Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 2007다51758

Confirmation of Invalidity of Dismissal, etc.해고무효확인등

Decided2007. 12. 27. Court대법원Case remanded (reversed and sent back to the lower court)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

Even after a collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) expires, provisions concerning dismissal procedures continue to bind the employer because they remain part of each individual employment contract. When disciplining an employee, an employer satisfies its obligation by merely giving the employee an opportunity to explain (소명기회); the employee does not actually have to make a statement in defense. In addition, a notice sent by registered mail is presumed to have been delivered unless there is clear evidence to the contrary, such as the mail being returned.

Key takeaways
  • CaseIncident: After the company's collective bargaining agreement had expired, it disciplinarily dismissed an employee, raising the question of whether the dismissal procedure rules still had to be followed.
  • OutcomeResult: The Supreme Court ruled that dismissal procedure rules survive as part of the individual employment contract even after the collective agreement expires, and that merely offering the employee a chance to explain is sufficient to satisfy the procedural requirement.
  • LessonLesson: Employers must still follow dismissal procedures even after a collective bargaining agreement has expired, and providing an opportunity to explain—rather than requiring the employee to actually respond—is enough to meet legal requirements.
Issues
  • Whether dismissal procedure provisions in an expired collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) remain effective
  • What it means for an employer to provide an opportunity to explain (소명기회) during disciplinary proceedings
  • Whether a notice sent by registered mail is deemed to have been delivered
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court held that dismissal procedure clauses in an expired collective bargaining agreement do not simply disappear—they survive as terms incorporated into each worker's individual employment contract and continue to bind the employer. Regarding disciplinary procedure, the Court clarified that an employer's duty is limited to providing the employee a genuine opportunity to present a defense; whether the employee actually exercises that opportunity is irrelevant to the validity of the disciplinary action. Finally, the Court applied the general presumption that registered mail is delivered to the addressee unless there is a specific reason to believe otherwise (e.g., return of the mail), meaning the employer need not separately prove actual receipt.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] Even if a collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) has lost its effect, the portions concerning wages, retirement allowances, working hours, and other individual working conditions become part of the content of the labor contract of the employee who was subject to that collective bargaining agreement, and unless a new collective bargaining agreement or rules of employment (취업규칙) that modify them are concluded or prepared, or the individual employee's consent is obtained, they remain as the content of the individual employee's labor contract and continue to govern the employer and the employee. This same legal principle applies equally to the portions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning grounds for dismissal and dismissal procedures.

[2] Even where a collective bargaining agreement provides that the party concerned shall be given an opportunity to state his or her case (소명기회) in connection with grounds for disciplinary action, it is sufficient that such opportunity be provided to the person subject to the disciplinary action, and it is not necessarily required that the statement of case itself actually be made.

[3] Where a piece of mail has been sent by the method of registered mail, it must be deemed to have been delivered to the addressee around that time, absent special circumstances such as the mail being returned.

Full text (English, AI translation) 9,846 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellant] Defendant Co., Ltd. (Attorney-at-law for the litigation: KCL Law Firm, Attorneys Choi Jong-gil and 1 other)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2006Na30305 rendered on June 22, 2007

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

[Reasoning]

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1

Even where a collective agreement (단체협약) has ceased to be effective, the portions concerning wages, retirement allowances, working hours, and other individual working conditions become part of the content of the employment contracts of the employees who were subject to that collective agreement, and remain as part of the content of each individual employee's employment contract governing the employer and the employee, unless a new collective agreement or rules of employment (취업규칙) are concluded or drawn up to amend them, or the individual employee's consent is obtained (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da13747, rendered June 9, 2000). This same legal principle applies equally to the portions of a collective agreement concerning grounds for dismissal and dismissal procedures.

According to the above legal principle, even if, at the time of the Plaintiff's disciplinary dismissal, the collective agreement at issue in this case had already ceased to be effective due to the expiration of its term, the Defendant was nonetheless required to comply with the provisions of the collective agreement at issue regarding dismissal procedures, unless a new collective agreement or rules of employment were concluded or drawn up, or the Plaintiff's individual consent was obtained. Although there are some insufficient points in the lower court's reasoning on this matter, its conclusion is justified.

The judgment below does not contain any error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, that misunderstood the legal principles concerning the effect of the collective agreement at issue in this case and thereby affected the outcome of the judgment.

2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2

The court below, after comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the collective agreement at issue in this case provides that "the disciplinary committee must give the party concerned seven days to make a statement of explanation (소명)"; the notice of attendance sent by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on February 11, 2005, notifying him to attend the disciplinary committee meeting to be held on February 18, 2005, stated only "Reason for attendance: You are referred to our company's disciplinary committee for violation of Article 8(3) (misconduct of insincerity) of the Gangwon Regional Labor Relations Commission's arbitration award, and you are requested to attend as indicated below and make your statement of explanation"; and at the disciplinary committee meeting held on February 18, 2005, specific questions and answers were exchanged only with respect to some of the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff. Based on these findings, the court below determined that, since the notice of attendance received by the Plaintiff stated as the ground for discipline only "violation of Article 8(3) (misconduct of insincerity) of the Gangwon Regional Labor Relations Commission's arbitration award," and since questions and answers were exchanged at the disciplinary committee meeting only with respect to some of the disciplinary facts, it was difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff had been given an opportunity to make a statement of explanation regarding the grounds for discipline.

However, even where a collective agreement, such as Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the collective agreement at issue in this case, provides that the party concerned must be given an opportunity to make a statement of explanation regarding the grounds for discipline, it is sufficient that such opportunity be provided to the subject, and it is not necessarily required that the statement of explanation itself actually be made (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da30620, rendered September 28, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 94Da24763, rendered May 23, 1995, etc.).

According to the record, the following facts can be ascertained: around the time the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff at issue in this case took place, disciplinary decisions were made against numerous taxi drivers employed by the Defendant for similar reasons; the Plaintiff himself had already been subjected to disciplinary action twice before for similar reasons prior to the disciplinary dismissal at issue in this case; witness ○○○ at the first instance trial testified that he showed the Plaintiff relevant materials and gave him an opportunity to explain before the disciplinary committee meeting at issue was held, and the Plaintiff did not conduct cross-examination or raise any rebuttal argument against this testimony; and the notice of attendance for the disciplinary committee meeting sent by the Defendant to the Plaintiff (Defendant's Exhibit No. 7-1) stated, "Before attending the disciplinary committee meeting, please review the materials concerning the grounds for discipline so that you may make a sufficient statement of explanation when you attend the committee meeting." Furthermore, as found by the court below, at the disciplinary committee meeting held against the Defendant [sic; Plaintiff] on February 18, 2005, specific questions and answers were in fact exchanged between the disciplinary committee members and the Plaintiff regarding some of the disciplinary charges.

Examining the matter in light of the above circumstances and the legal principle set forth above, it must be deemed that the Plaintiff was provided with the opportunity to make a statement of explanation as prescribed under Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the collective agreement at issue in this case, and it is therefore difficult to regard the Defendant as having violated Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the collective agreement at issue in this case.

Nevertheless, the court below made a different determination for the reasons set forth above, and such judgment below contains an error that misunderstood the meaning of Article 70, Paragraph 2 of the collective agreement at issue in this case or violated the rules of evidence, thereby affecting the outcome of the judgment.

The grounds of appeal pointing out this error are well-founded.

3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3

The court below, after comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found that the Defendant, in the course of the disciplinary proceedings against the Plaintiff, sent a notice on February 11, 2005, requesting that an employee-side disciplinary committee member be selected and notified to the Defendant for the disciplinary committee meeting to be held on February 18, 2005, and sent another notice on February 19, 2005, requesting that an employee-side disciplinary committee member be selected and notified to the Defendant for the disciplinary committee meeting to be held on February 25, 2005. However, the court below determined that, since there was no evidence to prove that each of the above notices had reached the Defendant's labor union, it was difficult to regard the Defendant as having complied with the procedure prescribed in the collective agreement at issue in this case for the selection of an employee-side disciplinary committee member.

However, according to the evidence adopted by the court below as stated in its reasoning, all of the notices requesting that an employee-side disciplinary committee member be selected and notified to the Defendant for the disciplinary committee meeting concerning the Plaintiff were addressed to "the Chapter Chairperson of (name omitted) Transportation, Democratic Taxi [Union]" as the recipient, and it can be ascertained that the Defendant sent these by registered mail, and that the postal receipt obtained upon delivery listed the recipient as "Union Chairperson." If so, absent special circumstances, it is reasonable to view the above notices as having been sent to "the Chapter Chairperson of (name omitted) Transportation, Democratic Taxi [Union]," and since mail sent by registered delivery must be deemed to have been delivered to the recipient around that time unless special circumstances exist, such as the mail being returned (see Supreme Court Decision 79Da1498, rendered January 15, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 91Nu3819, rendered March 27, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2000Da20052, rendered October 27, 2000, etc.), it should be recognized that, absent special circumstances such as the mail being returned, the above notices were delivered to "the Chapter Chairperson of (name omitted) Transportation, Democratic Taxi [Union]."

Nevertheless, the court below, contrary to the foregoing, determined that there was no evidence to prove that the above notices had reached the Defendant's labor union, and thus that it was difficult to regard the Defendant as having complied with the procedure prescribed in the collective agreement at issue in this case for the selection of an employee-side disciplinary committee member. Such judgment below contains an error that misunderstood the legal principles concerning the arrival of a manifestation of intent or violated the rules of evidence, thereby affecting the outcome of the judgment.

The grounds of appeal pointing out this error are also well-founded.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Ko Hyun-chul (Presiding Justice), Yang Sung-tae, Kim Ji-hyung (Justice in Charge), Jeon Soo-an

【판결요지】

[1] 단체협약이 실효되었다고 하더라도 임금, 퇴직금이나 노동시간, 그 밖에 개별적인 노동조건에 관한 부분은 그 단체협약의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자의 근로계약의 내용이 되어 그것을 변경하는 새로운 단체협약, 취업규칙이 체결·작성되거나 또는 개별적인 근로자의 동의를 얻지 아니하는 한 개별적인 근로자의 근로계약의 내용으로서 여전히 남아 있어 사용자와 근로자를 규율하게 되는데, 단체협약 중 해고사유 및 해고의 절차에 관한 부분에 대하여도 이와 같은 법리가 그대로 적용된다.

[2] 단체협약에서 당사자에게 징계사유와 관련한 소명기회를 주도록 규정하고 있는 경우에도 그 대상자에게 그 기회를 제공하면 되는 것이고, 소명 그 자체가 반드시 이루어져야 하는 것은 아니다.

[3] 우편물이 등기취급의 방법으로 발송된 경우에는 반송되는 등의 특별한 사정이 없는 한 그 무렵 수취인에게 배달되었다고 보아야 한다.

【참조조문】

[1] 노동조합 및 노동관계조정법 제32조, 근로기준법 제94조

[2] 노동조합 및 노동관계조정법 32조, 제33조

[3] 민법 제111조

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 2000. 6. 9. 선고 98다13747 판결(공2000하, 1588) / [2] 대법원 1993. 9. 28. 선고 91다30620 판결(공1993하, 2933), 대법원 1995. 5. 23. 선고 94다24763 판결(공1995하, 2224) / [3] 대법원 1980. 1. 15. 선고 79다1498 판결(공1980, 12542), 대법원 1992. 3. 27. 선고 91누3819 판결(공1992, 1439), 대법원 2000. 10. 27. 선고 2000다20052 판결(공2000하, 2400)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 3,452자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 피상고인】 원고

【피고, 상고인】 피고 주식회사 (소송대리인 법무법인 케이씨엘 담당변호사 최종길외 1인)

【원심판결】 서울고법 2007. 6. 22. 선고 2006나30305 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 서울고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】상고이유를 본다.

1. 상고이유 제1점에 대하여

단체협약이 실효되었다고 하더라도 임금, 퇴직금이나 노동시간, 그 밖에 개별적인 노동조건에 관한 부분은 그 단체협약의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자의 근로계약의 내용이 되어 그것을 변경하는 새로운 단체협약, 취업규칙이 체결·작성되거나 또는 개별적인 근로자의 동의를 얻지 아니하는 한 개별적인 근로자의 근로계약의 내용으로서 여전히 남아 있어 사용자와 근로자를 규율하게 되는데(대법원 2000. 6. 9. 선고 98다13747 판결 참조), 단체협약 중 해고사유 및 해고의 절차에 관한 부분에 대하여도 이와 같은 법리가 그대로 적용된다.

위와 같은 법리에 의하면, 원고에 대한 징계해고가 이루어질 무렵에 이미 이 사건 단체협약이 그 유효기간의 경과로 실효된 상태였다고 하더라도, 새로운 단체협약, 취업규칙이 체결·작성되거나 또는 원고의 개별적인 동의를 얻지 아니하는 한 피고는 이 사건 단체협약 중 해고의 절차에 관한 규정에 따라야 하는 것이므로, 이에 관한 원심의 이유 설시에 일부 미흡한 점이 있기는 하나 그 결론은 정당하다.

원심판결에는 상고이유로 주장하는 바와 같이 이 사건 단체협약의 효력에 관한 법리를 오해하여 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 위법이 없다.

2. 상고이유 제2점에 대하여

원심은, 그 채용 증거들을 종합하여 이 사건 단체협약 제70조 제2항은 "징계위원회는 당사자에게 7일간 필히 소명의 기회를 주어야 한다"고 규정하고 있는 사실, 피고가 2005. 2. 11. 원고에게 2005. 2. 18. 개최되는 징계위원회에 출석할 것을 통보하면서 보낸 출석통지서에는 "출석이유 : 귀하는 강원지방 노동위원회 중재재정서 제8조 ③항(불성실행위)을 위반 당사 징계위원회에 회부되어 아래와 같이 출석하여 소명하여 주시기 바랍니다"라고만 기재되어 있는 사실, 2005. 2. 18. 개최된 징계위원회에서는 원고에 대한 징계사유 중 일부에 대하여만 구체적인 질문과 답변이 이루어진 사실을 인정한 후, 원고가 받은 출석통보서에 징계사유로 ‘강원지방 노동위원회 중재재정서 제8조 ③항(불성실행위)위반’이라고만 기재되어 있고, 징계위원회에서도 일부 징계사실에 관하여만 질문과 답변이 이루어졌으므로 원고가 징계사유에 대한 소명기회를 가진 것으로 인정하기 어렵다는 취지로 판단하였다.

그러나 이 사건 단체협약 제70조 제2항과 같이 단체협약에서 당사자에게 징계사유와 관련한 소명기회를 주도록 규정하고 있는 경우에도 그 대상자에게 그 기회를 제공하면 되는 것이고 소명 그 자체가 반드시 이루어져야 하는 것은 아니다(대법원 1993. 9. 28. 선고 91다30620 판결, 대법원 1995. 5. 23. 선고 94다24763 판결 등 참조).

기록에 의하면, 원고에 대한 이 사건 징계해고가 이루어질 무렵 유사한 사유로 다수의 피고 소속 택시기사들에 대하여 징계결정이 이루어졌을 뿐만 아니라, 원고 자신도 이 사건 징계해고 전에 이미 유사한 사유로 2회에 걸쳐 징계처분을 받은 전력이 있는 사실, 제1심 증인 ○○○은 이 사건 징계위원회가 개최되기 전에 원고에게 관련 자료를 보여주면서 해명할 기회를 주었다고 증언하였는데, 원고가 그에 대한 반대신문이나 반박 주장을 하지 않은 사실, 피고가 원고에게 보낸 징계위원회 출석통지서(을 제7호증의 1)에 "징계위원회에 출석하기에 앞서 징계사유에 대한 자료열람을 한 후 위원회에 출석시 충분한 소명을 할 수 있도록 바랍니다"라고 기재되어 있는 사실을 알 수 있고, 2005. 2. 18. 개최된 피고에 대한 징계위원회에서 징계위원과 원고 사이에 일부 징계혐의 사실에 대하여 구체적인 질문과 답변이 이루어지기까지 하였음은 원심이 인정한 바와 같다.

위와 같은 사정과 앞서 본 법리에 따라 살펴보면, 원고에게는 이 사건 단체협약 제70조 제2항에서 정한 소명의 기회가 제공된 것으로 보아야 할 것이므로 피고가 이 사건 단체협약 제70조 제2항을 위반한 것으로 보기는 어렵다고 할 것이다.

그럼에도 원심은 앞서 본 바와 같은 이유로 이와 달리 판단하였으니, 이러한 원심판결에는 이 사건 단체협약 제70조 제2항의 의미를 오해하거나 채증법칙을 위배하여 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다.

이 점을 지적하는 상고이유의 주장은 이유 있다.

3. 상고이유 제3점에 대하여

원심은, 그 채용 증거들을 종합하면, 피고가 원고에 대한 징계절차에서 2005. 2. 11.에는 2005. 2. 18. 개최되는 징계위원회에 근로자측 징계위원을 선정하여 피고에 통보하여 줄 것을 요구하는 내용의 통지를 발송하였고, 2005. 2. 19.에는 2005. 2. 25. 개최되는 징계위원회에 근로자측 징계위원을 선정하여 피고에 통보하여 줄 것을 요구하는 내용의 통지를 발송한 사실을 인정할 수 있으나, 위 각 통지가 피고 노동조합에 도달하였다는 점을 인정할 증거가 없으므로, 피고가 이 사건 단체협약에서 정한 근로자측 징계위원선정을 위한 절차를 이행한 것으로 보기 어렵다고 판단하였다.

그러나 원심이 채용한 그 판시 증거들에 의하면, 원고에 대한 징계위원회에 근로자측 징계위원을 선정하여 피고에 통보하여 줄 것을 요구하는 내용의 통지들을 모두 ‘민주택시 (명칭 생략) 운수 분회장’을 수신인으로 하여 작성되었고, 피고가 이들을 등기우편물로 발송하고 교부받은 우편물 수령증에는 상대방이 ‘노조위원장’으로 기재되어 있음을 알 수 있다. 그렇다면 특별한 사정이 없는 한 위와 같은 통지들은 ‘민주택시 (명칭 생략) 운수 분회장에게 발송된 것으로 봄이 상당하고, 우편물이 등기취급의 방법으로 발송된 경우에는 반송되는 등의 특별한 사정이 없는 한 그 무렵 수취인에게 배달되었다고 보아야 하므로(대법원 1980. 1. 15. 선고 79다1498 판결, 대법원 1992. 3. 27. 선고 91누3819 판결, 대법원 2000. 10. 27. 선고 2000다20052 판결 등 참조), 반송 등의 특별한 사정이 인정되지 않는 한 위와 같은 통지들이 ‘민주택시 (명칭 생략) 운수 분회장’에게 배달된 것으로 인정하여야 할 것이다.

그럼에도 원심은 이와 달리 위와 같은 통지들이 피고 노동조합에 도달하였다는 점을 인정할 증거가 없으므로 피고가 이 사건 단체협약에서 정한 근로자측 징계위원선정을 위한 절차를 이행한 것으로 보기 어렵다고 판단하였으니, 이러한 원심판결에는 의사표시의 도달에 관한 법리를 오해하거나 채증법칙을 위배하는 등으로 인하여 판결 결과에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다.

이 점을 지적하는 상고이유의 주장도 이유 있다.

4. 결 론

그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 다시 심리·판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 고현철(재판장) 양승태 김지형(주심) 전수안

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