[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Rural Development Corporation (농어촌진흥공사), Attorney Kim Dong-hwan, Litigation Representative
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court, Judgment of April 10, 1992, Case No. 91Na33621
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff's litigation representative.
A. As to the first ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the amendments to the Defendant Corporation's Compensation Regulations (보수규정) dated January 1, 1981 and December 1, 1986 clearly disadvantaged the workers, in that they lowered the retirement allowance payment rate and restricted the scope of wages to be included in the calculation of average wage, which forms the basis for calculating retirement allowances. Nevertheless, the court below reasoned that, because no labor union existed at the Defendant Corporation at the time, the Defendant Corporation's workplaces were scattered across 17 locations nationwide, and the number of workers was as many as approximately 2,200, it was practically impossible to ascertain the will of all workers through a collective decision-making method. On this basis, the court below held that if the Defendant Corporation had obtained a resolution of its board of directors and the consent of workers' representatives in amending the above Compensation Regulations, the Defendant Corporation could be deemed to have taken reasonable measures, thereby concluding, in effect, that the amendments to the above Compensation Regulations by the Defendant Corporation should be regarded as having obtained the workers' consent required for a disadvantageous change to the rules of employment.
However, although the authority to draft and amend the rules of employment lies in principle with the employer, such that the employer may draft and amend the rules of employment according to its own will, when such amendment disadvantageously changes working conditions, the consent of the workers who were subject to the previous working conditions or rules of employment, obtained through a collective decision-making method, is required. An amendment to the rules of employment made without obtaining such consent has no effect. As for the method of obtaining such consent, where there exists a labor union organized by a majority of the workers, the consent of that labor union suffices; where no such labor union exists, the consent of a majority of the workers must be obtained through a meeting-type method. It is the settled view of this Court (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da25055, delivered February 25, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 91Da45165, delivered December 22, 1992) that consent by a meeting-type method also permits a method whereby opinions are exchanged among workers by department or unit within a single enterprise or single workplace, free from any intervention or interference by the employer side, the pros and cons are consolidated, and these are then aggregated as a whole.
In light of the facts found above, even granting that it may have been difficult for the Defendant Corporation to obtain the workers' consent to the amendments to the above Compensation Regulations, there is no circumstance suggesting that it was impossible even to expect that meetings be held or procedures be followed by workplace or by department to confirm the workers' will. Furthermore, a resolution of the board of directors or the written consent of department heads and office chiefs, who are managerial staff of the Defendant Corporation, cannot substitute for consent obtained through the workers' collective decision-making method. Therefore, the court below's determination that the workers' consent had been obtained constitutes an error of law in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the collective consent of workers required for a disadvantageous change to the rules of employment. The argument pointing this out has merit.
B. As to the second ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that, since nearly ten years had elapsed since the amended Compensation Regulations took effect on January 1, 1981 without any express objection being raised by the workers, and moreover, even after the Defendant Corporation's labor union was established and concluded collective agreements on three occasions, no objection was raised regarding the amendment, it was reasonable to find that there had been implied consent or ratification by the workers with respect to the amendment of the above Compensation Regulations.
However, in order to find that there had been ratification by the workers or the labor union of the Defendant Corporation, it must be shown that the workers or the labor union knew that the amendments to the above Compensation Regulations were invalid. The mere facts that the workers did not raise objections to the amendments to the above Compensation Regulations, or that the labor union raised no objection while concluding collective agreements on three occasions after the amendments to the Compensation Regulations, are not sufficient to conclusively find that there had been implied consent or ratification by the workers regarding the amendment of the Compensation Regulations. Accordingly, without examining whether there was any discussion among the workers concerning the validity of the amendment to the Compensation Regulations after the amendment, or whether there was any discussion concerning the validity of the amendment to the Compensation Regulations at the time the three collective agreements were concluded, the court below's recognition of consent or ratification based solely on the aforementioned facts constitutes an error of law in failing to conduct the necessary examination or in misapprehending the legal principles concerning ratification, which affected the judgment. This argument, too, has merit.
C. As to the third ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that, because the retirement allowance payment rate was significantly higher than that of ordinary public officials, and because there was a need to unify the progressive retirement allowance system, which was implemented differently among government-invested institutions, and to rationalize the management of government-invested institutions, the amendment of the Compensation Regulations concerning retirement allowances—whereby the retirement allowance payment rate for the period prior to the amendment remained governed by the previous regulations while the progressive retirement allowance rate was adjusted downward only prospectively—was reasonable in light of common social norms (사회통념).
However, it is the view of this Court (see Supreme Court Decision 89Daka24780, delivered March 13, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 92Da49324, delivered January 26, 1993) that even if the amendments to the above Compensation Regulations were made pursuant to the government's coordination policy aimed at resolving the management difficulties of government-invested institutions caused by excessively high salary levels among executives and employees of institutions under the government at the time, and at achieving parity with ordinary public officials, this alone does not establish that there existed reasonableness under common social norms sufficient to dispense with the need for the workers' collective consent. Accordingly, the determination of the court below contains an error of law in misapprehending the legal principles concerning reasonableness that may substitute for the workers' consent in the case of a disadvantageous change to the rules of employment, and this error affected the judgment. This argument, too, has merit.
2. As to the grounds of appeal by the Defendant's litigation representative.
A. As to the first ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that even where the rules of employment provide that, in certain cases, retirement allowances shall not be paid or shall be paid at a reduced amount, withholding the retirement allowance entirely is not permissible unless the worker has committed an act of betrayal against the employer serious enough to disregard the worker's meritorious service accumulated over a long period of continuous employment. On this basis, the court below determined that the Plaintiff's having been sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier punishment for violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률) (hit-and-run) and violation of the Road Traffic Act (도로교통법) did not constitute such an act of betrayal, and therefore Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Defendant Corporation's Compensation Regulations, which provides for a reduction of the retirement benefit amount where a worker has been sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier punishment, could not be applied to the Plaintiff.
However, the above Compensation Regulations of the Defendant Corporation, which were lawfully enacted and are being implemented, provide for a reduction of the retirement benefit amount in cases of automatic dismissal due to a sentence of imprisonment or a heavier punishment, or dismissal by disciplinary action. Examining the wording of the provision and related provisions, there is no basis for construing this provision restrictively as the court below did. Therefore, so long as the Plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier punishment, the Defendant Corporation may pay a reduced retirement allowance, regardless of the reason for which such punishment was imposed, to the extent that doing so does not violate Article 28 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) and other relevant statutes. Accordingly, the determination of the court below, which differs from the foregoing, contains an error of law in misconstruing Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Compensation Regulations, which affected the judgment, and the argument pointing this out has merit.
B. As to the second ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below premised its reasoning on the ground that Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법시행령), which provides that the number of days of a leave period taken for medical treatment of an injury or illness arising from the performance of duties, a period of suspension of work attributable to the employer, and a period of probationary training, together with the wages paid during such periods, shall be excluded from the calculation of average wage, is designed to prevent the average wage system—whose purpose is to calculate the average of actual wages paid on the premise of the normal provision of labor—from being undermined, and to prevent the average wage from being unduly lowered. The court below then reasoned that the case of a worker such as the Plaintiff, who was subject to suspension from duty (직위해제) and thus failed to provide normal labor, is analogous to the foregoing, and that Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act should therefore be applied by analogy, such that the wages paid during that period, together with the number of days thereof, should likewise be excluded from the calculation of average wage. Accordingly, the court below calculated the average wage for the purpose of calculating the retirement allowance of the Plaintiff, who retired while under suspension from duty, based on the wages of the three months preceding the suspension from duty, rather than the three months preceding retirement.
However, a period during which a worker, such as the Plaintiff, was suspended from duty due to having been indicted and detained for a personal crime does not fall under any of the periods prescribed in Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree, and therefore the number of days of that period and the amount of wages paid during that period may not be excluded from the basis for calculating average wage under the main text of Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act. If including that period and those wages results in a lowered average wage such that the average wage falls below the ordinary wage, then, pursuant to Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act, the ordinary wage should have been used as the average wage for calculating the retirement allowance.
The judgment below, which instead calculated the average wage by excluding the number of days of the suspension-from-duty period and the wages paid during that period from the basis for calculating average wage, contains an error of law in misapprehending the legal principles concerning Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, which affected the judgment. The argument pointing this out has merit.
3. Therefore, the appeals of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are accepted, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Ahn Woo-man (Presiding Justice), Kim Yong-jun, Cheon Gyeong-song (Justice in Charge), Ahn Yong-deuk