[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kwon Du-seop and 3 others
[Court Below] Seoul Central District Court Decision 2006No1532, decided December 20, 2006
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the grounds for appeal concerning "force" as a constituent element of the crime of obstruction of business
A. The crime of obstruction of business is established when a person obstructs another's business through deception or force (Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act (형법)). "Force" refers to any and all power capable of suppressing or confusing a person's free will.
A strike, as a form of industrial action carried out by workers refusing to provide labor for the purpose of achieving their demands and thereby impeding the normal operation of business (Article 2, Item 6 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법)), is not merely a passive omission of refusing to provide labor under an employment contract, but goes beyond this to constitute an exercise of collective force whereby workers collectively suspend the provision of labor in order to exert pressure on the employer and achieve their demands. As such, it includes elements that constitute "force" as referred to in the crime of obstruction of business.
However, while workers are not guaranteed an absolute right—since, pursuant to Article 37(2) of the Constitution (헌법), their rights may be restricted for public interest reasons such as national security, maintenance of order, or public welfare, and there is an inherent limitation that the exercise of such rights must be legitimate—workers in principle possess, as a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution, the right to independently organize, bargain collectively, and act collectively for the improvement of working conditions (Article 33(1) of the Constitution).
Therefore, a strike as an industrial action should not always be regarded as constituting the crime of obstruction of business. Rather, it is appropriate to hold that a collective refusal to provide labor constitutes "force" and thus establishes the crime of obstruction of business only where, in light of the surrounding circumstances and the course of events, it can be evaluated that the strike was carried out abruptly at a time the employer could not have anticipated, thereby causing severe confusion or enormous damage to the employer's business operations such that the employer's free will regarding the continuation of business could be suppressed or thrown into confusion.
To the extent they conflict with the views expressed in this decision, the following precedents—which held, on the premise that workers' collective refusal to provide labor, thereby impeding the employer's normal business operations and causing damage, inherently constitutes "force," that such conduct constitutes the crime of obstruction of business unless its illegality is negated as a legitimate industrial action under labor-related statutes—are hereby overruled: Supreme Court Decision 90Do2771 rendered on April 23, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 91Do326 rendered on November 8, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2004Do689 rendered on May 27, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do3450 rendered on May 12, 2006; and Supreme Court Decision 2002Do5577 rendered on May 25, 2006.
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the following facts may be ascertained: When the Korean Railway Workers' Union (전국철도노동조합) submitted a written pledge stating that it "pledges in writing to negotiate in good faith without engaging in a strike," the Special Mediation Committee, on November 25, 2005, issued a conditional recommendation for referral to arbitration, stating that "if it becomes highly likely in the future that the labor union will fail to honor its pledge and will resort to industrial action, it is recommended that the relevant workplace be referred to arbitration." Respecting this recommendation, the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission (중앙노동위원회) issued decisions on November 25, 2005 and December 16, 2005, respectively, deferring referral to arbitration in accordance with the aforesaid recommendation. However, when collective bargaining between the Korean Railway Workers' Union and Korea Railroad Corporation (한국철도공사) finally broke down on February 28, 2006, the Chairperson issued, on that same day at 21:00, a decision for ex officio referral to arbitration. Notwithstanding this, the leadership of the Korean Railway Workers' Union, including the Defendant, instructed that the strike proceed as scheduled and continue, pursuant to the resolution of February 7, 2006. As a result, from approximately 01:00 on March 1, 2006 until approximately 14:00 on March 4, 2006, members of the Korean Railway Workers' Union refused to report for work and refused to perform their duties at 641 workplaces nationwide, including the Seoul Railway Vehicle Maintenance Depot, causing the suspension of 329 KTX train operations and 283 Saemaul-ho train operations operated by Korea Railroad Corporation, thereby causing Korea Railroad Corporation to suffer damages totaling approximately 13.5 billion won, including lost operating revenue and compensation for substitute labor.
In light of the above facts, the two decisions by the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission to defer referral to arbitration, made in accordance with the purport of the Special Mediation Committee's conditional recommendation for referral to arbitration, clearly manifested an intention to respect autonomous bargaining between the Korean Railway Workers' Union and Korea Railroad Corporation, while also making clear that, should it be determined that the labor dispute between the two parties could no longer be resolved autonomously through collective bargaining, industrial action would not be permitted at Korea Railroad Corporation—an essential public service workplace with great potential to cause social disruption—and that the matter would instead be resolved through ex officio arbitration. Accordingly, the decision for ex officio referral to arbitration was issued immediately after the final breakdown of collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the Defendant, as chairperson of the Korean Railway Workers' Union, carried out the strike at issue in this case as planned at railway workplaces nationwide. Even though the Korean Railway Workers' Union had, on February 7, 2006, already resolved in advance to commence a general strike at approximately 01:00 on March 1, 2006, considering the circumstances and content of the aforementioned decisions to defer referral to arbitration, together with the fact that collective bargaining between Korea Railroad Corporation and the Korean Railway Workers' Union continued even after the resolution to strike, and that the decision for ex officio referral to arbitration was issued immediately after the final breakdown of collective bargaining, it cannot be said that Korea Railroad Corporation could have anticipated that the Korean Railway Workers' Union would go ahead with the strike at issue even in violation of the provisions prohibiting industrial action upon ex officio referral to arbitration under the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (as amended by Act No. 8158 on December 30, 2006, prior to such amendment; hereinafter the "former Trade Union Act") at this workplace, which is an essential public service workplace where strikes are not permitted. Furthermore, it can be seen that the strike at issue, which was carried out nationwide under the Defendant's leadership, resulted in the suspension of several hundred train operations, causing damages totaling approximately 13.5 billion won and bringing about a situation of unexpected and serious harm to Korea Railroad Corporation's business operations.
In light of the legal principles set forth above, these circumstances are sufficient to establish that the strike at issue, led by the Defendant, constituted a force capable of suppressing or confusing the free will of Korea Railroad Corporation, the employer, and thus constitutes "force" under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act.
The court below's judgment of conviction on the charge of obstruction of business in this case, rendered on the same reasoning, is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning "force" in the crime of obstruction of business, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
2. Regarding the grounds for appeal concerning the validity of the decision for ex officio referral to arbitration
A. Regarding the argument that the ex officio arbitration system is unconstitutional
Article 62, Item 3, Article 63, and Article 91, Item 1 of the former Trade Union Act have as their legislative purpose the maintenance of the public's daily life and the preservation of the national economy by enabling the resolution of labor disputes through mediation by the Labor Relations Commission, instead of through agreement between labor and management, in essential public service industries where frequent strikes—arising from extreme conflicts of interest and confrontation between labor and management—could paralyze the public's daily life and place the national economy at risk of collapse. This legislative purpose is legitimate; the method of restricting fundamental rights prescribed by the statute is appropriate; the degree of restriction on fundamental rights is minimized; and a balance is maintained between the public interest sought to be protected and the private interests restricted. Accordingly, these provisions do not violate the constitutional principle against excessive restriction, nor do they unreasonably discriminate between workers engaged in ordinary industries and those engaged in public interest industries (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do1863 rendered on December 26, 2003; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do825 rendered on June 24, 2005; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ga31 rendered on May 15, 2003, etc.).
The judgment below, which is to the same effect, is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles, etc., as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
B. Regarding the argument that there was a deviation from or abuse of discretion
The court below, having comprehensively considered the evidence it admitted, found the facts as set forth in its reasoning, and determined that the decisions in this case to defer referral to arbitration and to refer to arbitration were made in consideration of the ongoing autonomous bargaining, and cannot be regarded as having been used merely as a means to substantially restrict the industrial action itself; and that the mere fact that the decision to refer to arbitration was made three months after the Special Mediation Committee's conditional recommendation for referral to arbitration cannot be regarded as having effectively rendered meaningless the Special Mediation Committee's recommendation and the system of opinion-giving by public interest members, nor can it be regarded as a deviation from or abuse of discretion by the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission.
In light of the various provisions concerning the procedures of the ex officio arbitration system under the former Trade Union Act and the record in this case, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the ex officio arbitration system, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
3. Regarding the grounds for appeal concerning legitimate act
The court below held to the effect that the strike at issue, led by the Defendant, was carried out during a period in which industrial action was prohibited pursuant to the decision to refer to arbitration in this case, and thus already constituted industrial action in violation of statute; and that, given that the damages suffered by the employer as a result thereof were also substantial, such conduct did not constitute a legitimate act that does not violate social norms. This determination by the court below is justified, and the argument in the grounds for appeal to the contrary is without merit.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order. Except for the dissenting opinion of Justices Park Si-hwan, Kim Ji-hyung, Lee Hong-hoon, Jeon Su-an, and Lee In-bok regarding the determination in paragraph 1 above, the opinions of the participating Justices are unanimous.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justices Park Si-hwan, Kim Ji-hyung, Lee Hong-hoon, Jeon Su-an, and Lee In-bok
A. Basic premise
When one thinks of industrial actions such as strikes, one is likely to envision cases accompanied by violent means such as assault, intimidation, coercion, or occupation and sit-in protests. However, this case involves a situation in which members of the Korean Railway Workers' Union, including the Defendant, simply failed to report to work at Korea Railroad Corporation's workplaces. Accordingly, what is at issue here is a case in which workers, without resorting to such violent means, simply fail to provide labor by not reporting to the workplace (a so-called case of passive cessation of the provision of labor, hereinafter abbreviated as "simple strike"), and this must not be confused with a strike accompanied by violent means.
B. Whether the crime of obstruction of business by force satisfies the elements of a crime of commission, and whether a genuine or spurious omission crime is established
The majority opinion holds that even where a strike as industrial action is a "simple strike" as premised above, insofar as it is carried out collectively by workers in order to exert pressure on the employer and achieve their demands, it does not remain a mere omission but constitutes an "act of commission" containing "elements constituting force"; however, even if such a simple strike is an act of commission in this sense, it does not necessarily constitute "force" establishing the crime of obstruction of business under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act in every case, but only where, in light of the surrounding circumstances and course of events, it can be evaluated that the strike was carried out abruptly at a time the employer could not have anticipated, causing severe confusion or enormous damage to the employer's business operations such that the employer's free will regarding the continuation of business could be suppressed or thrown into confusion, does it then constitute "force" and thus establish the crime of obstruction of business.
First, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's view that even a simple strike should, by its very nature, be regarded as an act of commission rather than an omission.
It is generally understood that, except for genuine omission crimes—such as the crime of failure to disperse a crowd (Article 116 of the Criminal Act) or the crime of failure to leave premises (Article 319(2) of the Criminal Act)—in which the constituent elements prescribed by the penal statute can be realized only through simple omission, the basic forms constituting criminal conduct may include not only acts of commission but also acts of omission (so-called spurious or improper omission crimes). Precedent has likewise made this clear, holding that "where a certain crime can be realized not only through active commission but also through passive omission, i.e., failure to prevent the occurrence of a result, if the actor, through his own bodily activity or physical or chemical action, actively worsens another's legal interest, ultimately infringing upon that person's legal interest, this should in principle be regarded as a crime of commission" (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do995 rendered on June 24, 2004).
Acts of commission and omission are generally distinguished on a factual basis. As indicated in the above precedent, cases involving active conduct through bodily activity or physical or chemical action are regarded as acts of commission, whereas cases of passively doing nothing are regarded as acts of omission.
If so, the majority opinion errs from the outset in characterizing a simple strike—in which workers merely do nothing—as an act of commission, disregarding the factually distinguishable concepts of commission and omission. It is evident that a worker's absence from the workplace and failure to provide labor constitutes an omission, namely, a failure to perform an obligation under the employment contract. The majority opinion appears to regard this as an act of commission on the ground that the refusal to provide labor is not individual but collective, undertaken for the purpose of industrial action. However, whether one person does nothing or several persons do nothing, and regardless of the purpose or motive behind several persons doing nothing, in either case there is no difference in that there is no active conduct such as bodily activity. Therefore, the mere fact that workers collectively refused to provide labor for purposes of industrial action does not transform what would individually be an omission—namely, refusal to provide labor—into an act of commission.
Of course, as seen through the above legal principles concerning spurious omission crimes, "force" as a constituent element of the crime of obstruction of business by force under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act means any and all power capable of suppressing or confusing a person's free will, and the danger or result of suppressing or confusing the other party's free will caused by the actor may arise not only through active means of commission, such as bodily activity, but also through passive means of omission, namely, doing nothing. Therefore, the mere fact that a collective refusal to provide labor constitutes an omission cannot, by itself, negate the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business by force. However, in order for such an omission to be evaluated as equivalent to an act of commission, the person who omits to act must occupy the position of a guarantor obligated to prevent the occurrence of the result (a typical example being a mother who realizes the result of killing by failing to feed her infant). It is a textbook explanation that, in order to recognize such a guarantor's position, the following must be satisfied: (i) the subject of the legal interest lacks the capacity to protect against the threat to that legal interest on his or her own; (ii) the person who omits to act bears a legal duty, i.e., a duty to act, to protect the other party's legal interest from the danger of infringement; and (iii) the person who omits to act, in such position of guardian, controls the situation giving rise to the infringement of the legal interest.
Accordingly, even if, contrary to the majority opinion, a simple strike is regarded as an omission, if it can bring about the same result as the exercise of force through omission, and if workers can be regarded as occupying the position of guarantor obligated to prevent the occurrence of such a result, then, albeit on different grounds from the majority opinion, the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business by force may be recognized. Therefore, the crucial question is whether workers can be recognized as occupying a guarantor's position satisfying the elements of such a spurious omission crime.
In relation to workers, employers are generally in a socially and economically superior position as parties to an individual employment relationship. Moreover, even in the collective labor relationship with a labor organization, employers are in a mutually equal position in that they may devise means to counter workers' industrial actions. In this respect, it generally cannot be said that employers lack the capacity to protect on their own the legal interest of freedom of business activity from workers' simple strikes, nor can it be said that workers control the situation from a position of guardian vis-à-vis the employer. Accordingly, it is difficult to say that requirements (i) and (iii) above, necessary to recognize a guarantor's position, are even present at the outset.
Moreover, what is most important in recognizing a guarantor's position is requirement (ii) above, namely, the duty to act. Precedent likewise holds that "in order for a spurious omission crime, whereby a crime whose content is an act of commission is committed through omission, to be established, a person who bears a legal duty to act to prevent the occurrence of a result of infringement of a legal interest prohibited by the Criminal Act must have failed to perform that duty despite being able to easily prevent the occurrence of the result by performing it, and must have tolerated and stood by while the result occurred without performing the duty; and the omission in question must have a criminal-legal value equivalent to infringement of a legal interest by commission, such that it may be evaluated as the conduct constituting the crime. Here, the duty to act is recognized not only where it arises from statute, juristic act, or prior conduct, but also where a duty to act is expected under the principle of good faith, social norms, or reason" (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do4128 rendered on April 28, 2006, etc.).
Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether, in the relationship between worker and employer, a worker can indeed be said to bear, vis-à-vis the employer, a legal duty to act to prevent the danger or occurrence of a result of infringement of a legal interest prohibited by the Criminal Act, and whether an omission to perform that duty can be recognized as having a criminal-legal value equivalent to infringement of a legal interest by commission.
First, from the perspective of the individual employment relationship between worker and employer, a worker does indeed bear an obligation to provide labor under the employment contract. However, since a worker's obligation not to breach the employment contract belongs to the realm of private autonomy between the parties to the employment contract, sanctions therefor should in principle be resolved by imposing civil liability, such as damages. Accordingly, a worker's contractual obligation under the employment contract to provide labor cannot be characterized as a legal duty to prevent the danger or occurrence of a result of infringement of a legal interest of the employer prohibited by the Criminal Act, i.e., as a "duty to act" constituting the crime of "obstruction of business by omission." To characterize this as a criminal duty to act for purposes of a spurious omission crime is tantamount to making the failure to perform the contractual obligation to provide labor, thereby causing damage to the employer, a subject of criminal punishment. However, this amounts to compelling the provision of labor through criminal punishment. This directly and essentially negates the freedom or right not to work in accordance with one's own will. It goes without saying that this is unjust. Accordingly, a worker's failure to provide labor, which is a contractual obligation, must not be evaluated as a violation of a duty to act.
Next, we consider the matter from the perspective of the collective labor relationship between a labor organization and the employer or employers' association.
Where a strike is carried out in satisfaction of the legitimate requirements for the exercise of the right to collective action guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution, such conduct is constitutionally recognized as legitimate, and therefore cannot be regarded as constituting "force," a constituent element of the crime of obstruction of business (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2009Hun-Ba168 rendered on April 29, 2010). In this respect, the majority opinion is correct in overruling those precedents which held, in effect, that "a strike always constitutes force in every case, and its illegality is negated only where it is carried out as a legitimate industrial action." However, a question may arise as to whether workers who, in carrying out a strike without satisfying the requirements for legitimacy of industrial action, collectively refuse to provide labor, may be regarded—unlike individual workers who breach their employment contracts by failing to perform their obligation to provide labor—as having violated a duty to act required of them in connection with industrial action.
The majority opinion also cites, as conduct constituting "force" for purposes of the crime of obstruction of business, cases where a strike is carried out abruptly at a time the employer could not have anticipated, causing severe confusion or enormous damage to the employer's business operations, and thus appears ultimately to contemplate certain instances where the strike fails to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy. In order to reach the same conclusion as the majority opinion in recognizing the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business by force as a spurious omission crime, it would be necessary to recognize that workers bear a duty to act, namely, a duty not to engage in an illegal strike that leads to such a situation as described above. However, no legal basis can be found, whether in any provision of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter the "Trade Union Act") relating to industrial action in regulating labor relations in connection with the exercise of the right to collective action, or on any other ground, for recognizing such a duty to act on the part of workers.
Unlike other contractual relationships, labor relations contemplate not only an "individual employment relationship" centered on the relationship between worker and employer as parties to an employment contract, but also a "collective labor relationship" in which a labor organization, typified by a trade union, and the employer or employers' association are the parties (referred to in Article 2, Item 5 of the Trade Union Act as "parties to labor relations").
A collective labor relationship is a legal relationship formed in connection with the exercise of the three labor rights—the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to collective action—guaranteed to workers by the Constitution. Such a collective labor relationship has as its principal content the autonomous formation and adjustment of labor relations between the employer or employers' association and workers, from a position of substantive equality, through an organization voluntarily formed by workers. Accordingly, the collective labor relationship is fundamentally premised on the autonomous regulation and resolution of matters between the labor organization and the employer or employers' association, without interference from the State or other entities. This, too, is another form of private autonomy, sometimes referred to as "collective autonomy" (단체자치).
A strike or other industrial action carried out by workers as an exercise of the right to collective action guaranteed under Article 33(1) of our Constitution is conduct undertaken to protect workers themselves in a situation of confrontation with the employer for the maintenance and improvement of labor relations. Accordingly, the infringement of the employer's legal interests caused by workers' industrial action—such as the employer being rendered unable to carry out production or other business operations—is contemplated, in a collective labor relationship, as a necessary consequence thereof, regardless of whether the exercise of the workers' right to collective action is lawful or unlawful. This is no different from the fact that, in a contractual relationship, damage to the counterparty arising from breach of contractual obligations is contemplated in advance. In other words, even a strike that fails to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy as industrial action is, in substance, nothing more than a failure by the labor organization to perform an obligation required of it in a collective labor relationship between the labor organization and the employer or employers' association. If, as the majority opinion holds, a duty to act—namely, a duty on the part of the labor organization not to engage in an unlawful strike as industrial action—must be recognized, this would amount to recognizing that, in connection with the exercise of the right to collective action between "parties to labor relations" in a collective labor relationship who stand in a mutually equal position under the principle of collective autonomy, a labor organization must be compelled, by criminal punishment, not to fail to perform an obligation belonging to the realm of collective autonomy vis-à-vis the counterparty, the employer or employers' association—which is fundamentally impermissible. That is to say, this, too, is unjust in that it permits criminal sanctions for violations of self-regulating matters within the realm of collective autonomy, which plainly belongs to the domain of private autonomy in labor relations. This is no different from a case in which one of multiple parties to a contract, all of like mind, on one side fails to perform an obligation owed to the counterparty under the contract. Therefore, as will be discussed below, even though the Trade Union Act individually prescribes matters required in carrying out a strike or other industrial action and includes provisions imposing punishment for violations thereof, while it may be permissible to make each such violation a subject of punishment, it is unjust—on the basis thereof—to recognize that workers bear a duty to act, in the sense of a guarantor's position, to observe the requirements of legitimacy for a strike or other action so as to prevent infringement of the employer's legal interests, and to generally recognize the crime of obstruction of business by force for violation of such a duty to act, since this would compel workers, through criminal punishment, to provide collective labor itself.
In conclusion, recognizing a duty to act on the part of workers not to engage in an unlawful strike as industrial action amounts to recognizing a guarantor's position whereby one party, the worker, guarantees performance of its obligation to the counterparty, the employer or employers' association, in mutually opposing individual and collective legal relationships—which cannot be accepted. Moreover, workers' mere refusal to provide labor, even if carried out collectively, cannot be said to have a criminal-legal value equivalent to infringement of a legal interest caused by active obstructive conduct against the employer's performance of business, as conduct constituting the crime of obstruction of business.
C. Criteria for determining whether conduct constitutes "force," a constituent element of the crime of obstruction of business
Even if one takes the position, as does the majority opinion, that a simple strike may, in exceptional circumstances, constitute "force" as an act of commission, we cannot agree with the criteria proposed by the majority opinion for determining whether such "force" is present.
First and foremost, we again consider the principle of nulla poena sine lege (죄형법정주의, the principle of legality in criminal law).
The crime of obstruction of business under Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act is established where a person obstructs another's business through deception or force. Historically, the crime of obstruction of business in our Criminal Act was adopted from the crime of obstruction of business in the former Japanese Criminal Code, and the prototype of the crime of obstruction of business in Japanese criminal law is said to be the former French Criminal Code. Article 414 of the 1864 former French Criminal Code contained a provision punishing "any person who, for the purpose of compelling an increase or decrease in wages, or of obstructing the free exercise of industry or labor, causes the organized cessation of labor, maintains or continues such cessation, or commences its execution, by violence, assault, threats, or deception." However, the French Criminal Code as amended in 1884 was revised so as to permit punishment only where industrial action was accompanied by the use of violence. Meanwhile, Article 270 of the former Japanese Criminal Code contained a provision punishing "an agricultural or industrial employee who, in order to increase wages or to change the trend of agriculture or industry, obstructs the employer or other employees through deception or force," but this was revised in the current Criminal Code, in Article 234, to punish "a person who obstructs another's business by force." In this manner, the crime of obstruction of business by force originated, in both France and Japan, as a means of suppressing labor movements. This crime of obstruction of business, having been incorporated into our Criminal Act, remains in effect to this day. However, applying Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act to a strike or other industrial action, as in this case, to recognize the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business faces criticism for lacking legal consistency in and of itself, under the current legal system, which—unlike the era when strikes and other industrial actions were generally prohibited by law with punishment for violation thereof—guarantees the right to collective action as a fundamental constitutional right in order to realize a substantively equal relationship between labor and management.
Moreover, the concept of "force," one of the constituent elements of the crime of obstruction of business, belongs to an extremely broad and ambiguous category of conduct. Of course, as set forth by the majority opinion, our precedents understand the concept of "force" to mean "any and all power capable of suppressing or confusing a person's free will." Nevertheless, despite such construction, this concept in fact retains the character of a relatively very broad and ambiguous general clause. Accordingly, great caution must be exercised in interpreting this concept of "force" so as not to unduly expand its scope. For example, in a legal relationship under private law, expanding the scope of "force" on the ground that one party's breach of obligation may cause a danger or result of infringement of a legal interest sufficient to suppress or confuse the counterparty's free will should not be permitted, as it risks punishing a mere breach of obligation as the crime of obstruction of business. Likewise, in the case of a simple strike at issue in this case, even where it fails to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy as industrial action, since it is, as examined in detail in Section B above, fundamentally no different from a breach of obligation by the workers, whether viewed from the perspective of the individual employment relationship or the collective labor relationship, including it within the concept of "force" is, above all, unjust from the standpoint of the principle of legality in criminal law.
As noted above, in Japan, which has in its Criminal Act a provision on the crime of obstruction of business by force nearly identical to ours, it is said that the position of the prevailing academic theory and precedent is that only cases where an employer's business is obstructed through violent means such as assault or intimidation are subject to punishment, and that a simple strike unaccompanied by such violent means does not raise the issue of criminal punishment for obstruction of business. Moreover, it is said that in various European countries and the United States as well, an unlawful industrial action is treated primarily as a matter of civil liability, such as damages, or disciplinary liability, while violence, intimidation, coercion, damage to property, etc., accompanying industrial action are subject to punishment under the respective crimes of assault, intimidation, coercion, damage to property, etc., and that no instance can be found in which a simple strike unaccompanied by such violent means is made subject to criminal punishment such as the crime of obstruction of business. In this respect as well, the majority opinion's view of including a simple strike within the concept of "force" departs from the universally accepted position.
Furthermore, if one adopts the same approach as the majority opinion's view regarding a simple strike, it becomes possible to interpret that whenever industrial action fails to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy as such and is carried out abruptly at a time the employer could not have anticipated, causing severe confusion or enormous damage to the employer's business operations, it is in every such case subject to punishment for the crime of obstruction of business by force. Indeed, our precedents have held, with respect to a case where the use of monthly paid leave was legitimate as leave under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) but failed to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy as industrial action under the Trade Union Act, that "although the use of monthly paid leave under the Labor Standards Act is left to the free will of the worker, and, unlike annual paid leave, the employer does not even have the authority to change the timing thereof, where a large number of workers, without any legitimate purpose of industrial action but solely for the purpose of using it as a means of obstructing business, collectively and simultaneously apply for monthly paid leave and are absent from work en masse, thereby impeding the normal operation of the company's business, this must be regarded as constituting obstruction of business" (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2852 rendered on January 29, 1991). In addition, precedents have also taken the position of recognizing the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business by force, on the ground that legitimacy as industrial action was not recognized, with respect to so-called "law-abiding struggles" in which lawful exercises of rights in compliance with statutory provisions—such as refusal of overtime work or strict adherence to fixed working hours—are used as means of industrial action (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do326 rendered on November 8, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 95Do2970 rendered on February 27, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 96Do419 rendered on May 10, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 2003Do2146 rendered on August 30, 2004, etc.). However, this approach has been criticized as containing unconstitutional elements, in that it excessively broadens the scope of criminal punishment—imposing punishment even on conduct that, on one hand, has the character of a legitimate exercise of rights—thereby compelling workers to work under the threat of criminal punishment (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 97Hun-Ba23 rendered on July 16, 1998). In this respect as well, there are fundamental limits to generalizing the majority opinion's interpretive logic regarding the concept of "force."
Although limited to certain exceptional circumstances, the majority opinion's view that a simple strike may also constitute "force" for purposes of the crime of obstruction of business is, in the exceptional circumstances set forth by the majority opinion, no different, as discussed above, from compelling workers, through criminal punishment, to perform a "duty to work" vis-à-vis the employer. In this connection, it should also be noted that Article 1(d) of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour prohibits, as forced labor, sanctions imposed for having participated in strikes, and that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has, every year continuously since 2000, and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has, repeatedly in 2001 and 2009, expressed concern regarding the situation of punishing various acts related to workers' collective action that are unaccompanied by violence pursuant to Article 314 of the Criminal Act, and has recommended measures to ensure that "non-violent industrial action" is not punished under that provision, such that this matter faces criticism from the international community.
Meanwhile, another point that should be made clear is that, even if an unlawful simple strike does not constitute the crime of obstruction of business by force, this does not create a gap in the punishment of the underlying unlawful conduct itself.
Where a strike or other industrial action lacks legitimacy, separate penal provisions exist in the Trade Union Act for each act that renders the industrial action unlawful, and such acts may be punished as violations of the Trade Union Act. That is, Articles 37 through 46 of the Trade Union Act prescribe principles, subjects, procedures, methods, etc., regarding industrial action, and the penal provisions in Articles 88 through 91 impose punishment for violations of each of these provisions, ranging from imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 50 million won (see Article 88 of the Trade Union Act) to imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than 10 million won (see Article 91 of the Trade Union Act), whereas the crime of obstruction of business is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 15 million won.
If it is held that workers who participate in a strike or other industrial action, which cannot be recognized as legitimate due to violation of the various provisions of the Trade Union Act concerning industrial action, are thereby subject to punishment for the crime of obstruction of business under the Criminal Act, there would be no need for the Trade Union Act to have gone to the trouble of establishing separate penal provisions prescribing punishment equal to or lighter than the statutory punishment for the crime of obstruction of business. Accordingly, so long as workers who unite to passively refuse to provide labor in a strike or other industrial action do not resort to means such as assault, intimidation, or coercion, even if such conduct violates the aforementioned provisions of the Trade Union Act and thereby fails to satisfy the requirements of legitimacy as industrial action, the workers cannot be punished for the crime of obstruction of business under the Criminal Act on the ground of such industrial action; they may only be held liable to the employer for civil breach of obligation and punished for violation of the Trade Union Act, and this should suffice.
Finally, there is also considerable doubt as to whether the criteria proposed by the majority opinion for determining whether a simple strike constitutes "force"—namely, the circumstance that "the strike was carried out abruptly at a time the employer could not have anticipated, such that the employer was unable to respond thereto" and the circumstance that "this caused severe confusion or enormous damage to the employer"—are sufficiently clear to be presented as a reasonable interpretation of a penal statute.
The majority opinion's view that a simple strike cannot always be regarded as constituting "force" merely because it lacks legitimacy as industrial action, thereby somewhat limiting the interpretation of the concept of "force," represents a step forward compared to the position taken in previous precedents. However, even under the criteria proposed by the majority opinion for determining whether "force" is present, it is not necessarily clear what circumstances may be regarded as having occurred "abruptly," or to what extent a distinction can be drawn as to what constitutes "severe confusion" or "enormous damage." Accordingly, even following the majority opinion's interpretive approach, the general-clause character of the concept of "force" prescribed in Article 314(1) of the Criminal Act is not sufficiently resolved, and concerns regarding arbitrary application of the law inevitably remain in specific cases where the establishment of the crime of obstruction of business by force is at issue.
D. Propriety of applying the majority opinion's legal principles in this case
As noted above, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's interpretation of the concept of "force." Moreover, even applying the criteria proposed by the majority opinion for determining whether "force" is present to the facts of this case, it is difficult to find that the Defendant exercised force.
That is, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below, the following facts may be ascertained: In the mediation proceedings applied for by the Korean Railway Workers' Union on November 10, 2005, the Special Mediation Committee, judging that there was no possibility of successful mediation due to the significant gap between the positions of labor and management, terminated the mediation on November 25, 2005 without presenting a mediation proposal; when the Korean Railway Workers' Union submitted a written pledge to negotiate in good faith without engaging in a strike until December 16, 2005, the Committee issued a conditional recommendation for referral to arbitration, to the effect that "referral to arbitration is to be deferred, but if it becomes highly likely in the future that the union will resort to industrial action, it is recommended that the relevant workplace be referred to arbitration"; accordingly, the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission issued a decision to defer referral to arbitration; when the Korean Railway Workers' Union made a second pledge to engage in autonomous bargaining until January 31, 2006, the Chairperson again issued a decision to defer referral to arbitration; however, when there was little progress in bargaining between labor and management by January 31, 2006, the Korean Railway Workers' Union, on that same day, expressed the view that it could no longer promise to refrain from striking, and on February 7, 2006, the Strike Countermeasures Committee resolved to commence a general strike at approximately 01:00 on March 1, 2006, and gave advance notice thereof to Korea Railroad Corporation; and in these circumstances, when bargaining between labor and management finally broke down on February 28, 2006, the Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission only then issued the decision to refer the matter to arbitration at approximately 20:00 on February 28, 2006, five hours before the commencement of the strike.
[Reasoning]
In light of these facts, the Korean Railway Workers' Union made efforts toward voluntary bargaining prior to the strike and other industrial actions at issue in this case, including by filing an application for mediation; and although, under the principle established in Article 54 and related provisions of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (구 노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, "구 노조법"), a decision to refer a dispute to arbitration should, in the case of a public-interest business, be made within 30 days from the date of application for mediation, the National Labor Relations Commission instead issued a decision to withhold referral to arbitration—a kind of modified decision—so that the decision to refer the matter to compulsory arbitration was not made until around 20:00 on February 28, 2006, well over three months later. In particular, the Korean Railway Workers' Union had already, on January 31, 2006, prior to that, clearly indicated that it no longer intended to honor the commitment to refrain from striking that had formed the basis for the decision to withhold referral to arbitration, and on February 7, 2006, it resolved to commence a general strike at around 01:00 on March 1, 2006, and had given advance notice thereof to Korea Railroad Corporation. Nevertheless, when the decision to refer the matter to compulsory arbitration was issued only about five hours before the announced commencement of the general strike, the union proceeded with the strike as originally planned. Taking into account these circumstances surrounding and the course of progression of the strike at issue in this case, it must be said that Korea Railroad Corporation could fully have foreseen this strike, and therefore the strike at issue cannot be regarded as having been carried out abruptly at an unforeseeable time. If, in a case such as this, "suddenness" could be found to exist for the reasons given by the majority opinion, it would be difficult to conceive of virtually any case in which a failure to satisfy the requirements for legitimacy as an industrial action could be found not to involve suddenness, and thus the significance of the majority opinion's restrictive interpretation of the concept of "force" would be rendered largely meaningless.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the means employed in the strike at issue in this case amounted to nothing more than a collective, passive refusal by workers to provide labor, without any violent conduct or other conduct that could be characterized as unlawful, it is likewise difficult to conclude definitively that the damage caused by this strike was damage attributable to the suddenness of the strike.
Given the foregoing, even in light of the legal reasoning of the majority opinion, the strike led by the Defendant cannot be found to constitute "force" as provided in Article 314(1) of the Criminal Code (형법), i.e., a force sufficient to suppress or throw into confusion the free will of Korea Railroad Corporation with respect to the continuation of its business.
Accordingly, we cannot agree, for the reasons stated above as well, with the majority opinion, which affirms the lower court's determination that the offense of interference with business was established even with respect to this strike—a mere collective refusal to provide labor—by placing undue emphasis solely on the facts that the strike was conducted in violation of Article 63 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, "노조법"), which prohibits industrial action during arbitration, and that Korea Railroad Corporation suffered substantial damage as a result of the strike.
D. Conclusion
In light of the legal principles set forth above, the facts charged against the Defendant—to the effect that he led the strike at issue, which was carried out by members of the Korean Railway Workers' Union merely in the form of a refusal to provide labor—cannot be found to satisfy the elements of the offense of interference with business. Nevertheless, the lower court, proceeding from the opposite premise, found the Defendant guilty of the offense of interference with business; the lower court's judgment therefore contains an error of law, arising from a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the interpretation of Article 314(1) of the Criminal Code, that affected the outcome of the judgment. Accordingly, the lower court's judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the court below.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby set forth this dissenting opinion against the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Justice), Justice Yang Sung-tae, Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon (Justice in Charge), Justice Kim Neung-hwan, Justice Jeon Soo-an, Justice Ahn Dae-hee, Justice Cha Han-sung, Justice Yang Chang-soo, Justice Shin Young-chul, Justice Min Il-young, Justice Lee In-bok