Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 98도3299

Obstruction of Business (업무방해)업무방해

Decided2000. 05. 12. Court대법원Reversed and remanded (파기환송) - the lower court's finding that the strike was legitimate was overturned, an outcome favorable to the employer/prosecution
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A labor union's bylaws (규약) provided that the authority to conclude a collective agreement (단체협약 체결권한) must be decided by a general meeting of union members (조합원 총회), yet the union demanded collective bargaining (단체교섭) without clarifying this limitation to the employer, and subsequently carried out an industrial action (쟁의행위) after bargaining broke down. The Supreme Court held that because it was never confirmed whether the union's bargaining representative had final authority to conclude an agreement, the union could not be said to have bargained in good faith, and therefore the resulting strike was not legitimate.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA union demanded collective bargaining without clearly disclosing that its bargaining representative lacked final authority to conclude an agreement (since union member approval was required), and then went on strike after negotiations broke down.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that the strike was not legitimate because the union failed to confirm its representative's actual bargaining authority to the employer, showing the union had not made a sincere effort to negotiate.
  • LessonUnions should clearly communicate the scope and limits of their bargaining representative's authority to the employer before claiming that a breakdown in negotiations justifies industrial action.
Issues
  • What requirements must be met for an industrial action to qualify as a legitimate act (정당행위) exempting it from criminal liability under the Criminal Act
  • Whether collective bargaining and a subsequent industrial action can be deemed legitimate when it is unclear whether the bargaining representative held final decision-making authority
Key reasoning

Under the union's own bylaws, the conclusion of a collective agreement required the consent of the union membership, meaning the bargaining representative did not automatically possess final decision-making power. Despite this, the union demanded collective bargaining without informing or confirming to the employer whether its representative actually held final authority to sign an agreement. This lack of transparency meant the union failed to demonstrate a genuine, good-faith effort to reach an agreement through negotiation. Consequently, when bargaining broke down, the union's decision to strike on that basis could not be recognized as a legitimate industrial action under the law.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] For a worker's collective action (쟁의행위) to constitute a legitimate act (정당행위) under the Criminal Code (형법), it must satisfy all of the following conditions: first, the subject must be one who is qualified to be a party to collective bargaining; second, its purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; third, it must commence when the employer has refused to engage in collective bargaining over specific demands for the improvement of workers' working conditions, and, absent special circumstances, must go through procedures such as a resolution of approval by union members and the reporting of the occurrence of a labor dispute; and fourth, its means and methods must be compatible with the employer's property rights and must not constitute the exercise of violence.

[2] The main text of Article 33(1) of the former Trade Union Act (노동조합법) (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Trade Unions and Labor Relations Adjustment (노동조합및노동관계조정법), Act No. 5244 of December 31, 1996) provides that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by the trade union has the authority to bargain with the employer or an employers' association on behalf of the workers or union members with respect to the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." Here, the "authority to bargain" shall be deemed to include the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of the bargaining. If the trade union's bylaws provide that a draft collective agreement takes effect only upon obtaining the consent of the union members through a resolution, then even if the union members, at the time of forming the trade union, resolved to delegate matters concerning the conclusion of a collective agreement to the union chairman and the central executive committee, so long as the union side did not notify the company of the fact that it had received such separate delegation, the company cannot be expected to bargain in good faith with a bargaining representative whose final decision-making authority has not been confirmed, given the risk that even if an agreement on the demands for the collective agreement is reached through mutual compromise and concession between labor and management, the union's general meeting might refuse to accept the draft collective agreement, thereby nullifying the results of the collective bargaining. Accordingly, if the union side, despite being able to resolve the company's doubts concerning its authority to conclude a collective agreement, merely demanded collective bargaining without resolving such doubts, it cannot be said that the union made sincere efforts toward collective bargaining. Therefore, even if the collective bargaining conducted under such circumstances broke down, a collective action taken on that ground cannot be deemed a legitimate collective action in terms of its purpose, timing, and procedure.

Full text (English, AI translation) 15,866 chars

[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 5 others
[Appellant] Prosecutor
[Judgment Below] Suwon District Court Decision 98No895 delivered on September 16, 1998

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Suwon District Court.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The Facts Charged
The facts charged in this case are as follows: After the Defendants completed the registration of the establishment of the labor union of Nonindicted Company (hereinafter "Nonindicted Company") around September 16, 1996, they demanded collective bargaining from the company around September 23 of the same year, held an introductory meeting around October 2 of the same year, and after only the second round of collective bargaining took place around October 24, filed a report of the occurrence of a labor dispute around October 29. From around September 25 to around November 10 of the same year, while driving car carriers, the Defendants attached banners reading "Congratulations on the Establishment of the Nonindicted Company Labor Union" and "Smash Tak Seung-gi" and the like to the vehicles, and refused to work and left their posts, among other acts. During this period, Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant 5 conspired together, and from around 08:20 to around 09:50 on November 11, 1996, at the rear gate of Ssangyong Motor Company (hereinafter "Ssangyong Motor") located at 150-3 Chilgoe-dong, Pyeongtaek-si, attached banners reading "Congratulations on the Establishment of the Nonindicted Company Labor Union" to the front of five car carriers owned by Nonindicted Company and attempted to enter the premises to transport new vehicles. When Ssangyong Motor restricted entry of vehicles bearing the banners, the Defendants abandoned the vehicles there, blocking the access road, thereby preventing 12 drivers, including employee ○○○ of Nonindicted Company, from driving their respective car carriers into Ssangyong Motor, thereby obstructing the business of transporting new vehicles of Nonindicted Company and Ssangyong Motor by force. Further, from around 10:30 to around 12:30 on the same day, at the Samjuk Car Wash in Samjuk-myeon, Anseong-gun, Gyeonggi-do, together with workers engaged in car washing duties, the Defendants set out chairs and the like, drank alcohol, sang songs, blew whistles, and engaged in a sit-in protest and strike, thereby obstructing the car-washing business of Nonindicted Company by force. In addition, Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, and Defendant 6 conspired together, and from around 13:30 to around 17:30 on the 15th of the same month, at the Samjuk Car Wash, left the new vehicles that the Defendants had driven in on the car carriers without unloading them, and together with workers engaged in car-washing duties and the like, collectively left work early and engaged in a strike, thereby obstructing the vehicle-unloading and car-washing business of Nonindicted Company by force. Finally, the Defendants conspired together, and from around 09:30 to around 15:00 on the 28th of the same month, at the Samjuk Car Wash, together with workers engaged in car-washing duties and the like, set out chairs and the like and engaged in a sit-in protest while beating gongs, drums, and small gongs (kkwaenggwari), and went on strike, thereby obstructing the car-washing business of Nonindicted Company by force.

2. The Judgment Below
The court below determined as follows. The issues of providing a union office and furnishings and recognizing full-time union officials, which the labor union of Nonindicted Company demanded from the company, constituted only a very small portion of the proposed collective agreement presented by the labor union side. Moreover, under the proviso of Article 39, Item 4 of the former Trade Union Act (Act repealed by the enforcement of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5244 of December 31, 1996, which took effect on March 1, 1997) then in force, an employer's provision of a minimum-sized union office did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, at the time, there was no prohibition under the rules of employment or collective agreement against allowing a certain range of union officers to devote themselves exclusively to union affairs. As for the issue of supplementing personnel such as transport staff, this is on the one hand a matter belonging to the employer's management rights, but on the other hand is also closely related to workers' working conditions, and does not fundamentally restrict the employer's management rights. Accordingly, these matters could be the subject of a collective agreement, and thus an industrial action aimed at such objectives should be regarded as intended to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions. Furthermore, although it is recognized that the labor union side, in demanding the holding of collective bargaining for the conclusion of a collective agreement, sent to the company a copy of the union's rules including provisions that "the authority to conclude the collective agreement, etc. rests with the union members, and this becomes effective only upon a vote by a majority of the registered union members and the consent of a majority of those voting; and if the chairperson signs on his own authority, this shall be deemed to constitute grounds for a vote of no confidence, and a general meeting shall be convened immediately to conduct a vote of the union members on whether to pass a vote of no confidence," in light of the circumstances under which the rules were sent to the company—namely, that this was done in response to the company's request, prior to entering collective bargaining, that the union's rules be sent first—it is difficult to view the mere sending of the rules as clearly indicating that the labor union side would conclude the collective agreement only after obtaining a resolution of the general meeting of union members regarding approval or rejection of the proposed collective agreement. Rather, it appears that when the union members formed the labor union, they passed a resolution delegating matters concerning the conclusion of the collective agreement to the chairperson and the central executive committee. In light of the factual circumstances leading up to the industrial action in this case, the Defendants' industrial action does not appear to be defective in terms of subject, purpose, or procedure. Furthermore, from mid-September 1996, when the labor union of Nonindicted Company was established, until around November 10 of the same year, Ssangyong Motor exercised no control whatsoever over the operation of Nonindicted Company's car carriers bearing banners; it was only at the time and place stated in the first item of the facts charged in this case that Ssangyong Motor demanded the removal of the banners from the vehicles bearing them, and immediately after executives of Nonindicted Company personally removed the banners over a period of about 30 minutes, the Defendants and union members moved the vehicles to the parking lot beside the rear gate of Ssangyong Motor, thereby enabling other vehicles to enter and exit the rear gate of Ssangyong Motor. Also, while the Defendants and union members engaged in the industrial action at the car wash, they did not block the entrance to the workplace, restrict the access of others, obstruct the work of non-union members, use violence against the employer or non-union members, or coerce the suspension of operations. In light of these facts, it cannot be said that the Defendants' industrial action, in its means and methods, exceeded the bounds within which it could be reconciled with the employer's property rights, and its manner did not involve violence, destruction, or other acts of a highly antisocial nature, but remained within a legitimate scope. Accordingly, the court below concluded that the Defendants' acts constituted legitimate industrial action, and found the Defendants not guilty of the facts charged in this case.

3. Regarding the Argument of Violation of the Rules of Evidence
Upon comparing and examining the relevant evidence against the record, the court below's factual finding that the Defendants did not block the entrance to the workplace or restrict the access of others is justified, and there is no illegality of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as argued. This argument is without merit.

4. Regarding the Argument of Misapprehension of Legal Principles
For a worker's industrial action to constitute a legitimate act under the Criminal Act (형법), it must satisfy all of the following conditions: first, the subject must be one capable of being a party to collective bargaining; second, the purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; third, the action must be commenced when the employer has rejected collective bargaining regarding specific demands for the improvement of workers' working conditions, and, absent special circumstances, must have gone through procedures such as a vote of approval by the union members and the filing of a report of the occurrence of a labor dispute; and fourth, the means and methods must be reconcilable with the employer's property rights and must not amount to the exercise of violence (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do324 delivered on May 24, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 97Do588 delivered on January 20, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 97Do2543 delivered on February 27, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 99Da8377 delivered on June 25, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 99Do4838 delivered on March 10, 2000, and others).

According to the record, however, immediately after the labor union completed the registration of its establishment on September 16, 1996, it demanded that the company engage in collective bargaining, and while the company held an introductory meeting on October 2 of the same year, it proposed on October 4 that, since the representative for collective bargaining must have full authority, confirmation of the representative's full authority was necessary, and requested the union's rules while proposing a review period. In response, on October 7, the labor union side asserted that the question of the representative's authority was not a matter for the company to intervene in, and demanded that bargaining proceed. The company again replied on October 15 that collective bargaining would be possible only once preconditions were satisfied, including official notification of the union's demands and confirmation of the representative's full authority. In response, on the same day, the labor union side sent the company its union rules and a proposed collective agreement consisting of 144 articles. Article 38 of the rules provided, as found by the court below, that the authority to conclude the collective agreement rests with the union members, that it becomes effective only upon a vote by a majority of the registered union members and the consent of a majority of those voting, and that if the chairperson signs on his own authority, this shall be deemed to constitute grounds for a vote of no confidence, requiring the immediate convening of a general meeting to conduct a vote of the union members on whether to pass a vote of no confidence. Accordingly, on October 18, the company pointed out that, according to the union's rules, the authority of the union representative to conclude agreements was denied, meaning the representative lacked legitimate authority as a bargaining party, and requested confirmation of the legitimate authority of the bargaining representative. The parties held the second round of collective bargaining on October 24 but failed to reach agreement. Even thereafter, on November 12 of the same year, the company pointed out that there had been no response to its request for confirmation of whether the union representative possessed authority to conclude the collective agreement, and requested that collective bargaining be reconvened. Meanwhile, it can be seen that, regarding the labor union's report of the occurrence of a labor dispute filed on October 29 of the same year, the Gyeonggi Provincial Labor Relations Commission, on November 7 of the same year, instructed the labor union that the report of the occurrence of a labor dispute had been filed without sufficient bargaining having taken place.

The main text of Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the former Trade Union Act (Act repealed by the enforcement of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Act No. 5244 of December 31, 1996, which took effect on March 1, 1997) then in force provided that "the representative of a labor union or a person delegated by the labor union shall have the authority to bargain with the employer or an employers' association on behalf of the workers or union members regarding the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." Here, "authority to bargain" should be construed as including the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of the bargaining. Nevertheless, the rules of the labor union in this case contained a provision to the effect that a proposed collective agreement would become effective only upon obtaining the consent of the union members through resolution, and even though the union members, in forming the labor union, resolved to delegate matters concerning the conclusion of the collective agreement to the chairperson and the central executive committee, insofar as the labor union side did not notify the company of the fact that such separate delegation had been made, the company had reason to fear that, even if an agreement were reached on the proposed collective agreement as a result of mutual compromise and concession between labor and management, the union's general meeting might refuse to accept the proposed collective agreement, thereby nullifying the results of the collective bargaining. Accordingly, the company could not be expected to engage in bargaining in good faith with a bargaining representative whose final decision-making authority had not been confirmed. If the labor union side, despite being able to resolve the company's doubts regarding the authority to conclude the collective agreement, merely demanded collective bargaining without resolving such doubts, then it cannot be said that the union made sincere efforts toward collective bargaining. Therefore, even if collective bargaining conducted under such circumstances broke down, an industrial action undertaken on that basis cannot be regarded as a legitimate industrial action in terms of its purpose, timing, and procedure (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Nu12257 delivered on April 27, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 97Do588 delivered on January 20, 1998, and others).

Nevertheless, the court below overlooked this point and, without further examining whether the labor union made efforts to resolve the company's doubts regarding its authority to conclude the collective agreement, determined that the Defendants' acts constituted legitimate industrial action. This constitutes an illegality affecting the judgment due to incomplete deliberation or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the legitimacy of industrial action. The argument pointing this out has merit.

5. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and adjudication. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as stated in the Order.

Presiding Justice Yoon Jae-sik
Justice Lee Don-hee
Justice Lee Im-su (Presiding Justice for Preparation of Opinion)
Justice Song Jin-hoon

【판결요지】

[1] 근로자의 쟁의행위가 형법상 정당행위가 되기 위하여는 첫째 그 주체가 단체교섭의 주체로 될 수 있는 자이어야 하고, 둘째 그 목적이 근로조건의 향상을 위한 노사간의 자치적 교섭을 조성하는 데에 있어야 하며, 셋째 사용자가 근로자의 근로조건 개선에 관한 구체적인 요구에 대하여 단체교섭을 거부하였을 때 개시하되 특별한 사정이 없는 한 조합원의 찬성결정 및 노동쟁의 발생신고 등 절차를 거쳐야 하는 한편, 넷째 그 수단과 방법이 사용자의 재산권과 조화를 이루어야 함은 물론 폭력의 행사에 해당되지 아니하여야 한다는 여러 조건을 모두 구비하여야 한다.

[2] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법 부칙 제3조로 폐지) 제33조 제1항 본문은 "노동조합의 대표자 또는 노동조합으로부터 위임을 받은 자는 그 노동자 또는 조합원을 위하여 사용자나 사용자단체와 단체협약의 체결 기타의 사항에 관하여 교섭할 권한이 있다."고 규정하고 있고, 여기서 '교섭할 권한'이라 함은 교섭한 결과에 따라 단체협약을 체결할 권한을 포함하는 것이라고 할 것인바, 노동조합의 규약에 단체협약안에 대하여 조합원의 결의로 동의를 얻어야 효력을 갖는다는 내용이 있다면, 비록 조합원들이 노동조합을 결성하면서 단체협약의 체결에 관한 사항을 위원장과 중앙집행위원회에 위임하기로 의결하였다고 하더라도 노동조합측에서 이와 같이 별도의 위임까지 받았다는 사정을 회사측에 통보하지 않은 이상, 회사측으로서는 노사 쌍방간의 타협과 양보의 결과로 단체협약 요구안에 대하여 합의를 도출하더라도 노동조합 총회에서 그 단체협약안을 받아들이기를 거부하여 단체교섭의 성과를 무로 돌릴 위험성이 있어 최종적인 결정 권한이 확인되지 않은 교섭대표와 성실한 자세로 교섭에 임하는 것을 기대할 수 없으니, 노동조합측에서 회사측의 단체협약 체결권한에 대한 의문을 해소시켜 줄 수 있음에도 불구하고 이를 해소시키지 않은 채 단체교섭만을 요구하였다면 단체교섭을 위한 진지한 노력을 다하였다고 볼 수 없고 따라서 그러한 상황에서 가진 단체교섭이 결렬되었다고 하더라도 이를 이유로 하는 쟁의행위는 그 목적과 시기, 절차에 있어서 정당한 쟁의행위라고 볼 수 없다.

【참조조문】

[1] 형법 제20조

[2] 형법 제20조, 제314조, 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법 부칙 제3조로 폐지) 제33조 제1항(현행 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제29조 제1항 참조)

【참조판례】

[1][2] 대법원 1998. 1. 20. 선고 97도588 판결(공1998상, 636) / [1] 대법원 1991. 5. 24. 선고 91도324 판결(공1991, 1817), 대법원 1998. 2. 27. 선고 97도2543 판결, 대법원 1999. 6. 25. 선고 99다8377 판결(공1999하, 1503) / [2] 대법원 1993. 4. 27. 선고 91누12257 전원합의체 판결(공1993하, 1579), 대법원 1993. 5. 11. 선고 91누10787 판결(공1993하, 1716), 대법원 1995. 3. 10. 자 94마605 결정(공1995상, 1698)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 5,724자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】 피고인 1 외 5인

【상 고 인】 검사

【원심판결】 수원지법 1998. 9. 16. 선고 98노895 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하여 사건을 수원지방법원 본원 합의부에 환송한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 판단한다.

1. 공소사실

이 사건 공소사실은, 피고인들이 1996. 9. 16.경 공소외 주식회사(이하 '공소외 회사'라고 한다)의 노동조합 설립신고를 마친 후 같은 달 23일경 위 회사측에 단체교섭을 요구하여 같은 해 10월 2일경 상견례를 하고, 같은 달 24일경 2차 단체교섭만 이루어진 상태에서 같은 달 29일경 쟁의발생신고를 하고, 같은 해 9월 25일경부터 같은 해 11월 10일경까지 피고인들이 운전하는 차량운반차(카캐리어)에 '축 창립 공소외 회사 노동조합', '박살내자 탁승기'라는 등의 현수막을 부착한 채로 운행하면서 작업을 거부하고 근무지를 이탈하는 등의 행위를 해오던 중, 피고인 1, 피고인 2, 피고인 3, 피고인 4, 피고인 5는 공모하여, 1996. 11. 11. 08:20경부터 09:50경까지 평택시 칠괴동 150의 3 쌍용자동차 주식회사(이하 '쌍용자동차'라고 한다) 후문에서 공소외 회사 소유의 차량운반차 5대의 전면에 '축 창립 공소외 회사 노동조합'이라는 현수막을 부착하고 신차를 운송하기 위하여 들어가려다가 쌍용자동차측에서 현수막을 부착한 차량의 출입을 통제하자 차량들을 그 곳에 방치하여 그 진입로를 봉쇄함으로써 공소외 회사 소속 근로자인 ○○○ 등 운전기사 12명이 각자의 차량운반차를 운전하여 쌍용자동차에 들어가지 못하도록 하는 등 위력으로써 공소외 회사 및 쌍용자동차의 신차운송업무를 방해하고, 같은 날 10:30경부터 12:30경까지 경기 안성군 삼죽면 삼죽세차장에서 세차업무에 종사하는 근로자들과 함께 의자 등을 내다놓고 술을 마시면서 노래를 부르고 호루라기를 부는 등 농성을 하면서 파업하여 위력으로써 공소외 회사의 세차업무를 방해하고, 피고인 1, 피고인 2, 피고인 3, 피고인 6은 공모하여, 같은 달 15일 13:30경부터 17:30경까지 삼죽세차장에서 피고인들이 운전해 온 차량운반차에서 신차를 하차시키지 않은 채 방치하고 세차업무 등에 종사하는 근로자들과 함께 집단으로 조퇴하는 등 파업하여 위력으로써 공소외 회사의 차량하차 및 세차업무를 방해하고, 피고인들은 공모하여 같은 달 28일 09:30경부터 15:00경까지 삼죽세차장에서 세차업무 등에 종사하는 근로자들과 함께 의자 등을 내어놓고 징과 북, 꽹과리 등을 치는 등 농성을 하면서 파업하여 위력으로써 공소외 회사의 세차업무를 방해하였다는 것이다.

2. 원심의 판단

원심은, 공소외 회사 노동조합이 회사측에 요구한 노조사무실과 집기의 제공, 노조전임자의 인정 문제는 노동조합측이 제시한 단체협약안 중 극히 일부에 지나지 않을 뿐만 아니라 당시 시행되던 구 노동조합법(1997. 3. 1.부터 시행된 1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법의 시행에 의하여 폐지된 법률) 제39조 제4호 단서에 의하면 사용자가 최소한의 규모의 노동조합사무소를 제공하는 것은 부당노동행위에 해당하지 않는 것으로 규정되어 있고, 또한 당시에 취업규칙이나 단체협약 등에 의하여 노동조합의 간부들 중 일정한 범위 내의 자들에 대하여 노동조합의 업무만을 전담할 수 있도록 하는 것이 금지되어 있지도 않았으며 이송요원의 보충과 같은 인력충원의 문제는 한편으로는 사용자의 경영권에 속하는 사항이지만 다른 한편으로는 근로자들의 근로조건과도 밀접한 관련이 있는 부분으로서 사용자의 경영권을 근본적으로 제약하는 것은 아니라고 보여지는바, 그렇다면 이러한 문제들은 단체협약의 대상이 될 수 있다고 할 것이므로 이러한 목적을 가진 쟁의행위는 근로조건의 향상을 위한 노사간의 자치적 교섭을 조성하기 위한 것이라고 보아야 할 것이고, 나아가 노동조합측이 단체협약 체결을 위한 단체교섭의 개최를 요구하면서 "단체협약 등의 체결권한은 조합원에게 있고, 이는 재적조합원 과반수의 투표와 투표자 과반수의 동의를 얻어야만 효력을 가지며, 위원장이 직권으로 조인한 때에는 불신임사유가 발생한 것으로 보아 즉시 총회를 열어 불신임 여부를 묻는 조합원투표를 실시한다."는 내용이 포함된 노동조합 규약을 회사측에 보낸 사실은 인정되나, 위 규약을 회사측에 보내게 된 경위가 단체교섭에 들어가기 전에 먼저 노동조합의 규약을 보내달라는 회사측의 요구에 따른 것이라는 점 등에 비추어 볼 때 규약을 보낸 것만으로는 노동조합측이 단체협약안의 가부에 관하여 조합원총회의 의결을 거친 후에만 단체협약을 체결할 것임을 명백히 하였다고 보기 어렵고, 오히려 조합원들이 노동조합을 결성하면서 단체협약의 체결에 관한 사항을 위원장과 중앙집행위원회에 위임하는 의결을 한 사정이 엿보이며, 이 사건 쟁의행위에 이르게 된 사실관계에 비추어 보면 피고인들의 이 사건 쟁의행위가 그 주체, 목적 및 절차 면에서 하자가 있다고 보여지지도 않을 뿐만 아니라, 쌍용자동차측에서는 공소외 회사의 노동조합이 설립된 1996년 9월 중순 이후 같은 해 11월 10일경까지는 공소외 회사의 차량운반차에 현수막을 부착하고 운행하는 것에 대하여 아무런 통제도 하지 않다가 이 사건 공소사실 첫 항의 일시장소에서 현수막을 부착한 차량에 대하여 현수막의 제거를 요구하였고, 이에 공소외 회사 간부들이 직접 약 30분에 걸쳐 현수막을 제거한 직후 피고인들과 조합원들은 차량을 쌍용자동차 후문 옆의 주차장으로 이동시킴으로써 다른 차량들의 쌍용자동차 후문 출입이 가능하도록 한 사실, 피고인들과 조합원들은 세차장에서 쟁의행위를 하면서도 사업장의 문을 봉쇄하거나 타인의 출입을 통제하거나 비조합원의 업무를 방해하거나 사용자와 비조합원들에게 폭력을 행사하거나 또는 조업중단을 강요하는 등의 행위는 하지 않은 사실에 비추어 피고인들의 쟁의행위는 수단과 방법에 있어서 사용자의 재산권과 조화를 이룰 수 있는 범위를 일탈하였다고 할 수도 없고 그 태양 또한 폭력 또는 파괴행위를 수반하거나 기타 고도의 반사회성을 띤 행위가 아닌 정당한 범위 내의 것이어서 결국 피고인들의 행위는 정당한 쟁의행위이므로 이 사건 공소사실은 무죄라고 판단하였다.

3. 채증법칙 위반 주장에 대하여

관련 증거들을 기록과 대조하여 검토하여 보면, 원심이 피고인들이 사업장의 문을 봉쇄하거나 타인의 출입을 통제하지 않았다고 본 사실인정은 정당하고, 여기에 논하는 바와 같은 채증법칙 위반으로 인한 사실오인의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 논지는 이유가 없다.

4. 법리오해 주장에 대하여

근로자의 쟁의행위가 형법상 정당행위가 되기 위하여는 첫째 그 주체가 단체교섭의 주체로 될 수 있는 자이어야 하고, 둘째 그 목적이 근로조건의 향상을 위한 노사간의 자치적 교섭을 조성하는 데에 있어야 하며, 셋째 사용자가 근로자의 근로조건 개선에 관한 구체적인 요구에 대하여 단체교섭을 거부하였을 때 개시하되 특별한 사정이 없는 한 조합원의 찬성결정 및 노동쟁의 발생신고 등 절차를 거쳐야 하는 한편, 넷째 그 수단과 방법이 사용자의 재산권과 조화를 이루어야 함은 물론 폭력의 행사에 해당되지 아니하여야 한다는 여러 조건을 모두 구비하여야 한다(대법원 1991. 5. 24. 선고 91도324 판결, 1998. 1. 20. 선고 97도588 판결, 1998. 2. 27. 선고 97도2543 판결, 1999. 6. 25. 선고 99다8377 판결, 2000. 3. 10. 선고 99도4838 판결 등 참조).

그런데 기록에 의하면, 노동조합이 1996. 9. 16. 조합 설립신고를 마친 직후부터 회사측에 단체교섭에 응할 것을 요구하자 회사측은 같은 해 10월 2일 상견례는 하였으나, 같은 달 4일 단체교섭 대표는 전권을 가져야 하므로 대표자의 전권 확인이 필요하다면서 노동조합 규약을 요청하면서 검토기간을 갖자고 제의하였고, 이에 노동조합측은 같은 달 7일 대표 권한은 회사가 관여할 성격의 문제가 아니라고 하면서 교섭을 가지자고 주장하였으며, 회사측은 다시 같은 달 15일 노조요구안 공식통보와 대표자 전권확인 등 사전요건이 충족되어야 단체교섭이 가능하다고 회신하고, 이에 노동조합측은 같은 날 노동조합 규약과 144개 조항의 단체협약 요구안을 회사측에 보냈는데, 규약 제38조에는 원심이 인정한 바와 같이 단체협약의 체결권한은 조합원에게 있고 재적조합원 과반수의 투표와 투표자 과반수의 동의를 얻어야만 효력을 가지며 위원장이 직권으로 조인한 때에는 불신임사유가 발생한 것으로 보아 즉시 총회를 열어 불신임 여부를 묻는 조합원 투표를 실시한다고 규정되어 있어, 회사측은 같은 달 18일 노동조합 규약에 의하면 노동조합 대표자의 체결권이 부인되어 있어 교섭당사자로서의 정당한 권한이 없으니 교섭대표자의 정당한 권한을 확인해 줄 것을 요청하였고, 같은 달 24일 제2차 단체교섭을 가졌다가 합의에 이르지 못한 후에도 같은 해 11월 12일 노동조합 대표자의 단체협약체결권 유무의 확인요청에 대한 회답이 없었다는 점을 지적하면서 단체교섭을 다시 개최할 것을 요청하였고, 한편 경기도지방노동위원회에서는 노동조합측의 같은 해 10월 29일자 노동쟁의발생신고에 대하여 같은 해 11월 7일 충분한 교섭 없이 쟁의발생신고를 하였다고 노동조합에게 지도하였음을 알 수 있다.

당시 시행되던 구 노동조합법(1997. 3. 1.부터 시행된 1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법의 시행에 의하여 폐지된 법률) 제33조 제1항 본문은 "노동조합의 대표자 또는 노동조합으로부터 위임을 받은 자는 그 노동자 또는 조합원을 위하여 사용자나 사용자단체와 단체협약의 체결 기타의 사항에 관하여 교섭할 권한이 있다."고 규정하고 있고, 여기서 '교섭할 권한'이라 함은 교섭한 결과에 따라 단체협약을 체결할 권한을 포함하는 것이라고 할 것인데, 그럼에도 불구하고 이 사건 노동조합의 규약에는 단체협약안에 대하여 조합원의 결의로 동의를 얻어야 효력을 갖는다는 내용이 있고, 비록 조합원들이 노동조합을 결성하면서 단체협약의 체결에 관한 사항을 위원장과 중앙집행위원회에 위임하기로 의결하였다고 하더라도 노동조합측에서 이와 같이 별도의 위임까지 받았다는 사정을 회사측에 통보하지 않은 이상, 회사측으로서는 노사 쌍방간의 타협과 양보의 결과로 단체협약 요구안에 대하여 합의를 도출하더라도 노동조합 총회에서 그 단체협약안을 받아들이기를 거부하여 단체교섭의 성과를 무로 돌릴 위험성이 있어 최종적인 결정 권한이 확인되지 않은 교섭대표와 성실한 자세로 교섭에 임하는 것을 기대할 수 없으니, 노동조합측에서 회사측의 단체협약 체결권한에 대한 의문을 해소시켜 줄 수 있음에도 불구하고 이를 해소시키지 않은 채 단체교섭만을 요구하였다면 단체교섭을 위한 진지한 노력을 다하였다고 볼 수 없고 따라서 그러한 상황에서 가진 단체교섭이 결렬되었다고 하더라도 이를 이유로 하는 쟁의행위는 그 목적과 시기, 절차에 있어서 정당한 쟁의행위라고 볼 수 없을 것이다(대법원 1993. 4. 27. 선고 91누12257 전원합의체 판결, 1998. 1. 20. 선고 97도588 판결 등 참조).

그럼에도 불구하고 원심은 이 점을 간과하여 노동조합이 회사측의 단체협약 체결권한에 대한 의문을 해소하려는 노력을 하였는지에 관하여는 더 심리를 해보지 않고 피고인들의 행위가 정당한 쟁의행위라고 판단하였으니 여기에는 심리미진 또는 쟁의행위의 정당성에 관한 법리오해로 판결에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다고 할 것이다. 이를 지적하는 논지는 이유가 있다.

5. 그러므로 원심판결을 파기하여 사건을 다시 심리·판단하도록 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 윤재식(재판장) 이돈희 이임수(주심) 송진훈

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