[Plaintiff, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service
[Defendants, Appellants] Defendant 1 and 1 other (Attorneys of Law Firm Jungwon, Lee Ki-gwang and 1 other, Counsel for the defendants)
[Judgment Below] Daegu District Court Decision 2021Na311355 decided January 13, 2022
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against the Defendants is reversed. As to the part additionally accepted in the judgment below, the Plaintiff's corresponding appeal is entirely dismissed, and as to the part accepted in the first instance judgment, the corresponding part of the first instance judgment is revoked, and the Plaintiff's corresponding claim is entirely dismissed. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning] The grounds of final appeal are examined.
1. Outline of the case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted and examined by the court below, the following facts can be found.
A. Defendant 2 is an individual business operator engaged in the business of leasing construction machinery, and Defendant 1 is a worker employed by Defendant 2 who operated a 7-ton forklift owned by Defendant 2 (hereinafter referred to as “the forklift in this case”).
B. ○○ Comprehensive Construction Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Non-party 1 Company”) was subcontracted by the original contractor, △△△ Co., Ltd., for earthwork and structural work on Section 8-1 of the (road name omitted) expressway. In connection with the construction of the □□ Bridge (hereinafter referred to as “the construction work in this case”), Non-party 1 Company entered into a contract with Defendant 2 to lease the forklift in this case for rebar transport work, while also receiving the operating labor services of the worker employed by Defendant 2.
C. Defendant 1 performed rebar transport work at the site of the construction work in this case by operating the forklift in this case in accordance with the hand signals of Non-party 2 (hereinafter referred to as “the injured worker in this case”), a worker belonging to Non-party 1 Company. On February 27, 2017, at 13:45, while Defendant 1 was moving the forklift in this case loaded with three bundles of rebar and lowering the forks at the unloading site, the injured worker in this case approached below the forks to adjust the rebar spacer blocks. Although Defendant 1 stopped the operation of the forks, an accident occurred in which part of the bundle of rebar fell onto the head of the injured worker in this case (hereinafter referred to as “the accident in this case”).
D. The injured worker in this case sustained injuries, including cervical spinal cord injury, due to the accident in this case, and received treatment at Kyungpook National University Hospital and other institutions until around May 2020. The Plaintiff, the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service (hereinafter referred to as “the Service”), paid the injured worker in this case 267,889,990 won in medical care benefits and 135,425,960 won in temporary disability benefits as insurance benefits, and has been paying disability compensation pension (which, if converted into a lump-sum disability compensation payment, amounts to 233,552,722 won).
2. Issues in this case
A. Article 87(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Act No. 17326, before the amendment on May 26, 2020; hereinafter statute names are abbreviated as “Industrial Accident Insurance Act”), which was in effect at the time the accident in this case occurred, provides: “Where the Service has paid insurance benefits for an accident caused by the act of a third party, it shall be subrogated to the right to claim damages against the third party held by the person who received the benefits, within the limit of the amount of such benefits. Provided, That this shall not apply where two or more business owners who are insured persons carry out one business by dividing it at the same place, and an accident occurs due to the act of a worker of a business owner different from the injured worker.” [The current Industrial Accident Insurance Act Article 87(1), the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before the full amendment by Act No. 8694 on December 14, 2007) Article 58(1), and the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before the full amendment by Act No. 8373 on April 11, 2007) Article 54(1) contain the same content; hereinafter these are referred to collectively as Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act without distinction.]
The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting that the Defendants fall under the “third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and that the proviso of the same paragraph does not apply, and thus the Plaintiff is subrogated to the right to claim damages held by the injured worker in this case against the Defendants.
B. The issue in this case is whether, where the original contractor or subcontractor of construction work (including a re-subcontractor where subcontracting occurs multiple times; hereinafter referred to collectively with the original contractor as “the original contractor, etc.”) leases construction machinery and, in addition, enters into a contract to receive the operating labor services of the construction machinery from the lessor or the lessor’s worker (hereinafter referred to as “the construction machinery lessor, etc.”) (hereinafter referred to as “the construction machinery lease and operating labor service contract”), and the construction machinery lessor, etc., while operating the construction machinery at the construction site pursuant to such contract, causes an occupational accident to a worker of the original contractor, etc., the construction machinery lessor, etc. falls under the “third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
If the Defendants, who are the construction machinery lessor, etc., fall under the third party under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and the accident in this case does not fall under the case prescribed in the proviso of the same paragraph (hereinafter, when abbreviated, “the proviso in this case”), the Plaintiff may be subrogated to the right to claim damages held by the injured worker in this case against the Defendants.
3. Judgment on the issues
A. Existing legal principles
1) Regarding the meaning of “third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to mean a person who, together with the business owner who is the insured person, has no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker, and who bears liability for damages to the injured worker under tort liability or under the provisions of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Automobile Compensation Act”), the Civil Act, or the State Compensation Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da32910 decided April 10, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2021Da263748 decided August 19, 2022, etc.).
2) Under the above standard of judgment, the Supreme Court has held that a fellow worker employed by the same business owner (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da33691 decided December 24, 2004, etc.), a worker employed by the original contractor who is the business owner and a worker employed by the subcontractor (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da12408 decided July 28, 2011, etc.), and a subcontractor (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Da204666 decided May 26, 2016) do not fall under “third party” on the ground that they have, directly or indirectly, an industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker together with the business owner who is the insured person.
3) However, for the following reasons, in cases where a construction machinery lease and operating labor service contract has been concluded, the Supreme Court has affirmed the Service’s right of subrogation not only where, as in this case, a worker of the construction machinery lessor operated the construction machinery, but also where the construction machinery lessor personally provided the labor of operating the construction machinery (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da32910 decided April 10, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da44760 decided May 29, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da27093 decided May 15, 2008, etc.).
A) Where it is difficult to view the construction machinery lessor, etc. as having, in substance, provided labor in a subordinate relationship for the purpose of receiving wages, such that they cannot be regarded as a “worker” of the original contractor, etc., and where, considering the specific manner of use of the construction machinery, the method of payment of consideration, and other contractual terms, the legal relationship concerning the use of the construction machinery is essentially a lease rather than a subcontract, such that the lessor cannot be regarded as a “subcontractor” of the original contractor, etc. either, the construction machinery lessor, etc. has no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker belonging to the original contractor, etc., and thus falls under the third party under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
B) “One business” under the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act means that two or more business owners who are insured persons each carry out a business under Article 6 of the same Act, but do so for the completion of the same business (object) within the same place and the same risk zone; and “carry out by dividing” means that the business of one of the two or more business owners does not constitute part of the business of the other, and that each business is carried out separately without overlapping with each other. Since construction machinery work forms part of the business of the original contractor, it cannot be said that the construction machinery lessor carried out one business divided from that of the original contractor, and thus the proviso of Article 87(1) of the same Act does not apply either.
4) This existing judgment first grasped whether a person falls under the third party under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as a matter of the relationship of bearing industrial accident insurance premiums, in particular, as a matter of who bears the obligation to pay industrial accident insurance premiums for the perpetrator of the occupational accident. That is, where the perpetrator is a worker of the original contractor, etc., or where a subcontracting relationship is recognized, it was held that there is a “direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker” through the original contractor, who is the business owner bearing the insurance premiums under Article 9(1) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before the amendment by Act No. 7049 of December 31, 2003) or Article 9(1) of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (hereinafter referred to as “the Insurance Premium Collection Act”). However, since the construction machinery lessor, etc. is neither a worker of the original contractor nor a subcontractor, and thus the original contractor, who is the insured business owner, does not bear the insurance premiums for such lessor, it was held that there is no “direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker.”
B. New legal principles
1) Whether an accident is caused by “the act of a third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, or by “the act of a worker of a business owner different from the injured worker, where two or more business owners who are insured persons carry out one business by dividing it at the same place,” as stated in the proviso of the same paragraph, is a matter of determining against which of the persons who committed a tort, etc. against the injured worker (hereinafter referred to as “the perpetrator”) the Service may be subrogated to the injured worker’s right to claim damages—in other words, it is a matter of whether the Service bears the ultimate compensation liability to the injured worker within the limit of the amount of insurance benefits. Since the main text and the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act do not specifically explain the scope of “third party” or what it means to “carry out one business by dividing it,” the courts must reasonably interpret and apply these provisions by comprehensively considering the nature and purpose of the industrial accident insurance system, the legislative intent of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, its overall content and structure, the operation and financial burden of industrial accident insurance, and the concept of equity.
2) From this perspective, the scope of the exercise of the right of subrogation under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act should not be determined according to the relationship of bearing insurance premiums, but should be determined according to whether workers or labor providers have formed a common risk relationship regarding occupational accidents in the same business or workplace. That is, it is appropriate to grasp the scope of “third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) by focusing on whether they can be viewed as “sharing” the same “risk” inherent in the business or workplace. If they share such risk in this way, the perpetrator of the occupational accident and his or her employer do not fall under the third party against whom the Service, having paid insurance benefits, may be subrogated to the injured worker’s right to claim damages.
Specifically, even where the perpetrator is not a worker who has entered into an employment contract with the business owner of the injured worker (this includes not only cases where the perpetrator or the injured worker is a worker under the Labor Standards Act, but also cases where they are labor providers as defined in Article 91-15 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act; the same applies hereinafter) (this business owner includes, where the original contractor is the insured business owner under the main text of Article 9(1) of the Insurance Premium Collection Act, the subcontractor; the same applies hereinafter), if the occupational accident occurred while the perpetrator was performing the business owner’s work under the direction and supervision of the same business owner as the injured worker, it can be said that the perpetrator and the injured worker shared the risk inherent in the business or workplace. This is because the work performed by the perpetrator and the injured worker is incorporated into, and forms part of, the business carried out by the business owner who directed and supervised them.
The reason why the previous precedents excluded from “third party” a worker employed by the original contractor of a construction project, its subcontractor, or a worker employed by the subcontractor who worked at the same construction site can also be consistently explained under this legal principle. Furthermore, since an operator who provided labor for operating construction machinery at a construction site under the direction and supervision of the original contractor, etc. can also be said to have shared the risk with the injured worker, the relevant construction machinery lessor, etc. likewise does not fall under “third party.”
3) The detailed grounds for the new legal principle are set forth below.
A) The nature and purpose of the industrial accident insurance system
The industrial accident insurance system is one form of social insurance system that addresses, by means of insurance, the social risk of occupational accidents occurring to workers, using as its financial resources the insurance premiums paid by business owners who are insured persons and the burden borne by the national treasury (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2021Da241618 decided March 24, 2022; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2002Hunba52 decided November 25, 2004, etc.).
This nature of the industrial accident insurance system reflects the characteristics of occupational accidents, namely, that occupational accidents occur due to risks inherent in the business, beyond the personal carelessness of the worker. That is, the industrial accident insurance system, as a public insurance, considers the characteristics of occupational accidents occurring due to risks inherent in the business, and requires insurance benefits to be paid to the injured worker, who is the person entitled to benefits, regardless of whether the business owner such as the enterprise or the injured worker was at fault. The industrial accident insurance system does not transfer the risk inherent in the business to either the business owner or the worker, but rather has as its purpose that industry and society as a whole share the risk of occupational accidents and the costs thereof, thereby ultimately reducing conflict and costs in society as a whole and contributing to the stable development of industry and economic growth (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du3867 decided August 29, 2017).
Moreover, unlike health insurance, the industrial accident insurance system requires business owners to enroll in industrial accident insurance and pay premiums, thereby exempting them from liability for accident compensation under the Labor Standards Act. Beyond this, precedent has recognized, with respect to industrial accident insurance, a legal principle of special liability relationships peculiar to labor law that is not easily found in general liability insurance, by limiting the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation against fellow workers or subcontractors who do not bear the obligation to pay insurance premiums.
B) The legislative intent, overall content, and structure of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act
(1) Considering the above nature and purpose of the industrial accident insurance system together with the legislative intent of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the question of the extent to which the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation under the main text and the proviso of that paragraph should be allowed, and on the other hand, the question of to what extent the liability for compensation due to industrial accidents should be attributed to the Service, thereby exempting the perpetrator to that extent, cannot be fully discussed without considering the content and manner of the risk inherent in the business site, which is the essential cause of industrial accidents, and further, how that risk is shared and intersected by the workers who actually perform the work for the business purpose.
(A) The legislative intent of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is to secure the insurance finances by preventing the person entitled to receive insurance benefits from obtaining a double benefit by additionally receiving damages from the perpetrator, and by preventing the liable third party from evading liability for damages (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Du918 decided August 18, 2000). Accordingly, even where the perpetrator and the injured worker performed the work of the same business owner under that business owner’s direction and supervision, or performed work belonging to their respective businesses under the direction and supervision of two or more different business owners, if they thereby shared the risk inherent in the relevant business or workplace, it should be held that the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation against the perpetrator is not permitted with respect to the occupational accident that occurred as a result of the realization of that risk. This is because the perpetrator shared the risk together with the injured worker in the course of providing labor, and depending on how the risk manifested, the perpetrator himself or herself could also have suffered an occupational accident; thus, limiting the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation against such a perpetrator cannot be said to bring about the unjust result of a liable perpetrator evading liability for damages.
It is also consistent with the nature of industrial accident insurance as a social insurance system, as discussed above, that the cost of an occupational accident occurring as a result of the realization of such risk should be shared by industry and society as a whole, that is, that the Service should bear the ultimate compensation liability. To allow the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation on the formal ground that the units of insurance enrollment or insurance relationship differ, even though what has manifested is a risk inherent in the business or workplace, and thereby to attribute the entire liability for the occupational accident to the perpetrator who shared that risk together, would result in the unreasonable outsourcing of the risk inherent in the business or workplace.
(B) The existing precedent, in expanding the scope of the industrial accident insurance relationship to exclude fellow workers, subcontractors, etc. from “third party,” also based this on the ground that the wrongful act of a fellow perpetrator or a subcontractor is a single risk of the workplace, just like the risk of machinery, tools, etc. within the workplace, so that it is consistent with the social insurance or liability insurance nature of industrial accident insurance for the Service to bear the ultimate compensation liability, and that there is no reasonable ground to treat such cases differently from the wrongful act of the original contractor (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da12408 decided July 28, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da204666 decided May 26, 2016, etc.), which is to the same effect. Such judgment was not based solely on the relationship of bearing industrial accident insurance premiums.
(2) Considering the overall content and structure of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, it becomes even clearer that the scope of “third party” under the main text should be grasped not according to the industrial accident insurance relationship, but according to whether the perpetrator and the injured worker shared the risk inherent in the work of the relevant business or workplace.
(A) According to the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, even where the business owners differ, if they “carry out one business by dividing it at the same place,” and a worker of one business owner causes an occupational accident to a worker of another business owner, the Service may not be subrogated to the right to claim damages against the perpetrator worker and his or her business owner. Here, “one business” means that two or more business owners who are insured persons carry out a business at the same place, within the same risk zone, for the completion of the same object; on the other hand, even where two or more business owners who are insured persons carry out business at the same place, if the content of each business is not for the completion of the same object, this does not apply because the degree of risk differs between them (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da27684 decided April 11, 1997). That is, the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act determines whether the right of subrogation may be exercised according to whether the same risk is shared. This reflects the legislative intent that, even where the business owners differ and one business is divided and carried out separately, if it is evaluated that, in substance, the risk areas are identical—as would be the case if a single business owner carried out a single business—such that the risk is shared, it is appropriate that the Service ultimately bear the cost of the occupational accident that occurred as a result of the realization of such risk. Ultimately, the scope of the party against whom the right of subrogation may be exercised under the main text and the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act should be grasped in a unified manner, centering on whether the risk inherent in the work of the workplace is identical and shared, rather than on the industrial accident insurance relationship.
(B) The phrase “carry out by dividing” in the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act means that the business of one of the two or more business owners does not constitute part of the business of the other, and that each business is carried out separately without overlapping with each other; since the work performed by the construction machinery lessor, etc. forms part of the business of the original contractor, etc., it does not fall under carrying out one business by “dividing” it (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da32910 decided April 10, 2008, etc.).
However, with respect to the identical question of whether the right of subrogation may be exercised—that is, whether the Service bears the ultimate compensation liability for the occupational accident—it is unnecessarily dualistic, causes a regulatory gap unintended by the legislature, and is inequitable in that it discriminates against the construction machinery lessor, etc. without reasonable grounds, to apply, under the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the standard of “whether the same risk is shared” so as to limit the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation by treating a case where the business owners differ and the chain of direction and supervision is separated, and the business is divided and carried out, in the same manner as a case where one business is carried out, while under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, applying the standard of “whether there is a direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship” so as to hold that the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation is permitted even where the construction machinery lessor, etc. shares the same risk and, in substance, carries out one business together with the injured worker under the direction and supervision of the same original contractor, etc.
Rather, it is consistent with the overall content and structure of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act to hold, based on the single standard of whether the risk inherent in the business is identical and shared, that where a person performs joint work with the injured worker under the direction and supervision of the same business owner, i.e., the original contractor, etc., such person is excluded from “third party” under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and that where the business owners differ and the person is not under the direction and supervision of the same original contractor, etc., such person falls under “third party” but the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation is limited pursuant to the proviso thereof.
(C) Interpreting Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act in this manner is also consistent with the standard for interpreting “business or workplace” under Article 6 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. That is, “business or workplace” is a concept that serves as the unit of enrollment in and application of industrial accident insurance under Article 6 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, referring to an economic activity unit that is organically and singularly organized and continuously carried out based on a certain place. Whether a given case is to be regarded as one business or workplace should be determined by comprehensively considering whether each activity unit is separated in terms of location, whether the content of the economic activity is organically combined for the ultimate business purpose, and whether the risk of occupational accidents is shared, among other factors (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du5176 decided March 12, 2015). Considering this legal principle together with the nature and purpose of industrial accident insurance discussed above, it is appropriate to hold that activity units that share risk at the same place and are organically combined for the same business purpose belong to one business or workplace, at least in the context of applying Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. From this perspective, with respect to an occupational accident occurring within the bounds of a business that can be regarded as one business in this sense, it is a systematic and reasonable interpretation to hold that, where the relevant business is divided and carried out by two or more business owners, the proviso applies, and where it is not so divided, the person is excluded from “third party” under the main text, thereby limiting the Service’s exercise of the right of subrogation.
C) The financial burden of industrial accident insurance, the relationship of paying insurance premiums, etc.
(1) Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act also includes the intent of securing the Service’s insurance finances, and expanding the scope of parties against whom the Service may be subrogated to the injured worker’s right to claim damages may help the insurance finances. However, the burden of industrial accident insurance premiums is a matter of policy and legislative decision as to how to raise the financial resources of social insurance (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2021Da241618 decided March 24, 2022), and this is not in a preliminary relationship determining the scope of the Service’s assumption of risk or exercise of the right of subrogation.
(2) Indeed, after this accident occurred, Article 125, Item 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산재보험법, hereinafter "Industrial Accident Insurance Act") was amended by Presidential Decree No. 29354 on December 11, 2018, expanding the scope of "specially employed workers" related to construction machinery from "a person who owns a concrete mixer truck registered under Article 3(1) of the Construction Machinery Management Act (건설기계관리법) and personally operates that concrete mixer truck" to "a person who personally operates construction machinery registered under Article 3(1) of the Construction Machinery Management Act." In addition, when the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was amended by Act No. 18928 on June 10, 2022, the "labor provider" system was newly established under Article 91-15 as a concept encompassing the "specially employed worker" system, and "a person who personally operates construction machinery registered under Article 3(1) of the Construction Machinery Management Act" falls under this category (Article 83-5, Item 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act). Specially employed workers and labor providers are deemed "workers" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act [Article 125(2) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before amendment by Act No. 18928 on June 10, 2022) and Article 91-16(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act], and in the construction industry, pursuant to the main text of Article 48-6(6) and Article 9(1) of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Insurance (고용산재보험료징수법, hereinafter "Insurance Premium Collection Act"), the principal contractor came to bear one-half of the industrial accident insurance premiums for these persons. This reflects a change in the insurance premium burden relationship pursuant to statute, based on the policy determination that there is a need to protect "a person who personally operates construction machinery registered under Article 3(1) of the Construction Machinery Management Act" from occupational accidents. As such, who bears industrial accident insurance premiums and how much is a matter that can be adjusted according to policy and legislative decisions concerning the operation of industrial accident insurance, which is on a different plane of discussion from the question of how the risks inherent in industrial sites should ultimately be allocated.
(3) The fact that the practice concerning construction machinery lessors, etc. had already changed before the above amendment to the industrial accident insurance-related statutes can be understood in the same context. On January 12, 2018, the Minister of Employment and Labor issued a work directive to the Corporation to the effect that "even if a construction machinery operator is used at a construction site under the form of a lease agreement, this constitutes a subcontract, and thus, pursuant to the main text of Article 9(1) of the Insurance Premium Collection Act, the obligation to obtain insurance and pay premiums is imposed on the principal contractor." This work directive appears to have reorganized the practice, based on the recognition that it would be inappropriate to treat construction machinery lessors, etc. as third parties and thereby permit the Corporation's subrogation of claims for damages, so that in cases where a subcontractor leases construction machinery and also receives driving labor services from a driver employed by the lessor, such cases would be treated in a manner analogous to a subcontract, with the principal contractor bearing the entire industrial accident insurance premium for the driver, which had previously been collected from the construction machinery lessor. This also serves as evidence that the issue of insurance premium burden under industrial accident insurance may be adjusted as a matter of policy, taking into account the nature and purpose of the industrial accident insurance system.
(4) A principal contractor of a construction project, etc., even without entering into a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement, may carry out the construction machinery work necessary for the subcontracted construction through methods such as re-subcontracting a portion of the construction, including construction machinery work, or purchasing or leasing construction machinery and having its own employees operate it.
However, the fact that the content and form of the contracts involved in each of the above cases differ somewhat does not give rise to any meaningful difference in the manner in which the construction project proceeds, or in the type and degree of accident risk within the construction site. In particular, from the perspective of the principal contractor, who, pursuant to the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects under Article 9(1) of the Insurance Premium Collection Act, in principle bears the obligation as the business owner to obtain insurance and pay premiums for the entire construction project, this is generally nothing more than a difference in the specific method of work that the subcontractor may choose in the course of performing the subcontract. Moreover, where a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement is concluded, the degree of direction and command exercised by the principal contractor, etc. over the driver can be seen as lying between the case where the principal contractor, etc. leases construction machinery and has its own employees operate it, and the case where a portion of the construction including construction machinery work is subcontracted. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept as a conclusion having concrete reasonableness the view that only in the case of a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement can the Corporation exercise its right of subrogation, on the ground that there is no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship between the construction machinery lessor, etc. and the injured worker.
(D) Relationship with Liability Insurance
Meanwhile, even under the above view, this does not mean that an insurance company that has entered into a liability insurance contract with the construction machinery lessor regarding the construction machinery is also exempted from liability. This is because the right of direct claim against the liability insurer, which is recognized to the victim under Article 10(1) of the Act on Guarantee of Compensation for Loss Caused by Automobile Accidents (자동차손해배상 보장법, "Automobile Damage Compensation Act") and Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act (상법), is a right to claim damages that the victim holds against the liability insurer, and is a separate right from the right to claim damages against the tortfeasor. Accordingly, a liability insurer who bears direct liability for damages to the victim under Article 10(1) of the Automobile Damage Compensation Act and Article 724(2) of the Commercial Act falls within the scope of "third party," regardless of whether the perpetrator of the occupational accident constitutes a "third party" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da60793, decided January 25, 2007).
4. Change of Precedent
Contrary to the above, in cases including where a construction machinery lessor and a driver caused an occupational accident to a subcontractor's employee while working at a construction site, insofar as the tortfeasor worked under the direct or indirect direction and command of the same business owner as the injured worker or of that business owner's subcontractor, thereby sharing the risk inherent in the business's operations, and that risk materialized resulting in the accident, but nevertheless there was no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker such that the tortfeasor constituted a "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and the proviso of the same paragraph also did not apply, such that the Corporation, having paid insurance benefits to the injured worker, could exercise the injured worker's right to claim damages by subrogation within the limit of the amount of such benefits — Supreme Court Decision 2006Da32910, decided April 10, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 2006Da27093, decided May 15, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 2006Da44760, decided May 29, 2008, and other Supreme Court decisions to the same effect, are all hereby overruled to the extent they conflict with the views expressed in this decision.
5. Determination on This Case
A. Examining this case in light of the new legal doctrine.
This accident occurred as follows: Nonparty 1 Company entered into a construction machinery (forklift) lease and driving labor provision agreement with Defendant 2, and Defendant 1, who was employed by Defendant 2, operated the forklift at issue at the construction site in question under the direction and command of Nonparty 1 Company pursuant to the above agreement, and while jointly performing rebar-carrying work together with the injured worker in this case, the negligence of Defendant 1, Nonparty 1 Company, and the injured worker in this case concurred, resulting in the accident. Considering the course of this accident as described above, it is sufficient to find that, at the time of the accident, Defendant 1, the tortfeasor, worked under the direction and command of Nonparty 1 Company, the subcontractor, jointly with the injured worker at the site of this accident, thereby sharing the risk inherent in the workplace while performing the work, and that such risk materialized, resulting in this accident.
B. Accordingly, since the Defendants do not constitute "third parties" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act with respect to this accident, the Plaintiff cannot exercise, by subrogation, the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants. Nevertheless, the lower court's determination that the Plaintiff could exercise the right of indemnity against the Defendants pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act contains an error that misapprehends the legal doctrine concerning "third party" under the main text of the same paragraph and the industrial accident insurance relationship, thereby affecting the judgment, and the Defendants' grounds of appeal pointing this out are well-founded.
6. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the lower judgment against the Defendants is reversed, and since this Court finds it sufficient to render judgment directly on this portion, this Court renders its own judgment pursuant to Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법). As to the portion additionally granted by the lower court, the Plaintiff's corresponding appeal is entirely dismissed; as to the portion granted by the first instance court, the corresponding part of the first instance judgment is revoked, and the Plaintiff's corresponding claim is entirely dismissed; and the total costs of the litigation shall be borne by the Plaintiff. The judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order.
The Justices who participated in this decision were unanimous in their opinion except for the separate opinion of Justice Oh Seok-jun and Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, and there is a supplementary opinion of Justice Roh Tae-ak concerning the majority opinion.
7. Separate Opinion of Justice Oh Seok-jun and Justice Seo Kyung-hwan
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
We agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that, in this case, the Plaintiff, the Corporation, cannot exercise, by subrogation, the injured worker's right to claim damages against the Defendants, who are on the side of the tortfeasor.
However, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's reasoning that the scope of persons against whom the right of subrogation under the main text and proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act may be exercised should be determined by a new standard of "whether the risk inherent in the business or workplace was shared and materialized." The legal doctrine of the prior precedent, which defined "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as "a person who has no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured worker, together with the business owner who is the insured," is not only reasonable but also systematically sound, and should therefore be maintained as is.
Where, as in this case, a principal contractor of a construction project, etc. enters into a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement, having the construction machinery lessor, etc. operate the construction machinery to perform a certain portion of the relevant construction project, there is no compelling reason to treat this differently from a "subcontract" in terms of the operation of industrial accident insurance. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply, by analogy, the main text of Article 9(1) of the Insurance Premium Collection Act (hereinafter the "blanket application provision for subcontracted projects"), which provides for the blanket application of insurance administration in subcontracted projects, to construction machinery lessors, etc. (However, pursuant to Article 91-15, Item 1 and Article 91-16 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and Article 83-5, Item 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects applies directly, without analogy, to a labor provider who, in the capacity of lessor, personally operates construction machinery. In such a case, pursuant to Article 48-6(6), etc. of the Insurance Premium Collection Act, the principal contractor and the labor provider each bear one-half of the industrial accident insurance premium. The following discussion is limited to construction machinery lessors, etc. excluding such cases.)
Accordingly, the principal contractor must bear the industrial accident insurance premium for the construction machinery work, and a direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship is formed between the employees of the principal contractor, etc. and the construction machinery lessor, etc. As a consequence, where an employee of the principal contractor, etc. suffers an occupational accident due to the fault of the construction machinery lessor, etc. during the operation of the construction machinery, the construction machinery lessor, etc. does not constitute a "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and the Corporation, even if it pays insurance benefits to the injured worker, cannot subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages.
B. The specific reasons why the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects should be applied by analogy to construction machinery lessors, etc. are as follows.
1) A construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement, in that the construction machinery lessor uses its own manpower and equipment to perform construction machinery work in accordance with the requests of the principal contractor, etc., may be seen as a type of non-typical contract that has the character of a lease agreement while also clearly possessing elements of a subcontract. This holds true even considering that, unlike an ordinary subcontract, the content of the work to be completed is not specified in advance, or that the period of use of the construction machinery is specified and the consideration for use is paid according to that period of use — that is, considering the aspect that the primary purpose of the contract is the use of the construction machinery rather than the completion of the work. A construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement is not fundamentally very different from "cases where construction business is carried out through subcontracting," which the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects contemplates.
2) The blanket application provision for subcontracted projects and Article 7(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Insurance Premium Collection Act enacted pursuant to its delegation provide that, where "construction business" is carried out through multiple subcontracts, in principle, the "principal contractor" is deemed the business owner, and two or more businesses are treated as a unit for the collective processing of insurance administration. Through this, the principal contractor, who carries out the construction project through subcontracting, bears the obligation to pay industrial accident insurance premiums even for employees hired by the subcontractor. This provision is not merely intended to promote procedural convenience in insurance administration, but has a greater significance in securing the effectiveness of industrial accident insurance to more thoroughly protect workers. That is, this provision has its purpose in establishing a basis for securing premiums from the principal contractor, who generally has better ability to pay premiums than the financially small-scale subcontractor, thereby enabling prompt and fair compensation when employees hired by a financially small-scale subcontractor suffer occupational accidents, and also functions to appropriately limit the burden of damages resulting from occupational accidents caused by such employees (see Supreme Court Decision 99Du11011, decided February 25, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da204666, decided May 26, 2016).
Considering the purpose and function of the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects as described above, there is a great need to apply this provision also to construction machinery lessors, etc. who perform construction machinery work at the site pursuant to a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement with the principal contractor, etc. Construction machinery lessors, etc. are generally financially smaller-scale than the principal contractor, etc. and are directly exposed to the risks of the construction site, while also, in that they may themselves cause risks of occupational accidents to other employees at the site, are no different from subcontractors or their employees. Moreover, as noted above, since the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects applies directly, not by analogy, to a lessor who is also a labor provider, there is no substantive reason to treat this case differently from that one.
3) The practice regarding the collection of industrial accident insurance premiums in cases where the principal contractor, etc. entered into a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement has also changed to reflect the substance of the work performed. Even before the amendment of the industrial accident insurance-related statutes concerning the labor provider system, etc., the Minister of Employment and Labor, on January 12, 2018, had already issued a work directive to the Corporation to the effect that "even if a construction machinery operator is used at a construction site under the form of a lease agreement, this constitutes a subcontract, and thus, pursuant to the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects, the obligation to obtain insurance and pay premiums is imposed on the principal contractor." Applying the blanket application provision for subcontracted projects by analogy to construction machinery lessors, etc. is also consistent with this practice of the Ministry of Employment and Labor.
C. In resolving the issue of the exercise of the right of subrogation with respect to occupational accidents occurring during the performance of construction machinery work based on a construction machinery lease and driving labor provision agreement, the majority opinion abandons the established legal doctrine of determining whether a party is a "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act based on "whether there is a direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship between the tortfeasor and the injured worker," and instead seeks to redefine the concept of "third party" by introducing the standard of "risk sharing." However, the new legal doctrine proposed by the majority opinion is not only systematically unsound but also entails little necessity for such a change in doctrine. We examine this in more detail below.
1) The Corporation's exercise of the right of subrogation under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is, in its basic nature and structure, the same as an insurer's subrogation against a third party in property insurance (Article 682(1) of the Commercial Act). Therefore, even considering that industrial accident insurance has a social insurance character, it is unnatural to determine whether a party is a "third party" against whom subrogation may be exercised by relying on the standard of "risk sharing," which is unrelated to the existence of an "insurance relationship." The question of the extent to which the Corporation, as insurer, should be permitted to subrogate the injured worker's right to claim damages is the question of who should ultimately bear the economic risk arising from the "insured event" of an industrial accident, and this is not a matter that can be determined entirely apart from the insurance relationship, which encompasses the relationship of premium payment. If the insurance group mediated and formed by the "industrial accident insurance relationship" is different, then persons inside that group and persons outside it should, in principle, be treated differently.
In the case of National Health Insurance, which, like industrial accident insurance, has a social insurance character, the third party against whom the National Health Insurance Service may exercise subrogation is likewise "a person other than the insured victim receiving insurance benefits or a person who has a health insurance relationship with that victim" (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da1878, decided August 20, 2004), such that whether subrogation is permitted is determined according to the existence of an insurance relationship. The prior precedent, which determines the scope of the insurer's exercise of the right of subrogation according to the existence of an insurance relationship, is also sound from the perspective of legal systematization.
2) The standard of "risk sharing" proposed by the majority opinion has considerable aspects of unclarity as a standard for determining whether the Corporation should, as a practical matter, seek indemnity against the person who caused the insured event.
Of course, the majority opinion, in applying the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, somewhat concretizes this standard, holding that if the tortfeasor causes an occupational accident while performing the work of the same business owner as the injured worker under that business owner's "direction and command," then the tortfeasor and the injured worker have shared the risk inherent in the relevant business or workplace, and thus are not third parties to each other. However, whether the user business owner exercises "substantial direction and command, such as directly or indirectly giving binding instructions concerning the performance of the work itself," is one factor in determining a worker dispatch relationship (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da106436, decided February 26, 2015), and considering that numerous disputes arise over whether a worker dispatch relationship exists due to the legal unclarity of the concept of "direction and command," the unclarity of this standard itself is highly likely to undermine predictability in the Corporation's insurance administration practice.
While the concept of "risk sharing" should certainly be sufficiently considered as a theoretical foundation or legal and institutional basis in determining the scope of third parties subject to indemnity, greater caution should be exercised before elevating it, in resolving the practical issue of determining the scope of the Corporation's right of subrogation, to the level of a direct and universal standard comparable to a statutory provision.
3) Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act adopts a regulatory approach whereby the main text designates "persons who are not third parties" as subjects of exemption in principle, while the proviso expands the scope of exemption to "cases where two or more business owners, who are insured, divide and each carry out a single business at the same location." This means that, where no indirect industrial accident insurance relationship is formed between the tortfeasor and the injured worker centered on the business owner to which the injured worker belongs, the Corporation is permitted to subrogate the injured worker, but in a limited number of exceptional cases where it can be said that risk was shared between the tortfeasor and the injured worker, the Corporation's right of subrogation is partially restricted, with the additional requirement that the respective business owners of both the tortfeasor and the injured worker must all be insured. In other words, reducing the scope of the Corporation's right of subrogation merely on the ground of risk sharing, in a situation where no industrial accident insurance relationship centered on the injured worker's business owner exists in the first place, is not what Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act originally contemplates.
4) Since the majority opinion severs the issue of the Corporation's subrogation from the industrial accident insurance relationship, it determines whether the Corporation may subrogate without regard to whether the tortfeasor's business owner is enrolled in industrial accident insurance. Even looking at the case at hand, Article 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 28506 on December 26, 2017) designated construction machinery leasing businesses with fewer than one regular employee as excluded businesses, and since this accident occurred on February 27, 2017, the above former Enforcement Decree provision applies; however, there is insufficient evidence in the record to find that Defendant 2, the construction machinery lessor, was enrolled in industrial accident insurance. Nevertheless, the majority opinion does not permit the Plaintiff's subrogation on the ground that Defendant 1, the construction machinery driver, performed the work while sharing risk with the injured worker in this case.
However, if the reasoning of the majority opinion is applied consistently, then where an employee of the principal contractor, etc. causes harm to a construction machinery lessor, etc. who is not enrolled in industrial accident insurance, the Corporation would not even pay insurance benefits to the victim in the first place, whereas where a construction machinery lessor, etc. causes harm to an employee of the principal contractor, etc., the Corporation would be unable to exercise the right of subrogation after paying insurance benefits. Such an imbalance arising in the course of insurance administration is also inconsistent with the direction of "unified" operation of industrial accident insurance that the majority opinion emphasizes.
5) The issue of broadening the scope of recognition of occupational accidents themselves, in order to protect workers and promote their welfare, and the issue of narrowing the scope of the Corporation's subrogation against those who caused occupational accidents, are separate matters, and there is no necessity to discuss both on the same plane and align them. The latter concerns the question of whether the economic burden arising from insurance benefits should ultimately be borne by the Corporation, which is a matter that falls within the area that can be adjusted through the legislative establishment of the industrial accident insurance relationship. Since the legislative purpose of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act also includes the purpose of securing insurance finances funded by premiums paid by business owners together with government subsidies (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2021Da241618, decided March 24, 2022), reducing the Corporation's scope of subrogation as much as possible is not necessarily the best solution in all respects.
It appears that underlying the majority opinion is the awareness that it would be appropriate not to permit the Corporation's subrogation even in broader cases such as worker dispatch, or construction machinery leasing in non-construction industries. However, the resolution of such cases can be substantially addressed and supplemented through existing statutes and systems, such as the employer's liability under the Civil Act (민법), commercial vehicle insurance, fire insurance, and various other insurance systems, and resolution through such systems may in fact be more appropriate and desirable. Nevertheless, the majority opinion's approach of interpreting the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act in a manner that goes beyond the text and structure of the statute, in order to resolve such cases all at once and in advance, is premature. Furthermore, as noted above, the question of "to what extent the Corporation's exercise of the right of subrogation should be permitted" is an area in which legislative discretion is recognized, and attempting to revise the legal doctrine of the prior precedent by anticipating cases such as worker dispatch or construction machinery leasing in non-construction industries, which are not even at issue in this case, is in some respects inconsistent with the essential nature of the judiciary, whose purpose is to provide relief of rights in the specific case at hand.
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, while we agree with the majority opinion's conclusion in this case, our reasoning differs, and we thus set forth this separate opinion accordingly.
8. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Roh Tae-ak Concerning the Majority Opinion
I wish to supplement the majority opinion regarding the soundness of the new legal doctrine on the meaning of "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the interpretation and application of the proviso at issue in this case, and to point out certain aspects concerning the logical consistency and limitations of the separate opinion.
A. Regarding the Meaning of "Third Party" under the Main Text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act
1) The previous precedent defined "one business" under the proviso of this case as "two or more business owners who are insured persons each conducting the same business, but doing so within the same place and the same risk zone for the completion of the same business (subject matter)," and in applying the proviso of this case, developed an interpretive theory focusing on whether workers had already formed a "shared risk relationship concerning occupational accidents" in the course of actually providing labor at industrial sites. Although the expression "risk" is not explicitly mentioned in the text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, hereinafter the "Industrial Accident Insurance Act"), this properly grasped the scope of application of the above provision in light of its legislative purpose and the nature of industrial accidents.
Nevertheless, in interpreting and applying the term "third party" in the main text of the same paragraph, the previous precedent excluded the element of "risk," which the industrial accident insurance system naturally presupposes as described above, and instead judged purely on the basis of the "insurance premium bearing relationship," thereby bifurcating the standards of judgment for the main text and the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. Although the precedent somewhat expanded the meaning of the insurance premium bearing relationship into the question of "whether the business owner who paid the premium is the same," and held that an "indirect" insurance relationship is recognized not only where the business owner who bore the premium himself caused harm to his own employee, but also between fellow employees, and—where the original contractor bears the premium in a lump sum—between an employee employed by the original contractor and an employee employed by a subcontractor, and between subcontractors, such a bifurcation of the standard of judgment does not, in itself, precisely accord with the purpose and nature of the industrial accident insurance system. Moreover, in a case such as this one, where a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor is at issue, it also produces results contrary to equity. Considering all these circumstances together, the need to correct the meaning of "third party" in the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is as the Majority Opinion has demonstrated in detail. According to the Majority Opinion, the cases that the previous precedent resolved by positing an indirect insurance relationship, as well as cases involving contracts for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor, can be resolved under the unified standard of "whether the same risk inherent in the business or workplace was shared."
2) However, in a case such as this one, where an accident occurred in connection with a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor, as pointed out in the Separate Opinion, the same conclusion as the Majority Opinion could be reached merely by applying by analogy the provision on the lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses under the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (고용보험 및 산업재해보상보험의 보험료징수 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Insurance Premium Collection Act"). Accordingly, a question may be raised as to whether it is truly necessary to change the previous standard of judgment—namely, the existence of a direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship—regarding the meaning of "third party" in the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
However, where a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor has been concluded, the driver employed by the lessor provides driving labor during the lease period in accordance with the direction and command of the business owner who is the lessee, thereby temporarily taking on an appearance similar to "employment" or "worker dispatch." Since the primary purpose of the contract is the use of the construction machinery rather than the completion of a specific task, and the provision of driving labor is merely an ancillary part of the contract, constituting what may be called "labor subcontracting," it is clearly distinct from a "subcontract" under the Civil Act. Nevertheless, treating a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor in the same manner as a subcontract for a specific part or process of a construction project, and applying by analogy the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses, is unreasonable. Moreover, the logic of the Separate Opinion first reaches the conclusion that it would be harsh to allow the Corporation to exercise its right of subrogation against the lessor of construction machinery, etc., and then seeks a specific solution to fit that conclusion, which is also awkward from the standpoint of legal-theoretical consistency.
The method of applying by analogy the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses also shows difficulties in cases where a business owner in a "non-construction industry" has concluded a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor. In a case such as this one, where a business owner engaged in construction business has concluded such a contract, it may be regarded as similar to subcontracting part of the relevant construction business, and thus the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses may be applied by analogy; however, it seems difficult to apply the said provision by analogy even to a case where, for example, a business owner engaged in "manufacturing" has concluded such a contract. Furthermore, according to the Separate Opinion, since the previous precedent's standard for judging "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act—based on the existence of a direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship—remains unchanged, as long as the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses is applied by analogy, the business owner who is the lessee of the construction machinery must bear the insurance premium for the driver. It is difficult to view this differently even where a business owner in a non-construction industry has concluded a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor, as long as the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses is applied by analogy. However, with the enactment of the Insurance Premium Collection Act and its Enforcement Decree, the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses no longer applies to non-construction industries, which would bring about the unusual result that, uniquely with respect to construction machinery drivers, a business owner in a non-construction industry who does not employ the driver would have to pay the industrial accident insurance premium.
3) Furthermore, the approach of the Separate Opinion cannot resolve cases such as an accident occurring between an employee of the user company and a dispatched worker under a worker dispatch relationship, or a case in which an individual business operator who does not fall under the category of "worker" under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or "labor provider" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and its subordinate statutes concludes a labor provision contract with a business owner and, in the course of providing labor, an accident occurs between such person and another employee employed by the business owner. This is because there is no room to apply by analogy the provision on lump-sum application to subcontracted businesses in these cases.
a) In a worker dispatch relationship, dispatched workers maintain an employment relationship with the dispatching business owner while, in accordance with the terms of the worker dispatch contract, receiving the direction and command of the user business owner and engaging in labor for the benefit of the user business owner (Article 2, Item 1 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers [파견근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률], hereinafter the "Dispatched Workers Act"). Thus, dispatched workers are incorporated into the business of the user business owner and perform their duties together with the employees of the user business owner under a shared risk relationship concerning occupational accidents, but they have no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with such employees. In other words, according to the previous precedent, dispatched workers and employees of the user business owner are mutually "third parties" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. Furthermore, since the dispatching business owner merely conducts a worker dispatch business (Article 2, Item 3 of the Dispatched Workers Act) and cannot be regarded as dividing and separately conducting a single target business together with the user business owner, and since the work performed by the dispatched worker forms part of the business of the user business owner, the proviso of this case also does not apply.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has affirmed the application of the proviso of this case in cases where a company undertaking factory construction works separately subcontracted the transport and unloading of materials and machinery on the one hand and the manufacture and installation of a boiler on the other (Supreme Court Decision 94Da29225, decided October 11, 1994), and where a project operator undertaking construction of a single project district, in consideration of local conditions and convenience of construction, divided the work into several sections and subcontracted them, with each section separated only by walls (Supreme Court Decision 2001Da25788, decided June 29, 2001). However, compared to these cases of divided subcontracting, dispatched workers and employees of the user business owner are even more organically connected and combined, and directly cooperate with and support one another, sometimes performing joint work together. Nevertheless, treating them as mutual "third parties" and thereby allowing the Corporation to exercise its right of subrogation results in discriminating, without any proper basis, between the dispatching business owner and the user business owner and their respective employees.
The limitations of the previous legal theory become clearer in a case where, rather than an employee of the user business owner suffering harm, such an employee is placed in the position of the tortfeasor. This is because, even where the same accident occurs while the employee is performing his ordinary duties in accordance with the direction and command of the user business owner, the ultimate scope of the damages liability borne by the employee of the user business owner may vary entirely due to the incidental circumstance of the presence of dispatched workers. For example, suppose a fire occurs due to the negligent operation of machinery by a tortfeasor-employee of the user business owner at a factory operated by a user business owner engaged in manufacturing, and both other employees of the user business owner and dispatched workers working there together suffer harm. The tortfeasor-employee had performed the same work even before the dispatch of the dispatched workers, and, if anything, after their dispatch, worked while bearing the additional risk of being harmed by the dispatched workers; yet, as the Corporation subrogates the right to claim damages of the dispatched workers among the injured employees, the tortfeasor-employee is exposed to a liability for damages that he could not have foreseen or prepared for. This is a result contrary to equity.
b) A gap in protection for individual business operators may also become an issue. Where the question of whether a person falls under "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is judged on the basis of the insurance premium bearing relationship, an individual business operator who does not fall under the category of "worker" under the Labor Standards Act would, even while working under the same risk relationship in the same manner, find that whether he must ultimately bear the damages liability accompanying the provision of labor differs depending on changes in the statutes or policies concerning the bearing of insurance premiums—that is, depending on "who" pays the premium for him.
It is true that the industrial accident insurance-related statutes have, through numerous amendments, continuously expanded the scope of persons in special types of employment or labor providers, and that as a result, the problem of protecting such persons has been substantially improved. However, such legislative responses reflect, in a follow-up manner, changes in labor provision relationships and methods in modern society, adjusting the scope of compulsory coverage under industrial accident insurance and the specific method of premium collection. Meanwhile, the setting of the scope of "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is a matter of a different dimension, namely, the question of whether the cost of an industrial accident should ultimately be borne by the Corporation, which operates the insurance business, or by an outside third party. Amid the continued emergence of new types of labor provision arrangements that cannot be classified under traditional legal theory, including the spread of platform labor, the Majority Opinion's problem consciousness begins from the recognition that, in order for the institutional protective function of industrial accident insurance to be fully realized, these two issues must be addressed together. Assuming, contrary to the trend thus far, a situation in which the scope of labor providers were instead to be reduced, thereby narrowing the insurance premium bearing relationship, it would be difficult to regard it as reasonable, due to a failure to distinguish between these two issues, to expand once again the scope of the Corporation's exercise of the right of subrogation without considering the "substance of the labor provision."
4) Furthermore, according to the Separate Opinion, the Majority Opinion's decoupling of the issue of the Corporation's subrogation from the industrial accident insurance relationship results in determining whether the Corporation may exercise subrogation without regard to whether the business owner employing the tortfeasor is enrolled in industrial accident insurance, which is unjust. However, this issue appears to be a subsidiary one that can be resolved through the improvement of the industrial accident insurance system and policy. In fact, Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which enumerates businesses excluded from the application of industrial accident insurance pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Insurance Premium Collection Act and Article 6 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, previously excluded businesses in certain fields with fewer than one regularly employed worker from compulsory coverage under industrial accident insurance (Item 5); however, upon amendment by Presidential Decree No. 28506 on December 26, 2017, this exclusion provision was deleted in order to strengthen the social safety net for small-scale workplaces, and as a result, all businesses employing workers, including construction machinery leasing businesses, in principle became businesses compulsorily covered by industrial accident insurance.
The Majority Opinion's purport is that, without being bound by the form of the contract concluded between the parties to the labor relationship or by the insurance premium payment relationship, and giving consideration instead to the nature of the industrial accident insurance system and the substance of labor provision occurring at industrial sites, it is proper not to regard as a "third party" a tortfeasor who shared the risk concerning occupational accidents by performing the business of the same business owner under whose direction and command the injured employee also worked. Nevertheless, this criticism raised in the Separate Opinion, which clings to the form of the insurance relationship irrespective of the risk actually borne by the tortfeasor and the injured employee in the course of performing their work, cannot ultimately be regarded as a meaningful criticism of the Majority Opinion.
5) In order to resolve the gap in regulation arising from the previous precedent's bifurcation of the standards of judgment for the main text and the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, one might also consider a method of maintaining the previous standard for judging "third party" under the main text based on the industrial accident insurance relationship, while merely expanding the scope of application of the proviso. Taking as an example a case where an accident occurs in connection with a contract for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor, this would be a method whereby the lessor of the construction machinery, etc., is deemed to fall under the category of "third party" because there is no direct or indirect industrial accident insurance relationship with the injured employee, but, contrary to the view of the previous precedent, the proviso of this case is applied so as not to allow the Corporation to exercise its right of subrogation.
However, this is an interpretation that exceeds the limits of textual interpretation. This is because, in the cases discussed above involving contracts for the lease of construction machinery and the provision of driving labor, as well as cases of worker dispatch, it cannot be said that two or more business owners "divide and separately conduct" a single business. It cannot be said that the construction business of the lessee of the construction machinery and the construction machinery leasing business of the lessor constitute a division of a single business conducted separately, and the part in which the driver employed by the lessor performs construction machinery work at the construction site under the direction and command of the lessee merely forms part of the construction business, and it is difficult to regard this as a case where the lessor and the lessee divide and separately conduct a single business.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the proviso of this case applies only where two or more business owners divide and separately conduct a single business. That is, where an occupational accident occurs in the course of an individual business operator, who does not fall under the category of "labor provider" under the industrial accident insurance-related statutes, providing labor to a business owner without having enrolled in insurance as a small or medium enterprise business owner, the above proviso cannot apply. The problem of protection for individual business operators, to whom the proviso has no room to apply from the outset, cannot be resolved merely by expanding the scope of application of the proviso.
6) Considering all of the foregoing circumstances, the reasoning of the Majority Opinion, which seeks to re-establish the standard for judging "third party" under the main text of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, is valid.
B. Concerning the Interpretation and Application of the Proviso of This Case
1) From the standpoint of the Majority Opinion, which determines the scope of the Corporation's exercise of the right of subrogation according to the single standard of "whether the risk inherent in the business or workplace was shared and manifested," there is a great need to clarify the meaning of "risk" concerning occupational accidents.
2) As noted above, the precedent has, from early on, interpreted "one business" as used in the proviso of this case as meaning "two or more business owners who are insured persons each conducting the same business, but doing so within the same place and the same risk zone for the completion of the same business (subject matter)," and, in judging the issue of the Corporation's right of subrogation, has considered whether the work was performed within the "same risk zone." Although whether a case falls within the "same risk zone" is a matter that must be individually determined for each specific case based on the parties' assertions and evidence, it does not appear that a sufficient body of precedent specifying this standard has yet accumulated.
Meanwhile, the Corporation, which operates the insurance business, appears to have sought concrete reasonableness in the actual operation of industrial accident insurance in its own way, including by establishing operational guidelines that apply the proviso of this case relatively broadly in two-party subcontracting relationships. If the Supreme Court continues to remain in the passive stance of its long-standing precedent and does not further specify the meaning of "risk," the gap between the Corporation's operational guidelines and actual practice on the one hand, and the decisions of the lower courts on the other, will gradually widen.
3) Accordingly, on this occasion of unifying the standards of judgment for the main text and the proviso of Article 87(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, it is desirable to concretize, as far as possible, the meaning of "risk" or "sharing of risk," thereby coordinating the scope of application of the main text and the proviso together. The following standards may generally be proposed.
a) It is proper to view the concept of dividing and conducting "one business" as including not only cases where the "main business" itself is divided and partly conducted, but also cases where "ancillary work necessary" for the completion of the purpose of the main business, such as preparatory or support work, is subcontracted and performed. However, considering the organic relationship between the original main business and the subcontracted ancillary businesses, the specific purpose, content, and manner of each business and the nature and form of the risk accompanying it, and the content of the contract or agreement between the respective business owners, the proviso of this case may be applied only where the tortfeasor and the injured employee shared, through the performance of their work, a risk inherent in the relevant business or workplace, and the occupational accident occurred as a manifestation of that risk.
b) For example, the proviso of this case applies, and the Corporation may not subrogate the injured employee's right to claim damages, in the following cases: ① not only cases involving the division of the main business itself, such as where a single project operator undertaking construction of a project district, in consideration of local conditions and convenience of construction, divides the work into several sections and subcontracts them, but also ② cases where an accident occurs due to the act of an employee in the course of performing ancillary work pursuant to a mutually beneficial contract or agreement, such as where an employee of a machinery and equipment repair company visits a manufacturing company and performs repair work under a contract; and ③ cases where the businesses are in a cooperative relationship for the achievement of the main business, such as where a manufacturing company subcontracts ancillary work, such as the transport of materials within the workplace, to several companies, and employees of the respective subcontractors intermingle within the manufacturing company's workplace while performing the same or similar material transport work.
c) By contrast, it is proper to hold that the proviso of this case does not apply, on the ground that the risk inherent in the relevant business or workplace cannot be regarded as shared, in the following cases: ① where, even though the construction was carried out in adjacent locations, the projects were separate apartment construction projects undertaken by different project owners, or, even with the same project owner, where the construction sites and construction periods differ substantially and the subcontracted subject matter is entirely separate, such that the main businesses themselves differ; ② cases where the organic relationship between the respective businesses is insufficient and they cannot be regarded as being in a cooperative relationship with one another, such as where, even though a manufacturing company has subcontracted ancillary work within the workplace to several companies, the purpose, content, and manner of each business differ, and intermingled work is not contemplated; and ③ cases where it cannot be said that work was performed pursuant to a mutually beneficial contract or agreement, such as where an employee of a machinery and equipment repair company merely visited a manufacturing company for sales activities.
Since the proviso of this case excludes the Corporation's exercise of the right of subrogation only with respect to accidents occurring "due to the act of an employee," it goes without saying that, where an accident occurs due to a cause attributable to the employer, such as a defect in a facility within the workplace, the exercise of the right of subrogation is not restricted.
C. The foregoing sets forth the Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Justice), Justice Noh Tae-ak (Justice in charge), Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Oh Kyung-mi, Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Kwon Young-jun, Justice Eom Sang-pil, Justice Shin Suk-hee, Justice Noh Kyung-pil, Justice Park Young-jae, Justice Lee Suk-yeon, Justice Ma Yong-ju