[Defendant]
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kim Han-ju and 2 others of Dongseo Partners Law Firm
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul Central District Court Decision 2011No188, 1225, 1267, dated July 20, 2011
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the violation of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법)
A. Whether the provisions of the Labor Standards Act punishing wage arrears are unconstitutional
Article 36 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "an employer shall pay wages, compensation, and all other monetary benefits within 14 days from the time the cause for payment arises, in the event that a worker dies or retires."
Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the same Act provides that "wages shall be paid directly to the worker in currency in full,"
and Paragraph 2 of the same Article provides that "wages shall be paid at least once a month on a fixed date."
Article 109, Paragraph 1 of the same Act provides that violation of each of the above provisions shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine not exceeding 20 million won.
In light of the following: the legislative purpose of the above provisions is legitimate, as they are intended to prevent difficulties in the livelihood of retired workers and their families that may arise if retirement pay is not promptly paid after the termination of the employment relationship, as well as the inconvenience and risk that may accompany the payment of retirement pay with the passage of time, and to prevent the instability in the livelihood of workers—whose wages are their source of livelihood—that may result if wage payments are made over a long period or irregularly; the public interest requirement of securing the payment of retirement pay and wages, which are workers' means of livelihood, in order to guarantee workers' livelihood must take precedence over restrictions on the employer's freedom of contract and freedom of business activity, and thus the balance of legal interests is also satisfied; in light of the above legislative purpose and public interest requirement, the legislature's judgment to criminally punish the act of failing to pay wages cannot be deemed arbitrary; and moreover, in cases where it is recognized under generally accepted social norms that the employer could not have prevented the arrears or non-payment of wages such that further lawful conduct could not be expected of the employer, or where it is recognized that the employer made the utmost effort to pay retirement pay and wages but was simply unable to make payment by the due date due to unavoidable circumstances such as financial difficulties arising from poor management, such circumstances may constitute grounds for exculpation from the crime of violating the Labor Standards Act; therefore, it is not the case that the employer is uniformly compelled to pay retirement pay and wages and subjected to criminal punishment even in cases where the company has reached a state of economic collapse in which it is unable to repay its debts and unable to maintain or continue its economic activities, without consideration of such specific circumstances—in light of all of the above, it cannot be said that the above provisions violate the fundamental constitutional norm of strictly separating the civil law system from the criminal law system, as argued in the grounds of appeal
(see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2002Hun-Ba11, dated September 29, 2005).
B. Whether the Defendant's failure to pay wages constitutes grounds for exculpation
The crime of violating the duty to pay wages, retirement pay, etc. within the due date, as provided in Article 109 and Article 36 of the Labor Standards Act, is exculpated only where it is recognized, in light of generally accepted social norms, that the employer made the utmost effort to make such payment but was unable to make payment by the due date due to unavoidable circumstances such as financial difficulties arising from poor management; the employer cannot be exculpated merely because the employer was unable to make such payment due to financial pressure arising from poor management or the like. In determining whether there existed "unavoidable circumstances that made it impossible to pay wages or retirement pay within the due date," one specific indicator that may be considered is whether the employer took measures that could be objectively evaluated as reasonably acceptable from the perspective of the retired worker, such as making the utmost effort to promptly settle wages or retirement pay in order to promote the stability of the livelihood of retired workers, or clearly presenting a future repayment plan and engaging in good-faith consultation with the workers regarding such plan
(see Supreme Court Decision 2005Do9230, dated February 9, 2006, among others).
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court found that the Defendant, as the representative director of Nonindicted Company 1 (hereinafter "Nonindicted Company 1"), recklessly commenced flight operations on or about July 25, 2008 with only one leased aircraft, suspended operations on or about December 1, 2008 due to lack of funds, and, in a situation where the majority of employees resigned due to wage arrears, merely told the employees "Investment will be secured soon. Please wait," without ever explaining a specific wage payment plan or reaching any agreement with the employees. Based on these and other findings, and in light of the circumstances stated in its judgment, the lower court determined that it could not be found that the Defendant had made every effort to prevent the arrears of wages to workers in advance, and thus rejected the Defendant's argument that there were grounds for exculpation from the wage arrears, and found this part of the charges guilty.
Upon examination of the record in light of the above legal principles, the lower court's fact-finding and determination are justified and may be affirmed.
There is no illegality in the lower court's judgment, such as violating the principles of logic and experience or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in the selection and evaluation of evidence, which falls within the exclusive authority of the lower court, or misapprehending the legal principles regarding grounds for exculpation from the crime of violating the Labor Standards Act due to non-payment of wages, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
2. Regarding the fraud charge
Where there is no risk of causing substantial prejudice to the exercise of the defendant's right of defense, it does not violate the principle against unindicted matters (불고불리의 원칙) for the court to find facts different from the indicted facts, without going through the procedure for amendment of the indictment, so long as the basic facts remain identical to the indicted facts
(see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do2134, dated July 12, 2002, among others).
This part of the indicted facts states that "the Defendant, without any intention or ability to repay, deceived Nonindicted Person 2 by saying, 'Nonindicted Company 1 has secured 50 hundred million won in investment funds from Nonindicted Company 3 of Japan. The said 50 hundred million won is secured in a separate deposit account. The company currently lacks operating funds; if you lend me 100 million won, I will definitely repay it within three days,' thereby obtaining 100 million won by fraud," while the criminal facts found by the lower court state that "the Defendant, without any intention or ability to repay, deceived Nonindicted Person 2 by saying, 'Nonindicted Company 1 is about to receive investment funds from overseas soon. The company currently lacks operating funds; if you lend me 100 million won, I will definitely repay it within three days,' thereby obtaining 100 million won by fraud."
The above indicted facts and the criminal facts found by the lower court share the identical basic factual relationship that "the Defendant, without any intention or ability to repay, deceived the victim by saying he would repay within three days, thereby obtaining 100 million won by fraud." The only difference is that the lower court changed the portion of the indicted facts stating "50 hundred million won in investment funds has been secured from Nonindicted Company 3 of Japan. The said 50 hundred million won is secured in a separate deposit account" to "investment funds are about to be received from overseas soon." This does not amount to finding new content that is entirely absent from the indicted facts; moreover, the record shows that sufficient examination was conducted regarding the content of the criminal facts as found by the lower court. In light of the foregoing, even though the lower court found facts different from the indicted facts without going through the procedure for amendment of the indictment, this does not depart from the scope of identity of the indicted facts to the extent of differing in basic factual relationship, nor did it cause any substantial prejudice to the Defendant's exercise of the right of defense.
Furthermore, upon examination of the record in light of the evidence lawfully adopted by the lower court, the lower court's finding of the facts as stated in its judgment, and its determination that the 100 million won received by the Defendant from Nonindicted Person 2 was clearly a loan, and that the Defendant's deceptive act and intent to deceive at the time of borrowing were recognized, and its consequent finding of guilt as to this part of the criminal facts as stated in the lower court's judgment, are justified and may be affirmed.
There is no illegality in the lower court's judgment, such as violating the principles of logic and experience or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in the selection and evaluation of evidence, which falls within the exclusive authority of the lower court, or misapprehending the legal principles regarding the principle against unindicted matters or the subject matter of adjudication, insufficient examination, omission of judgment, or violation of the principle of oral argument, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
3. Regarding forgery of a private document and uttering of the forged private document
A photocopy of a forged document also constitutes a "document" as the object of the crimes of document forgery and uttering of a forged document
(see Supreme Court en banc Decision 87Do506, dated September 12, 1989),
and the crime of forgery of a private document is established where the document possesses such form and appearance sufficient to be regarded as a document genuinely prepared by the named person, to the extent that an ordinary person would be sufficiently misled into believing it to be a genuine private document of the named person
(see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do10195, dated July 23, 2009, among others).
Upon examination of the record in light of the above legal principles, the photocopy of the passbook in the name of Woori Bank forged by the Defendant was created by referring to a Woori Bank passbook, using a computer graphics program to produce a Woori Bank passbook, and then inserting the text and symbol marks in the name of Woori Bank; in light of its form and appearance, this is sufficient to mislead an ordinary person into believing it to be a genuine photocopy of a passbook. Therefore, the crimes of forgery of a private document and uttering of a forged private document are established.
The argument in the grounds of appeal that, just as with negotiable instruments, the crime of forgery does not apply to a photocopy of a passbook cannot be accepted.
4. Regarding attempted fraud
Where a person, after commencing the execution of a crime but before its completion, discontinues the execution of the crime of his or her own free will, and such discontinuance is not attributable to circumstances that would, under generally accepted social norms, constitute an obstacle to the completion of the crime, this constitutes attempted crime with voluntary abandonment (중지미수). However, as lawfully established by the lower court, where the Defendant showed Nonindicted Person 2 a forged stock subscription agreement and a photocopy of a passbook, stated that he had received an investment of 5 billion won, and requested a loan of funds, and then, while going to the bank together with Nonindicted Person 2 to confirm whether the 5 billion won had been deposited, abandoned the borrowing and returned at the entrance of the bank, this constitutes an instance where the Defendant discontinued the crime out of fear that the crime would be discovered, which must be regarded as circumstances constituting, under generally accepted social norms, an obstacle to the completion of the crime. Therefore, this cannot be considered a voluntary discontinuance.
The lower court's determination to the same effect is justified.
There is no illegality in the lower court's judgment, such as violating the principles of logic and experience or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in the selection and evaluation of evidence, which falls within the exclusive authority of the lower court, or misapprehending the legal principles regarding attempted crime with voluntary abandonment, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
5. Regarding illegality in the trial proceedings
Whether to adopt a party's application for evidence is a matter within the discretion of the court, and thus the court may decline to examine evidence applied for by the defendant or defense counsel if it deems such examination unnecessary
(see Supreme Court Decision 94Do252, dated February 24, 1995, among others).
Therefore, even though the lower court did not adopt and examine as witnesses Jo In-ha, whom the defense counsel had applied for, and Nonindicted Person 2, who had already testified in the first instance, this does not constitute an illegality as argued in the grounds of appeal.
Furthermore, upon examination of the record, there are no circumstances from which it may be found that the lower court revealed a prejudgment of guilt or deprived or severely restricted the Defendant's right to make statements or defense counsel's right to examine witnesses and right of defense.
There is no illegality in the trial proceedings of the lower court's judgment as argued in the grounds of appeal.
6. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and this judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice), Kim Ji-hyung (Justice in charge), Jeon Su-an, Lee Sang-hoon