, as the basis of authority, on the "statutory provision" that is Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act and on "the court's decision granting permission." Furthermore, this may be treated in the same manner in light of the guardianship-like role of the court under the system of property administrators for absentees and under the adult guardianship system, and in light of the fact that, under each system, the court's decision granting permission is made following a concrete and substantive hearing.
(d) Legitimacy of Analogical Application Owing to the Introduction of the Adult Guardianship System
1) Before the Introduction of the Adult Guardianship System
Until the adult guardianship system was introduced, there was no way to supplement or complement the capacity to form an intent of an adult victim who lacked such capacity.
Under the Civil Act (before its amendment by Act No. 10429 of March 7, 2011) (hereinafter "the former Civil Act"), an adjudication of incompetency was possible for a person lacking capacity to form an intent, but it was interpreted that a guardian was not vested with authority to support or assist in decision-making concerning the ward's personal affairs; and even assuming such authority were affirmed, due to the rigidity by which a guardian was automatically appointed according to the fixed order of degree of relationship and age among the incompetent person's spouse and blood relatives, and due to the fact that the council of relatives, which served as the supervisory body, was largely nominal, it is difficult to find any actual case in which a guardian of an incompetent person affirmatively made an expression of intent not to seek punishment and its legal effect was disputed.
2) The Significance of the Introduction of the Adult Guardianship System
Even a person whose decision-making capacity is insufficient should be able to exercise self-determination—that is, to act as a normal member of society to the maximum extent possible, with respect shown to that person's own intent and remaining capacity. To hold that a person need not make decisions concerning his or her own personal affairs, or cannot make decisions accompanied by legal effects, on the ground that the person's decision-making capacity is deficient, is tantamount to denying the human dignity and the right to pursue happiness of persons with deficient decision-making capacity.
The adult guardianship system, introduced by the amendment to the Civil Act of March 7, 2011, effective from July 1, 2013, has its ideological and theoretical basis in the aim of substantively guaranteeing the human dignity and right to pursue happiness of persons whose decision-making capacity is insufficient or deficient, by supporting and supplementing their right of self-determination.
The adult guardianship system is a new system based on premises and principles fundamentally different from the prior incompetency and quasi-incompetency systems, performing new functions and being accorded legal effects pursuant to provisions that the former Civil Act did not possess.
Where the family court adjudicates the commencement of adult guardianship for a person who continuously lacks the capacity to handle affairs due to a mental disability (Article 9 of the Civil Act) and appoints an adult guardian (Article 936, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act), the adult guardian becomes the legal representative of the ward (Article 938, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act). The family court may determine the scope of that legal representative's authority and may impose restrictions such as requiring the court's permission for the exercise of that authority (Article 938, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Act).
In addition, Article 947-2 of the Civil Act provides for decisions concerning the personal affairs of the ward. As a principle, the ward may make decisions alone concerning his or her own personal affairs to the extent permitted by his or her condition (Paragraph 1), but where the ward lacks the capacity to form an intent with respect to certain important acts, the adult guardian may act in the ward's place (Paragraph 3), and for acts that materially affect the person and residence of the ward, the permission of the family court must be obtained (Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4). Although the Civil Act provides for only some matters concerning personal affairs, in light of the fact that the family court may set the scope of the adult guardian's authority to make decisions concerning the ward's personal affairs (Article 938, Paragraph 3 of the Civil Act), it would not be appropriate to limit the adult guardian's authority to make decisions concerning the ward's personal affairs to only those matters expressly set forth in Article 947-2 of the Civil Act; rather, it is appropriate to apply the above provision broadly to matters concerning personal affairs in general.
This interpretation is supported by statutory provisions similar to international norms. That is, the adult guardianship system under the amended Civil Act corresponds to the system responding to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, enacted in 2006 and entering into force in 2008, which provides, as a general principle, for respect for individual autonomy and independence, including freedom of choice, for persons with disabilities, and for their full and effective participation and inclusion in society, and requires State Parties to take all procedures necessary to ensure the provision of reasonable accommodation.
The Act on the Guarantee of Rights of and Support for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (「발달장애인 권리보장 및 지원에 관한 법률」) likewise provides, in Article 8, Paragraph 1, that a person with a developmental disability shall decide for himself or herself matters concerning his or her personal affairs, such as the determination of residence and medical treatment, while Article 8, Paragraph 3 provides that, where a person with a developmental disability does not have sufficient capacity to make decisions on his or her own, support for such decision-making may be provided; and Article 9, Paragraph 1 provides that, where there is substantial reason to believe that a person with a developmental disability lacks sufficient capacity to make decisions in daily life such that representation or support in decision-making is necessary, the head of the local government may petition the family court for an adjudication commencing guardianship.
3) The Substantive Protection of the Right to Make Decisions Concerning Personal Affairs
(a) The difficulties faced by a person lacking capacity to form an intent are not limited to matters of property, but also include decision-making concerning personal affairs, and in particular, with respect to personal affairs, the person's own right of self-determination must be respected to the maximum extent possible. Even under the current adult guardianship system, the ward may, so long as some capacity to form an intent remains, make decisions alone concerning his or her own personal affairs to the extent permitted by his or her condition.
However, where the ward is not in a physical or mental state to make such an independent decision, if it were held that, even in such a case, only the ward could make decisions concerning personal affairs, then, due to the ward's lack of capacity to form an intent as the decision-maker, there would ultimately be no subject capable of making a legally valid and effective decision, resulting in a gap in the protection of the ward to that extent. Accordingly, in a situation where the ward is unable to make decisions concerning personal affairs on his or her own due to a lack of capacity to form an intent, rather than adhering to a narrow reading of the principle of respect for self-determination on the theory that only the ward may make such decisions, the adult guardian should be permitted to make the decision in the ward's place, so that the ward's right of self-determination may ultimately be substantively realized.
Since the core purpose of the adult guardianship system is to assist a person who lacks independent capacity to handle his or her own affairs, so as to support that person's decision-making and thereby ultimately respect the person's right of self-determination and pursue that person's welfare and protection, it would be improper to understand decisions concerning personal affairs made by an adult guardian merely as a substitute performance of decision-making.
(b) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Da17417, decided May 21, 2009, concerning the so-called removal of meaningless life-sustaining treatment, held that, with respect to a patient in a persistent vegetative state with little likelihood of regaining consciousness, a court may "presume" the patient's right of self-determination and intent and thereby recognize an intent to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. The removal of life-sustaining treatment devices is directly connected to the maintenance of life and, for an individual, is a matter requiring perhaps the most important decision of any situation. The above decision held that, in order to guarantee the right of self-determination concerning the personal affairs of a person lacking capacity to form an intent, such a right should not be denied merely because there is no express statutory provision permitting it, but rather it is proper to enable the substantive exercise of an effective right of self-determination through means such as presumption of intent. The reason for accepting this, in accordance with a relaxed principle of presumption, even though the person's true intent as to the existence of the important decision was not expressly confirmed, is that it was deemed ultimately consistent with the person's human dignity and worth and right to pursue happiness.
In particular, in the separate opinion of Justices Kim Ji-hyung and Park Il-hwan in the above en banc decision, by analogically applying the main text of Article 947, Paragraph 2 of the former Civil Act, it was argued that a guardian's request to a medical practitioner to discontinue life-sustaining treatment must be subject to the court's permission as to whether it constitutes the best judgment for substantively guaranteeing the incompetent person's right of self-determination, thereby emphasizing the court's guardianship supervisory function for guaranteeing the substantive right of self-determination of a person lacking capacity to form an intent. This is in the same vein as the purport of the dissenting opinion [in the present case], which seeks to permit an expression of intent not to seek punishment by an adult guardian only where a person with a public status—an adult guardian—is appointed to support and supplement the right of self-determination, thereby permitting decisions concerning the person's own personal affairs to be made through that guardian, while at the same time subjecting the matter to the hearing and adjudication of the family court, which functions as the guardianship supervisory body.
(e) Clear Limitation on the Scope of Analogical Application
1) The dissenting opinion does not propose to generally recognize representation or substitute performance of litigation acts by a third party in all cases lacking an express provision. Where the victim possesses capacity to form an intent, it suffices that the intent not to seek punishment be determined by the victim.
Moreover, if the victim's genuine intent cannot be confirmed, the victim's intent must be ascertained through a sufficient hearing.
This case deals with, and the solution sought herein is limited to, "a case in which the court has recognized that the capacity to handle affairs is continuously lacking, adult guardianship has thereby commenced, and the ward, lacking capacity to form an intent, is unable to make a lawful and effective expression of intent not to seek punishment in criminal procedure."
2) It is not the case that, generally, an adult guardian of a victim lacking capacity to form an intent should be permitted to represent the victim in all litigation acts. In light of the meaning or purpose of a litigation act, such as the testimony of a witness, it is entirely possible, as a matter of law, to distinguish between litigation acts for which representation is permitted and those for which it is not.
3) There is no provision under the Civil Act as to the standard for determining in what state the ward must be for the ward personally to exercise the right to make decisions, and in what case there is a "deficiency in capacity to form an intent" such that supplementation of capacity to form an intent by a guardian should be permitted.
Some foreign legislative examples that set forth such standards by statute may serve as reference, as they generally provide for the capacity to understand, remember, and utilize information relevant to the decision, the capacity to communicate the decided intent to others, the capacity to understand the consequences and risks resulting from the decision, and the capacity to make a decision based on such understanding.
4) The family court's permission with respect to an adult guardian's expression of intent not to seek punishment is not a mere formal procedure, but constitutes a substantive hearing procedure that enables the court to adequately identify, in advance, possible problems that may arise, by comprehensively examining and determining specific circumstances, including whether the victim lacks decision-making capacity and whether there is any concern that the expression of intent not to seek punishment might be detrimental to the victim's welfare. An adult guardian is appointed under the involvement of the court, and the guardian's authority is likewise based on statutory provisions and the court's adjudication. In light of the subject who appoints the guardian, the procedure of appointment, and the basis of the authority of representation, the "public status" of an adult guardian may be recognized.
In light of this public status of the adult guardian, together with the fact that the adult guardian expressed the intent not to seek punishment in accordance with what was determined in the adjudication commencing adult guardianship and with the permission of the family court, it is desirable to affirmatively construe the validity of such an act.
(f) Rebuttal to the Majority Opinion
1) As to the Argument That This Is a Literal and Rational Interpretation of the Law
The fact that the Criminal Procedure Act contains no provision whatsoever concerning representation with respect to a victim's lack of capacity to form an intent constitutes a gap in the law requiring supplementation. Since permitting an expression of intent not to seek punishment by an adult guardian is not disadvantageous to the accused, permitting analogical interpretation does not violate the principle of legality. The majority opinion understands the gap in the law under the Criminal Procedure Act solely as a matter of legislative policy or legislative discretion, and grasps the necessity and permissibility of analogical interpretation arising from the introduction of the new system in an excessively narrow manner. Such an interpretive approach is not proper, as it confines the scope of the victim's life to an extremely limited sphere, fundamentally forecloses the possibility of utilizing the adult guardianship system, thereby setting back the victim's welfare and protection, and, by unduly narrowly construing a negative condition for prosecution, results in expanding the scope of punishment.
2) As to the Argument That This May Not Accord with the Victim's Intent or May Not Accord with the Victim's Welfare and Protection
The support and supplementation of the ward's right of self-determination by an adult guardian is permitted under the relevant provisions of the Civil Act and the adult guardianship system.
Supporting and supplementing the exercise of self-determination by a person whose decision-making capacity is limited or lost is an institutional device for guaranteeing, among other things, the "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" as well as the constitutional rights of citizens to dignity and value as human beings and to pursue happiness. A person cannot be excluded from such protection merely because he or she is the victim in a criminal trial. In particular, a victim who has lost cognitive capacity due to an unexpected accident becomes entangled in various legal disputes, including a civil action against the offender and a criminal action in which the offender is the defendant. However, since the civil action and the criminal action share the same historical facts as the cause of the harm suffered, the adult guardian, who conducts each lawsuit on behalf of the victim who has lost cognitive capacity, is more likely to seek a solution from a comprehensive and holistic perspective that pursues the victim's best interests as a whole, rather than separating civil and criminal matters and seeking an independent solution for each proceeding; in this respect, the respective lawsuits are closely interrelated. Accordingly, it can be said that the adult guardian's acts, whether in the civil action or the criminal action, are organically connected toward the same goal of the victim's best interests, and it is difficult to regard it as appropriate to treat the two separately. The act of receiving damages and the act of submitting a written statement of non-desire for punishment are closely combined to constitute, as a whole, a procedure that frees the victim from legal disputes. At this time, the family court, as the guardianship supervisory institution, examines and adjudicates the degree of the victim's lack of decision-making capacity and the suitability for the victim's welfare in the permission proceeding for each act. It is difficult to agree with the view that the family court's adjudication on adult guardianship and the criminal trial are entirely unrelated.
The premise that a decision regarding an individual's personal affairs must be made based on the person's own true intention is also a premise of the dissenting opinion. However, a human being may lose decision-making capacity due to unforeseen causes, and even then there still exists a matter that must be decided. The support and supplementation of the right to make decisions by an adult guardian is not a substitution or replacement of decision-making by a third party, but rather is intended to have the adult guardian, who holds a public position appointed by the family court, achieve, through a serious and thorough investigation and confirmation of the person's own intention, the same legal effect as if the person's own intention had been substantively realized, while also involving the court's guardianship supervisory function in that process to secure the exercise of the person's right of self-determination. The risks of conflict with the victim's welfare and the nullification of the victim's intention, which the majority opinion is concerned about, will be filtered out in the family court's permission proceeding.
3) Regarding the precedents, etc. cited as grounds by the majority opinion
가) The precedents cited academically as grounds for the view that, absent an express provision, representation of procedural acts is not permitted in criminal proceedings (Supreme Court Order 4286Hyeonghang3, dated June 9, 1953; Supreme Court Order 94Mo25, dated October 28, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 2013Do1228, dated November 13, 2014, etc.) can be regarded as precedents that are not properly invocable in this case, because the relevant holdings therein are either dicta or predate the introduction of the adult guardianship system, and the facts differ. Even upon closely examining the content of those holdings, it is difficult to regard them as precedents supporting the negative view.
나) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, dated November 19, 2009, cited by the court below, held, in relation to crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, that so long as the victim has decision-making capacity, the victim may express the intention of non-desire for punishment alone and it need not be represented by a legal representative; it should not be construed as further meaning that representation by a legal representative is denied even in the case of a victim "lacking decision-making capacity." This case, in which the victim "lacks decision-making capacity," presents different facts.
다) Supreme Court Decision 2012Do568, dated September 26, 2013, held that where an adult victim has lost decision-making capacity and thus cannot express an intention regarding whether he or she desires punishment, the victim's father may not express an intention of non-desire for punishment. This was an unavoidable conclusion resulting from the fact that, at that time, there was no legal basis whatsoever for recognizing a legal representative's authority for a close relative of an adult who lacked decision-making capacity, and there were no particular circumstances in the case at issue by which such authority of legal representation could have been recognized.
라) Supreme Court Decision 93Do1689, dated April 26, 1994, holding that the principle of indivisibility of a complaint does not apply to an intention of non-desire for punishment in crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, is likewise merely a holding concerning the provision on indivisibility of a complaint for crimes subject to a complaint requirement, and should not be construed as meaning that the application, or analogical application, of any provision of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) to an expression of intention of non-desire for punishment in crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish is entirely prohibited. It should further be noted that there is a considerable body of views criticizing the above decision in light of the essential similarity between crimes subject to a complaint requirement and crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish.
4) Regarding the function as a sentencing consideration
The majority opinion states that it suffices to consider, as a sentencing consideration, an expression of intention of non-desire for punishment or a criminal settlement made by the adult guardian of a victim who lacks decision-making capacity.
The dissenting opinion has no disagreement with the point that the act of the adult guardian receiving damages on behalf of the victim may be taken into account as compensation for the harm. Nor does the dissenting opinion dispute the majority opinion's understanding, from the perspective of harm compensation, of the purpose and background of the introduction of the criminal deposit system.
However, the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment is to "forgive the other party" based on "the victim's own true intention." It is difficult to accept that, while stating that the decision of an intention to forgive the offender and not desire his or her punishment can be made only by the victim personally who possesses decision-making capacity, the majority opinion nonetheless treats the written statement of non-desire for punishment as a lawful and effective intention of non-desire for punishment when considered as a sentencing factor. This view understands the meaning of an intention of non-desire for punishment dualistically—once as a negative prosecutorial condition and once as a factor that may function as a sentencing element—but it is difficult to discern the basis for such dualistic treatment. It goes without saying that the meaning of an "intention of non-desire for punishment" should be construed consistently throughout the entire criminal procedure. The question of whether to construe the procedural status or function of an "intention of non-desire for punishment" differently depending on its procedural characteristics or the stage of the proceeding is a matter that can properly be discussed only after the concept of "intention of non-desire for punishment" has first been defined. It is difficult to agree with the majority opinion in that it construes the meaning of "intention of non-desire for punishment" differently depending on the stage of the proceeding. In this respect, this differs from a case in which a written statement of non-desire for punishment based on the victim's own true intention is submitted at the appellate trial and is recognized as a sentencing consideration.
사. Determination in this case
1) As seen in Section 1 above, adult guardianship was commenced for the victim and Nonparty 2 was appointed as the adult guardian; the family court decided that Nonparty 2's litigation acts on behalf of the victim require permission; and Nonparty 2 received a settlement amount from the defendant's side before the first instance judgment was rendered and prepared and submitted to the court a written statement of non-desire for punishment. Furthermore, according to the record, the victim was in a state in which expression of intention was impossible around the time of the rendering of the first instance judgment, and in the civil action in which the victim sought damages from the defendant's parents for the harm arising from the acts stated in the facts charged in this case (finalized by Seoul High Court Decision 2021Na2026756, dated April 22, 2022), the settlement amount received from the defendant's side by Nonparty 2 as the victim's legal representative was taken into account in calculating the scope of the defendant's, etc., liability for damages.
2) Examining the above circumstances in light of the legal principles set forth above, where Nonparty 2, the victim's adult guardian, obtained permission from the family court and thereafter expressed, on behalf of the victim who lacks decision-making capacity, an intention of non-desire for punishment, there is room to recognize the validity of that act.
3) Nevertheless, the court below, without sufficiently examining the above requirements, upheld the first instance judgment, which found the facts charged in this case guilty, relying solely on the reasons stated in its holding. The court below's determination contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning representation by an adult guardian of a victim's litigation acts in a crime subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, and of failing to conduct the necessary examination, which affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded. Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed and the case should be remanded to the court below.
For the reasons stated above, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Noh Jeong-hee and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop supplementing the Majority Opinion
We supplement the grounds set forth in the majority opinion, and state our views, to the extent necessary, on the grounds raised by the dissenting opinion.
가. Aspects of the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish and of the adult guardianship system
The dissenting opinion proposes to permit an expression of intention of non-desire for punishment through use of the adult guardianship system for the sake of the welfare and protection of the victim personally; however, having the adult guardian make an expression of intention of non-desire for punishment on behalf of a victim who lacks decision-making capacity is, on the contrary, substantively contrary to the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish and of the adult guardianship system.
1) As the dissenting opinion appropriately points out, the issue in this case is whether, in a case where "the victim lacks decision-making capacity and thus cannot make a lawful and effective expression of intention of non-desire for punishment in criminal proceedings," an intention of non-desire for punishment by a third party (the adult guardian) on behalf of the victim may be permitted. Unlike a case where decision-making capacity is merely somewhat deficient but decision-making by the residual capacity is possible to some degree, in a case where decision-making capacity is entirely lacking such that the making and expression of a decision itself is impossible, it is unclear whether the victim's intention actually exists, and even if this is affirmed, it is impossible to ascertain its true meaning. It is merely a hasty inference to assume that, because the adult guardian's act of representation somewhat conforms to the victim's objective interests, that act of representation will conform to the victim's true intention.
Permitting representation of an intention of non-desire for punishment in a situation where it is difficult to confirm the victim's true intention appears to presuppose that the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment, or the victim's welfare, may be replaced with monetary or economic compensation irrespective of the victim's true intention. However, in a crime subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, the intention of non-desire for punishment is not something that may be wholly replaced by monetary or economic compensation. There can certainly be cases in which the victim desires criminal punishment of the defendant separately from recovery of the harm, and the mere unilateral provision of monetary or economic compensation, unaccompanied by the victim's serious and voluntary intention, cannot bring about healing for the victim. Prompt recovery of harm is merely one important element of the victim's welfare, not the only element. Considering the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish and the victim's feelings and intention toward the offender and the crime, the victim's intention regarding the punishment of the offender is also closely related to the victim's welfare. It is doubtful whether it can be asserted that it is for the sake of the victim's welfare—rather than being contrary to the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish—that the offender is freed from the State's penal authority on the ground of monetary or economic compensation even though the victim desires punishment or the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment is not clear.
As the dissenting opinion points out, unlike the former system of persons lacking legal capacity, the adult guardianship system has as its basic ideology the substantive guarantee and protection of the ward's right of self-determination, human rights, and welfare on the premise of respect for the ward's residual capacity. To this end, the adult guardian may not only act on behalf of, or support, the ward's affairs concerning property management, but may also act on behalf of, or support, affairs protecting the ward's personal matters when the ward has entirely lost decision-making capacity or has almost no residual capacity remaining and thus cannot make an independent decision regarding personal matters. Here, "personal matters" may include various circumstances related to the ward's physical and mental welfare, such as decisions regarding treatment or food, clothing, and shelter, and the provision of welfare services. However, deciding and expressing an intention of non-desire for punishment of a suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings has no direct relation to representing or supporting the ward's property management affairs, and clearly differs from affairs protecting or supporting the ward's personal matters. An intention of non-desire for punishment must be based on the victim's true intention. Therefore, even if the adult guardian or the family court, as the guardianship supervisory institution, can determine, and does determine, whether there is a risk that the expression of intention of non-desire for punishment would undermine the victim's welfare or protection, that alone cannot be said to be sufficient to recognize the existence of the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment or to substitute for that decision. It may also be pointed out that such an interpretation, which risks leaning excessively toward the perspective of the ward's welfare and protection without sufficiently reflecting and respecting the victim's intention regarding punishment, is contrary to the very purpose of introducing the adult guardianship system.
2) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Da17417, dated May 21, 2009, concerning the discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment, presents different facts from this case. That en banc decision permits a "presumption of intention" of the patient in a case where the patient is already in "an irreversible stage of dying (a case in which there is no possibility of recovery of consciousness, an irrecoverable loss of vital bodily functions related to life has occurred, and it is clear that death will occur within a short time)," and where compelling the patient to undergo life-sustaining treatment, which is not aimed at improvement of the disease but is merely carried out solely to maintain the current state after having, in effect, given up on improvement of the disease, and which thus amounts to a medically meaningless bodily invasion, would rather infringe upon human dignity and value. This is essentially different from the dissenting opinion's view that the adult guardian's intention of non-desire for punishment may effectively substitute for the ward's intention, and that the adult guardian may represent the intention of non-desire for punishment of any and all persons lacking decision-making capacity without setting any particular limit on the purpose or permissibility of such representation, in that the above en banc decision, logically, does not deem the third party's "intention to discontinue life-sustaining treatment" as fictively equivalent to the patient's true intention, but rather, after presuming the patient's true intention from the patient's own perspective, treats that presumption as remaining a "presumed intention" as such, while permitting it only in the extremely exceptional case where failing to presume such intention would rather infringe upon the patient's dignity and value as a human being.
3) It is neither appropriate nor possible for the adult guardian to determine a specific settlement amount that could substitute for the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment. Nor can this be viewed otherwise merely because the family court has granted permission for the adult guardian's act of representation. As in this case, investigating the true intention of a victim who is in a vegetative state without decision-making capacity is impossible because it effectively exceeds the domain of natural-scientific cognition, and in this respect there is little difference between the family court and the adult guardian. This is because the family court's permission can only guarantee objective control of appropriateness—such as whether the adult guardian's act of representation conforms to the victim's best interests in light of social norms or general standards, or whether it exceeds the purpose of guardianship and constitutes abuse of the power of representation, or rather harms the ward's welfare and safety—while the family court, no differently from the adult guardian, is not in a position to confirm the true intention of a victim who is in a state lacking decision-making capacity.
4) Substituting the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment with the adult guardian's determination will, as a result, serve merely to enhance the defendant's interests in the criminal procedure rather than to protect the victim. In the settlement process, calculation of an appropriate compensation amount for the defendant to avoid criminal punishment will be treated as the top priority, and there is a high likelihood that consideration of the victim's true intention regarding the defendant's punishment will, in effect, be excluded or reduced to an object of objective evaluation based on monetary or economic standards. Such a result is contrary to the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, which exceptionally permits intervention in criminal proceedings out of respect for the victim's intention, and is also inconsistent with the purpose of introducing the adult guardianship system and the role of the family court, which aim at realizing the victim's right of self-determination and enhancing the victim's welfare.
나. Distinction from forgiveness or settlement by the victim's side in the sentencing hearing procedure
1) The criminal trial procedure may be divided into the procedure for examining whether a crime has been established and whether the prosecutorial conditions are satisfied, and, on the premise thereof, the procedure for examining appropriate sentencing. Since each procedure has a different purpose or objective, there are differences in the subject matter of examination, the method of examination, and the guiding principles. For example, the presumption of innocence and the principle of a public trial have important significance in the former procedure, but in the sentencing examination procedure premised thereon, a comprehensive examination including matters not directly related to the crime at issue, such as the defendant's overall life or personal factors, becomes more important for the purpose of appropriate sentencing. This is also why the argument is raised that the "bifurcation of the trial procedure" should be institutionally introduced and refined. Also, even where the subject matter of examination is the same or similar, it is not necessarily required to construe its meaning or evaluation identically in each procedure, depending on the purpose or method of examination of that procedure.
2) Article 51 of the Criminal Act (형법) prescribes, as matters to be considered in determining a sentence, the offender's age, character and conduct, and intelligence and environment, the relationship with the victim, the motive, means, and result of the offense, and the circumstances after the offense. Sentencing is a discretionary determination made, on the basis of the statutory penalty, within a reasonable and appropriate range by comprehensively considering the matters constituting the conditions for sentencing set forth in Article 51 of the Criminal Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2020Do8358, dated September 3, 2020), and since the circumstances relevant to sentencing that form the basis thereof are diverse, complex, and non-typical, there is, in principle, no particular limitation on the conditions for sentencing. Any matter falling under those set forth in Article 51 of the Criminal Act may be considered as a sentencing factor, and under our Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the principles of trial-centered proceedings and directness, each level of court has its own inherent discretion regarding sentencing determinations (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, dated July 23, 2015).
3) The victim's intention of non-desire for punishment is distinguished into an aspect as a negative prosecutorial condition and an aspect as a sentencing factor. In a crime subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, the intention of non-desire for punishment as a negative prosecutorial condition is a procedural precondition for the realization of the State's penal authority, and examination of its existence or nonexistence falls within the former procedure. Here, the examination of the existence or nonexistence of an intention of non-desire for punishment concerns whether the victim's true intention exists. If the victim's true intention of not desiring punishment is confirmed, the court must dismiss the prosecutor's indictment on the ground that the negative prosecutorial condition is satisfied; if the victim's true intention regarding whether punishment is desired cannot be confirmed, the proceeding advances to the sentencing examination procedure.
4) Even in a case where, due to unconsciousness or the like, the victim's true intention regarding non-desire for punishment cannot be confirmed and thus an expression of intention of non-desire for punishment as a negative prosecutorial condition is impossible, forgiveness or settlement by the victim's family or other interested parties of the victim, mediated by the defendant's expression of apology to the victim and monetary compensation, may function as a sentencing factor. In this sense, it can be seen that settlement or forgiveness by the victim's side is not excluded from the entire criminal trial procedure.
Rather, guaranteeing the defendant the procedural rights necessary to actively influence the progress and outcome of the criminal procedure in order to defend himself or herself constitutes the content of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Constitution, and guaranteeing the defendant the opportunity to submit materials favorable to himself or herself regarding sentencing is also included in that right to a fair trial [see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2019Hunma516, 586, 768, 2020Hunma411 (consolidated), dated August 31, 2021, etc.]. Since sentencing materials favorable to the defendant are not limited to matters that must be the subject of strict proof from the perspective of guaranteeing the defendant's right to a fair trial, sentencing materials relating to non-desire for punishment, such as forgiveness or settlement, may also fall within this category merely by conforming to the victim's objective interests or the subjective intention of the victim's family.
In this way, the intention of non-desire for punishment in a crime subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, which is a negative prosecutorial condition, and forgiveness or settlement broadly by the victim's side, which is a sentencing factor, differ in their respective purposes and the phases to which they apply; it is difficult to agree that, merely because of a similarity in form, they should be construed identically, or further, that sentencing materials relating to non-desire for punishment in the latter sense should be treated as constituting the negative prosecutorial condition in the former sense, as this overlooks the multi-layered nature of the entire criminal trial procedure. Forgiveness or settlement by the victim's side, or efforts toward such, mediated by monetary or economic compensation for a victim lacking decision-making capacity, may be considered as a sentencing factor to any extent, irrespective of whether it constitutes an intention of non-desire for punishment as a negative prosecutorial condition, and it should be deemed sufficient that it be so considered.
다. Concern regarding excessive reliance on settlement and secondary harm to the victim
1) Since crimes subject to a complaint requirement and crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish exceptionally permit the intervention of a private person's intention in criminal justice on the premise of the victim's "true intention," expanding their application without an express basis must be guarded against. In particular, greater caution is required in readily inferring the victim's true intention merely on the ground that a "settlement" has been reached, and, on that basis, fundamentally blocking the realization of the State's penal authority over the crime. This is because our criminal law does not, in principle, adopt the principle of party disposition regarding the exercise of the State's penal authority, and there is a risk of fostering an excessive reliance on settlement—whereby "as long as a settlement is reached, it is acceptable to have committed a crime"—and of substantively encouraging decriminalization in practice even where a crime has been committed. In such a case, the State becomes unable to respond effectively to crime, and as a result, the legal-interest-protection function and the principle of responsibility under criminal law may recede, and ultimately, public trust in the entire legal order and the judiciary may be seriously undermined. Recently, criticism has been growing regarding the phenomenon whereby, in crimes subject to a complaint requirement and crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish, the offender avoids punishment through monetary or economic compensation, and, on the shared understanding that punishment commensurate with the crime is necessary, national and social demand for removing the complaint requirement and the victim's-expressed-wish requirement is growing. While, as the dissenting opinion points out, legislation reflecting this demand of the times is being enacted, its implication—namely, guarding against the phenomenon of the State's penal authority being rendered ineffective based on monetary, economic, or nominal settlements not accompanied by the victim's true forgiveness—differs in its orientation from that of the dissenting opinion.
2) While the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) governs litigation capacity on the basis of decision-making capacity, it, unlike its treatment of the lack of decision-making capacity of a defendant or suspect, contains no particular provision regarding the lack of decision-making capacity of a victim. Considering the purpose of crimes subject to punishment upon the victim's expressed wish and the negative ripple effects of its indiscriminate expansion, it is proper to understand this stance of the Criminal Procedure Act as reflecting the legislature's intent not to permit representation with respect to an intention of non-desire for punishment as a negative prosecutorial condition. Nevertheless, going further and, with respect to a victim whose true intention cannot be confirmed, substituting for the victim's intention of non-desire for punishment by using the adult guardianship system, which the current Criminal Procedure Act and its subordinate statutes do not contemplate, risks reviving the past ill practice whereby a defendant, who should bear criminal responsibility commensurate with the criminal act, mobilizes even excessive means to press the victim's side into reaching a settlement in order to secure favorable sentencing materials, and the criminal court uncritically invokes this as a factor favorable to the defendant's sentencing, thereby inevitably causing secondary harm to the victim. This would also run counter to the legislative and judicial efforts to eradicate secondary harm through the official introduction of the criminal deposit system by amendment of the Deposit Act (공탁법).
3) From the defendant's standpoint, where the victim is unconscious, there may be a disadvantage of not being afforded the opportunity for non-desire for punishment, as compared with a case where the victim's consciousness is recovered and the victim's true intention can be confirmed. However, this disadvantage is merely a phenomenon or result arising, in a particular case, from the existence or nonexistence of the victim's decision-making capacity, and the opportunity to secure an intention of non-desire for punishment need not necessarily be protected as a legal right. This is all the more true in this case, where the victim's state of lacking decision-making capacity was caused by the defendant's own criminal act.
The defendant may provide the victim's side with monetary or economic compensation and reach a criminal settlement with the victim's side at any time. Even where such efforts by the defendant fall short of achieving the victim's full forgiveness or an actual settlement, the effort toward and substance of such monetary or economic compensation may be considered as a favorable sentencing factor in the sentencing deliberation process regarding the defendant. This also falls within the domain contemplated by the newly introduced criminal deposit system (형사공탁제도). However, such circumstances, arising in the absence of any means of confirming the victim's genuine intent, should only be reflected as a sentencing factor at the sentencing deliberation stage; treating them as if they constituted a genuine intent to forgive or settle, and thereby treating them as a negative condition for prosecution in an offense subject to prosecution only upon the victim's expressed wish (반의사불벌죄), is excessively skewed toward the defendant's perspective and interests, and is therefore difficult to accept. This is because legal guarantees of the defendant's right of defense can be considered sufficiently addressed through their reflection in the sentencing deliberation process.
라. The Implications and Necessity of Respecting the Independence and Completeness of Criminal Procedure
1) The dissenting opinion ultimately proposes an analogical interpretation that departs from the text of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법). This demonstrates that the dissenting opinion's reasoning is difficult to adopt based solely on the text of the current Criminal Procedure Act, and rather serves as proof that the majority opinion's conclusion is the logical consequence of a textual interpretation of the current law.
2) The fundamental function and role of criminal law (형법) is to maintain the order of the social community and protect the legal interests of its members, such as life, body, liberty, and property, by punishing and preventing crime, while the task of criminal procedure is to realize, through due process based on the spirit of the Constitution, the State's penal authority as required by substantive criminal law. It is the basic stance that criminal law interpretation must maintain that offenders whose guilt has been proven should receive commensurate punishment, while innocent persons should not be punished.
Meanwhile, criminal law fundamentally regulates the legal relationships between the State, as the subject holding penal authority, and the offender, as the object thereof, as well as between the prosecutor, who performs the functions of investigation, prosecution, and maintenance of public prosecution for the exercise of penal authority, and the suspect or defendant, as the counterpart, treating them as the direct addressees of norms and parties to the procedure. Legal effects under criminal law are conferred by the State, independent of the will of each individual victim, based on matters that the legislature has, grounded in the common ethical norms of the legal community, determined to designate as crimes and to impose punishment for; they are not meant to compensate for the individual victim's damages or to substitute for retaliation against the offender.
In short, criminal law is a public procedure that operates independently of individual victims, aiming at the protection of legal interests and the maintenance of order through the fair exercise of penal authority. The function of criminal justice does not, in principle, depend on the will of the victim, and the exercise of the State's penal authority cannot be made to hinge upon the victim's intent. In a specific case, the victim's intent or the restoration of the victim's harm is not, in itself, a matter that must essentially be resolved within the purpose or regulatory domain of criminal justice.
3) The individual provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and criminal procedure as a whole are consistently and organically interconnected in order to realize the ideology and values of criminal law described above. Focusing only on one aspect of a non-criminal provision or institution, such as those found in civil or family law, and applying that provision or institution to criminal procedure without rigorous verification may conflict with the nature or purpose of the criminal justice system as designed and established by the legislature, or may impede the unified and organic operation of the criminal justice system.
4) The dissenting opinion overlooks the essential differences between the adult guardianship system under family litigation procedure and criminal procedure, and proposes to import the legal principles of adult guardianship directly into criminal justice as they are; this is difficult to readily accept, in that it carries the risk of "civilizing the criminal," which ought to be guarded against even more than the risk of "criminalizing the civil."
The adult guardianship system aims to improve the welfare of the ward by regulating matters requiring guardianship intervention to supplement the ward's insufficient capacity to act across the entirety of legal relationships, centered on the individual ward. In contrast, the essence of criminal justice lies not in the entirety of the life of the defendant or suspect, who is the addressee of the norm, but in the protection of legal interests and the maintenance of social order through the proper realization of the State's penal authority, centered on a specific criminal act, and in the pursuit of procedural justice in the course of realizing the State's penal authority. The adult guardianship system, which aims at the recovery of the ward's welfare in terms of individual capacity to act and at the adjustment of general legal relationships, is not well suited to criminal justice, which aims at the legitimate realization of the State's penal authority concerning crime and at securing procedural legitimacy in that process. Even if one may fully sympathize with the purpose of the adult guardianship system or the necessity or background behind its recent introduction, such circumstances cannot serve as an appropriate basis for affirming the extension of the adult guardianship system to criminal justice without an explicit statutory basis.
The foregoing sets forth the Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Min Yu-suk to the Dissenting Opinion
가. Rebuttal to the Supplementary Opinion of the Majority and the Gist of the Supplementary Opinion of the Dissent
1) The Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion criticizes that, if an expression of intent not to punish made by an adult guardian is permitted, there is a concern that the defendant, who is the offender, may obtain the benefit of avoiding punishment through monetary compensation, and may induce a criminal settlement, thereby causing secondary harm to the victim.
However, the fact that an offender is freed from the State's penal authority due to an expression of intent not to punish stems from the very nature of offenses subject to prosecution only upon the victim's expressed wish (반의사불벌죄), and is not a new problem arising from the utilization of the adult guardianship system. Arguments for the abolition or reform of such offenses have long been made on the basis of the same criticism. So long as such offenses continue to exist, courts must exercise meticulous care in determining whether the victim's genuine intent underlies the submission of a written statement of intent not to punish, and must examine whether there has been coercion or secondary harm by the offender.
The "omnipotence of settlement" has likewise been pointed out as a side effect of such offenses. In particular, the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, delivered on November 19, 2009, and Supreme Court Decision 2010Do5610, 2010Jeondo31, delivered on October 14, 2010, among others, held that an expression of intent not to punish, made by a victim of sexual violence around the age of 14 without the assistance of a guardian, was nonetheless valid. This resulted in criticism that the doctrine of capacity to form intent (의사능력), combined with the formalistic determination that "if capacity to form intent exists, the expression is recognized as an intent not to punish," has instead moved closer to an "omnipotence of settlement." Below, I explain in detail how adopting the dissenting opinion can reject the omnipotence of settlement.
The family court appoints, through substantive deliberation, a person capable of representing the victim's best interests as the adult guardian. The adult guardian then expresses the intent not to punish from that "public position," under the supervision of the court. It can be said that the risk of a criminal settlement being abused for the benefit of the offender rather than the victim, or of secondary harm occurring to the victim, is in fact lower than in other cases.
Ultimately, the concerns raised by the Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion are insufficient grounds for criticizing the dissenting opinion.
2) Broadening the perspective, I wish to supplement the dissenting opinion by empirically examining that support for the victim's decision-making—not only in offenses subject to prosecution upon the victim's expressed wish, but throughout the entirety of criminal trial procedure in which criminal settlements occur—is generally necessary for all persons lacking or deficient in capacity to handle their own affairs, including those without capacity to form intent, and by clarifying the basis and methods of such support and supplementation. This expansion of discussion is intended, together with the appropriate resolution of the case at hand, to elevate the status and protection of the victim, one of the principal parties concerned in the operation of criminal procedure, and to strengthen its orientation toward constitutional values.
나. Criticism of the Conventional Criteria for Determining the Intent Not to Punish and of Actual Practice
1) The victim's intent regarding whether punishment is desired carries significance not only as a negative condition for prosecution in offenses subject to prosecution upon the victim's expressed wish. The expression of intent not to punish in a criminal trial—that is, the submission of a written criminal settlement—carries great significance in sentencing deliberation as well, regardless of whether it constitutes a negative condition for prosecution. In current practice, where the Supreme Court's sentencing guidelines have become established as the basic framework for sentencing deliberation, the intent not to punish is an important factor in determining the recommended sentencing range and in fixing the specific sentence to be imposed. Most of the defendant's litigation activities outside the trial itself are concentrated on securing restoration of harm and an expression of intent not to punish.
2) It has repeatedly been confirmed as established legal doctrine that the intent not to punish in offenses subject to prosecution upon the victim's expressed wish must be based on the victim's genuine intent. In specific cases, however, the practice of the Supreme Court and lower courts appears to have focused not on whether the expressed intent not to punish corresponds to the victim's "genuine intent," but rather to have formalistically applied the doctrine of interpretation of declarations of intent under private law, concentrating solely on whether there was any defect in the "expressed intent of legal effect." As a result, if the victim had capacity to form intent and there was no defect such as violence, intimidation, or coercion in the declaration of intent, such that the declaration could not be deemed invalid, the declaration was considered "genuine, being free of defect." This has given rise to questions as to what a "genuine declaration of intent" means and whether the genuineness of an intent not to punish can be confirmed through the doctrine of interpretation of declarations of intent under private law, and, despite the limitation that the criteria and methods for genuinely confirming the victim's true declaration of intent remain unclear, there has been persuasive criticism that criminal procedure relies on the "victim's genuine declaration of intent" only in name.
3) In practice thus far, once an adult victim could not be regarded as entirely lacking capacity to form intent, courts have readily found that the victim was capable of recognizing the content of the written criminal settlement and the meaning of the legal effect arising from its submission, and have accordingly given full effect to the settlement so submitted. This has been the case even where the facts constituting the crime themselves reveal that the victim's cognitive ability or capacity for decision-making was significantly deficient. For example, in the so-called "salt farm slavery" case, in which the defendant was prosecuted for quasi-fraud and violation of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), among other offenses, for exploiting the victim's labor over a long period by taking advantage of the victim's deficient judgment and decision-making capacity, a settlement letter submitted in the victim's own name was recognized as an intent not to punish based on the victim's "genuine intent," thereby either satisfying the negative condition for prosecution or being considered as a favorable sentencing factor for the defendant.
4) Furthermore, criminal settlement letters submitted by child or youth victims who had not received support or supplementation in forming their intent have also been readily recognized, as submitted, as constituting "genuine intent" regarding non-punishment. Child or youth victims who, due to circumstances such as not living with a parent holding parental authority, cannot receive assistance in decision-making from a parent with parental authority or a legal representative, have difficulty having their immature decision-making capacity or judgment, as minors, supplemented. Many among them also have mental or physical disabilities that make it difficult for them to form and express intent. Nevertheless, where a written statement of intent not to punish was submitted in their name, the effect of that statement was, in many cases, recognized as submitted, without meticulous deliberation as to its genuineness or the victim's true intent. In the Gwangju Inhwa School case as well, a written criminal settlement submitted at the appellate stage by a child or youth victim with a Grade 4 hearing and speech impairment was used as it was as material favorable to the defendants in sentencing.
5) It is difficult to deny that, with respect to the intent not to punish—a matter that has an enormous impact on criminal procedure as a whole—much of the practice thus far has focused solely on the existence of a victim's basic capacity to form intent, mechanically and formalistically applying the doctrine of interpretation of declarations of intent, even where an incomplete declaration of intent requiring support or supplementation had been made. This tendency in practice has, in all likelihood, resulted in the unjust exemption of some offenders from criminal punishment and the distortion of the victim's genuine intent.
6) The right of self-determination presupposed by the intent not to punish can be genuinely realized only where a person is able to freely determine his or her own intent, clearly recognizing what legal effects his or her conduct will bring about, without being subjected to any coercion (see the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Young-ran in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do6058, delivered on November 9, 2009). The legal doctrine—applied uniquely in criminal procedure—that a victim with capacity to form intent may, and indeed must, express the intent not to punish alone, does not accord with the substantive realization of the right of self-determination. Allowing a person who entirely lacks capacity to form intent, or who, while possessing partial capacity to form intent, has incomplete cognitive ability or judgment, to unilaterally exercise an act having legally dispositive effect cannot be regarded as genuine protection of that person's right of self-determination. For a victim lacking or deficient in decision-making capacity, merely examining whether there is any defect in the formally and outwardly expressed declaration of intent cannot reveal that victim's genuine intent regarding whether punishment is desired.
다. Supporting and Supplementing the Victim's Decision-Making Capacity through the Adult Guardianship System
1) Whether the victim's decision-making capacity is lacking or merely deficient, this must be supported and supplemented comprehensively so that the victim's right of self-determination is substantively realized. This is not a matter of a third party making the decision on the victim's behalf, but rather one in which the victim remains the subject of the decision, while a third party, acting as an assistant, provides support and supplementation only to the extent of the deficiency.
2) From the standpoint of the need for support concerning capacity to form intent, it is not appropriate to treat cases of a complete lack of such capacity entirely differently from cases of mere deficiency. In that both call for the supplementation and correction of an incomplete capacity to form intent, cases of lack and cases of deficiency do not differ in kind, but only in the degree of supplementation and correction required. Moreover, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish, in specific and individual circumstances, between a complete lack of capacity to form intent and mere deficiency therein. Although the existence and degree of capacity to form intent must, in principle, be determined individually in relation to the specific juristic act in question (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da29358, delivered on September 22, 2006, among others), it is not an easy task to accurately grasp this in every specific situation.
Furthermore, the legal doctrine peculiar to criminal procedure, centered on "capacity to form intent," also has the paradoxical effect of excluding from the scope of support those persons lacking capacity to form intent, who are in greater need of such support.
3) The new adult guardianship system has incorporated protection of personal affairs (신상보호) as one of the principal duties of guardianship. The primary task with respect to decisions concerning the personal affairs of persons whose capacity for self-defense is weak due to a lack or deficiency of capacity to form intent is to protect them from exploitation and abuse. The need for such protection is especially urgent in the case of members of socially vulnerable groups. Through the function of protecting personal affairs, the adult guardianship system has come to serve the function of protecting the human rights of persons with disabilities who lack capacity to form intent, and this has, in turn, heightened the importance of the role and responsibility of the State and society regarding the use of adult guardianship by members of socially vulnerable groups.
4) In criminal procedure, the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (성폭력범죄의 처벌 등에 관한 특례법), the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth against Sex Offenses (아동·청소년의 성보호에 관한 법률), and the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Child Abuse Crimes (아동학대범죄의 처벌 등에 관한 특례법), among others, provide for a system of court-appointed attorneys for victims (피해자를 위한 국선변호사제도). The victim's court-appointed attorney performs the function of supporting and supplementing the formation of intent for victims whose capacity to form intent is incomplete, making it difficult to ascertain their genuine intent. However, the system of court-appointed attorneys for victims has the limitation of applying only in a restricted manner to specific crimes.
5) The introduction of the adult guardianship system has made it possible to fill gaps in existing regulation and to strengthen and expand support and protection for victims lacking capacity to form intent. Indeed, legislation and projects utilizing the adult guardianship system to support persons with decision-making disabilities, such as persons with disabilities and dementia patients, have already been attempted in various forms. Examples include support utilizing adult guardianship under the Act on Guarantee of the Rights of, and Support for, Persons with Developmental Disabilities (발달장애인 권리보장 및 지원에 관한 법률) for persons with developmental disabilities, the Act on the Improvement of Mental Health and the Support of Welfare Services for Mental Patients (정신건강증진 및 정신질환자 복지서비스 지원에 관한 법률) for persons with mental illness, and the Dementia Management Act (치매관리법) for dementia patients.
6) The adult guardianship system aims to guarantee the human dignity of persons who lack or are deficient in capacity to form intent, and to substantively realize their right of self-determination. The realization of human dignity and the right of self-determination, as constitutional values, is not confined to any particular field or area.
The circumstance that the adult guardianship system was not devised entirely with criminal procedure in mind cannot constitute a sufficient or valid reason to exclude or restrict an adult guardian from supporting the ward in criminal procedure. In order to realize the constitutional values intended for the ward, the peculiar characteristics and purposes of criminal procedure may be restricted within a reasonable scope. An adult guardian's support and supplementation of the ward's intent not to punish falls within that reasonable scope.
Nor is it persuasive to argue that the intent not to punish in criminal procedure is unrelated to support and supplementation concerning the victim's personal affairs. The new adult guardianship system introduced the protection of personal affairs, or the substitution of decisions concerning personal affairs, as a category of guardianship duty, reflecting on the fact that the former incompetency and quasi-incompetency systems (금치산·한정치산제도), which were largely confined to matters of property, were insufficient for realizing the ward's right of self-determination and welfare. Although the concept of "personal affairs" or "decisions concerning personal affairs" is not entirely clear-cut, it is generally understood to refer to acts that form and define the basic content of the living relationships that constitute the foundation upon which one's personality is expressed, or matters of highly personal decision-making, in forming one's living relationships, that cannot essentially be reduced to acts of property management. The inclusion of decisions concerning personal affairs, in addition to property matters, in the duties of guardianship reflects an intent to minimize gaps in the support and supplementation of the right of self-determination by encompassing the entirety of the ward's living relationships within the scope of protection. A crime victim's intent regarding whether he or she desires the offender's criminal punishment is an important matter requiring the victim's own decision-making within the victim's living relationships, and is not unrelated to the victim's mental welfare and personal interests. Support and supplementation regarding that intent should be understood from the perspective of realizing the victim's right of self-determination.
라. The Legitimacy and Necessity of Analogical Interpretation
1) The legislature enacts laws with as many cases as possible in mind, seeking to regulate them all; however, no matter how meticulous a legislature may be, it is impossible to anticipate and legislate for every situation that may arise, and areas inevitably remain unregulated by law. It is a tradition of civil law systems to believe that the law provides guidance even for legal problems arising in areas not explicitly regulated by law, and juristic analogy is grounded in this belief. It reflects the recognition that, where justice requires that two similar cases be treated identically, and the law confers a specific legal effect on only one of them, the same legal effect must also be conferred on the other case, which the law does not explicitly regulate. The legal norm that a judge discovers through analogy may be evaluated as part of the law deductively derived from existing law, or as inherent within the law itself.
The Supreme Court has ruled on numerous occasions regarding the distinction between and limits of textual interpretation and analogical interpretation. However, it has never held that statutes must be interpreted only within the bounds of the statutory text, or only within the bounds contemplated by the legislature at the time of enactment.
Perfect legislation cannot exist. Gaps in the law are unavoidable. There are various methods of legal interpretation, and the discovery and interpretation of law may be said to be the synthesis and selection among these various methods. There is no specific rule governing such synthesis and selection. It is not appropriate to conclude, merely because an interpretation going beyond the statutory text is not permitted for a certain legal issue, or merely because such an interpretation has been made, that it is thereby improper. There are cases in which analogical interpretation is necessary, such as where the statute itself contains a gap, or where the normative situation has changed due to changes in social institutions. Where a law enacted by the legislature for a specific purpose at the time of its enactment does not conform to present-day socio-ethical conceptions, it is necessary, within certain limits, to supplement that law through interpretation so that it conforms to present-day socio-ethical conceptions.
2) The protection of and support for socially vulnerable persons are essential principles for the organization of society, necessary to protect human dignity, maintain social order, and achieve sustainable development, and are constitutional values that must be realized. Article 34(5) of our Constitution (헌법) provides: "Citizens who are unable to earn a livelihood due to a physical disability or disease, old age, or other reasons shall be protected by the State under the conditions as prescribed by law." This provision emphasizes that the State must create and maintain the conditions under which socially vulnerable persons, such as persons with disabilities, can exercise their constitutional fundamental rights on their own (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ba20, 22, 2009Hun-Ba30 (consolidated), delivered on May 28, 2009). It is the fate of human beings to live exposed to unforeseen dangers. Anyone may be at risk of temporarily or permanently losing capacity due to an unexpected accident. In line with the spirit of the Constitution, the legislature introduced a flexible and socially integrative adult guardianship system for this purpose (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2020Hun-Ga8, delivered on December 22, 2022).
The need to support and supplement the incomplete formation of intent of a person lacking or deficient in capacity to form intent is no different in criminal procedure. This holds true whether the matter concerns a negative condition for prosecution or a sentencing factor. Even legal doctrine peculiar to criminal procedure is rooted in constitutional values. Excluding a victim from the procedure on the ground that objective confirmation of the victim's intent is difficult amounts, on the contrary, to disregarding the constitutional demand for the protection of socially vulnerable persons. It must be borne in mind that seeking a way for their intent to be substantively realized and reflected accords with the series of institutional and attitudinal changes in our society aimed at standing together with socially vulnerable persons.
For the foregoing reasons, I supplement the dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justices Cho Jae-yeon, Park Jeong-hwa, Ahn Cheol-sang, Min Yu-suk (Justice in Charge), Kim Seon-su, Lee Dong-won, Noh Jeong-hui, Noh Tae-ak, Lee Heung-gu, Cheon Dae-yeop, Oh Kyung-mi, Oh Seok-jun