[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff's Litigation Representative: Seongsim General Law Firm, Attorneys Kang Su-rim and 2 others
[Defendant, Appellant] Korean ○○ Association (사단법인 대한○○회), Litigation Representative: Attorney Lee Se-jak
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Decision 93Na29015 rendered on April 8, 1994
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
On the First Ground
It is the established position of this Court that, where the preparation or amendment of employment rules (취업규칙) pursuant to Article 95(1) of the former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (before its amendment by Act No. 4099 on March 29, 1989) has content that deprives employees of vested rights or interests and imposes disadvantageous working conditions, the consent of the group of employees who were subject to the previous working conditions or employment rules, obtained through a collective decision-making method, is required, and employment rules prepared or amended without such consent are invalid unless they are recognized as having reasonableness in light of common social norms (see, e.g., this Court's Decisions 93Da17898 rendered on August 24, 1993; 92Da49324 rendered on January 26, 1993; and 92Da39778 rendered on January 15, 1993).
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court found, based on the evidence presented, that the Defendant Association, on August 28, 1979 and December 27, 1980, amended its remuneration regulations to lower the retirement allowance payment rates as indicated in the judgment, and that as the procedure for amending such regulations, only deliberation and resolution by the board of directors was undertaken; that although the amendment proposals were circulated to the employees before and after each amendment of the remuneration regulations, no request for expression of assent or dissent was made; and that no consent was otherwise obtained through a collective decision-making method by the employees belonging to the Defendant Association. Based on these findings, the lower court determined that the amendment of the remuneration regulations at issue in this case was made without the consent, through a collective decision-making method, of the employees who were subject to the regulations at that time, and was therefore invalid. Upon examining the relevant evidence against the record, the above factual findings and determination of the lower court are justified, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality, as argued in the grounds of appeal, such as insufficient deliberation, violation of the rules of evidence, or misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the method of obtaining employees' consent to amendments of working conditions. This ground of appeal is without merit.
On the Second Ground
According to the record of this case, it is recognized that the labor union established around March 9, 1988, after the amendment of the remuneration regulations at issue in this case, with the participation of a majority of the employees belonging to the Defendant Association, entered into a collective agreement with the Defendant Association on March 5, 1991, which provides that wages, bonuses, diligence allowance, and physical fitness allowance/family allowance shall be governed by the respective regulations of the Defendant Association (Articles 23 through 27 of the collective agreement, and Article 5 of the Addendum), but contains no provisions regarding retirement allowances, and that Article 3 of the Addendum to the collective agreement provides that "working conditions not specified in this agreement shall be determined by mutual consultation in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations." Accordingly, it cannot be found that the labor union ratified the invalid retirement allowance regulations at issue in this case at the time of concluding the above collective agreement.
The lower court's judgment, which is to the same effect, is justified, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality, as argued in the grounds of appeal, involving a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning ratification of working conditions. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
On the Third Ground
Even if, at the time of the amendment of the remuneration regulations at issue in this case, all state-invested enterprises were in a situation where salary regulations were being amended downward for the normalization of their operations, and even if the Defendant Association likewise made the amendment at issue in accordance with the instructions of the government supervisory authority for the purpose of rationalizing management amid financial difficulties, such circumstances alone cannot be regarded as constituting reasonableness in light of common social norms sufficient to dispense with the need for the consent of the group of employees (see, e.g., this Court's Decisions 92Da49324 rendered on January 26, 1993; 92Da45490 rendered on September 14, 1993; and 92Da20309 rendered on April 12, 1994). The lower court's judgment, which is to the same effect, is justified, and there is no illegality as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
On the Fourth Ground
Upon examining the record of this case, the lower court's determination that it cannot be found that the Plaintiff individually consented to the amendment of the remuneration regulations at issue in this case is justified. Furthermore, even if the Defendant has paid retirement allowances to retiring employees calculated according to the amended regulations, and even if the Plaintiff himself raised no objection at the time of receiving his retirement allowance, since the amended remuneration regulations are without effect, the Plaintiff's claim in this case cannot be said to violate the principle of good faith. The lower court's judgment, which is to the same effect, is also justified, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is likewise without merit.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating.
Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Justice), Park Man-ho, Park Jun-seo (Justice in Charge), Kim Hyung-sun