[Plaintiff, Appellee] Ssangyong Heavy Industries Labor Union
[Defendant, Appellant] Mayor of Changwon City, Litigation Representative Attorney Kim Ik-ha
[Judgment Below]
Busan High Court Decision 91Gu1332 rendered October 16, 1991
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found the following facts: Article 66 of the collective agreement (hereinafter "the collective agreement in this case") concluded on November 20, 1990 between the Plaintiff Union and the employer, non-party Ssangyong Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., provides that "all matters agreed upon in collective bargaining shall be drawn up in writing, and the authority to conclude the collective agreement shall belong to the bargaining representative, and all bargaining committee members shall sign jointly in accordance with the results of the general meeting of union members. Provided, that this Article shall be governed by the provisions of the labor union's bylaws." The court below also found that, on December 22, 1990, after deliberation by the Gyeongsangnam-do Regional Labor Relations Commission, the Defendant, citing Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법) (hereinafter referred to simply as "the Act") as the legal basis, directed the Plaintiff to amend and supplement the collective agreement in this case on the ground that the representative of a labor union has the authority to bargain collectively and to conclude collective agreements, and that where the representative of a labor union has concluded a collective agreement with the employer through collective bargaining, such agreement takes effect notwithstanding a resolution of the general meeting of union members.
The court below determined that Article 33(1) of the Act merely provides that the representative of a labor union, or a person delegated by the labor union, has the authority to conduct collective bargaining aimed at the conclusion of a collective agreement, and cannot be regarded as a provision concerning the labor union's authority to conclude collective agreements; moreover, it cannot be interpreted as a provision granting the representative of a labor union an independent authority to conclude collective agreements that cannot even be restricted by a resolution of the general meeting of union members, such that, once the representative of a labor union has concluded a collective agreement with the employer, it necessarily takes effect notwithstanding a resolution of the general meeting of union members.
The court below further determined that Article 34(1) of the Act likewise merely requires that the method of concluding a collective agreement be in writing with signatures and seals of both parties, and cannot be regarded as a provision concerning who has the authority to conclude a collective agreement, the scope of such authority, or its effect. Accordingly, in light of the autonomy of labor unions, the collective agreement in this case, concluded between labor and management, cannot be said to violate Article 33(1) and Article 34(1) of the Act, and therefore the Defendant's disposition directing the amendment and supplementation of the agreement in this case is unlawful.
2. The main text of Article 33(1) of the Act provides that "the representative of a labor union, or a person delegated by the labor union, has authority to bargain with the employer or employers' association, on behalf of the labor union or its members, with respect to the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." Here, the term "authority to bargain" must be interpreted as including not only the authority to engage in collective bargaining as a factual act, but also the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of such bargaining.
The reasons are as follows.
First, since a labor union is itself a type of association, it is self-evident, in light of the general legal principles governing the representation of associations, that the representative of the union has authority to represent the union in concluding a collective agreement. The main text of Article 33(1) of the Act, insofar as it concerns the authority of a labor union representative to conclude a collective agreement, merely states a matter that is self-evident as a matter of principle; its principal significance lies, rather, in providing that, in addition to the union representative, a person delegated by the labor union may also, together with or in place of the representative, hold the authority to conduct collective bargaining (including the authority to conclude a collective agreement).
Second, Article 33(1) of the Constitution (헌법) provides that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions." Here, the right to collective bargaining should be interpreted as including not only the right to bargain collectively as a factual act, but also the right to conclude, by means of a collective agreement, the content agreed upon as a result of collective bargaining. Among collective bargaining processes, there are cases in which the purpose can be achieved by factual acts alone, and there are also cases in which collective bargaining is conducted for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement. In the latter case, the right to collective bargaining must be understood as including not only the authority to negotiate and bargain for the benefit of union members, but also the authority to conclude a collective agreement in the name of the labor union in accordance with the results of that negotiation. If one were to say that a party has the authority to bargain collectively but no authority to conclude a collective agreement, this would be akin to saying, in the context of agency, that an agent has authority to negotiate the terms of a contract but no authority to conclude the contract; it is doubtful whether such a status could even be regarded as a legally meaningful authority or right.
Third, Article 33(5) of the Act provides that "an employer or employers' association shall not, without justifiable reason, refuse or neglect to conclude a collective agreement in good faith with the representative of a labor union or a person delegated by the labor union," and Article 39, Item 3 of the Act defines as an unfair labor practice "an act of refusing or neglecting, without justifiable reason, to conclude a collective agreement or otherwise bargain collectively with the representative of a labor union or a person delegated by the labor union." In light of these related provisions, the Trade Union Act presupposes, as a matter of course, that the representative of a labor union or a delegate has the authority to conclude a collective agreement. The fact that the Trade Union Act, apart from providing in the main text of Article 33(1) for who has "authority to bargain with respect to the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters," does not separately provide as to who has "authority to conclude a collective agreement," also supports the above interpretation.
Fourth, if a person having the authority to bargain collectively were held to lack authority to conclude a collective agreement, collective bargaining with the employer as the counterparty could not proceed smoothly, and as a result, the authority to bargain collectively itself could become meaningless. If, even after reaching agreement on wages or other working conditions as a result of mutual compromise and concession, such agreement could take effect only after undergoing a separate decision-making procedure (such as a resolution of the general meeting of the labor union), the employer would be inclined either to avoid bargaining or negotiation with a bargaining representative who lacks authority to make binding decisions, or, even if it did engage in bargaining, to be reluctant to present its final concessions in good faith; and it would be difficult to criticize such avoidance or neglect of bargaining by the employer as being without justifiable reason.
Fifth, the position that denies the authority to conclude a collective agreement to a representative, etc., who holds the authority to bargain collectively, relies on the grounds that it is a basic requirement underpinning collective self-governance that a collective agreement be concluded on the basis of the union's collective will formed with the participation of union members, and that if the union's representative, etc., were also granted authority to conclude collective agreements, it would be impossible to check the tendency of the executive leadership to become subservient to the employer ("yongyoung-hwa") or to commit breaches of trust, with the result that the autonomy and democratic nature of the labor union could be undermined.
However, once a labor union has elected its representative or delegated bargaining authority in accordance with procedures prescribed by its bylaws, the autonomous and democratic operation of the union has already been realized thereby; and it cannot be said that the only way to satisfy such a requirement, on the ground that the conclusion of a collective agreement has a profound impact on the rights and obligations of union members, is necessarily to have the final decision as to whether to conclude the agreement made through a resolution of the general meeting of union members. If union members cannot trust the representative, etc., they may replace the representative, etc., through procedures prescribed by the bylaws, or, while leaving the representative, etc., in the executive leadership as they are, delegate only the authority to bargain collectively for the purpose of concluding the particular collective agreement to another bargaining representative.
Finally, the collective agreement in this case itself provides that "the authority to conclude the collective agreement shall belong to the bargaining representative," and Article 58 of the Plaintiff Union's bylaws (Exhibit Ga No. 4) likewise provides that "the conclusion of the collective agreement shall belong to the chairperson, and the bargaining committee members shall conclude it by joint signature in accordance with the results of the general meeting of union members." From this it can be seen that even the Plaintiff Union has merely placed a restriction to the effect that a resolution of the general meeting of union members must be obtained before concluding a collective agreement, and does not itself deny the union representative's authority to conclude a collective agreement.
3. Although a labor union is itself a type of association, a labor union, as an organization exercising collective power through the solidarity of workers, is not an independent existence transcending the individual union members; moreover, since a collective agreement has normative effect determining the content of the rights and obligations of individual union members, and its conclusion is the most important decision-making act of the labor union, the theory of association representation as applied in ordinary property transaction relationships cannot be applied as it is. In light of these points, together with the autonomy and democratic nature of labor unions provided for in Article 33 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the Trade Union Act, the view of the court below—that the authority of a labor union representative or delegate to conclude a collective agreement may be restricted by a resolution of the general meeting of the labor union or otherwise by the collective will of union members—warrants examination.
However, as in the case of the collective agreement in this case, requiring that, after the representative or delegate has agreed with the employer on the content of a collective agreement as a result of collective bargaining, the agreement must again be submitted to a resolution of the general meeting of union members as to whether to approve it, amounts to a comprehensive and blanket restriction on the representative's or delegate's authority to conclude a collective agreement, effectively hollowing out that authority so that it becomes nothing more than nominal. This cannot but be found to violate the purpose of Article 33(1) of the Act, which provides for the authority of a union representative or delegate to conclude a collective agreement.
4. This being so, the collective agreement in this case, which requires that after the bargaining representative has reached agreement with the employer and prepared a draft collective agreement, it must undergo a resolution of the general meeting of union members, violates the main text of Article 33(1) of the Act; and therefore, the Defendant's disposition in this case, directing the amendment and supplementation of the collective agreement, must be held lawful. The judgment below, having found that there was no unlawfulness in the collective agreement in this case and having thereby determined that the Defendant's disposition in this case was unlawful, erred in its understanding of the legal principles concerning the authority to conclude a collective agreement, and such error affected the outcome of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, excluding Justice Yoon Kwan and Justice Bae Man-woon, as set forth in the Order.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Yoon Kwan is as follows.
The majority opinion holds that, where the representative of a labor union has concluded a collective agreement in accordance with an agreement with the employer, that collective agreement is lawful notwithstanding a resolution of the general meeting of union members; and in order to reach that conclusion, the majority opinion takes the position that the representative of a labor union naturally holds authority to conclude a collective agreement irrespective of a resolution of the general meeting of the labor union, and further that the labor union cannot impose any restriction whatsoever on a collective agreement so concluded, even by way of a resolution of the general meeting.
However, such a view is not only incompatible with the constitutional provisions guaranteeing workers' fundamental rights to subsistence, but also undermines the very autonomy and democratic nature of labor unions that the Trade Union Act takes as its basic ideology, and therefore cannot be endorsed. The majority opinion cites, as its grounds, Article 33(1) of the Constitution, and Article 33, paragraphs (1) and (5), and Article 39, Item 3 of the Trade Union Act.
Article 33(1) of the Constitution provides that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions." This is a provision guaranteeing that workers hold the three labor rights as such; it does not provide as to who shall be the party or agent to collective bargaining. Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act provides that "the representative of a labor union, or a person delegated by the labor union, has authority to bargain with the employer or employers' association, on behalf of the labor union or its members, with respect to the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." It is clear from the text of this provision that it grants the representative, etc., of the labor union authority to bargain for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement, but does not grant authority to conclude the collective agreement itself.
Even accepting, as the majority opinion asserts, that the concept of collective bargaining includes the conclusion of a collective agreement, it cannot be interpreted that merely because the representative of a labor union holds the authority to bargain collectively, that representative necessarily also holds authority to conclude a collective agreement. This is because the term "bargaining" as used here refers only to the factual act of bargaining itself, and the content of collective bargaining does not automatically become the content of a collective agreement; therefore, a person in charge of collective bargaining cannot, for that reason alone, be regarded as a party to the conclusion of a collective agreement, which is an act having the character of a juristic act.
Furthermore, Article 33(5) and Article 39, Item 3 of the Trade Union Act merely provide for the employer's obligation to respond in good faith to collective bargaining and to conclude a collective agreement, and the fact that these provisions impose such an obligation on the employer with respect to collective bargaining or a collective agreement with the union representative, etc., does not alter the above conclusion. Here, the majority opinion advances the theory that, since a labor union is itself a type of association, it is self-evident, in light of the legal principles governing the representation of associations, that the representative of the union has authority to represent the union in concluding a collective agreement.
However, a labor union is a special type of organization (Article 3 of the Trade Union Act) formed by workers, who are the subjects of the three labor rights, autonomously joining together in order to maintain and improve working conditions, promote the welfare of workers, and otherwise enhance their economic and social status; and so long as the three labor rights under the Constitution are understood as fundamental rights of subsistence held by workers, the theory of association representation as applied in ordinary property transaction relationships cannot be imported into the case of the representation of a labor union. Moreover, since a collective agreement is directly connected to the right of subsistence of union members, including their working conditions, it goes without saying that the collective will of union members, formed through democratic procedures, must be specially reflected in the process of concluding the collective agreement.
In this respect, the majority opinion's view—that once a labor union has elected its representative or delegated bargaining authority in accordance with its bylaws, the autonomous and democratic operation of the union has already been realized thereby—not only conflicts with Article 14 of the Trade Union Act, which provides for the autonomy and democratic nature of labor unions, but rather reinforces, all the more, the persuasiveness of the concern the majority opinion itself raises prior to that point, namely that "it is a basic requirement underpinning collective self-governance that a collective agreement be concluded on the basis of the union's collective will formed with the participation of union members, and that if the union's representative, etc., were also granted authority to conclude collective agreements, it would be impossible to check the tendency of the executive leadership to become subservient to the employer or to commit breaches of trust, with the result that the autonomy and democratic nature of the labor union would be undermined." I emphasize this point here.
The majority opinion attempts to support its reasoning by pointing to practical problems in labor-management relations, stating: "Unless the representative of a labor union is held to naturally possess authority to conclude a collective agreement, collective bargaining cannot proceed smoothly, and as a result, the authority to bargain collectively itself would become meaningless. Moreover, if, even after reaching agreement on working conditions, etc., as a result of mutual compromise and concession, such agreement could take effect only after undergoing another decision-making procedure such as a resolution of the general meeting of the labor union, it would be difficult to criticize the employer's avoidance or neglect of bargaining, using this as a pretext, as being without justifiable reason."
However, such reasoning appears, notwithstanding the criticisms set forth above, to be aimed at maintaining the position that, unless it is presupposed that the representative of a labor union naturally holds authority to conclude a collective agreement, the representative may conclude a collective agreement at will, regardless of the will of the labor union, and that a collective agreement so concluded cannot be restricted even by a resolution of the general meeting of the union. On the contrary, it must never be overlooked that it is precisely where a representative of a labor union, without even having been delegated authority to conclude a collective agreement, concludes a collective agreement at will—disregarding the will of the labor union, and even in collusion with the employer—a collective agreement unfavorable to workers, and forces workers to abide by that agreement regardless, that becomes the very source of repeated, unnecessary discord and conflict among workers, the labor union's representative, and the employer.
In conclusion, considering the constitutional provisions intended to guarantee the rights and interests of workers, the autonomy and democratic nature of labor unions pursued by the Trade Union Act, and the special character of labor unions discussed above; and considering that Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act grants its representative, etc., only the authority to bargain collectively as a factual act, that Article 19(1), Item 3 of the same Act designates matters concerning collective agreements as matters to be resolved by the general meeting, and that Article 22 of the same Act provides that members of a labor union have the right and duty to participate equally in all matters of the labor union; and considering also, in addition, the aspect of maintaining amicable labor-management relations and thereby promoting the development of the national economy—it is proper that a labor union determine, by resolution of its general meeting, the person who holds authority to conclude a collective agreement, and require that person, holding such authority, to comply with resolutions of the general meeting either before or after concluding a collective agreement.
Finally, this Court has previously held, in stating that in order to amend rules of employment (취업규칙) to the disadvantage of workers, the consent of the group of workers subject to the previous rules of employment, obtained through a collective decision-making method, is required, that one of the grounds for this is that it is proper, as a procedure for amending a legal norm, to require that an amendment to a legal norm applicable to a group be given effect on the group itself only by obtaining the consent of the collective will of that group (see this Court's Decision 77Da355, rendered July 26, 1977). Although that decision concerned rules of employment, I add that its reasoning may also be invoked in the present case, which concerns the conclusion of a collective agreement having a normative character.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Bae Man-woon is as follows.
1. Since the conduct of collective bargaining by the representative of a labor union or a person delegated by the labor union (hereinafter "the representative, etc., of the labor union") is ultimately aimed at the conclusion of a collective agreement, I agree with the view that such a representative, etc., must be held to possess, even without a separate delegation, not only the authority to bargain for the collective agreement but also the authority to conclude the collective agreement in accordance with the results of such bargaining.
However, the fact that Article 33(1) of the Trade Union Act (hereinafter "the Act") provides for the authority to bargain for a collective agreement merely establishes, in a general and abstract manner, that the representative, etc., of the labor union possesses authority to bargain for and conclude a collective agreement. Separate consideration must be given to such questions as: by what procedures and methods they are to conduct collective bargaining and conclude collective agreements; whether the authority of the representative, etc., of the labor union may be restricted by the union's bylaws or by resolution of the general meeting; to what extent such restriction is permissible; whether such restriction may be asserted against the employer or employers' association; what effect a collective agreement concluded in violation of such a restriction has; and whether a collective agreement restricting the authority of the representative, etc., of the labor union may itself be concluded by way of a collective agreement. I do not believe that the above provision is a mandatory provision that prohibits any and all restrictions whatsoever on the authority of the representative, etc., of the labor union to conclude a collective agreement.
2. Since a collective agreement has normative effect directly determining standards concerning working conditions and other matters of treatment of individual union members (Article 36 of the Act), the substantive subject to whom a collective agreement ultimately belongs may be said to be the workers themselves. It follows, therefore, that it is a basic requirement of collective bargaining that a collective agreement be concluded on the basis of the union's will formed with the participation of union members (Article 19(1), Item 3 of the Act), and it is only natural that workers, in order to maintain and improve their working conditions, to check any tendency of the representative, etc., of the labor union to become subservient to the employer or to commit breaches of trust, and to secure the autonomy and democratic nature of the labor union, would seek, where necessary, to monitor, supervise, and control the collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements by the representative, etc., of the labor union.
However, if the representative, etc., of the labor union engaged in collective bargaining possesses only the authority to engage in the factual act of bargaining, and not the authority to conclude a collective agreement as a juristic act, then, as the majority opinion is concerned, the counterparty employer or employers' association would face uncertainty as to the terms proposed for the conclusion of the collective agreement, and there would be no guarantee that the terms proposed by the representative, etc., of the labor union reflect the will of the union members, which could impede rational and smooth collective bargaining. Accordingly, in order to remove such uncertainty on the part of the employer or employers' association as well, it is necessary to interpret that a person who has become the representative of a labor union, or who has been delegated authority by the labor union, possesses authority extending from bargaining for a collective agreement through to its conclusion.
Therefore, where the labor union unilaterally restricts such authority of its representative, etc., and does so in a comprehensive and blanket manner, such restriction should in principle not be permitted; however, where that is not the case, it is proper to hold that the procedures or authority for the conclusion of a collective agreement by the representative, etc., of the labor union may be restricted, provided that such restriction does not conflict with the purpose of the above provisions of the Act.
3. Turning to the present case, since the content of the collective agreement in this case, concluded between the Plaintiff Union and its employer, provides that authority to conclude the collective agreement belongs to the bargaining representative, this cannot be said to violate Article 33(1) of the Act. It is true that, insofar as the collective agreement provides that matters agreed upon in collective bargaining shall be signed jointly by all bargaining committee members in accordance with the results of the general meeting of union members, thereby requiring that matters agreed upon in collective bargaining be subject to the approval or resolution of the general meeting of union members before the collective agreement is concluded, this may be viewed as restricting, in the procedure for concluding the collective agreement, the authority of the collective bargaining representative to conclude the agreement. However, this restriction was not unilaterally imposed by the labor union side, but was agreed to by the employer as well. Moreover, a collective agreement in principle may not have a term exceeding two years (one year with respect to wage-related matters) (Article 35 of the Act), and according to Exhibit Ga No. 3 (the collective agreement), the collective agreement in this case has a term of validity until August 31, 1992 (provided that, even after the term of validity expires, it remains effective until a renewed agreement is concluded). Accordingly, the above provision of the collective agreement can only apply, on a time-limited basis, to collective agreements concluded during the period in which this collective agreement remains in effect. Given that the employer itself consented to this, such a restriction, of this degree, on the procedure for concluding a collective agreement, cannot be said to be unlawful as conflicting with the purpose of the above statutory provision, and I do not believe that the above statutory provision prohibits the conclusion of a collective agreement of this kind of content either.
Working conditions are, in principle, determined by agreement between the worker and the employer, and it is proper that the conclusion of a collective agreement be left to the private autonomy of the parties; except where the Act specially and necessarily provides otherwise, matters agreed upon by the parties as to who is to conclude the collective agreement and by what procedures and methods should be respected.
4. Considering the matter further, in order to secure their autonomy and democratic nature, a labor union or its members may require the collective bargaining representative, etc., to conclude the collective agreement after obtaining a resolution of the general meeting with respect to matters settled or agreed upon with the employer, or may require that a provisional agreement (假協約) first be concluded and that the formal agreement be concluded only after obtaining the approval of the general meeting, or may require that the conclusion of the agreement be made subject to the approval of the general meeting as a condition for its taking effect. Where the representative, etc., and the employer disregard such requirements and conclude a collective agreement nonetheless, whether that agreement is valid may be open to dispute; however, where the representative, etc., in conducting collective bargaining with the employer, agrees to submit the matters settled therein to the will of the general meeting (or the delegates' general meeting) and to conclude the collective agreement in accordance with the results thereof, or agrees to conclude the collective agreement subject to the approval of the general meeting as a condition for its taking effect, there can be no doubt that such an agreement, or a collective agreement concluded by such a method, is valid.
If that is so, then there is no reason to prohibit as unlawful an agreement whereby, instead of making such an agreement at the time of concluding each individual collective agreement, the parties agree by way of collective agreement—as in the present case—that all matters agreed upon in the next round of collective bargaining shall be finalized as a collective agreement by the signature of the collective bargaining representative in accordance with the results of the general meeting of union members. If the employer does not wish to engage in collective bargaining or to conclude a collective agreement by such a procedure or method, the employer need only refuse to conclude a collective agreement of that content; and once such an agreement has been concluded, the employer need only refuse to conclude an agreement of that content at the time of the next renewal of the collective agreement.
I cannot agree that, where the employer has not objected to collective bargaining or the conclusion of a collective agreement by such a procedure or method, and has clearly accepted this by way of a collective agreement with the labor union, this should nevertheless be regarded as unlawful in violation of the main text of Article 33(1) of the Act, nor can I agree that it is proper for the Defendant to intervene and require its amendment.
Chief Justice Kim Deok-ju (Presiding), Justices Choi Jae-ho, Park Woo-dong, Yoon Kwan, Kim Sang-won, Bae Man-woon, Kim Ju-han, Yoon Young-cheol (Reporting Justice), Kim Yong-jun, Kim Seok-su, Park Man-ho, Choi Jong-young, Cheon Gyeong-song