[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Judgment Below] Uijeongbu District Court Decision 2023No544, decided December 7, 2023
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. The Court determines ex officio the issue of whether a co-defendant who is an accomplice has competence to be a witness.
가. Outline of the Case and the Issue
The gist of the facts charged in this case is that the Defendant, who worked as the head of the construction management department of a construction company, was indicted together with Choi ○○, the operator of the said company, as a co-offender, on charges including that the Defendant had submitted to the construction ordering party, through the supervision team, site photographs that had been digitally manipulated to appear as if the construction had been carried out according to the design drawings, even though the construction had actually been carried out using a method different from the design drawings, thereby obtaining construction payments by fraud; and that, while testifying as a witness in the case against Choi ○○, the Defendant, for the purpose of framing Choi ○○, committed perjury by falsely testifying to the effect that Choi ○○ had participated in the crime, including that the Defendant had received instructions from Choi ○○ to fabricate the site photographs, when in fact the Defendant had received no such instructions.
The court below maintained the first instance judgment, which had found the facts charged in this case guilty on the premise that, with the litigation procedures for the Defendant and Choi ○○ having been separated, the Defendant testified regarding the facts charged against Choi ○○, and had made false statements for the purpose of framing Choi ○○.
The Supreme Court has held, in its Decisions 2008Do3300 rendered on June 26, 2008; 2012Do6848, 2012Jeondo143 (consolidated) rendered on October 11, 2012; 2010Do10028 rendered on December 13, 2012; and 2023Do7528 rendered on February 29, 2024, among others, that "a co-defendant who is an accomplice, while in the relevant litigation procedure, holds the status of a defendant and thus cannot be a witness with respect to the facts charged against another co-defendant, but once the litigation procedures are separated and the co-defendant is no longer in the status of a defendant, he or she may become a witness with respect to the facts charged against the other co-defendant." The judgment below was premised on this precedent legal doctrine (hereinafter referred to as the "current doctrine"), and the issue in this case is whether the current doctrine should be maintained.
나. The Supreme Court's Determination
1) With respect to the subject of the crime of perjury, the current doctrine concerning whether a co-defendant who is an accomplice has competence to be a witness regarding the facts charged against another co-defendant is valid and should be maintained. The reasons are as follows.
가) A "witness" refers to a third party who states, in a trial procedure or otherwise, facts that he or she personally experienced in the past. Since Article 146 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) provides that "the court may examine any person as a witness unless otherwise provided by law," it should be understood that, unless otherwise provided by law, any third party other than the defendant who is a party to the relevant case may become a witness. Even a co-defendant who is an accomplice may become a witness in the relevant litigation procedure concerning another co-defendant whose litigation procedure has been separated, because the former is no longer in the status of a defendant in that procedure.
나) In order to guarantee the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, under which "no citizen shall be compelled to make a statement disadvantageous to himself in a criminal case," Article 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "any person may refuse to testify if such testimony is likely to reveal facts that could result in his or her own conviction," and, in order to guarantee this right to refuse to testify, Article 160 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "the presiding judge shall explain, before the examination, that the witness may refuse to testify." Therefore, so long as this right to refuse to testify is substantially guaranteed, recognizing the competence of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to testify after the litigation procedure concerning him or her has been separated, and asking him or her questions related to his or her own criminal facts, cannot be said to infringe upon the defendant's right to refuse to make statements or the privilege against self-incrimination. If a defendant who is thus recognized as having competence to be a witness, having been informed of the right to refuse to testify pursuant to Article 160 of the Criminal Procedure Act during the witness examination procedure, made a false statement without exercising the right to refuse to testify with respect to his or her own criminal facts, the crime of perjury is established.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has held that where a witness, who has grounds for refusing to testify relating to the privilege against self-incrimination or other grounds, has not been informed of the right to refuse to testify, such that a practical obstacle can be said to have arisen in the exercise of that right, the crime of perjury should not be found to have been established (see, e.g., the en banc Decision 2008Do942 rendered on January 21, 2010), and, accordingly, trial practice has developed in the direction of thoroughly exercising judicial direction of proceedings, such as clearly and comprehensibly informing witnesses of their right to refuse to testify. Considering this trial practice as well, it cannot be concluded that recognizing the competence of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness, premised on the separation of litigation procedures, directly results in an infringement of the "right not to be compelled to make a statement disadvantageous to oneself in a criminal case."
다) The concern that exercising the right to refuse to testify would in practice be difficult, in that such exercise might be taken as implying an admission of guilt regarding one's own criminal facts, is not essentially different from the concern that a defendant's silence during other phases of the trial procedure, such as the defendant examination rather than the witness examination, might create in the judge's mind a suspicion of guilt. In a criminal trial, a finding of guilt must be based on evidence with probative value sufficient to give the judge a conviction that the facts charged are true beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there is no evidence forming such a degree of conviction, the judge has no choice but to decide in favor of the defendant, even if there is suspicion of guilt against the defendant. Therefore, the existence of such a concern does not by itself warrant denying the competence itself of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness with respect to another co-defendant.
라) Even where the litigation procedure is not finally separated but is merely temporarily separated—such as where it is planned to examine the co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness after separating the litigation procedure, and then to consolidate the litigation procedure again and try the case together with the other co-defendant—the competence of the co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness should not be viewed differently.
The consolidation or separation of litigation procedures is carried out in consideration of various circumstances, such as the economy and speediness of litigation, the demand for discovering the substantive truth, the convenience of the prosecution's proof or the defense's defense, the necessity for fairness in the treatment of cases among accomplices and for uniform fact-finding and balanced sentencing, and the advantages and disadvantages of consolidated or separate trials in specific cases, among other matters; and the choice of consolidation or separation, and the manner of utilizing it, fall within the discretion of the court (Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act). The view that a temporary separation of litigation procedures is merely formal or conceptual, and that therefore the competence of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness cannot be recognized in such a state of separation, is, in substance, tantamount to challenging the court's discretionary judgment concerning the progress of litigation procedures.
Moreover, even where the litigation procedures for each co-defendant are finally separated (the same applies where accomplices are indicted separately from the outset), if the same court having jurisdiction over the case tries those cases in parallel, this cannot be said to be particularly different, in terms of the formation of the judge's conviction, from a temporary separation of litigation procedures. Therefore, unless it is held that accomplices can never be witnesses for each other with respect to the relevant criminal facts, it is not reasonable to distinguish between the final separation and the temporary separation of litigation procedures and to hold that the current doctrine applies only to the former.
마) There is also a practical necessity to recognize the competence of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness. In types of cases such as drug crimes, telecommunications financial fraud (voice phishing, etc.), operation of illegal gambling sites, and organization or activity of criminal organizations, where the crime is committed by multiple persons acting in concert or in an organized manner and it is difficult to obtain objective physical evidence concerning such conspiracy or participation in the crime, there are parts of the facts charged that can, in practice, be proven only through the statements of accomplices. Therefore, considering the purpose of criminal procedure, which is the speedy discovery of substantive truth in accordance with due process, where the litigation procedures for accomplices are consolidated and proceed together, there is a need to secure the accuracy of the statements made by a co-defendant who is an accomplice. To this end, the method of witness examination—whereby the co-defendant who is an accomplice is placed under a duty of truthfulness, clearly warned that violation thereof will subject him or her to the penalty for perjury, and made to testify under oath while being subject to cross-examination by the other co-defendant—is more suitable than the method of defendant examination, which is not followed by the sanction of the penalty for perjury and in which the other co-defendant's right of cross-examination may, in practice, be difficult to substantially guarantee due to the right to refuse to make statements. This is all the more so considering that our Criminal Procedure Act contains no express provision concerning the right of one co-defendant to examine another co-defendant who is an accomplice, and that the defendant examination is, in principle, conducted after the conclusion of the examination of evidence, examining the defendant on matters necessary concerning the facts charged and sentencing considerations (main text of Article 296-2, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act), the primary purpose of which is to have the relevant defendant clarify his or her opinion or position, not to ask the relevant defendant about facts he or she experienced in connection with the criminal suspicions against another co-defendant.
2) The court below found the facts charged in this case guilty on the premise of the current doctrine, and there is no error in the judgment below in misunderstanding the legal doctrine concerning "the competence of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to be a witness" in relation to the subject of the crime of perjury for the purpose of framing another.
2. The Court determines the Defendant's grounds of appeal.
The court below maintained, on the grounds set forth in its judgment, the first instance judgment, which had found that the Defendant made a false statement contrary to his memory for the purpose of framing Choi ○○. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below and the first instance judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below that affected the outcome of the judgment, such as exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or misunderstanding the legal doctrine concerning the establishment of the crime of perjury for the purpose of framing another.
3. Conclusion
The appeal is dismissed, and the judgment is rendered as stated in the Order. All Justices who participated in this decision concur, except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Oh Kyung-mi. There are concurring opinions supplementing the majority opinion by Justices Cheon Dae-yeop, Eom Sang-pil, Shin Suk-hee, and Lee Suk-yeon, and a supplementary opinion supplementing the dissenting opinion by Justice Oh Kyung-mi.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Oh Kyung-mi
가. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion
Even where the litigation procedure concerning a co-defendant who is an accomplice has been separated, if such separation can be regarded not as final but merely as temporary, then, even if the co-defendant who is an accomplice testifies as a witness with respect to the facts charged against another co-defendant, if he or she has made statements in response to questions relating to his or her own criminal suspicions, that defendant, with respect to that portion of the statement, has in substance made the statement in the status of a defendant. Therefore, in such a case, his or her competence to be a witness cannot be recognized, and even if he or she made a false statement, this cannot be punished as perjury.
In this respect, I disagree with the majority opinion, which holds that, so long as the litigation procedure has been separated even temporarily, the co-defendant who is an accomplice is always, without particular restriction, competent to be a witness as a third party rather than as a defendant, and that, accordingly, even false statements made by him or her with respect to his or her own criminal suspicions can all be punished as perjury. The specific reasons are as follows.
나. Grounds for Denying Competence to Be a Witness
1) Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution declares that "no citizen shall be compelled to make a statement disadvantageous to himself in a criminal case." Article 283-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "the defendant may refrain from making a statement, or may refuse to answer individual questions (Paragraph 1). The presiding judge shall inform the defendant that he or she may refuse to make a statement as set forth in Paragraph 1 (Paragraph 2)." This right to refuse to make statements, or right to remain silent, is a right derived from the privilege against self-incrimination, whereby a defendant or suspect may refuse, in response to examination by a court or investigative agency during trial or investigative procedures, to make statements disadvantageous to himself or herself in a criminal case. The reason the Constitution guarantees the right to refuse to make statements as a fundamental right is that, as a core part of due process, it protects the human rights of criminal suspects or defendants in preference to the national interest in the discovery of substantive truth or the realization of concrete social justice, which are the purposes of criminal procedure, thereby guaranteeing human dignity and the value of existence, and further eradicating inhumane coerced confessions and torture. This means that a statement cannot be compelled not only by violence, such as torture, but also by law (see, e.g., the en banc Decision of the Constitutional Court 2001Hun-Ba41 rendered on November 29, 2001).
In criminal litigation procedure, the right to refuse to make statements is the most essential right that a defendant has in order to secure his or her rights to the greatest extent possible against the prosecutor, who is the subject of the power of prosecution, as the subject of the right of defense and as a party on an equal footing. Since this is an essential right conferred upon the defendant by the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act, the value of protection of the defendant's right to refuse to make statements cannot be sacrificed on the grounds of the national interest in the discovery of substantive truth or the convenience of litigation practice for the sake of litigation economy and speedy trials. Criminal trials should be conducted in a direction that maximally protects the defendant's substantial exercise of the right to refuse to make statements.
2) In our criminal litigation procedure, the status of a defendant and the status of a witness are separate. A defendant, as the party who is the subject of the criminal litigation procedure, may submit documents or objects as evidence as part of the exercise of the right of defense, and may apply for the examination of witnesses and examine witnesses (Article 294, Paragraph 1, and Article 161-2, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Procedure Act). A witness is a third party who states, in a trial procedure or otherwise, facts that he or she personally experienced in the past, and is, in principle, the object of an application for evidence made by a party and the object of the witness examination procedure conducted under the court's direction of litigation (Article 146 and Article 161-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Therefore, it cannot be that one person is simultaneously a defendant and a witness in a single criminal litigation procedure, and a defendant cannot become a witness in the criminal trial concerning himself or herself.
Even in the case of co-defendants indicted together as accomplices, this basic framework should, as far as possible, be maintained. However, the method that the current doctrine and the majority opinion adopt in order to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness is "temporary separation of litigation procedures." This is premised on the logic that, once the litigation procedure concerning the co-defendant who is an accomplice is merely separated, that co-defendant is no longer in the status of a defendant and thus naturally becomes a third party; however, it is difficult to say that this substantially carries out the principle that "a defendant cannot become a witness in the criminal trial concerning himself or herself."
This is because, where the separation of litigation procedures is not final but merely temporary, it is difficult to say that the status of the co-defendant who is an accomplice is fully converted into that of a third party, or that he or she completely loses the status of a co-defendant. Even where the litigation procedure concerning a co-defendant is temporarily separated, it is planned that, after he or she finishes testifying, the litigation procedures will soon be consolidated again, restoring him or her to the status of a defendant, so that he or she will be tried together with the other co-defendant with respect to the facts charged against himself or herself and will be sentenced. Such temporary separation is nothing more than a litigation technique that, in a formal and conceptual sense, turns a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who holds the status of a party in the criminal litigation procedure into a third party. To allow this without limitation, and thereby cause the co-defendant who is an accomplice to answer questions relating to his or her own criminal suspicions, is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional principle of due process.
The method currently employed in trial practice for temporarily separating procedures in order to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness is, generally, as follows. That is, in a case where A and B are indicted as co-defendants who are accomplices, when the court adopts the prosecutor's application to examine Defendant A as a witness, the presiding judge, without separating the litigation record, orally announces at the trial date a ruling to "separate and try the proceedings concerning Defendant A in order to examine Defendant A as a witness," proceeds with the witness examination, and then orally announces a ruling to "consolidate the proceedings concerning Defendant A," recording the content in the trial record. In this way, for a judge who has been trying the criminal suspicions against co-defendants who are accomplices at the same time, simply orally declaring the separation of proceedings in the same courtroom causes the status of co-defendant to disappear, allowing the co-defendant to stand as a witness, and then, upon the conclusion of the witness examination, orally declaring the consolidation of proceedings restores the status of co-defendant—this may be logically possible, but it must in reality be a very awkward and artificial act. Even considering that the separation or consolidation of litigation procedures is a matter carried out in accordance with the court's discretionary judgment in the conduct of litigation procedures, taking into account various circumstances, this does not dilute the formality and conceptuality inherent in the above conduct of proceedings. In the conduct of litigation procedures related to a defendant's right to refuse to make statements, the court's discretionary judgment is also required to be exercised within the bounds of due process.
3) Where a co-defendant is examined as a witness through the temporary separation of litigation procedures, the status of a party held by the co-defendant who is an accomplice conflicts with his or her status as a witness. This conflict between the two statuses substantially renders the status of a defendant hollow. This is because, in the status of a defendant, the right to refuse to make statements is granted, while in the status of a witness, a duty to testify is borne. In such circumstances, the status of the co-defendant who is an accomplice as a defendant should be regarded as taking precedence over his or her status as a witness, so as to secure the substance of the right to refuse to make statements. The exercise of the right of defense as a defendant in the criminal litigation procedure, pursuant to the requirement of due process, must be maximally protected, and is not the kind of thing that can be readily sacrificed for the necessity of discovering substantive truth through the securing of testimony. If, by placing the duty to testify borne in the status of a witness ahead, a co-defendant who is an accomplice is made to bear a duty to state, as he or she recalls, in response to questions concerning facts he or she personally experienced in the past relating to his or her own criminal suspicions, and, in violation of that duty, the defendant who made a false statement is punished for perjury, this amounts to compelling the defendant to abandon the right to refuse to make statements and to take an oath and make a statement. This is because it substantially contravenes the legislative purpose and objective of Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution and Article 283-2, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, even where a co-defendant who is an accomplice was adopted as a witness and examined while the litigation procedure was temporarily separated, the defendant should be regarded as substantially retaining the status of a defendant, at least "with respect to questions relating to his or her own criminal suspicions."
4) In relation to the principle of free evaluation of evidence, if a co-defendant who is an accomplice, examined as a witness due to the temporary separation of litigation procedures, exercises the right to refuse to testify in response to questions relating to his or her own criminal suspicions, there is a concern that this may be taken as implying an admission of guilt regarding his or her own criminal suspicions. Under Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides that "the probative value of evidence shall be determined by the free evaluation of the judge," thereby establishing the principle of free evaluation of evidence, the trial court judge, who has full authority over the evaluation of evidence, must, in finding facts, consider without omission the perceptions obtained and the evidence examined during the trial procedure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Do2221 rendered on June 25, 2004). It cannot be flatly asserted that when a co-defendant, testifying as a witness in the presence of the judge who is trying the facts charged against himself or herself, exercises the right to refuse to testify on the ground that the matter relates to his or her own criminal suspicions, this will not, in practice, be considered by the relevant judge as one of the "perceptions obtained during the trial procedure." From the standpoint of a co-defendant whose proceedings have been temporarily separated and who thus comes to testify, he or she cannot but be concerned that, if he or she exercises the right to refuse to testify, the presiding judge might form an unfavorable impression regarding his or her own criminal suspicions. This concern will not be dispelled by the logic that, since the proceedings have been separated, the trial during his or her testimony is a trial concerning the other co-defendant, and the impression formed by the presiding judge in that process concerns only the other co-defendant. In this case, although there is a similarity, in the external appearance of "the defendant's silence," between exercising the right to refuse to testify and exercising the right to refuse to make statements as a defendant during a defendant examination, the exercise of the right to refuse to testify has, as its legal background, the fact that making a false statement is punishable as perjury, and thus may arouse suspicion that it is done to avoid punishment. This cannot be said to be of the same degree of implication as a defendant examination, which carries no sanction for a false statement. From the defendant's standpoint, he or she cannot but be reluctant to have even the slightest implication of guilt or aggravating sentencing factor exposed to the judge trying the facts charged against himself or herself, and the defendant's procedural right of defense related thereto cannot be said to lack value worthy of protection.
Let us assume the case of a defendant who, during the trial procedure, has actively denied his or her own criminal suspicions by making statements contrary to his or her memory and to the actual facts. In this case, three choices are available to him or her. The first is to tell the truth; the second is to exercise the right to refuse to testify; and the third is to state falsehoods. If, having taken the oath as a witness pursuant to the first choice, he or she states as he or she recalls in order to avoid the penalty for perjury, this reverses his or her prior statements and amounts to admitting his or her own crime, thereby falling into self-contradiction. If, under the second choice, he or she exercises the right to refuse to testify, this implies that he or she has committed the crime, and he or she cannot but be concerned about the unfavorable effect this may have on the presiding judge's formation of an impression as to guilt or innocence or the evaluation of sentencing. Ultimately, the defendant is likely to make the third choice, consistently testifying in denial of his or her offense as he or she has actively stated throughout the trial procedure up to that point. Such testimony should be evaluated as a statement made for self-defense and self-interest pursuant to the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed to the defendant under the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act. It is not appropriate to punish him or her for perjury solely on the ground that his or her statement is false. It is worth recalling that Supreme Court precedent has also held that "in the criminal litigation procedure, a defendant may, based on the right of defense, refuse to make a statement regarding the criminal facts or make a false statement" (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do192 rendered on March 9, 2001). This is solely intended to maximally guarantee the defendant's right regarding the right to refuse to make statements, and is by no means intended to recognize a right of the defendant to lie.
5) If the current doctrine is maintained, as the majority opinion holds, there is also a concern that, in the case of a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who has retained or been appointed defense counsel, the right to assistance of counsel may be infringed. The defense counsel of a co-defendant who is an accomplice may, in the case of a defendant examination, freely participate and perform the role of assistant, as a legal professional, in supporting the defendant's self-defense as a party. The defense counsel may also provide timely advice and consultation upon the defendant's request, or state opinions based on the defense counsel's own judgment, and may raise objections to improper methods of examination, among other things. However, according to the majority opinion, the moment the co-defendant who is an accomplice is adopted as a witness through the temporary separation of proceedings and is examined, he or she immediately loses the status of a defendant, and is thereby substantially deprived of the right to receive such assistance of counsel. He or she is placed in a position where he or she must, standing alone at the witness stand, exposed to a state in which he or she cannot receive the assistance of counsel with respect to questions relating to his or her own criminal suspicions, rely entirely on his or her own judgment in choosing either to make a statement or to exercise the right to refuse to testify. The mere fact that he or she was granted the right to refuse to testify cannot justify this deprivation of rights.
6) The majority opinion's view that the defendant's right against self-incrimination cannot be deemed infringed because a codefendant who is an accomplice, and who comes to testify in a temporarily severed proceeding, is granted the right to refuse to testify, is difficult to accept. The majority opinion's position appears to originate from the Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Do1724 delivered on July 7, 1987. That decision stated that "the right not to be compelled to make a statement disadvantageous to oneself in a criminal matter does not by any means guarantee the right to actively make a false statement, and since a witness in the same position as a defendant is granted the right to refuse to testify, thereby providing an escape route from the crime of perjury, it cannot be said that there is no expectation of lawful conduct." Prior to this, the legal doctrine—derived from the Supreme Court Decision 4294Hyeongsang194 delivered on July 13, 1961—that a false statement by a codefendant who is an accomplice and has become a witness cannot be punished as perjury, on the grounds that truthful testimony cannot be expected from such a person, had persisted for a long time, but this doctrine was abolished by the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Do1724.
However, the right to refuse to testify is not a "complete escape route from the crime of perjury," nor can it serve as a substitute for the right against self-incrimination granted to a defendant. Although both the witness's right to refuse to testify and the defendant's right against self-incrimination derive from the privilege against self-incrimination, their purposes and objectives, and the meaning and role they play in criminal procedure, are very different. The witness's right to refuse to testify is, in principle, an exceptional right that exempts a witness who otherwise bears a duty to testify from that duty only where there exists a legitimate ground for refusal. In order for a witness to exercise the right to refuse to testify, the witness must substantiate the grounds for refusal required under the Criminal Procedure Act (Hyeongsasosongbeop) (Article 150 of the Criminal Procedure Act), and whether such substantiation is sufficient is determined by the court. Furthermore, where a witness refuses to testify without justifiable reason, the witness may be subject to an administrative fine of up to 500,000 won (Article 161(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act). By contrast, the defendant's right against self-incrimination is a comprehensive right allowing the defendant to freely choose to make a statement or remain silent, regardless of the reason. The defendant need not substantiate the reason for exercising the right against self-incrimination, the court has no authority to determine the propriety thereof, and the defendant is subject to no sanction whatsoever in connection with exercising the right against self-incrimination. This stems from the fundamental difference that a witness is an object of the criminal procedure who bears a duty to testify, whereas a defendant is a party to the criminal procedure whose right of defense is guaranteed. Accordingly, from the standpoint of a codefendant who is an accomplice and has become a witness, when questioned about facts concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct, the "complete escape route from the crime of perjury" is not the right to refuse to testify but the right against self-incrimination. This fundamental difference cannot be narrowed merely by thorough conduct of proceedings in judicial practice, such as clearly and comprehensibly informing the codefendant who has become a witness of the right to refuse to testify.
The above Supreme Court Decision 4294Hyeongsang194 coolly recognized the dilemma faced by a codefendant who is an accomplice upon becoming a witness—namely, the contradictory situation of either committing perjury by making a false statement, or implying his or her own criminal conduct through silence, or otherwise having to confess his or her own criminal conduct—and, giving deep consideration to human nature and existential limitations in seeking to protect oneself, as well as the practical difficulties inevitably encountered in actually exercising the legally recognized right to refuse to testify, held that such false statements should be interpreted as "acts that cannot be punished." This still has much to suggest at present.
7) The Criminal Procedure Act provides, separately from the witness examination procedure, a defendant examination procedure by which necessary matters concerning the facts charged and sentencing may be examined with respect to the defendant (Article 296-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Since a codefendant who is an accomplice has the right of cross-examination guaranteed to the other codefendant with respect to statements made in court, such statements are no different from those made when examined as a witness, and are recognized as having independent admissibility as evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do917 delivered on July 28, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2006Do1944 delivered on May 11, 2006, etc.). Thus, questioning a defendant regarding facts related to his or her suspected criminal conduct is a procedure contemplated by our Criminal Procedure Act to be conducted through the defendant examination procedure. The fact that no separate punishment or sanction is imposed even where the defendant makes a false statement during defendant examination is intended to substantively guarantee the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the majority opinion holds that, merely because the proceedings are severed, a codefendant who is an accomplice can and must be examined as a witness even with respect to questions concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct. Furthermore, the majority opinion seeks to open a path whereby, merely because the proceedings were temporarily severed and the codefendant was informed of the right to refuse to testify, the codefendant may be punished for perjury if he or she makes a false statement. This is no different from compelling a confession from the defendant, or compelling silence and forming an impression as to guilt or innocence or an assessment for sentencing based on that silence, all under the pretext of ensuring the accuracy of statements. It must be pointed out that this attitude of the majority opinion operates the system beyond the scope or degree originally contemplated by the Criminal Procedure Act, and substantively infringes upon the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
While it is true that, in terms of securing evidence with probative value, the defendant examination procedure clearly has limitations compared to witness examination, this too is what the Criminal Procedure Act intended, and its purpose should be respected. The Criminal Procedure Act, in order to prioritize guaranteeing the defendant's status as the subject of the right of defense and as a party equal to the prosecutor, rather than securing the convenience of litigation practice or the national interest in discovering substantive truth, provides that the defendant examination procedure is to be used where it is necessary to obtain matters concerning the facts charged against the defendant and sentencing. Nevertheless, putting the defendant on the witness stand through the formal procedure of temporary severance of proceedings, as the majority opinion does, to have the defendant testify concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct disregards the limitations intentionally set by the Criminal Procedure Act as described above, thereby degrading the defendant into an object of the criminal procedure, and results in reversing the values pursued by the Constitution (Heonbeop) and the Criminal Procedure Act.
8) The majority opinion argues that in cases such as drug offenses, telecommunications-based financial fraud (voice phishing, etc.), operation of illegal gambling sites, and organization and activity of criminal organizations—types of cases in which crimes are committed by multiple persons or through organized conspiracy and objective physical evidence is difficult to obtain—there are portions of the charged facts that can, in reality, be proven only through the statements of accomplices, and thus there is also a practical need to recognize the competence of a codefendant who is an accomplice to be a witness. This argument directly contravenes the purpose and objective of Article 12(2) of the Constitution and Article 283-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which seek to guarantee human dignity and the value of human existence by protecting the human rights of a criminal suspect or defendant with priority over the national interest in discovering substantive truth or realizing concrete social justice, which are the objectives of criminal procedure, and is therefore difficult to accept. The human dignity and fundamental human rights of the individual that the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act seek to protect through the guarantee of the defendant's right against self-incrimination are rooted not only in the values of human rational reason and the pursuit of truth, but also in the existential contradiction of human existence—namely, existential limitations and the instinct for self-protection—and thus their essence must not be infringed even if this requires sacrificing, to some extent, the demand for social defense through the criminal punishment of offenders. This holds true even taking into account the characteristics of group crimes such as drug offenses and telecommunications-based financial fraud and the need to punish them. Even from the standpoint of criminal policy, in the situation at issue in this case, where the status of defendant and the status of witness overlap, it is desirable to institutionally allow for a neutral zone in which the incompleteness and contradictoriness inherent in the person subject to the norm can coexist alongside the need to discover substantive truth.
Moreover, given that the burden of proving a charged crime lies solely with the prosecutor, the majority opinion's argument that "it is appropriate to impose a duty of truthfulness on a codefendant who is an accomplice in order to secure the accuracy of the codefendant's statement, to clearly warn that a violation thereof will result in punishment for perjury, and to have the codefendant testify subject to cross-examination by the other codefendant after taking an oath" may amount to an unjustified curtailment of the defendant's right against self-incrimination, or to shifting the prosecutor's burden of proof onto the codefendant who is an accomplice by compelling, under the threat of the crime of perjury, a disadvantageous statement concerning the codefendant's own suspected criminal conduct.
As is also the case here, it is worth noting that witness examination of a codefendant who is an accomplice through temporary severance of proceedings is generally conducted upon the prosecutor's motion. Where the statements of codefendants who are accomplices conflict, the prosecutor seeks to examine one of them as a witness in order to obtain evidence unfavorable to the other. It cannot but raise doubt whether it accords with the true meaning of the principle of due process or the principle of trial-centered proceedings to permit the prosecutor, who bears the burden of proving the facts of the suspected crime against the defendant, to obtain additional evidence through such an irregular procedure that curtails the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
9) There is also no longer any practical benefit in examining the maker of an original statement as a witness in order to confer admissibility on a suspect interrogation record concerning a codefendant who is an accomplice. Pursuant to Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, as amended by Act No. 16924 on February 4, 2020 and effective from January 1, 2022, not only a suspect interrogation record prepared by an investigative agency other than a prosecutor (Article 312(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act), but also a suspect interrogation record prepared by a prosecutor, may now be admitted as evidence only "where it was prepared in accordance with lawful procedure and form, and only where the defendant who was the suspect, or his or her defense counsel, acknowledges its content during trial preparation or at a trial date." As a result, even if a codefendant who is an accomplice acknowledges the authenticity of a suspect interrogation record prepared by an investigative agency through testimony, if another codefendant denies its content, the record's admissibility as evidence is denied with respect to the codefendant who denied its content.
10) Furthermore, in order to firmly guarantee the defendant's core right—the right against self-incrimination—it should be noted that legislative measures ultimately need to be taken in the direction of recognizing, for anyone currently on trial as a defendant or anyone likely to become a defendant in the future, as well as codefendants who are accomplices, the right not to become a witness at least with respect to that person's actual or potential suspected criminal conduct. Going beyond the approach taken in the above Supreme Court Decision 4294Hyeongsang194, which approached the matter from the standpoint of an individual ground for excuse from responsibility and held that there was no expectation of lawful conduct with respect to a false statement made by a codefendant who is an accomplice, a fundamental examination should be conducted of the very question of whether such a person has the competence to be a witness, so as to move in the direction of faithfully guaranteeing and realizing the fundamental human rights that a defendant possesses as a party to criminal procedure, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to assistance of counsel. Such legislative measures also accord with the Supreme Court's existing position. The Supreme Court has already rendered a similar judgment in a case in which the issue was the applicability of former Article 85(2)(9) of the Saemaul Geumgo Act (Saemaeul Geumgohbeop) (before amendment by Act No. 12749 on June 11, 2014; the same hereinafter), which provided that "an officer, employee, or liquidator of a Saemaul Geumgo or the Korean Federation of Saemaul Geumgo who refuses, obstructs, or evades an inspection by a supervisory authority, or makes a false statement in response to a question by the relevant inspector, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine not exceeding five million won." Namely, the Supreme Court held that, in a case where an officer or employee of a Saemaul Geumgo made a false statement in response to a question from an inspector concerning a matter for which the person might in the future be punished under Article 5 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Teukjeong Gyeongje Beomjoe Gajung Cheobeol deung-e Gwanhan Beomnyul), the above provision of the former Saemaul Geumgo Act does not apply absent special circumstances, on the ground that such a case is, in substance, no different from compelling a person who may in fact become a criminal suspect or defendant in the future to admit his or her own criminal liability before an investigative agency (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3136 delivered on May 28, 2015).
(c) Necessity of Changing Precedent
As seen above, the mere fact that proceedings against a codefendant who is an accomplice have been temporarily severed does not warrant recognizing that codefendant's competence to be a witness with respect to the portion of his or her statement concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct, and even if such codefendant made a false statement, he or she cannot be punished for perjury. Accordingly, the current legal doctrine—including that set forth in Supreme Court Decision 2008Do3300 delivered on June 26, 2008 and other decisions—holding that where the proceedings are severed and the defendant is thereby removed from the status of defendant, a codefendant who is an accomplice may become a witness with respect to the charged facts against another codefendant, should be changed to the extent described above.
(d) Resolution of This Case
The court below maintained the judgment of the first instance court, which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case solely on the ground that the defendant, having appeared as a witness while proceedings were temporarily severed as a codefendant who is an accomplice, made a false statement as a witness for the purpose of framing codefendant Choe ○○, as testified above. This was done on the premise that a codefendant who is an accomplice may become a witness with respect to the charged facts against another codefendant, and that only the status of witness continues even with respect to questions concerning the codefendant's own suspected criminal conduct, without examining whether the defendant's statement recorded in the facts charged concerned the defendant's own suspected criminal conduct. Such judgment of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal doctrine concerning "the competence of a codefendant who is an accomplice to be a witness" in relation to the subject of the crime of perjury for the purpose of framing another, and failed to conduct the necessary examination. Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, I state that I cannot agree with the majority opinion.
5. Supplementary Opinion of Justices Cheon Dae-yeop, Eom Sang-pil, Shin Suk-hee, and Lee Sook-yeon Concurring with the Majority Opinion
(a) Summary of the Supplementary Opinion
The issue of whether a codefendant who is an accomplice has competence to be a witness with respect to another codefendant, in relation to the subject of the crime of perjury, generally arises at the point where the value of discovering substantive truth and thereby realizing concrete social justice conflicts with the value of protecting the defendant's human rights through guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination. The majority opinion, which holds that this issue can be resolved through severance of proceedings and guarantee of the right to refuse to testify in accordance with the necessities of trial procedure, such as the discovery of substantive truth and the guarantee of the codefendant's right of cross-examination, is correct. However, the dissenting opinion's concern, pointing out the dilemma faced where a defendant who denies the charges must become a witness against a codefendant charged jointly with him or her as an accomplice and testify concerning facts also related to his or her own suspected criminal conduct, cannot be lightly dismissed.
Accordingly, this supplementary opinion will point out the limitations of the dissenting opinion and examine in greater detail the situation in which a codefendant who is an accomplice takes the witness stand, thereby supplementing the grounds of the majority opinion, while also, without going so far as to change the current legal doctrine, presenting matters that should be given attention in the operation of judicial practice so as to resolve the problems and concerns pointed out by the dissenting opinion, and examining the systems that need to be reorganized and supplemented.
(b) Limitations of the Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, mainly addressing the situation in which a codefendant who is an accomplice and denies his or her own crime effectively becomes a witness within the proceedings against himself or herself, points out matters of concern under the current legal doctrine. However, the reasoning of the dissenting opinion has clear limitations as follows.
1) The dissenting opinion holds that where proceedings against a codefendant who is an accomplice are temporarily severed, and that defendant makes a statement in response to a question concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct, the defendant remains in the status of defendant and thus cannot be recognized as having competence to be a witness. However, if only the "portion of the statement concerning the codefendant's own suspected criminal conduct" made by a codefendant who is an accomplice while testifying as a witness concerning the charged facts against another codefendant is denied competence as a witness, then within a single witness examination procedure, whether the codefendant has competence to be a witness would vary from statement to statement depending on whether each individual statement is related to his or her own suspected criminal conduct, which is unreasonable. Moreover, since codefendants charged as accomplices necessarily have closely related suspected criminal conduct, it is difficult to clearly determine whether the content of a given statement is related to the codefendant's own suspected criminal conduct, leading to the conclusion that it would be impossible to determine, at the stage of selecting and examining witnesses, whether a codefendant who is an accomplice indeed has competence to be a witness.
2) A prosecutor may, due to various incidental circumstances at the indictment stage or the individual circumstances of suspects, be unable to indict accomplices together. It cannot but be said that it is an excessively formalistic approach to hold that accomplices have competence to be witnesses against each other where they are indicted separately, or where the proceedings against codefendants are ultimately severed after indictment, but that they lack competence to be witnesses against each other where the proceedings are merely temporarily severed after joint indictment. Adopting such an approach would allow a prosecutor, even though the accomplices could have been indicted together from the outset, to indict them separately within the prosecutor's discretion for various reasons, conduct witness examination, and then move for consolidation of the proceedings. In such a case, regardless of whether consolidation actually occurs, not only would the problem of infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination pointed out by the dissenting opinion remain unresolved, but this would also undermine the fairness of case handling in terms of judicial economy, speedy trial, and consistent fact-finding and balanced sentencing among accomplices, and could even undermine confidence in the judicial process.
3) Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the dissenting opinion fails to give sufficient consideration to the value of discovering substantive truth in criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the guarantee of the defendant's procedural rights and the discovery of substantive truth are not mutually exclusive values, but rather the two pillars supporting criminal justice, neither of which takes precedence over the other. Only when these two values are harmoniously balanced can the ideals and objectives of criminal procedure be fully realized. As noted by the majority opinion, judicial practice, with respect to the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and right to refuse to testify, has developed in the direction of thoroughly guaranteeing the procedural rights of a codefendant who is a witness in accordance with Supreme Court en banc Decision 2008Do942 and other decisions. The more sharply the assertions of parties with differing interests—especially codefendants indicted together as accomplices—conflict in a criminal case, the more the court's duty to ascertain substantive truth is emphasized; yet, if competence to be a witness itself is denied, going beyond guaranteeing the defendant's legitimate procedural rights, the guarantee of the other codefendant's legitimate procedural rights and the function of discovering substantive truth cannot be properly realized. The current legal doctrine, which recognizes the competence of a codefendant who is an accomplice to be a witness on the premise of severance of proceedings and guarantee of the right to refuse to testify, is the fruit of a balanced institutionalization of the two values of guaranteeing codefendants' procedural rights and discovering substantive truth, and its utility can be affirmed.
4) Given that the current legal doctrine has been maintained for a long time, and judicial practice has settled in the direction of substantively guaranteeing the defendant's right against self-incrimination and right to refuse to testify through appropriate conduct of proceedings, there would be little practical change or benefit to be gained by abolishing this doctrine, as the dissenting opinion expects. As noted above, the conclusion of the dissenting opinion—that competence to be a witness should be denied only where a codefendant who is an accomplice becomes a witness against another codefendant through "temporary severance" of proceedings and makes a statement "concerning his or her own suspected criminal conduct"—can be relatively easily circumvented through alternative means such as "separate indictment of accomplices (and subsequent consolidation)."
Given this, there is no reason to cause confusion by changing the current legal doctrine, which has been established through decades of accumulated precedent and practice, and if there is a point of concern regarding conflict between the discovery of substantive truth and the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the appropriate response—one that realizes criminal justice while substantively guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination granted to the defendant—is to supplement judicial practice or reorganize the system in a manner that resolves this harmoniously.
(c) Examination of the Various Situations in Which a Codefendant Who Is an Accomplice Takes the Witness Stand
1) Even where a codefendant who is an accomplice is examined as a witness through temporary severance of proceedings, if the content of the testimony is unrelated to the codefendant's own suspected criminal conduct, the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated. The dissenting opinion, too, does not assert that witness examination of such content violates the privilege against self-incrimination.
2) In practice, in most cases where a codefendant who is an accomplice confesses to his or her own crime while another codefendant denies his or her own crime, the prosecutor, seeking to prove the crime of the other codefendant, moves to have the confessing codefendant examined as a witness, and the court examines that codefendant through temporary severance of proceedings. However, a defendant who confesses to his or her own crime may be said to have already relinquished the privilege against self-incrimination, and thus, in principle, no issue of infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination arises even if such a defendant is examined as a witness against another codefendant. What is at issue here is not the defendant's statement "incriminating himself or herself," but rather the statement that "another codefendant is guilty," and with respect to this, the prosecutor can obtain highly probative testimony by examining as a witness the defendant who confesses to the crime. Meanwhile, witness examination in such a case is also meaningful in that it can provide, on the one hand, an active opportunity to testify to a codefendant who is an accomplice and is willing to take an oath as a witness in order to help clarify the substance of the case, and on the other hand, an opportunity for the other codefendant to impeach such testimony through effective cross-examination.
For example, not only in cases of the type presented by the majority opinion, but also in cases involving so-called counterpart-type accomplice relationships where codefendants are suspected of having given and received a bribe between themselves, situations often arise in which the discovery of substantive truth is difficult because their statements conflict, as where one codefendant confesses to the fact of giving a bribe while the other codefendant denies the fact of receiving a bribe. In such cases, there is no reason to deny the competence to be a witness of a codefendant who voluntarily and actively wishes to be given the opportunity to make a statement through the witness examination method in order to enhance the probative value of his or her own statement and clarify the substance of the case, and recognizing that codefendant's competence to be a witness cannot be deemed to infringe upon the privilege against self-incrimination granted to that codefendant.
[Reasoning] (continued)
The Supreme Court's precedent and the majority opinion's rationale function best in these circumstances. Meanwhile, as Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) concerning the admissibility of evidence of interrogation records of suspects prepared by prosecutors was amended, an interrogation record of a co-defendant who is an accomplice, prepared by a prosecutor, also became inadmissible as evidence if the defendant who was the suspect or his/her defense counsel denies its content in preparation for trial or at a trial date, and it also became inadmissible as evidence of guilt where another co-defendant who is an accomplice denies its content. Accordingly, the necessity for a prosecutor or another co-defendant to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness in court has become even greater. Moreover, as the Criminal Procedure Act was amended on June 1, 2007, emphasizing the defendant's status as a party to criminal procedure, the examination of the defendant, unlike before when it was conducted prior to the examination of evidence, became positioned, in principle, as a method by which necessary matters concerning the facts charged and sentencing factors regarding the relevant defendant may be examined after all examination of evidence has been completed and before the prosecutor's statement of opinion under Article 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The examination of the defendant conducted after the completion of the examination of evidence has as its main purpose eliciting the defendant's opinion or position by asking about matters that remain unclear even after the examination of evidence, discrepancies between facts revealed during the examination of evidence and the defendant's prior assertions, the defendant's conduct not revealed during the examination of evidence, and the defendant's views on the results of the examination of evidence (whether the defendant's assertions have changed after the examination of evidence). Nevertheless, if it were held that only the examination of the defendant, and not the examination of witnesses, is possible in such circumstances, this could in fact go beyond the nature and scope of the defendant examination procedure originally contemplated by the Criminal Procedure Act, thereby treating a co-defendant who is an accomplice, who holds the status of a defendant, as a means of evidence, and thus effectively making him or her an object or target of the criminal procedure.
Where a person, as a defendant, confesses to his or her own crime but, as a witness, fabricates a false accusation of guilt that does not exist against another co-defendant, such testimony exceeds the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the crime of perjury is established with respect to this portion of the testimony. This is because the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to recognizing a right to commit perjury by actively slandering another person, beyond merely denying one's own crime. Meanwhile, it is essential that the co-defendant who is the target of such slander be guaranteed the opportunity to exercise the right of defense to impeach the credibility of that testimony through effective cross-examination, and this can be said to be the guarantee of the basic right of a party to criminal procedure to defend himself or herself against the risk of unjust criminal punishment.
3) However, there is a point worth heeding in the dissenting opinion's argument that, in the case where the procedure is separated for a defendant who denies his or her own crime and he or she is examined as a witness for another co-defendant, it is difficult to expect that person to reverse his or her prior statements and make a statement admitting the crime, even if he or she is informed of the punishment for perjury or takes the witness oath, and that this remains the same even if he or she is informed of the right to refuse to testify. This is especially true for a defendant who not only passively denies his or her own crime but actively denies the crime while making statements that differ from the actual facts. Even though, in light of the current trial practice in which trial-centered adjudication has become established and the exercise of a witness's right to refuse to testify is accepted as a matter of course, it would not be appropriate to revive the feasibility doctrine of Supreme Court Decision 4294Hyeongsang194, which has already been abolished by the Supreme Court's en banc Decision 86Do1724, the examination of such a defendant as a witness needs to be exercised with restraint. Furthermore, even where a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies his or her own crime is examined as a witness in order to ascertain the substantive truth, whether perjury is established with respect to the portion of testimony related to his or her own criminal charges must be carefully determined while fully considering the overall context of the testimony and the specific circumstances the defendant was in at the time of testifying.
4) The prosecutor's act of indicting suspects who deny the offense as accomplices and then applying to examine one of the defendants as a witness against another co-defendant may be considered, to some extent, as not substantially contributing to the proof of the facts charged or the discovery of substantive truth, but rather as being done with the intent to compel a confession from the defendant or force silence upon him or her under the pretext of perjury, thereby aiming to form a negative impression in the mind of the judge and to later punish false statements as perjury. This risks undermining the purposes of discovering substantive truth and guaranteeing the defendant's right of defense, which our criminal justice system aims to serve.
Moreover, another co-defendant who denies his or her own crime may have an incentive to apply for examination of the co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness, with the intention of hearing a statement favorable to himself or herself from the co-defendant who is an accomplice, or with the intention of rebutting the portion related to himself or herself among the statements made by that co-defendant as a defendant during the course of the trial proceedings. However, if the co-defendant who is an accomplice is already denying his or her own crime, and moreover, if the portion of that co-defendant's statement relates to the criminal charges common to the co-defendants, such an application to examine a witness may result in placing the defendant who denies the offense in the dilemma of having to become a witness against the co-defendant who is an accomplice and testify concerning facts related to his or her own criminal charges.
These circumstances must be fully considered in the course of operating trial practice.
D. Desirable Direction for the Operation of Trial Practice
Under the current legal doctrine, as discussed above, in order to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, situations in which infringement of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination may become an issue, and in order to substantively guarantee the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to make statements, it is believed that the following operation of trial practice is necessary.
1) An application to examine, as a witness, a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies the facts charged against himself or herself, for the purpose of asking necessary matters concerning his or her own facts charged and sentencing factors, should not, in principle, be permitted. Care must be taken because there may be an incentive for the prosecutor to use the examination of witnesses for a purpose different from its original purpose, such as pressuring the defendant by notifying him or her of the possibility of punishment for perjury in order to obtain a forward-looking confession, thereby proving the facts charged against him or her, and furthermore, the facts charged against other co-defendants, or with the intent of detecting a new crime of perjury.
2) The court must pay particular attention to ensuring that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is procedurally guaranteed. As already noted by the majority opinion, current trial practice has developed in the direction of clearly and comprehensibly notifying the right to refuse to testify, but where a co-defendant who is an accomplice is applied for and adopted as a witness through the method of temporary severance of the trial procedure, there is a need to explain this even more thoroughly. Since the co-defendant who is an accomplice already has his or her own case pending before the same court that has jurisdiction over the case, he or she cannot but, in fact, take into account the effect that his or her statement or silence may have on the court's judgment; therefore, by fully explaining that his or her statement or silence will have no effect on his or her own pending trial, such vague concerns and anxieties should be resolved, trust in a fair trial should be secured, and there should be no obstacle to the exercise of the right to refuse to testify. Whether to sever the trial procedure with respect to the co-defendant who is an accomplice and conduct an examination of witnesses, or to conduct an examination of the defendant while maintaining his or her status as a co-defendant, is a matter within the discretion of the court, but in that process, care must be taken to ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination is substantively guaranteed by giving maximum consideration to the opinions of the defendant and his or her defense counsel.
3) Furthermore, even in the course of adopting a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness and conducting the examination, where a question appears to relate to his or her own criminal charges, the court needs to notify him or her again that he or she may refuse to testify pursuant to Article 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act (there is ample room to view the very fact that the trial procedure was temporarily severed due to his or her having been indicted as a co-defendant who is an accomplice as, in itself, corresponding to a showing of grounds for refusing to testify), and, if necessary, to inform him or her that he or she may answer such questions through a separate defendant examination procedure, thereby enabling him or her to choose to make a statement or remain silent without the burden of perjury, beyond simply refusing to testify. Through this, the co-defendant who is an accomplice can freely exercise the privilege against self-incrimination granted to him or her by choosing, according to his or her genuine intent, to make a statement or remain silent.
E. The Necessity of Assistance of Defense Counsel
1) Under the current legal doctrine, there is also a point worth heeding in the dissenting opinion's criticism that there is a risk of infringing the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed to a co-defendant who is an accomplice for whom defense counsel has been appointed or selected.
2) Since a witness, who is a third party rather than a subject or party to criminal procedure, is merely a participant in the procedure while being an object of the examination of evidence, it would, in principle, be unreasonable to recognize a right to assistance of counsel for him or her equivalent to that of a defendant. This is because a witness in a criminal trial need only state, as he or she recalls, facts he or she personally experienced, and in the process of receiving advice from defense counsel, there is a risk that memories of the experienced facts as they are may become confused or embellished, or may be guided in a particular direction, and moreover, there is a risk that the judge may be unable to clearly grasp the witness's demeanor in testifying, thereby impeding the smooth examination of evidence.
3) However, if a co-defendant who is an accomplice was originally, in his or her status as a defendant, able to sit beside defense counsel and obtain legal advice from him or her at any time, thereby being able to faithfully exercise his or her right of defense, then even if the trial procedure is temporarily severed and he or she becomes a witness, it is desirable that the right to assistance of counsel be recognized in some form, within a certain scope.
This is because a co-defendant who is an accomplice, harboring concerns and anxiety that his or her testimony may directly affect the case pending against him or her, may fail to properly understand when and to what extent he or she must testify, or whether he or she may remain silent, during the examination of witnesses, and thus may fail to respond appropriately; and the requirement that he or she show grounds in order to refuse to testify may also operate as a burden on him or her, such that he or she may fail to sufficiently exercise the right to refuse to testify guaranteed to him or her.
4) Under current law, it is not clear whether assistance of counsel can be recognized for a co-defendant who is an accomplice where, due to the temporary severance of the trial procedure, he or she is applied for and adopted as a witness and the examination of witnesses actually proceeds. Therefore, if the system is reformed in the future in the direction of allowing him or her to receive the assistance of counsel, at least with respect to examination relating to his or her own criminal charges and sentencing factors, so that he or she may fully exercise the right to refuse to testify, the problem pointed out by the dissenting opinion could be resolved.
F. Resolution of This Case
In this case, the defendant, while confessing to the facts charged against himself, gave false testimony, contrary to the facts, to the effect that co-defendant Choi ○○ had participated in the crime, when testifying as a witness against co-defendant Choi ○○ after the trial procedure was severed.
It can be seen that the defendant had already relinquished the privilege against self-incrimination by confessing to his own crime, and no illegality can be found in the procedures for adopting the defendant as a witness, severing the trial procedure, administering the witness oath, and notifying him of the right to refuse to testify. Even if the defendant's false testimony was intended to secure a favorable sentence for himself, this exceeds the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by our Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act, and thus, even considering the problems raised by the dissenting opinion, no issue of substantive infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination granted to the defendant arises.
The foregoing sets forth the concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Oh Kyung-mi Supplementing the Dissenting Opinion
A. Summary of the Concurring Opinion
Guaranteeing the defendant's right to refuse to make statements and procedural rights in criminal proceedings is a constitutional value that cannot be compromised. Although the status of a defendant and the status of a witness are distinct from each other in our criminal procedure, according to the majority opinion, a co-defendant who is an accomplice, who held the status of a defendant in a single criminal proceeding, becomes, through the temporary severance of the trial procedure, a witness bearing a duty to testify even with respect to matters relating to his or her own criminal charges, and then, once the trial procedures are consolidated again, returns to the status of a defendant, to undergo a hearing on his or her own criminal charges and be sentenced, thereby being placed in a dual status. Due to this dual status, when a situation arises in which the status of a party held by the co-defendant who is an accomplice conflicts with his or her status as a witness, his or her legal status as a defendant may easily be shaken; therefore, the guarantee of the right to refuse to make statements and procedural rights for a co-defendant who is an accomplice must be made even more thoroughly and substantively.
Accordingly, this concurring opinion points out that the measures for the operation of trial practice and the reform of the system proposed by the concurring opinion of Justices Cheon Dae-yeop, Eom Sang-pil, Shin Suk-hee, and Lee Suk-yeon supplementing the majority opinion (hereinafter referred to as the "majority concurring opinion") cannot substantively guarantee the defendant's right to refuse to make statements and procedural rights, and emphasizes the necessity of changing the current legal doctrine.
B. Limitations of the Majority Concurring Opinion
While maintaining the current legal doctrine as it is, the majority concurring opinion states that the examination as a witness of a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies his or her own crime should be exercised with restraint, and that an application to examine, as a witness, a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies the facts charged against himself or herself, for the purpose of asking necessary matters concerning his or her own facts charged and sentencing factors, should not, in principle, be permitted. Insofar as this position of the majority concurring opinion is not a declaration of legal doctrine, one cannot help but ask what is to guarantee that the examination as a witness of a co-defendant who is an accomplice, which "should not, in principle, be permitted" because he or she denies the facts charged, will not take place. The attitude of attempting to resolve the problem that has arisen with respect to the guarantee of the defendant's fundamental rights by, in effect, restricting the discretion of the court having jurisdiction over the case regarding the adoption or rejection of witness applications, through recommendations or guidance that have no binding force whatsoever on the fact-finding judge, cannot be an appropriate method of regulating the sensitive criminal procedure in a manner consistent with due process and the Constitution. In other words, while the majority concurring opinion clearly recognizes what problems are inherent in the examination as a witness of a co-defendant who is an accomplice who denies his or her own crime, it avoids a fundamental answer regarding the legal doctrine necessary to resolve this problem, and instead merely emphasizes "desirable operation of trial practice" with an ambiguous and reserved conclusion. If the majority concurring opinion shares the same awareness of the problem as the dissenting opinion with respect to the examination as a witness of a co-defendant who is an accomplice who denies his or her own crime, then rather than merely enlightening fact-finding judges under the guise of the merits of practical operation, it should declare a clear legal doctrine capable of correcting erroneous procedural conduct. This is because the "appropriate procedure" proposed by the majority opinion cannot substitute for due process of law.
The dissenting opinion, for its part, does not deny the value of the desirable measures for the operation of trial practice proposed by the majority concurring opinion. However, whether to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness or as a defendant is entirely left to the discretion of the court having jurisdiction over the case. The fact that the majority concurring opinion has proposed desirable measures for the operation of trial practice cannot compel individual courts having jurisdiction over cases to follow this method. Since the direction and conclusion proposed by the majority concurring opinion do not constitute a legal doctrine with normative force and effectiveness, considerable variation is bound to arise in each individual trial in which co-defendants are jointly indicted as accomplices, as to whether the above measures for the operation of practice are followed, and this could ultimately lead to distrust in the judiciary. Since the adoption or rejection of an application to examine a witness is a matter of great importance on which the interests of the parties in criminal trial proceedings depend, it is desirable to secure trust in the judiciary by promoting consistency and stability in practice through a clear legal doctrine. Although the issue in this case concerns an important procedure related to the basic human rights of a co-defendant who is an accomplice, an attitude of attempting to resolve the problem by relying on the good faith and consideration of practitioners such as judges and prosecutors is not one that the Supreme Court should adopt. The majority concurring opinion, by placing excessive emphasis on the pursuit of the discovery of substantive truth, turns a blind eye to the serious defect that has arisen in the matter of guaranteeing the defendant's right of defense, which is one pillar of criminal justice, and relegates this to a matter of practical operation.
C. The Importance of the Meaning of the Right to Refuse to Make Statements and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Criminal Proceedings
The position, as taken by the majority concurring opinion, that a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who has confessed to his or her own crime may be examined as a witness, whereas the examination as a witness of a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies his or her own crime should be exercised with restraint, is not reasonable, as it treats the defendant's status within the criminal procedure differently depending on whether the defendant has confessed to his or her own crime.
In criminal proceedings, the right to refuse to make statements is a constitutional right granted to the defendant as the subject of the right of defense and an equal party, and the necessity of guaranteeing it is not of a nature that varies depending on whether the defendant confesses to his or her own crime. The reason the dissenting opinion arrives at the conclusion that, where the trial procedure has merely been temporarily severed, the qualification of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to testify as a witness should be denied with respect to questions relating to his or her own criminal charges, is likewise to substantively guarantee the right to refuse to make statements held as a defendant, because, in such a case, the co-defendant who is an accomplice, even while standing at the witness stand, can still be considered to remain in the status of a defendant.
There are various motives by which a co-defendant who is an accomplice may make a false statement in the course of an examination of witnesses. Not merely because he or she has been denying the facts charged, but also the various interests surrounding the defendant—including the defendant's complex inner intentions—affect the circumstances of his or her statement. Even if a defendant has confessed to the crime, he or she may still exercise the right to refuse to make statements with respect to facts underlying sentencing or unfavorable facts constituting sentencing factors, and may further shift responsibility to another person or make false statements with respect to only some facts, in order to reduce his or her own sentence. Therefore, it cannot be said that a defendant has relinquished the privilege against self-incrimination merely because he or she has confessed to his or her own crime.
Moreover, because criminal proceedings possess dynamism within a continuous flow of time, whether a defendant confesses may change at any time according to the defendant's choice until the conclusion of the trial proceedings at the fact-finding level. Cases in which a defendant who confessed at the first instance denies and contests the offense at the appellate level are quite common. Such a choice is a right inherent to the defendant. Nevertheless, the position of the majority concurring opinion—that, merely because a co-defendant who is an accomplice is confessing at the time the application to examine him or her as a witness is made, he or she may be recognized as having the qualification to testify as a witness even with respect to his or her own criminal charges—cannot be explained without contradiction in relation to the situation where the defendant subsequently changes his or her position and denies his or her own charge. The majority concurring opinion fails to take into account this variability inherent in criminal proceedings.
Ultimately, at this point, the difference between the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion lies in whether, from the standpoint of due process, in a situation where a co-defendant who is an accomplice testifies as a witness due to the temporary severance of the trial procedure and is asked questions relating to his or her own criminal charges, it is sufficient merely to grant the right to refuse to testify, or whether the defendant's right to refuse to make statements should still be recognized so as to deny the qualification to testify as a witness. The majority concurring opinion states that what is at issue here is not the defendant's statement of "self-incrimination" but rather a statement that "another co-defendant is guilty," presupposing that the two can be separated, in effect stating that the former is worthy of protection by the right to refuse to make statements while the latter is not. However, it is doubtful whether a "statement in response to a question relating to one's own criminal charges" can really be separated in that manner into a statement of "self-incrimination" and a statement that "another co-defendant is guilty." This is because, in the relationship between co-defendants who are accomplices, their respective criminal charges are closely interconnected with each other.
D. The Change in the Meaning of Defendant Examination Under the Amended Criminal Procedure Act and Its Direction
What does it mean that, under Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act as amended on February 4, 2020, an interrogation record of a co-defendant who is an accomplice, prepared by the prosecutor, is rendered inadmissible as evidence of guilt if the defendant who was the suspect or his or her defense counsel denies its content, or if another co-defendant who is an accomplice denies its content? Also, what is the direction of the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act, effective June 1, 2007, which, while emphasizing the defendant's status as a party, positioned the examination of the defendant, in principle, to be conducted after the conclusion of the examination of evidence and before the prosecutor's statement of opinion? The majority concurring opinion states that, since it has become no longer possible to secure compelling evidence through an interrogation record prepared by the prosecutor or through the examination of the defendant as a result of these amendments, the necessity for the prosecutor or another co-defendant to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness in court, in order to secure a probative statement from the defendant, has become even greater. However, one cannot help but doubt whether the majority concurring opinion, stated as above, is consistent with the purpose of the amended Criminal Procedure Act, given that the direction of the amended Criminal Procedure Act lies in strengthening the defendant's status as a party in criminal proceedings and in restraining the situation in which he or she becomes an object of the examination of evidence. The reason the dissenting opinion proposes an examination of the defendant, rather than an examination of witnesses through temporary severance of oral argument, with respect to a co-defendant who is an accomplice, is by no means because the latter is a superior method of proof to the former. Rather, the dissenting opinion's position is that, in accordance with the purpose of the amended Criminal Procedure Act, even at the cost of forgoing the securing of compelling evidence, restraining the practice of setting up the defendant as a witness with respect to his or her own criminal charges and thereby making him or her the object of examination of evidence, and instead making use, however insufficient, of the examination of the defendant, is a measure consistent with due process.
E. The Risk and Incompleteness Inherent in the Procedure for Examining a Co-defendant Who Is an Accomplice as a Witness
By its nature, it is difficult to predict in advance what questions and answers will be exchanged in an examination of witnesses. This uncertainty becomes even more pronounced, in particular, in the examination as witnesses of co-defendants who are accomplices, whose respective criminal charges are closely interrelated. In the course of examining a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness, questions are not confined solely to matters related to the criminal charges of the other co-defendant, and it is all the more difficult to expect a defendant, standing alone at the examination of witnesses without the assistance of defense counsel, to clearly distinguish between his or her own criminal charges and those of the other co-defendant when answering. Even statements that relate to the criminal charges of another co-defendant are, in many cases, ultimately also statements related to his or her own criminal charges. It is not reasonable to shift onto the defendant the risk arising from such incompleteness inherent in the examination of witnesses. It is with this awareness of the problem that the dissenting opinion argues that the current legal doctrine, which always recognizes the qualification of a co-defendant who is an accomplice to testify as a witness even where the trial procedure has been only temporarily severed, must be changed.
According to the dissenting opinion, where an application is made to examine a co-defendant who is an accomplice as a witness, the court having jurisdiction over the case may adopt the application if the matters proposed for examination do not relate to the facts charged against that co-defendant. Even where, in the course of exercising the power to direct proceedings so as to confine questioning, during an examination of witnesses conducted after severing the trial procedure, to matters relating solely to the criminal charges of the other co-defendant, a situation nevertheless arises, due to the aforementioned incompleteness inherent in the procedure for examining witnesses, in which the co-defendant who is an accomplice gives testimony relating to his or her own charges, it is the position of the dissenting opinion that the qualification to testify as a witness should be denied with respect to this portion of the statement alone, and that a situation in which he or she is indicted and punished for perjury on account of this statement should not be permitted. Where it cannot be clearly determined whether the content of the statement relates to his or her own criminal charges or to the criminal charges of the other co-defendant, then, when he or she is indicted for perjury on the pretext of that statement, the matter should be resolved in favor of the defendant by denying his or her qualification to testify as a witness.
[Reasoning]
According to the supplementary opinion of the majority, the examination of a co-defendant who is an accomplice and who denies his own crime as a witness should be refrained from, but ultimately, witness examination is permitted according to the necessity of the trial procedure, such as the discovery of substantive truth. However, under the logic of the supplementary opinion of the majority, there is no way to control the possibility that, in a situation where the prosecutor lacks evidence of conspiracy, the prosecutor forcibly indicts co-defendants as accomplices under the pretext of discovering substantive truth, requests that one of the accomplice co-defendants be examined as a witness, and then, when the credibility of that testimony is rejected in the judgment and the prosecutor fails to prove the charges against the other co-defendant, retaliates against or pressures the co-defendant who testified by means of "indictment for perjury." Since whether to indict, for perjury, the accomplice co-defendant whose testimony's credibility was rejected in the final judgment after the witness examination is left entirely to the discretion of the prosecutor, the pressure felt by the defendant standing alone on the witness stand is all the greater. No matter how hard a fact-finding judge tries to follow the desirable method of trial practice operation recommended by the supplementary opinion of the majority, there is no way to prevent the prosecutor from indicting a co-defendant for perjury on the ground that the credibility of that co-defendant's testimony related to his own suspected crime was rejected in the judgment. Recognizing witness competence for an accomplice co-defendant even in cases where the trial procedure has been only temporarily separated is, in the end, nothing other than, by prioritizing only the discovery of substantive truth, imposing the double risk of "infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination" and "punishment for perjury" on an accomplice co-defendant who has not completely lost the status of defendant within one and the same criminal procedure.
The defendant in this case may also be one such example. Even though there was no evidence other than the statement of the defendant, who was the head of the affairs department, the prosecutor indicted both the defendant and the other co-defendant Choi ○○ together as co-conspirators on the charge that Choi ○○ had participated in the crime by, among other things, instructing the fabrication of on-site photographs, and when Choi ○○ denied the fact of conspiracy, the prosecutor requested that the defendant, who had confessed, be examined as a witness in order to prove the fact of Choi ○○'s conspiracy. Subsequently, a guilty verdict was rendered against the defendant, and when the credibility of the defendant's testimony was rejected and Choi ○○ was acquitted, the prosecutor indicted the defendant for aggravated perjury (perjury committed with intent to harm another). Although the defendant's attitude of making a false statement in order to receive favorable consideration of the circumstances regarding his own criminal facts is morally reprehensible, the principle of criminal procedure — that a co-defendant placed in a contradictory position must still be guaranteed the essence of the right to refuse to make statements and of procedural rights — must be firmly maintained; nevertheless, punishing him again for perjury on the ground of a false statement concerning his own suspected offense contradicts the above principle and cannot be said to fall within the scope of due process. To criticize this as recognizing a right to actively commit perjury to harm another person is nothing other than confusing the fundamental principles of criminal procedure with moral norms. In light of this background and the progress of the proceedings in this case, one cannot help but ask on what basis the supplementary opinion of the majority states that "the current legal doctrine has been maintained for a long time, and through appropriate conduct of trials, trial practice has become established in the direction of properly guaranteeing the defendant's right to refuse to make statements."
(f) The difference between temporary separation of trial procedures and separate indictment
Where the trial procedure has been only temporarily separated in order to examine an accomplice co-defendant as a witness, since the merger of the trial procedures is scheduled to take place immediately after the witness examination is concluded, it is difficult to view the accomplice co-defendant's status as having been fully converted into that of a third party, or as having completely lost the status of co-defendant. On the other hand, where accomplices are indicted separately from the outset and the trials proceed before different courts of first instance, the court hearing the criminal charges is different, and the structure is not one in which the judge who conducted the witness examination also hears and renders judgment on the charges against that witness; therefore, there is no situation in which the status of defendant and the status of witness overlap to create a "dual status" at each respective court. In other words, the case where the trial procedure has been temporarily separated and the case where separate indictments have been made from the outset and the trials have proceeded before different courts differ in terms of the firmness of the defendant's status at the time of the witness examination, and in terms of concern over the formation of an unfavorable impression in the mind of the judge who will adjudicate the person's own charges.
Meanwhile, the supplementary opinion of the majority points out that the conclusion of the dissenting opinion could be relatively easily nullified through an alternative means or expedient such as the prosecutor's separate indictment of accomplices followed by subsequent consolidation. However, controlling or checking the prosecutor's arbitrary exercise of the power to prosecute is the inherent role and duty of the judiciary; it is difficult to accept an attitude of relaxing the strictness of criminal procedure, which is meant to guarantee the defendant's right to refuse to make statements and procedural rights, on the pretext of concern over the prosecutor's improper litigation tactics or arbitrary exercise of the power to prosecute. Moreover, in a situation where, after separate indictment of accomplices, an accomplice co-defendant has been examined as a witness, whether to subsequently consolidate the respective cases is a matter within the discretion of the court hearing the case, and it is precisely in this respect that it is necessary for the courts to operate their practice in the direction of not accepting the prosecutor's subsequent motion for consolidation. Generally speaking, from the standpoint of the court hearing the case as well, belatedly consolidating a case in which the witness examination procedure has already been completed with another case against a co-defendant is likely to be avoided, since it causes side effects such as delay of proceedings; therefore, it is expected that the side effects in this respect will not be significant.
(g) The need for follow-up measures in criminal policy
It cannot be denied that, in cases where co-defendants are in a so-called mutually opposing accomplice relationship (daehyangjeok gongbeom gwan-gye), following the dissenting opinion may create a situation in which the discovery of substantive truth, among other things, becomes difficult. However, if the current legal doctrine is changed and a new practice is established, investigative agencies will abandon their existing practice of recklessly indicting on the basis solely of the statement of an investigation cooperator, such as a bribe-giver, without objective evidence, and will instead develop new investigative techniques and methods of proof suited to crimes of mutual opposition (daehyangbeom) in order to secure objective evidence. It cannot be denied that, in our criminal justice procedure, there has been the malpractice whereby, in the course of investigating offenses such as bribery, in order to overcome the absence of objective evidence, investigative agencies have used information obtained about the bribe-giver to exploit his various weaknesses and interests, pressuring or inducing him to obtain a confession statement that he provided a bribe, and then, relying solely on this statement, have indicted the bribe-taker and the bribe-giver as accomplices, and thereafter examined the bribe-giver, who is an accomplice co-defendant, as a witness, using his testimony as evidence against the bribe-taker who denies the charge. Such conduct, in which, in a mutually opposing accomplice relationship such as bribery, investigative agencies rely solely on the statement of an investigation cooperator for indictment without making efforts to secure various other pieces of evidence including circumstantial evidence, may amount to condoning an investigative technique that in effect compels a confession statement from the bribe-giver, and is by no means desirable; the scope in which a conviction for an offense such as bribery in a mutually opposing accomplice relationship is found solely on the basis of the statement of an investigation cooperator as the only evidence must also be gradually reduced. Until such practice becomes established, some gap in punishment may arise, but the system must not be operated in a direction that infringes upon the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination on the ground of such a gap in punishment. How to prove the charges against a party to a mutually opposing accomplice relationship when the statement of an investigation cooperator is the sole evidence in a serious crime must be left as a task for criminal policy. It is not a proper attitude for the judiciary, out of concern over this, to concede the value of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or to maintain, as is, a legal doctrine that infringes upon the defendant's right to refuse to make statements and right to the assistance of counsel, among other rights.
For the foregoing reasons, we set forth this supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Judge), Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in Charge), Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Kwon Young-jun, Justice Um Sang-pil, Justice Shin Sook-hee, Justice Noh Kyung-pil, Justice Lee Suk-yeon, Justice Ma Yong-joo