[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Moon Jae-in and 1 other
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 90No782, delivered October 25, 1990
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed.
The case is remanded to the Busan High Court.
[Reasoning] The Court determines the grounds of appeal raised by the Prosecutor as follows.
1. Summary of the facts charged in this case.
The Defendant, as the head of the Planning Office of the labor union of Non-Indicted Company 1, is charged as follows: On February 12, 1990, at a meeting of union delegates, the Defendant put forward as an agenda item a "Daily Sectional Collective Action Guideline" providing that "each business division shall be divided into 12 sections, and from February 14 to February 28, union members of one section per day shall collectively march to the Ulsan Police Station to stage strong protest demonstrations, and shall conduct public relations activities to citizens in groups of three per team," and unilaterally caused it to be passed, thereby resolving to carry out illegal collective action. (i) In conspiracy with Non-Indicted 2, who was the delegate section head of the Plant Business Division, the Defendant, in accordance with the collective action guideline conveyed through Non-Indicted 2, caused work to be suspended and workers to assemble from around 11:00 to around 12:30 on February 14, and, by delivering a speech before approximately 1,000 union members belonging to the Plant Business Division—the section scheduled to hold its assembly that day—incited the union members to shout slogans and sing labor songs, thereby holding an illegal assembly and suspending the company's normal operations; and (ii) In conspiracy with Non-Indicted 3, who was the delegate section head of the Hull Production Division, the Defendant, in accordance with the collective action guideline conveyed through Non-Indicted 3, caused work to be suspended and workers to assemble from around 11:00 to around 18:00 on February 15, and, by delivering a speech before approximately 1,500 union members belonging to the Hull Production Division—the section scheduled to hold its assembly that day—incited the union members to hold a street demonstration, and thereafter had them return to the company to hold a departure ceremony and resolution rally of the Emergency Countermeasures Committee formed in response to the arrest of Non-Indicted 4, the union chairman, thereby suspending the company's normal operations. Through each of these acts, it is charged that the Defendant obstructed the company's normal business operations by means of the force of a multitude.
2. Summary of the reasoning of the judgment below.
The court below premised that the crime of interference with business is established by disseminating false facts or otherwise damaging a person's credit by deceptive means, or by obstructing another's business by means of force, and that "force" here means the strength of the offender's side, sufficient in light of the offender's authority, number of persons, and surrounding circumstances, to overpower the victim's free will. On this premise, the court below held that even if the company's employees, incited or instigated by the Defendant, collectively failed to report to work during working hours and instead participated in assemblies and demonstrations, thereby causing disruption to the company's operations, there was no basis to view that the employees failed to perform their duties against their will as a result of the Defendant's deceptive means or force; therefore, the crime of interference with business could not be established as to the Defendant's above conduct. The court below further found no other evidence that the employees who participated in the assemblies and demonstrations destroyed or occupied the company's production facilities by the force of a multitude so as to obstruct operations, or that, in the course of such assemblies and demonstrations, force was used to obstruct the performance of duties by employees who wished to work or by company staff. Accordingly, the court below determined that the facts charged in this case either did not constitute a crime or that there was no proof of the criminal facts.
3. Judgment of this Court.
However, even if an employee who has entered into an employment contract with an employer fails, of his or her own volition, to provide labor in breach of the contract, this may give rise to liability for breach of contract arising from the non-performance of the labor contract, but it cannot be said to directly constitute the crime of interference with business. Nevertheless, where a large number of employees, acting in concert with mutual communication of intent, collectively leave the workplace or fail to report for work, thereby refusing to provide labor, and thereby impede the normal operation of the employer's business such as production and sales, causing damage, such conduct—unless it constitutes a legitimate industrial action under labor-related statutes and is thereby exempted from illegality—must be regarded as constituting interference with another's business by the force of a multitude, and thus constitutes the crime of interference with business (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2852, delivered January 23, 1991).
Accordingly, if the Defendant, by the methods set forth in the facts charged, caused the company's employees to collectively fail to report to work during working hours and instead participate in assemblies and demonstrations, thereby causing disruption to the company's operations, then, unless such collective action constitutes a legitimate industrial action under labor-related statutes, the Defendant cannot escape liability as a co-principal who obstructed the company's business by means of force exercised through collective action. It should not be held that the Defendant bears liability for the crime of interference with business only where the employees obstructed the company's business as a result of the Defendant's exercise of deceptive means or force upon them, as the court below held.
The court below should have examined these matters in somewhat greater detail and determined whether the crime of interference with business was established; however, it overlooked this and rendered its judgment as described above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment below is free from illegality in that it failed to conduct a proper examination or misapprehended the legal principles concerning the crime of interference with business, and it is clear that such illegality affected the judgment. Accordingly, the argument pointing out this error has merit.
4. Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination, the Justices concerned being unanimous in this opinion, and it is decided as stated in the Order.
Presiding Justice Yoon Kwan, Justice Choi Jae-ho, Justice Kim Ju-han, Justice Kim Yong-jun