[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee] ○○○ Labor Union (Attorneys for the plaintiff: Law Firm Yeoneun, Shin In-su and 3 others)
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Head of the Seoul Gangnam District Office, Seoul Regional Labor Agency
[Intervenor for the Defendant, Appellant] △△△ Co., Ltd. (Attorneys for the intervenor: Ju Han-il and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2010Nu32879, dated June 1, 2011
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeals shall be borne by each appellant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the lower court's determination that Article 68(1), latter part, of the Union Rules at issue in this case—which provides that collective bargaining committee members shall sign a collective agreement jointly—violates Article 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter the "Trade Union Act"), which grants the authority to conclude collective agreements to the representative of a labor union, is justified. This is because, under said provision of Article 68(1), latter part, of the Union Rules, even where the chairperson, who is the representative of the Plaintiff, has reached an agreement with the employer as a result of collective bargaining, he or she cannot conclude a collective agreement pursuant to his or her authority unless the collective bargaining committee members sign jointly. There is no error in the lower court's judgment in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the interpretation and scope of application of Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act and Article 68(1), latter part, of the Union Rules at issue in this case, or in violating Supreme Court precedent.
2. Regarding the grounds of appeal of the Defendant and the Intervenor for the Defendant
A. Regarding Article 7, Subparagraph 3 and the proviso to Article 9, Subparagraph 1 of the Union Rules at issue in this case
(1) Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act provides: "The term 'labor union' means an organization or federation of organizations formed autonomously by workers as the main body, on their own initiative, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and otherwise enhancing the economic and social status of workers. Provided, that in any of the following cases, it shall not be deemed a labor union," and Item (Ra) thereof provides "where persons who are not workers are permitted to join." However, the proviso of Item (Ra) of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act applies only in a limited manner to the case of an "enterprise-level labor union," and does not apply to industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide labor unions, etc., which by their nature do not require a subordinate relationship with a specific employer (see Supreme Court Judgment 2001Du8568, dated February 27, 2004).
(2) The lower court determined that, notwithstanding the provision of the Union Rules at issue in this case stipulating that union membership is lost upon the termination of an employment contract, considering the following: (i) the Union Rules at issue in this case define union members, who constitute the organization, not as persons belonging to a single place of business, but as persons engaged in the electric power generation industry and related business sectors; (ii) the place of union activities spans multiple places of business; and (iii) the subject matter of collective bargaining is not confined to a single employer; the Plaintiff constitutes a type of supra-enterprise labor union whose members are workers belonging to five electric power generation companies and to ○○ Industries and the Korea Electric Power Training Institute, which are related to those power generation companies. Accordingly, the lower court determined that Article 7, Subparagraph 3, and the proviso to Article 9, Subparagraph 1 of the Union Rules at issue in this case, which permit "a person dismissed in connection with union activities" to join the Plaintiff as a union member, cannot be deemed to violate Item (Ra) of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act.
In light of the aforementioned legal principles and the record, the lower court's determination as above is justified, and there is no error therein in exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the principles of logic and experience, or in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the organizational form of a labor union or the scope of application of Item (Ra) of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act.
B. Regarding Article 24(1), Subparagraph 2, and Article 68(1), former part, of the Union Rules at issue in this case
(1) Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act provides: "The representative of a labor union shall have the authority to bargain with, and conclude a collective agreement with, the employer or an employers' association, on behalf of the labor union or its members." Accordingly, the representative of a labor union has not only the authority to bargain collectively but also the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of such bargaining. Therefore, if the union rules provide that, after the representative of the labor union has agreed with the employer on the content of the collective agreement as a result of collective bargaining, the general meeting of union members must again resolve on whether to approve or reject the draft agreement, such union rules comprehensively and wholly restrict the representative's authority to conclude a collective agreement, thereby effectively hollowing out that authority and rendering it nominal, which contravenes the purport of Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act, which provides for the authority of the labor union's representative to conclude collective agreements (see Supreme Court en banc Judgment 91Nu12257, dated April 27, 1993).
(2) Article 24(1), Subparagraph 2, of the Union Rules at issue in this case provides that "matters concerning the conclusion of an industry-wide agreement" shall be a matter for resolution by the Plaintiff's general meeting, and Article 68(1), former part, of the same Union Rules provides that "when the union intends to conclude an agreement, the chairperson shall conclude it following a general meeting." However, in light of the following: (i) it is unclear whether Article 24(1), Subparagraph 2, and Article 68(1), former part, of the Union Rules at issue in this case limit the chairperson, the Plaintiff's representative, to concluding a collective agreement only after undergoing a resolution of the general meeting of union members on whether to approve or reject the draft agreement, after having agreed with the employer on the content of the collective agreement as a result of collective bargaining; (ii) it appears that the chairperson, the Plaintiff's representative, may gather the opinions of union members through a resolution of the general meeting and then reflect the opinions so gathered in conducting collective bargaining, and may also hold a general meeting during the course of collective bargaining, before reaching a substantive agreement with the employer; and (iii) no material has been submitted in the record showing that, after the chairperson, the Plaintiff's representative, conducted collective bargaining with the employer and agreed on the content of the collective agreement, a general meeting was in fact held, prior to concluding the collective agreement, as a procedure for gathering the opinions of union members on whether to approve or reject the draft agreement; it is difficult to view Article 24(1), Subparagraph 2, and Article 68(1), former part, of the Union Rules at issue in this case as provisions that comprehensively and wholly restrict the labor union representative's authority to conclude a collective agreement in violation of Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act.
The judgment below, which is to the same effect, is justified, and there is no error therein in exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the principles of logic and experience, or in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the interpretation and scope of application of Article 29(1) of the Trade Union Act.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeals shall be borne by each of the losing parties. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as stated in the Order.
Justice Park Bo-young (Presiding Justice), Min Il-young (Justice in charge), Lee In-bok, Kim Shin