[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Haman Traffic Co., Ltd. (함안교통 유한회사)
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 90Na8664 delivered on August 29, 1991
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the plaintiff's losing portion regarding the claim for payment of money is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.
[Reasoning]
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. Regarding the wage claim
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the defendant company's disciplinary dismissal of the plaintiff dated January 25, 1989 in this case was invalid for the reasons stated therein. The court below then addressed the plaintiff's claim that, since the plaintiff had been employed as a driver for the defendant company and had earned an average monthly income of at least 500,000 won, payment at the rate of 500,000 won per month should be made until the plaintiff's reinstatement. With respect to this claim, the court below ordered payment only of the amount at the rate of 215,254 won per month, which is the sum of the base salary paid monthly by the defendant company to the plaintiff plus the bonus equivalent to 100% of the base salary paid annually, characterizing only this amount as "wages." The court below, on the premise that the remaining amount—which the plaintiff himself retained as his own income after deducting from the daily transportation revenue the fixed quota amount (사납금) paid to the defendant company—did not constitute wages, construed the plaintiff's claim for this remaining amount as a claim for damages for loss of expected income due to the disciplinary dismissal in this case, and rejected this portion of the claim on the ground that the defendant company's dismissal of the plaintiff alone could not, absent other special circumstances, constitute a tort.
However, according to the record, the defendant company, in addition to paying its drivers a fixed amount each month based on the actual number of days worked, has allowed drivers—in consideration of the special nature of their form of labor and for convenience of calculation—to keep as their own personal income, subject to their free disposal, the remaining balance of the daily transportation revenue after deducting the fixed quota amount (사납금) paid to the defendant company. Given its nature, this portion constituting the individual driver's personal income should also be regarded as wages, being compensation for labor (see this Court's Decision 87Daka570 delivered on March 22, 1988). Meanwhile, the plaintiff has asserted and proven that his monthly income, amounting to approximately 500,000 won, consists of the sum of the fixed amount paid monthly by the defendant company based on days worked plus the remaining portion constituting his personal income after deduction of the quota amount from the daily transportation revenue. The plaintiff has not clearly stated that he is claiming the portion constituting his personal income separately from the fixed monthly amount paid by the defendant company, specifically as damages. In light of these circumstances, it is reasonable to construe that the plaintiff intended to claim the entire amount of 500,000 won as wages.
Therefore, the court below should have ascertained the amount constituting the plaintiff's personal income and then determined the merits of the claim accordingly. Nevertheless, the court below rejected this portion of the claim for the reasons stated above alone, thereby either misunderstanding the nature of the portion constituting the driver's personal income or misinterpreting the content of the plaintiff's assertions, and failing to exhaust the examination of the matter, which constitutes an error that affected the judgment. The argument pointing out this error has merit.
2. Regarding the claim for consolation money
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for consolation money, which was sought on the ground that the plaintiff suffered mental distress due to the defendant's wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff, on the basis that, although the disciplinary dismissal in this case is invalid, this alone does not, absent other special circumstances, constitute a tort.
However, while it is generally true that where an employer's disciplinary dismissal of an employee is determined to be invalid due to lack of justification, the mere fact that the dismissal is rendered invalid does not immediately mean that the dismissal constitutes a tort, nevertheless, in cases where an employer, despite having no grounds whatsoever for disciplinary dismissal of an employee, deliberately fabricates or asserts some nominal ground for dismissal solely with the intent to expel the employee from the workplace, and resorts to disciplinary measures to dismiss the employee, or in cases where the fact relied upon as the ground for dismissal objectively and clearly does not fall under the statutory grounds for dismissal or cannot serve as a ground for dismissal, and where, even with a modicum of attention, such circumstances could have been easily recognized, yet the employer nonetheless proceeded with the disciplinary dismissal on that ground—in such cases where the abuse of the right to discipline is clearly unacceptable under sound social norms or common social standards, the dismissal is not merely rendered ineffective for lack of justification as referred to in Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), but constitutes the unlawful infliction of mental distress upon the other party, and may thus constitute a tort in relation to the employee. In such cases, even if the dismissal is legally invalid and the situation reverts to the state prior to the dismissal, this does not mean that the dismissal, as a social fact, is retroactively extinguished or resolved; therefore, the mere fact that the employee subsequently receives the wages that were not paid during that period does not mean that the damage from mental distress caused by the tort is thereby completely remedied (see this Court's Decision 92Da43586 delivered on October 12, 1993).
However, as found by the court below, the grounds for disciplinary action against the plaintiff asserted by the defendant company either do not constitute grounds for discipline at all or cannot serve as grounds for discipline. Moreover, in light of the fact that the defendant company, through labor-management consultation, had agreed to let bygones be bygones regarding matters arising during the strike period around September 1987, yet, in violation of this agreement, raised issues concerning the strike period anew after as long as one year and three months had passed; and in light of the fact that the defendant company itself, having repeatedly issued wrongful advance notices of dismissal and wrongful dismissals against the plaintiff since around November 1986, continued to ignore the remedial order of the Labor Relations Commission which had determined the advance notice of dismissal to be an unfair labor practice, as well as the court judgment which had determined the dismissal to be invalid, while actively refusing to allow the plaintiff to work or be reinstated, and yet conversely asserted, as one of the grounds for the dismissal in this case, that the plaintiff had failed to report for normal duty without any justification—in light of all these circumstances, it appears that the defendant company, despite having no clear grounds for dismissing the plaintiff, carried out the disciplinary dismissal in this case with the intent to completely exclude the plaintiff from the defendant company, the plaintiff having established and led the labor union. If this is indeed the case, it must be regarded as falling under a case that is clearly unacceptable under sound social norms or common social standards.
The court below's rejection of the plaintiff's claim for consolation money based solely on the reasons stated therein constitutes an error affecting the judgment, arising from a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the establishment of tort liability in cases of wrongful dismissal. The argument pointing out this error also has merit.
3. Accordingly, the part of the judgment below concerning the plaintiff's losing portion regarding the claim for payment of money is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Busan High Court. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved.
Justice Yoon Young-cheol (Presiding Justice), Kim Sang-won, Park Man-ho, Park Jun-seo (Justice in Charge)