[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee]
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 92Na65137 rendered on December 9, 1993
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Upon examination of the record, the fact-finding of the first instance court, as cited by the court below, regarding the matters raised in the arguments is deemed justified and acceptable. However, in connection with the incentive dispute, when the union's dispute report was returned and the union was thereby practically unable to engage in a labor dispute, the first instance judgment, as cited by the court below, found that the union executive body including Plaintiff 1 held a delegates' meeting and, as part of a so-called "law-abiding struggle," resolved that union members who received hazardous overtime allowances would work only 6 hours per day, and as stated in its findings, had day-shift workers delay their starting time by 2 hours each, and had workers who were to report for duty at 23:00 not work at all. This finding cannot be regarded otherwise than as meaning that, on the ground that the dispute occurrence report had been returned, the union resolved to and did carry out a so-called "law-abiding struggle" instead of a labor dispute in the ordinary form such as a strike. Therefore, there is no illegality of erroneous fact-finding as argued in the appeal. All of these grounds of appeal are without merit.
2. Regarding the legitimacy of the grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff 1:
A. Even if the Defendant Company was at fault with respect to the circumstances under which Plaintiff 1 distributed leaflets demanding bonuses, in judging the legitimacy of the disciplinary action against the said Plaintiff, which was based on other misconduct as the grounds for discipline, it is proper to take into account, as a factor in determining the severity of discipline, the violation of the provision of the Rules of Employment requiring the employer's permission for the distribution of leaflets. There is no illegality of contradictory reasoning as argued in the appeal.
Moreover, a provision in the Rules of Employment requiring an employer's permission for the distribution of leaflets within the workplace in order to maintain workplace order, and a disciplinary provision allowing discipline against employees who violate this, cannot be held void as violating the constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of speech. Therefore, the argument disputing this point is without merit.
B. Even if there was an agreement of exemption from liability not to discipline an employee with respect to certain misconduct, this only prohibits using that particular misconduct as grounds for discipline; it does not prohibit taking into account the fact of the misconduct covered by the exemption agreement as a factor in determining the severity of discipline when disciplining the employee on the basis of other misconduct as grounds for discipline. Therefore, the argument disputing this point is also without merit.
C. The first instance judgment, as cited by the court below, under the heading "Obstruction of Business Due to Illegal Strike," found the fact that the said Plaintiff, from May 17, 1989 to June 19 of the same year, as stated in its findings, used force to block the company's entrances, etc., thereby obstructing employees who wished to report for work and obstructing the Company's business. If the facts are as such, then, as will be discussed below, this strike action cannot be regarded as having attained social propriety in terms of the method and manner of the labor dispute, and thus cannot be deemed legitimate. Accordingly, the fact-finding of the court below recognizing the above strike as an illegal strike is proper, and there is no illegality therein as argued in the appeal.
D. (1)
It has been the consistently held view of this Court (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Da43800 rendered on July 14, 1992; 91Da34523 rendered on May 12, 1992; 91Nu5204 rendered on January 21, 1992; 91Do324 rendered on May 24, 1991; 90Do357 rendered on May 15, 1990, etc.) that, for a worker's labor dispute action to have legitimacy: its subject must be a labor union with the capacity to conduct collective bargaining or conclude a collective agreement; its purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; as to timing, it must commence only after the employer has refused collective bargaining regarding the workers' specific demands for improved working conditions, or has given a refusal in response to such demands at the bargaining table, and, absent special circumstances, it must go through the approval resolution of union members and the report of occurrence of a labor dispute as prescribed by statute; as to method, it must passively suspend the provision of labor, in whole or in part, so as to inflict a setback on the employer; it must comply with the principle of fairness in light of the principle of good faith in labor relations; it must be in harmony with the employer's ownership and other property rights over the business facilities; and it must not, of course, involve violence or destructive acts. Here, the phrase "its purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions" means that the demands sought to be achieved through the dispute must be matters that can be the subject of collective bargaining (see the above Decision 91Da34523; Supreme Court Decision 93Da30242 rendered on March 25, 1994).
Furthermore, a labor dispute action carried out in violation of the so-called peace obligation — that is, the obligation not to conduct, during the term of validity of a collective agreement, a labor dispute demanding the modification, amendment, or abolition of working conditions or other matters already fixed in the collective agreement — not only undermines the essential function of a collective agreement in peacefully and autonomously regulating labor relations, but also violates the principle of good faith required in labor relations, and therefore must be held to lack legitimacy.
Now, in the case at hand, according to the record, the labor union to which the Plaintiffs belonged demanded bargaining regarding the payment of a special bonus based on business performance (the "incentive" prescribed in Article 53, Paragraph 3 of the Collective Agreement), and when the Defendant Company refused this, the union carried out an "incentive dispute" from October 7, 1989, through a form of labor dispute called the "law-abiding struggle," for the purpose of forcing acceptance of the incentive payment amount as demanded by the union. Meanwhile, Article 53, Paragraph 3 of the collective agreement then validly in effect provided that the payment of incentives was to be determined through labor-management consultation, and Article 88 provided that "with respect to matters prescribed in this Agreement, excluding disputes concerning the interpretation of the Agreement, the parties shall bear a peace obligation during the term of validity of this Agreement." Given this, it must be held that, as regards the Defendant Company, during the term of validity of the above collective agreement, an agreement between labor and management was reached such that working conditions relating to whether and how incentives were to be paid were designated as matters for labor-management consultation, thereby excluding them from the subject of collective bargaining. Therefore, the above labor dispute action, which was carried out to force acceptance of the union's demand after the union had demanded bargaining regarding the payment of incentives — a matter already agreed by the collective agreement to be a matter for labor-management consultation and thus not a subject of collective bargaining — and after that demand had been refused, must be held to lack legitimacy, not only because its objective was something that could not be the subject of collective bargaining, but also because it violated the peace obligation discussed above.
Given these circumstances, even if, as argued in the appeal, the dispute occurrence report filed with respect to this matter was lawful, or the dispute action was taken after the cooling-off period had elapsed from the date of the report, this alone does not make it a legitimate labor dispute action (see the above Decision 93Da30242). Therefore, the argument that the court below failed to sufficiently examine the legitimacy of the labor dispute action is also without merit.
(2) As stated above, the fact-finding of the first instance court that, during the above incentive dispute, on October 4, 1989, some 30 union officers including Plaintiff 1 chanted slogans and sang labor songs in front of the Company's executive office, thereby obstructing the Company's business, is proper. If the facts are as such, this must be held to constitute obstruction of the Company's business by the said Plaintiff and others through the use of force, and this cannot be regarded as legitimate union activity. Therefore, there is no illegality of misunderstanding the law regarding the elements of the offense of obstruction of business and the assessment of illegality. The argument disputing this point is also without merit.
E. As stated above, the fact-finding of the first instance court that Plaintiff 1, despite not being an employee directly employed by Dongguk University Pohang Hospital, nor a person with lawful authority under statute, intervened in the labor dispute at that hospital, is proper. Therefore, there is no illegality of misunderstanding the legal principle on the prohibition of third-party intervention. The said Plaintiff's above conduct constitutes "a person who, without justifiable reason, ... has exceeded his authority" as prescribed in Article 18.2(18) of the Rules of Employment. The first instance judgment, as cited by the court below, merely held that the said Plaintiff's above conduct itself constituted grounds for discipline under the Rules of Employment, and did not hold that it constituted grounds for discipline on the basis that the said Plaintiff had received a conviction due to such conduct. Therefore, the arguments disputing these points are also without merit.
3. Regarding the legitimacy of the grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff 2:
A. Even though the dismissal action against the said Plaintiff on the ground of false statements in his resume was found to constitute an unfair labor practice, and it was subsequently agreed that this matter would not be raised again, in light of the legal principle discussed in Paragraph 2.B above, it was proper for the court below, in judging the legitimacy of the dismissal of the said Plaintiff carried out on the basis of other grounds for discipline, to take into account this act of false statement in the resume as a factor in determining the severity of discipline. The reason an enterprise requires a resume stating educational background or work experience when hiring an employee is not solely to assess the employee's working ability, that is, labor capacity, but also because, for the purpose of building trust between labor and management and maintaining enterprise order, it is necessary to make a comprehensive personal assessment of the employee's intelligence and experience, level of education, honesty, and settledness and adaptability in the workplace, in order to decide whether to hire (see Supreme Court Decisions 87Daka3196 rendered on March 14, 1989; 92Da8873 rendered on June 23, 1992, etc.), and the mere passage of a long period of time since then does not cure such a defect (see the above Decision 87Daka3196). Therefore, the arguments disputing these points are also without merit.
B. As stated above, the fact-finding of the first instance court that Plaintiff 2 participated in the illegal strike from May 17, 1989 to June 19 of the same year is proper. Therefore, there is no illegality of insufficient examination regarding the illegal strike or misunderstanding of the legal principle on obstruction of business. This argument is also without merit.
C. Visiting a labor dispute site for the purpose of supporting a labor dispute action at a place of business with which one does not have an employment relationship, in order to encourage those engaged in the dispute action, delivering beverages, etc. to them, and jointly chanting slogans and singing labor songs with them, constitutes third-party intervention as prescribed in Article 13-2 of the former Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법) (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do2178 rendered on April 12, 1994). Therefore, if, as found in the first instance judgment cited by the court below, the said Plaintiff led some 30 union officers and delegates to visit the dispute site as stated in its findings, delivered beverages, etc., and chanted slogans and sang labor songs, this must be held to constitute third-party intervention under the above Act. The judgment below to the same effect is proper, and this cannot be regarded as merely legitimate union activity. If the facts are as such, this constitutes "a person who, without justifiable reason, ... has exceeded his authority" as prescribed in Article 18.2(18) of the Rules of Employment. The fact that the court below did not accept the Defendant's argument that the Defendant Company's reputation was damaged by the said Plaintiff's above conduct does not mean there is an illegality of contradictory reasoning, as argued, in treating this as a ground for discipline. This argument is also without merit.
D. The judgment on the said Plaintiff's grounds of appeal regarding the incentive dispute is the same as the judgment on the corresponding grounds of appeal regarding Plaintiff 1. This argument is also without merit.
E. (1)
As argued, Article 12 of the collective agreement provides: "Union activities by union members who are not full-time union officials shall in principle be conducted outside working hours; however, where there is an unavoidable reason to engage in union activities during working hours, prior notice shall be given to the Company, and this shall be permitted absent special reasons." However, it is consistent with the purpose of this provision to limit union activities of non-full-time union members during working hours to cases where the purpose is legitimate union activity. Moreover, this is only exceptionally permitted under the provision of the collective agreement itself, and furthermore, since the Company is required, upon notice from the union side of union activity by non-full-time union members during working hours, to permit it absent special reasons, in light of these points, the "unavoidable reason" prescribed in the above provision must be interpreted very restrictively.
Accordingly, considering these circumstances together with Article 18 of the union's bylaws, which specifically prescribes matters to be resolved by the general union assembly, and Article 22 of the union's bylaws, which provides that the delegates' assembly may deliberate and resolve on matters to be resolved by the general assembly other than the election of officers, votes of approval or disapproval regarding wages and the conclusion of agreements, merger, division, or dissolution of the union, and resolutions on whether to commence a labor dispute, the holding of an extraordinary general assembly during working hours as union activity by non-full-time union members must be limited, for example, to cases such as where most union officers have vacated their posts, creating an urgent situation making it difficult to carry out the union's normal activities, thus necessitating the holding of an extraordinary general assembly to elect officers to fill the vacancies, or where it is necessary to make an important decision regarding the continued existence of the union or organizational change, such as a merger, or where it is necessary to hold an extraordinary general assembly to resolve on whether to carry out a legitimate labor dispute action.
Therefore, holding an extraordinary general assembly during working hours in order to decide whether to carry out an illegitimate labor dispute action is not only contrary to the purpose of Article 12 of the collective agreement, which permits union activities by non-full-time union members during working hours, but also does not fall under the "unavoidable reason" prescribed in Article 12 of the collective agreement.
(2) In this case, the purpose for which the Defendant Company's labor union held the extraordinary general assembly on October 6, 1989, was, as discussed above, to resolve on whether to carry out a labor dispute for the purpose of forcing acceptance of the incentive payment amount as demanded by the union — a matter that is not a subject of collective bargaining but must be decided through labor-management consultation. Therefore, this cannot be held to constitute an "unavoidable reason" under Article 12 of the collective agreement.
Accordingly, it was proper for the Defendant not to permit the holding of the extraordinary general assembly during working hours on the above date, and this conclusion is not to be interpreted otherwise merely because the Defendant's place of business operates on a 24-hour shift basis. Therefore, there is no illegality of erroneous interpretation of the "special reasons" prescribed in Article 12 of the collective agreement.
Furthermore, the purpose of the extraordinary general assembly that the above labor union decided to hold on January 23, 1990 was to report on the progress of matters relating to the detention of Plaintiff 1, who was then the union chairman, and this too cannot be held to constitute an unavoidable reason to be permitted as union activity by non-full-time union members during working hours. Therefore, it was also proper for the Defendant not to permit that extraordinary general assembly. In the end, all of the arguments disputing these points are without merit.
F. Although the court below found it difficult to recognize that the Defendant Company's reputation was damaged by Plaintiff 2's act of refusing to submit relevant documents when requested to do so by Pohang City, the supervisory authority, for the purpose of a business investigation into the union's operations and accounting status, etc., it nevertheless held that the said Plaintiff's above conduct constituted grounds for discipline under the Rules of Employment. The ground for discipline intended by the court below appears to refer to "a person who, without justifiable reason, has disobeyed a superior's order or exceeded his authority" as prescribed in Article 18.2(18) of the Rules of Employment. However, the union's obligation to submit materials under Article 30 of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법) is intended to enable the supervisory authority to effectively carry out its guidance for promoting the democratic operation of the union and the sound management of union finances, etc. Therefore, a union official's refusal of the supervisory authority's request to submit materials is merely a passive failure to perform the above obligation, and cannot be held to constitute "exceeding authority" in the sense of actively exercising authority beyond its scope, so as to undermine enterprise order vis-à-vis the employer.
Therefore, the first instance judgment, as cited by the court below, erred in its interpretation of the grounds for discipline in holding that the said Plaintiff's act of refusing the business investigation constituted a ground for discipline under the Rules of Employment. However, since it is recognized, as will be seen below, that the remaining grounds for discipline, excluding this one, are sufficient to justify the dismissal of the said Plaintiff, this error of the court below does not affect the outcome of the judgment. This argument is also without merit.
G. As stated above, the fact-finding of the first instance court that the said Plaintiff prepared and distributed a leaflet containing false statements is proper, and even if the said Plaintiff did not prepare the said leaflet, the act of distributing it without permission clearly constitutes a ground for discipline under Article 18.2(16) of the Rules of Employment. Therefore, the argument disputing this point is also without merit.
H. The said Plaintiff's act, on May 21, 1990, of singing labor songs, etc. in the courtroom where the sentencing trial of Plaintiff 1 was in progress, and of scuffling with the correctional officers who were about to escort Plaintiff 1, thereby obstructing the performance of their official duties, constitutes "a person who has committed violence against another" as prescribed in Article 18.2(11) of the Rules of Employment, or constitutes "a person who, without justifiable reason, ... has exceeded his authority" as prescribed in Article 18.2(18). Therefore, there is no illegality in this respect in the judgment below as argued in the appeal.
4. As argued, Article 18.3 of the Defendant Company's Rules of Employment provides that, in dismissing an employee on the ground of attributable misconduct, the approval of the Labor Relations Commission must be obtained. However, under the current statutory provisions, the Labor Relations Commission does not have the authority to grant prior recognition or approval regarding an employer's dismissal of an employee. Therefore, even if the employer, in dismissing an employee, did not obtain the approval of the Labor Relations Commission as provided in the above provision of the Rules of Employment, this cannot affect the validity of the dismissal (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da49192 rendered on January 11, 1994). Therefore, the argument disputing this point is also without merit.
5. In light of the number and content of each of the Plaintiffs' acts of misconduct as revealed in the record, the motives therefor, the economic loss and damage to reputation suffered by the Defendant Company as a result, and the Plaintiffs' work attitude to date, including their extreme illegal labor dispute activities, it must be held that each of the Plaintiffs' acts of misconduct is to such a degree that, under generally accepted social norms, it would be markedly unreasonable to continue the employment relationship with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, it was proper for the Defendant to disciplinarily dismiss the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rules of Employment on these grounds, and this cannot be held to constitute an unfair labor practice either. Therefore, the argument disputing this point is also without merit.
6. Accordingly, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by the losing Plaintiffs, the Justices participating in the judgment being unanimous in this opinion, and the judgment is rendered as stated in the Order.
Justice Kim Hyung-seon (Presiding Justice), Park Man-ho (Justice in charge), Park Jun-seo, Lee Yong-hoon