[Plaintiffs, Appellants]
[Defendant, Appellee] Defendant Co., Ltd.
[Original Judgment]
Seoul High Court Decision 90Na36968 decided July 5, 1991
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs' litigation representative are examined.
As to Point 1(a):
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the lower court's factual finding that Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were also given an opportunity to appear before the disciplinary committee and to explain themselves, since the notice of convening the disciplinary committee and the notice to appear were delivered to them, is justified and may be upheld. Furthermore, although Article 32 of the Defendant Company's collective agreement provides in principle that notice to appear before the disciplinary committee is to be given by delivering a written document to the person subject to discipline personally, notice by supplementary service or deposit service is also to be regarded as valid. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment below erred by mistaking the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, or by misinterpreting the above collective agreement provision, as argued. This ground is without merit.
As to Point 1(b):
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court found the following facts: Article 32 of the collective agreement provides that when the Company intends to discipline a union member, it shall decide after deliberation by the Personnel Committee (Disciplinary Committee), and shall notify the relevant union member in writing at least 5 days in advance, specifying the personal details of the subject, the grounds for discipline, and the date, time and place of the disciplinary committee meeting; that the relevant union member must be given an opportunity to explain if requested; that if the member requests to call a witness, this must be approved; that the labor union must also be notified in writing at least 5 days in advance of the disciplinary deliberation; and that 3 union representatives must be allowed to attend the disciplinary committee to present their opinions. The lower court also found that the Defendant Company served notices to appear before the disciplinary committee on the Plaintiffs, thereby giving the Plaintiffs themselves or their agents an opportunity to appear before the disciplinary committee and explain themselves; that it served notices of attendance on the labor union, thereby giving the union representatives an opportunity to attend the disciplinary committee; that for some Plaintiffs who were then in detention, it selected 2 of the disciplinary committee members as representatives to hear responses directly from the detained persons; and that the Plaintiffs and the labor union requested that the disciplinary committee be postponed until operations returned to normal, and did not have union representatives attend the disciplinary committee.
Based on these findings, the lower court determined as follows: the purport of the above collective agreement provision — that the Defendant Company must give the subject an opportunity to explain when disciplining a union member, and must have union representatives attend to present their opinions — is satisfied by giving the opportunity to explain; actual explanation itself need not necessarily be made. Therefore, where the opportunity was given but no explanation was made, or no explanation was requested at all, the disciplinary procedure may proceed merely upon notice. Likewise, the purpose of having 3 union representatives attend to present opinions is to prevent unjust disciplinary action in advance and to enable the union to check the Company's unilateral exercise of personnel authority, thereby securing the status of union members; therefore, where the opportunity to attend was given but the representatives did not attend, the disciplinary committee may be convened without their attendance and presentation of opinions. Accordingly, the disciplinary committee meeting held on January 18, 1989 in this case, having given the Plaintiffs or the union representatives the opportunity to appear or attend and explain or present their opinions, cannot be deemed unlawful merely because it proceeded without the attendance of the Plaintiffs or the union representatives, who themselves refused to appear or attend.
Upon examination of the record, the lower court's findings and determination as above are justified and may be upheld. Moreover, it cannot be said that the Defendant Company's refusal to accept the Plaintiffs' and the labor union's request to postpone the disciplinary proceedings was unjust as argued, nor does it appear that the circumstances at the time were such that the Plaintiffs were substantially unable to explain themselves or that the attendance of union representatives was in fact precluded. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment below erred, as argued, in misinterpreting the above collective agreement provision or in misunderstanding the relevant legal principles. This ground is also without merit.
As to Point 1(c):
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court found that Article 17, Item 2 of the collective agreement provides that prior consent of the labor union must be obtained regarding personnel actions concerning labor union officers (executives, operating/standing committee members, delegates). However, the lower court also found that Article 17, under the heading "Personnel Authority," provides in Item 1 that "the union acknowledges that all authority regarding personnel matters resides in the Company"; in Item 3 that "the Company shall ensure fairness in personnel matters concerning union members and shall not discriminate against them on the ground of union membership"; in Item 4 that "the union may present its opinion in advance regarding the criteria for promotion and pay-grade advancement of union members, and the Company shall respect this"; in Item 5 that "the Company shall notify the union of all matters concerning personnel affairs of union members"; and in Item 6 that "where the union has an objection regarding personnel matters concerning a union member, it may file an objection with the Company, and the Company shall respect the reasonable opinion and consult with the union."
Based on the purport and content of these provisions, and considering that if it were held that disciplinary action against a union member takes effect only upon obtaining the union's prior consent or subsequent approval, the employer's inherent disciplinary authority — recognized for the maintenance of employees' service discipline and other order in the enterprise — would essentially be infringed and rendered meaningless, the lower court determined that Article 17, Item 2 of the collective agreement applies only where the Defendant Company exercises ordinary personnel authority over union members, such as promotion, pay-grade advancement, or transfer, and cannot be construed to apply even where a union officer is disciplined pursuant to the collective agreement on grounds for discipline.
However, discipline against an employee is a matter concerning personnel affairs (see this Court's Decisions 91Da22100 decided May 22, 1992, and 92Da13400 decided September 22, 1992), and even though personnel authority in principle belongs to the employer, the employer may, of its own volition, impose restrictions on such authority. Therefore, if the employer, through a collective agreement concluded with the labor union, has recognized the union's involvement in personnel matters concerning union members, the effect thereof shall arise in accordance with the purport of the agreement provision (see this Court's Decision 92Da18542 decided September 25, 1992), and the provisions of each item of Article 17 of the collective agreement as construed by the lower court do not warrant a different conclusion.
Furthermore, where the specific content of a personnel clause provided in a collective agreement, etc., is such that it merely requires giving the labor union an opportunity to present its opinion so that the employer may exercise due care in taking personnel action, failure to follow that procedure does not affect the validity of the personnel action. However, as in the present case, where it is provided that the employer must obtain the labor union's prior consent, or obtain the union's approval, or discuss the matter with the union and reach agreement before taking personnel action, a personnel action taken without following that procedure must, in principle, be deemed void (see this Court's Decisions 91Da4775 decided April 14, 1992, 91Da22100 decided May 22, 1992, 92Da32074 decided December 8, 1992, and 92Da34940 decided April 23, 1993).
According to the record, the remaining Plaintiffs, excluding Plaintiff 4, are found to be officers of the labor union. Therefore, the lower court's determination that the personnel-consent clause under Article 17, Item 2 of the collective agreement does not apply to disciplinary actions must be regarded, with respect to the remaining Plaintiffs excluding Plaintiff 4, as an error in the interpretation of the personnel provisions under the collective agreement.
Nevertheless, even where it is provided, as a product of labor-management negotiation, that prior consent of the labor union must be obtained in disciplining and dismissing union officers, this is intended to restrict the employer's unjust exercise of disciplinary authority over union officers, and cannot be construed as denying the employer's exercise of disciplinary authority over employees itself, which belongs to the employer's inherent authority. Accordingly, the union's right of prior consent must, after all, be exercised reasonably in accordance with the principle of good faith. Therefore, where the person subject to discipline has objectively clear grounds for discipline, and the employer has made sincere and genuine efforts to obtain the union's consent in disciplining that person, but the union has nonetheless recklessly refused without presenting any reasonable basis or reason, thereby abusing its right to refuse consent, or where it is recognized that the union itself has waived the exercise of such prior consent right, the disciplinary action cannot be deemed void merely because the employer failed to obtain the union's prior consent (see this Court's Decisions 92Da45735 decided July 13, 1993, and 92Da32074 decided December 8, 1992).
However, as in the present case, where the collective agreement requires the union's prior consent for disciplining union officers, but neither the collective agreement nor the rules of employment, etc., contain any provision regarding the specific procedure or method for such prior consent, and Article 32 of the collective agreement merely provides that when the Company intends to discipline a union member, it must notify the labor union of the disciplinary deliberation at least 5 days in advance (Paragraph 2), and that 3 union representatives shall be allowed to attend the disciplinary committee to present their opinions (Paragraph 4), then the union's consent or non-consent to discipline should ordinarily be understood as being effected through the procedure whereby union representatives attend the disciplinary committee and present their opinions.
According to the facts as found by the lower court and the record, due to a series of illegal labor disputes by the Plaintiffs, including occupation of and sit-in at the Defendant Company's Angang Plant as described below, operations at the Defendant Company's Angang Plant were completely suspended at the time, and the Company's business was entirely paralyzed. In the midst of this, because of the danger that might arise from the failure to properly manage military ammunition and explosives produced and stored at the Angang Plant, police force was deployed to suppress the Plaintiffs' illegal labor dispute. As a result, most of the core officers of the executive body of the Defendant Company's labor union Angang Plant Branch, including Plaintiff 1, the Branch chief who led the illegal labor dispute, and Plaintiff 5, the senior deputy branch chief, were detained, and the union office was closed. Accordingly, Non-party 1, the deputy branch chief, was designated as acting branch chief and handled union affairs at a temporary office set up in Angang-eup. Under these circumstances, the Defendant Company determined that, as a prerequisite for the prompt calming of the situation and normalization of operations, disciplinary action against those responsible for causing the disorder was unavoidable, and decided to convene a disciplinary committee on January 18, 1989 to resolve on discipline against the Plaintiffs and other subjects of discipline. On January 11 of that month, it sent notices to appear to the subjects of discipline, and, pursuant to Article 32, Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the collective agreement, sent notices (Defendant's Exhibit 13) to the chairman of the Defendant Company's labor union, the Angang Branch chief, and Non-party 1 as acting Angang Branch chief, stating that a disciplinary committee meeting would be held, requesting that 3 union representatives attend and present their opinions, and stating that failure to attend would be deemed as indicating no intention to present opinions. In response, Non-party 1 discussed the matter with union delegates and standing committee members, and on January 14 requested, as the union's position, that the convening of the disciplinary committee be postponed on the ground that the Company's operations were suspended. On January 16, the Defendant Company again sent a reply (Defendant's Exhibit 26) stating that postponement was not possible for the sake of prompt normalization of operations, and repeatedly urging that union representatives attend the disciplinary committee and present their opinions. Furthermore, on January 18, the very day the disciplinary committee was convened, the Company telephoned the union's temporary office twice to confirm whether union representatives would attend, but Non-party 1 expressed an intention not to attend, and thus the disciplinary committee proceeded without the attendance and presentation of opinions by union representatives, resulting in the disciplinary resolution against the Plaintiffs.
Given these circumstances leading to the disciplinary resolution against the Plaintiffs, it must be said that, objectively viewed, the disciplinary procedure against the subjects of discipline, including the Plaintiffs, was a situation requiring prompt conclusion. Under these circumstances, even though the Defendant Company sincerely requested, in writing or orally, on multiple occasions, that Non-party 1, the acting branch chief, and others follow the procedure of having union representatives attend the disciplinary committee and present opinions — the procedure for expressing the union's consent or non-consent under the above personnel-consent clause — the union side requested postponement on grounds that cannot be deemed justifiable, and when this request was not accepted, unilaterally expressed its intention not to attend and did not attend the disciplinary committee. It is reasonable to view this as the union having abused or waived the exercise of its right of prior consent under the above personnel-consent clause. Accordingly, even though the Defendant Company took the disciplinary dismissal action in this case against the Plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 4, who are union officers, without obtaining the union's prior consent, this cannot be deemed void.
Therefore, even though the lower court erred, as noted above, in interpreting the personnel provisions of the collective agreement with respect to the remaining Plaintiffs excluding Plaintiff 4, this error does not affect the conclusion that the disciplinary dismissal action against those Plaintiffs is valid. This ground is, after all, without merit.
As to Point 2:
Upon comparing the relevant evidence with the record, the lower court's factual finding that Plaintiff 6 also participated to some extent in the illegal labor dispute in this case may be upheld, and it cannot be said that there was an error of mistaking the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, as argued. This ground is without merit.
As to Point 3:
Labor union activities must be conducted outside working hours, except where there is a separate permissive provision in the rules of employment or the collective agreement, or where there is a practice or the employer's consent; furthermore, where the labor union, in conducting a sit-in or convening a temporary general meeting of union members, does not merely occupy part of the workplace but engages in total and exclusive occupation, or where such action involves violence or destructive acts, this cannot be deemed a legitimate act.
Article 8 of the collective agreement in effect at the time of this case merely provided that union activities shall in principle be conducted outside working hours, but that where union activities must be conducted during working hours due to unavoidable circumstances, prior approval of the Company must be obtained. (The provision that "the activities of union officers shall in principle be subject to prior notice" was newly established in the collective agreement effective from January 1, 1989.)
According to the facts found by the lower court, the remaining Plaintiffs, excluding Plaintiffs 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9, together with approximately 90 workers of the Angang Plant, without the Defendant Company's prior approval, left the Angang Plant to which the Plaintiffs belonged at around 08:45 on December 9, 1988, during working hours, entered the Onsan Plant, and for 5 hours sang labor songs and shouted slogans, calling out Onsan Plant workers and obstructing operations. The remaining Plaintiffs, excluding Plaintiffs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, together with approximately 250 workers of the Angang Plant, on the pretext of protesting the fact that Non-party 2, the chairman of the head office labor union at the Onsan Plant, had concluded a collective agreement in violation of the union's bylaws, left the Angang Plant without the Defendant Company's approval at around 11:00 on the 23rd of the same month, during working hours, entered the Onsan Plant, and until around 15:10 on the 28th of the same month, blocked the main gate of the Onsan Plant, formed groups of 2 or 3 persons and went to each workplace to coerce workers on duty into joining the sit-in, and damaged the building and equipment by, among other things, spraying waste oil, flour, grease, coal dust, etc. on the plant manager's office, the cafeteria, the interior and exterior walls of the administration office, desks and other fixtures, and writing slogans on the plant building using waste oil, spray paint, etc., thereby obstructing the Company's business. The above excluded Plaintiffs also, at around 20:00 on the 26th of the same month, again entered the Onsan Plant together with 450 workers of the Angang Plant and joined the sit-in. The Plaintiffs further, from the 28th to around 17:30 on the 31st of the same month, during working hours, without the Defendant Company's approval, mobilized approximately 3,000 plant workers at the Angang Plant under the pretext of a temporary general meeting of union members, assembled them in the plant cafeteria and auditorium, and held various events, thereby completely suspending operations at the plant. Plaintiffs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 13, among others, were even convicted by a final judgment on charges including violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violences, etc. (폭력행위등처벌에관한법률), obstruction of business, violation of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법), and violation of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법), as a result of the above acts. It is evident that this series of acts by the Plaintiffs constitutes grounds for discipline under Article 74 of the Defendant Company's Rules of Employment and Article 30 of the collective agreement, namely, where a union member has committed a wrongful and illegal act that constitutes grounds for criminal prosecution, has violated company rules, has disturbed order within the company or damaged the Company's reputation, or has intentionally or through gross negligence caused obstruction to business or serious damage to the Company. This conduct by the Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to constitute legitimate union activity.
The lower court's determination to this effect is justified, and it cannot be said that there was an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the legitimacy of labor union activities and unfair labor practices, as argued.
This ground is also without merit.
As to Point 4:
In light of all the circumstances, including the content of the Plaintiffs' acts as found by the lower court and the extent of damage suffered by the Defendant Company as a result, it must be said that this constitutes a case where the Plaintiffs bear responsibility to such a degree that, under generally accepted social norms, the Defendant Company cannot be expected to continue the employment relationship with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the lower court's determination that the disciplinary dismissal action taken by the Defendant Company against the Plaintiffs in this case did not constitute an abuse or deviation of disciplinary authority is justified. This ground is also without merit.
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiffs. It is so decided as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Bae Man-un (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho, Kim Seok-su, Choi Jong-yeong (Justice in charge)