Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 97도588

Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc.; Obstruction of Business; Invalidation of Official Seals/Marks (Supreme Court Case No. 97Do588)폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반·업무방해·공무상표시무효

Decided1998. 01. 20. Court대법원Employer won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

In this case, the union chairman had explicitly stated that any collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) would require final approval from a general meeting of union members before it could be concluded. The Supreme Court held that the employer's refusal to continue bargaining under these conditions was legitimate, since the union representative did not have final authority to sign the agreement. As a result, the labor dispute action (쟁의행위) staged in response to the employer's refusal was found not to satisfy the requirement of a legitimate purpose.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA union chairman insisted that any collective bargaining agreement would need approval from a general union member meeting, and the employer refused further negotiations on that basis.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that the employer's refusal to bargain was justified, and therefore the union's dispute action lacked a legitimate purpose and was not protected under criminal law.
  • LessonUnion representatives should ensure they have clear, final authority to conclude agreements at the bargaining table, as conditioning approval on internal member votes may give employers valid grounds to pause negotiations.
Issues
  • What requirements must be met for a worker's labor dispute action (쟁의행위) to qualify as a legitimate act (정당행위) under the Criminal Act, exempting it from criminal liability?
  • Whether an employer may lawfully refuse to bargain with a union representative whose authority to conclude a collective bargaining agreement is conditioned on approval by a general meeting of union members
Key reasoning

Under Korean labor law, a union representative negotiating on behalf of the union must generally have the authority to conclude a binding collective bargaining agreement. Where the union chairman makes clear that any agreement is contingent on approval by a general meeting of union members, the chairman effectively lacks final decision-making authority at the bargaining table. In such circumstances, the employer's refusal to negotiate further with a representative who cannot make binding commitments does not constitute an unfair labor practice (부당노동행위). Consequently, since the employer's refusal to bargain was legitimate, the union's subsequent strike or dispute action taken to force negotiations lacked a legitimate objective and could not be justified as a lawful act (정당행위) under the Criminal Act.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] In order for a worker's industrial action to constitute a legitimate act under the Criminal Code (형법), it must satisfy all of the following conditions: first, the subject thereof must be a party capable of being a subject of collective bargaining; second, its purpose must be to foster autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; third, it must commence only after the employer has refused to engage in collective bargaining regarding specific demands for improvement of workers' working conditions, and, absent special circumstances, must have undergone procedures such as a resolution of approval by union members and a report of the occurrence of a labor dispute; and fourth, its means and methods must be in harmony with the employer's property rights and must not amount to the exercise of violence.

[2] The main text of Article 33(1) of the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) (repealed by Act No. 5244, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합및노동관계조정법), on December 31, 1996) provided that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by the trade union shall have the authority to negotiate with the employer or employers' association on behalf of the workers or union members with respect to the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." Here, "authority to negotiate" includes not only the authority to conduct collective bargaining as a factual act but also the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of the bargaining. Nevertheless, if the representative of the trade union or the delegated person has made clear that, after reaching agreement with the employer on the content of the collective agreement as a result of collective bargaining, the collective agreement will be concluded only after a resolution of the general meeting of union members on whether to accept the draft agreement, then even if an agreement is reached on wages or other working conditions as a result of mutual compromise and concession between labor and management, there remains a risk that the general meeting of union members may refuse to accept the draft collective agreement, thereby rendering the results of the collective bargaining null and void. Accordingly, the employer would be inclined to avoid negotiating or bargaining with a bargaining representative who lacks final decision-making authority, or, even if engaging in bargaining, would be reluctant to sincerely present a final concession proposal, and it is difficult to criticize such avoidance or neglect of collective bargaining by the employer as being without justifiable reason. Therefore, it is difficult to view the employer's avoidance of collective bargaining as constituting an unfair labor practice under Article 39, Subparagraph 3 of the same Act, and the industrial action carried out in response thereto cannot be regarded as a legitimate industrial action in terms of its purpose.

Full text (English, AI translation) 7,279 chars

[Defendants] Defendant 1 and 5 others
[Appellants] Defendants
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Jeong Ju-seok
[Judgment Below] Changwon District Court Decision 96No1766, decided February 5, 1997

[Order]

All appeals are dismissed.

[Reasoning]

The Court examines the grounds of appeal raised by the defendants' defense counsel.

1. Whether the collective action had justifiability as a labor dispute act

For a worker's collective action to constitute a legitimate act under the Criminal Code (형법), it must satisfy all of the following conditions: first, the subject must be one who can be a party to collective bargaining; second, the purpose must be to promote autonomous bargaining between labor and management for the improvement of working conditions; third, the action must commence only when the employer has refused to engage in collective bargaining regarding specific demands for improvement of working conditions, and, absent special circumstances, must be preceded by procedures such as a resolution of approval by union members and the filing of a report on the occurrence of a labor dispute; and fourth, the means and methods employed must be in harmony with the employer's property rights and must not amount to the exercise of violence (see this Court's Decisions 95Do1959, decided January 26, 1996; 91Do324, decided May 24, 1991; 90Do357, decided May 15, 1990, etc.).

Upon examination of the record, it can be seen that in this case, Defendant 1 was elected chairman of the labor union of Non-indicted Company on December 21, 1995, in the union chairman election, running on the pledge that "the contents of the collective agreement negotiations will be disclosed, and the collective agreement will be concluded only if a majority of the union members approve it." On March 19, 1996, the said labor union submitted a request for renewal of the collective agreement to Non-indicted Company, and on April 10, 1996, the employer side notified that it would engage in collective bargaining on matters other than reinstatement of dismissed workers and withdrawal of damages claims, and collective bargaining commenced on April 12 of the same year. However, the first, second, and third rounds of bargaining fell through due to disputes over the attire of the union's bargaining committee members, and from the fourth round of bargaining on April 30 of the same year, the employer side demanded a written statement (affidavit) that Defendant 1, as union chairman, had the authority to conclude the collective agreement. The union side, however, asserted that the employer's demand constituted interference in the union's internal affairs, and made clear that even if the collective agreement were agreed upon between the bargaining representatives of labor and management, Defendant 1 would conclude the collective agreement only after a vote of approval or disapproval by the general meeting of union members. On that ground, the employer side avoided collective bargaining with the union, resulting in a breakdown of the negotiations. On June 5 of the same year, the union filed a report on the occurrence of a labor dispute with the Gyeongsangnam-do Regional Labor Relations Commission, and on June 15 of the same year, the Labor Relations Commission provided guidance that such a state of conflict did not constitute a dispute arising from disagreement over working conditions and thus could not be the subject of a labor dispute. Nevertheless, the union commenced collective action on June 20 of the same year, and it can be seen that the defendants committed each of the acts of obstruction of business set forth in the facts charged in this case.

Upon examination, the main text of Article 33(1) of the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) (repealed by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합및노동관계조정법), Act No. 5244, enacted December 31, 1996, effective March 1, 1997) provided that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by the trade union has the authority to negotiate with the employer or employer's association on behalf of the workers or union members regarding the conclusion of a collective agreement and other matters." Here, "authority to negotiate" includes not only the authority to conduct collective bargaining as a factual act, but also the authority to conclude a collective agreement in accordance with the results of the bargaining. Nevertheless, if the representative of a trade union or the delegated person makes clear that, after reaching agreement with the employer on the contents of the collective agreement as a result of collective bargaining, the collective agreement will be concluded only after undergoing a resolution of the general meeting of union members on whether to approve or reject the draft agreement, then even if an agreement is reached on wages or other working conditions as a result of mutual compromise and concession between labor and management, there remains a risk that the general meeting of union members may refuse to accept the draft collective agreement, thereby rendering the results of the collective bargaining null and void. Accordingly, it would be difficult to blame the employer for avoiding or neglecting negotiations with a bargaining representative who lacks final decision-making authority, or for being reluctant, even when engaging in negotiations, to sincerely present a final concession proposal, as lacking justifiable grounds (see this Court's en banc Decision 91Nu12257, decided April 27, 1993).

Therefore, it is difficult to view the above avoidance of collective bargaining by Non-indicted Company as constituting an unfair labor practice as defined in Article 39, Item 3 of the above Act, and the collective action carried out in this case in opposition thereto cannot be regarded as a legitimate labor dispute act in terms of its purpose. The judgment below, which found in this vein that the illegality of the defendants' acts of obstruction of business in this case was not negated, is justified, and it cannot be said that there was an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the justifiability of collective action, as argued. This ground of appeal is without merit.

2. Whether there was a violation of the rules of evidence

Upon comparing and examining the evidence adopted by the first instance judgment, which was cited by the court below, against the record, it is proper that the court below found all of the facts charged against the defendants to be guilty, and it cannot be said that there was an error of misapprehension of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence, as argued. This ground of appeal is also without merit.

3. Regarding the argument of unfair sentencing

In this case, where each defendant was sentenced to imprisonment or imprisonment without labor lighter than 10 years, an argument that the sentence is too heavy and therefore unfair cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal. This ground of appeal is also without merit.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and it is so decided by the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved, as set forth in the Order.

Chief Justice Choi Jong-yeong (Presiding Justice)
Justice Lee Don-hee
Justice Lee Im-su (Justice in charge)
Justice Seo Seong

【판결요지】

[1] 근로자의 쟁의행위가 형법상 정당행위가 되기 위하여는 첫째 그 주체가 단체교섭의 주체로 될 수 있는 자이어야 하고, 둘째 그 목적이 근로조건의 향상을 위한 노사간의 자치적 교섭을 조성하는 데에 있어야 하며, 셋째 사용자가 근로자의 근로조건 개선에 관한 구체적인 요구에 대하여 단체교섭을 거부하였을 때 개시하되 특별한 사정이 없는 한 조합원의 찬성결정 및 노동쟁의 발생신고 등 절차를 거쳐야 하는 한편, 넷째 그 수단과 방법이 사용자의 재산권과 조화를 이루어야 함은 물론 폭력의 행사에 해당되지 아니하여야 한다는 여러 조건을 모두 구비하여야 한다.

[2] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법에 의하여 폐지된 법률) 제33조 제1항 본문은 "노동조합의 대표자 또는 노동조합으로부터 위임을 받은 자는 그 노동자 또는 조합원을 위하여 사용자나 사용자단체와 단체협약의 체결 기타의 사항에 관하여 교섭할 권한이 있다."고 규정하고 있었는바, 여기서 '교섭할 권한'이라 함은 사실행위로서의 단체교섭의 권한 외에 교섭한 결과에 따라 단체협약을 체결할 권한을 포함하는 것이지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 노동조합의 대표자 또는 수임자가 단체교섭의 결과에 따라 사용자와 단체협약의 내용을 합의한 후 다시 협약안의 가부에 관하여 조합원 총회의 의결을 거친 후에만 단체협약을 체결할 것임을 명백히 하였다면 노사 쌍방간의 타협과 양보의 결과로 임금이나 그 밖의 근로조건 등에 대하여 합의를 도출하더라도 노동조합의 조합원 총회에서 그 단체협약안을 받아들이기를 거부하여 단체교섭의 성과를 무로 돌릴 위험성이 있으므로 사용자측으로서는 최종적인 결정 권한이 없는 교섭대표와의 교섭 내지 협상을 회피하거나 설령 교섭에 임한다 하더라도 성실한 자세로 최후의 양보안을 제출하는 것을 꺼리게 될 것이고, 그와 같은 사용자측의 단체교섭 회피 또는 해태를 정당한 이유가 없는 것이라고 비난하기도 어렵다 할 것이므로, 사용자측의 단체교섭 회피가 같은 법 제39조 제3호가 정하는 부당노동행위에 해당한다고 보기도 어렵고, 그에 대항하여 단행된 쟁의행위는 그 목적에 있어서 정당한 쟁의행위라고 볼 수 없다.

【참조조문】

[1] 형법 제20조

[2] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법에 의하여 폐지된 법률) 제33조 제1항, 제39조 제1항 제3호

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 1990. 5. 15. 선고 90도357 판결(공1990, 1306), 대법원 1990. 10. 12. 선고 90도1431 판결(공1990, 2334), 대법원 1991. 5. 24. 선고 91도324 판결(공1991, 1817), 대법원 1996. 1. 26. 선고 95도1959 판결(공1996상, 838) / [2] 대법원 1993. 4. 27. 선고 91누12257 전원합의체 판결(공1993하, 1579), 대법원 1993. 5. 11. 선고 91누10787 판결(공1993하, 1716), 대법원 1995. 3. 10. 자 94마605 결정(공1995상, 1698)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 2,708자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】 피고인 1 외 5인

【상 고 인】 피고인들

【변 호 인】 변호사 정주석

【원심판결】 창원지법 1997. 2. 5. 선고 96노1766 판결

【주 문】

상고를 모두 기각한다.

【이 유】 피고인들의 변호인의 상고이유를 본다.

1. 쟁의행위로서의 정당성이 있는지 여부에 대하여

근로자의 쟁의행위가 형법상 정당행위가 되기 위하여는 첫째 그 주체가 단체교섭의 주체로 될 수 있는 자이어야 하고, 둘째 그 목적이 근로조건의 향상을 위한 노사간의 자치적 교섭을 조성하는 데에 있어야 하며, 셋째 사용자가 근로자의 근로조건 개선에 관한 구체적인 요구에 대하여 단체교섭을 거부하였을 때 개시하되 특별한 사정이 없는 한 조합원의 찬성결정 및 노동쟁의 발생신고 등 절차를 거쳐야 하는 한편, 넷째 그 수단과 방법이 사용자의 재산권과 조화를 이루어야 함은 물론 폭력의 행사에 해당되지 아니하여야 한다는 여러 조건을 모두 구비하여야 한다(당원 1996. 1. 26. 선고 95도1959 판결, 1991. 5. 24. 선고 91도324 판결, 1990. 5. 15. 선고 90도357 판결 등 참조).

그런데 기록에 의하여 살펴보면, 이 사건에서 피고인 1은 "단체협약 체결 및 협상 내용에 대하여 공개하고 조합원들의 과반수가 찬성하면 단체협약을 체결하겠다."는 것을 공약으로 내세워 1995. 12. 21. 공소외 주식회사 노동조합 위원장 선거에서 위 노동조합 위원장으로 당선되었는데 1996. 3. 19. 위 노동조합이 공소외 주식회사에 단체협약 갱신 요구안을 제출하고, 1996. 4. 10. 사용자측이 해고자 복직과 손해배상 철회를 제외한 나머지 안건을 대상으로 단체교섭에 응하겠다고 통보하여 같은 달 12. 단체교섭이 개시되었으나, 제1, 2, 3차 교섭은 노동조합측 교섭위원들의 복장이 문제가 되어 무산되고, 같은 달 30. 제4차 교섭부터 사용자측에서 노동조합 위원장인 피고인 1에게 단체협약체결권이 있다는 각서를 요구하였으나, 위 노동조합측에서는 사용자측의 요구는 위 노동조합의 내부 문제에 간섭하는 것임을 내세워 단체교섭을 하여 노사의 교섭위원 사이에 단체협약안이 합의되더라도 조합원 총회의 찬반투표를 거친 후 피고인 1이 단체협약을 체결할 것임을 명백히 하였고, 위 사용자측은 그를 이유로 위 노동조합과의 단체교섭을 회피하여 단체교섭이 결렬되었으며 같은 해 6. 5. 위 노동조합이 경남지방노동위원회에 쟁의발생 신고를 하고, 같은 달 15. 위 노동위원회에서 그와 같은 분쟁상태는 근로조건에 대한 의견불일치로 인한 분쟁상태가 아니므로 쟁의대상이 될 수 없다고 지도하였는데도 위 노동조합은 같은 달 20. 쟁의행위에 돌입하여 피고인들이 이 사건 공소사실에 기재된 각 업무방해 행위를 하였음을 알 수 있다.

살피건대 구 노동조합법(1997. 3. 1.부터 시행된 1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 노동조합및노동관계조정법에 의하여 폐지된 법률) 제33조 제1항 본문은 "노동조합의 대표자 또는 노동조합으로부터 위임을 받은 자는 그 노동자 또는 조합원을 위하여 사용자나 사용자단체와 단체협약의 체결 기타의 사항에 관하여 교섭할 권한이 있다."고 규정하고 있었는바, 여기서 '교섭할 권한'이라 함은 사실행위로서의 단체교섭의 권한 외에 교섭한 결과에 따라 단체협약을 체결할 권한을 포함하는 것이지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 노동조합의 대표자 또는 수임자가 단체교섭의 결과에 따라 사용자와 단체협약의 내용을 합의한 후 다시 협약안의 가부에 관하여 조합원 총회의 의결을 거친 후에만 단체협약을 체결할 것임을 명백히 하였다면 노사 쌍방간의 타협과 양보의 결과로 임금이나 그 밖의 근로조건 등에 대하여 합의를 도출하더라도 노동조합의 조합원 총회에서 그 단체협약안을 받아들이기를 거부하여 단체교섭의 성과를 무로 돌릴 위험성이 있으므로 사용자측으로서는 최종적인 결정 권한이 없는 교섭대표와의 교섭 내지 협상을 회피하거나 설령 교섭에 임한다 하더라도 성실한 자세로 최후의 양보안을 제출하는 것을 꺼리게 될 것이고, 그와 같은 사용자측의 단체교섭 회피 또는 해태를 정당한 이유가 없는 것이라고 비난하기도 어렵다 할 것이다(당원 1993. 4. 27. 선고 91누12257 전원합의체 판결 참조). 그러므로 공소외 주식회사측의 위와 같은 단체교섭 회피가 위 법 제39조 제3호가 정하는 부당노동행위에 해당한다고 보기도 어렵고, 그에 대항하여 단행된 이 사건 쟁의행위는 그 목적에 있어서 정당한 쟁의행위라고 볼 수 없다 할 것이다. 이와 같은 취지에서 피고인들의 이 사건 업무방해 행위의 위법성이 조각되지 아니한다고 본 원심의 판단은 정당하고, 여기에 논하는 바와 같이 쟁의행위의 정당성에 관한 법리를 오해한 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 이 점에 관한 논지는 이유가 없다.

2. 채증법칙 위반 여부에 대하여

원심이 인용한 제1심판결이 채택한 증거들을 기록과 대조하여 검토하여 보면 원심이 피고인들에 대한 각 공소사실을 모두 유죄로 인정하였음은 정당하고, 거기에 논하는 바와 같은 채증법칙 위반으로 인한 사실오인의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 이 점에 관한 논지도 이유가 없다.

3. 양형부당의 주장에 대하여

피고인들에 대하여 각 10년 이상의 징역이나 금고보다 가벼운 형을 선고한 이 사건에 있어서 형이 너무 무거워서 부당하다는 것은 적법한 상고이유가 될 수 없다. 논지도 이유가 없다.

4. 그러므로 상고를 모두 기각하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

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