[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Intervenor for the Defendant School Foundation (Counsel: Attorney Lee Sang-gyu)
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Dankook Educational Foundation (Counsel: Attorney Lee Sang-gyu)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 97Gu46353, decided September 16, 1998
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Summary of the Judgment Below
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, on the basis of the evidence it adopted, the following facts: ① Around 20:00 on an unspecified date in the fall of 1995, at the house of Nonparty 1, an emeritus professor of the university operated by the Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter "the Intervenor"), the Plaintiff said to him that former President Nonparty 2 must have diverted school funds to invest in a ski resort in Pocheon and elsewhere, that there must have been some hidden scheme behind the sale of the first campus, and that when students stormed the Plaintiff's office while he was serving as president of the professors' council, causing damage to fixtures, no one but former President Nonparty 2 could have instigated it; and when Nonparty 1 tried to persuade the Plaintiff by saying that the rumor that most of the ski resort belonged to Nonparty 2 was groundless, the Plaintiff said things such as "Now that Nonparty 2 is as good as dead, he must be finished off completely." ② On October 19, 1995, in the examination room on the third floor of the graduate school building of the said university, during a meeting of the professors of the Department of Public Administration concerning thesis examination, the Plaintiff verbally abused Nonparty 4, then Vice President, saying such things as "What kind of Vice President are you?" and "If you're going to grow old, do it gracefully." ③ When disciplinary proceedings were requested by the Intervenor around December 3, 1996, the Plaintiff, without confirming the truth of the matter, sent a certified mail letter dated around December 17 of that year to Nonparty 2, chairman of the board of directors of the Intervenor, stating, among other things, "Depending on how you respond, I will judge the possibility for the new development of the university and will expose this to society, so please clarify your position as soon as possible," together with seven items including: "1. I wish to make known to the whole world that the Intervenor is a representative example of the pervasive corruption that has persisted to this day, evidenced by the enormous number of suspected illegal admissions almost every year, collusion with successive regimes, the dismissal of the president from office due to the incineration of documents evidencing illegal admissions, debts amounting to over a hundred billion won, and various suspicions of corruption in connection with the purchase of new school land and the sale of old school land, and so on. (Omitted) 3. At the time Nonparty 5 was admitted to the doctoral program of the graduate school, you admitted him without his taking the English and major-subject examinations, and you also told me (the Plaintiff) that after I was admitted through special admission, the school authorities received 40 million won as a development fund. (Omitted) 5. The mere fact that your family members were engaged in private money-lending earning several hundred million won in interest income alone amply demonstrates how deceptive and false your conduct as a learned and virtuous educator has been up to now." The court below then found that these acts of the Plaintiff constituted acts undermining the dignity of a teacher, which is grounds for disciplinary action under Article 61(1)(3) of the Private School Act (사립학교법), and that even though Articles 20 and 21 of the Intervenor's Rules on Rewards and Punishments provide only for disciplinary dismissal, suspension, salary reduction, and reprimand as types of discipline, since Article 61(2) of the Private School Act provides for removal from office, dismissal, suspension, salary reduction, and reprimand as types of discipline, it was lawful both for the Intervenor to choose removal from office in imposing this disciplinary action and for the Defendant to alter the removal to dismissal. The court below further held that, considering that all the professors of the Department of Public Administration of the said university except the Plaintiff submitted a petition to the Minister of Education and to the school authorities stating that they could no longer work together with the Plaintiff as fellow professors, and taking into account all the circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, including his years of service and contribution to the school's education, the disposition of dismissal as modified by the decision on reexamination in this case could not be said to constitute an abuse of discretion or to exceed its bounds.
2. Determination on the Grounds of Appeal
A. As to the Alleged Violation of the Rules of Evidence in the First Ground of Appeal
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the fact-finding as stated in the judgment below is deemed correct, and there is no illegality in violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the ground of appeal. This argument is without merit.
B. As to the Second Ground of Appeal
The Private School Act, enacted on the basis of Article 31(4) and (6) of the Constitution, provides not only for matters concerning the rights of teachers, such as security of status and guarantee of the economic and social standing of private school teachers, but also for matters concerning the duties of teachers, such as the prohibition of acts likely to impair citizens' right to receive education. The discipline prescribed in Article 61 of the Private School Act is imposed for violations of duties imposed on teachers under public law, such as the Education Act (교육법). Meanwhile, the internal school regulations concerning discipline are nothing more than provisions by which the school foundation, as an employer, disciplines disorderly conduct arising from breach of the duty of good faith within the bounds of statutes, given that private school teachers are appointed under an employment contract with the school foundation or the operator and bear a duty of good faith toward the employer. Therefore, so long as the Private School Act provides for removal from office as one type of discipline, it is possible to impose removal from office for conduct undermining dignity, regardless of the content of the Intervenor's Rules on Rewards and Punishments. The determination of the court below to the same effect is justified, and there is no illegality therein due to a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the Intervenor's Rules on Rewards and Punishments and the provisions of the Private School Act, as alleged in the ground of appeal. This argument is also without merit.
C. As to the Alleged Misapprehension of Legal Principles in the First Ground of Appeal and the Third Ground of Appeal
(1) Whether the Conduct Constitutes an Act Undermining Dignity
Considering that teachers must always strive to improve their character and qualities so as to serve as a model, and must devote themselves wholly to the education of students by researching academic matters and studying and refining educational principles and methods, a higher standard of morality is required of teachers than of ordinary members of the workforce, and conduct by a teacher that undermines dignity risks undermining public trust not only in the teacher concerned but in the teaching profession as a whole. For this reason, the Private School Act imposes on private school teachers a duty to maintain dignity not only in matters related to their duties but also in their private affairs. Here, "dignity" refers to a character not unworthy of holding and carrying out the responsibilities of an educator toward the citizens, and whether particular conduct constitutes an act undermining dignity must be determined according to sound social norms in light of the specific circumstances.
According to the record, it can be seen that the Plaintiff, during a professors' meeting held for thesis examination, used the abusive language noted in the judgment below toward Nonparty 4, the Vice President, because Nonparty 4 had criticized the Plaintiff's argument; and that, after Nonparty 2 returned to the position of chairman of the board of directors of the Intervenor and disciplinary proceedings against the Plaintiff were commenced at his request, the Plaintiff, harboring resentment and intending to have the disciplinary proceedings halted, sent, without confirming whether they were true, the certified mail letter noted in the judgment below citing rumors and matters referred to in campus wall posters, and expressed extremely emotional grievances such as: "I judge this to be evidence that you feel not the slightest sense of guilt for having viciously tormented me by mobilizing every possible means and method," and "Please bear in mind that continuing to receive notices to appear before the disciplinary committee has been deeply etched in my heart as a lifelong grudge." Even assuming the Plaintiff's assertions were justified, such conduct on the part of the Plaintiff exceeded the bounds of an appropriate form of protest by a university professor, and as a result, it cannot be denied that the honor and dignity of the Plaintiff as a private school teacher were undermined. This constitutes conduct undermining the dignity of a teacher, whether inside or outside the scope of duties, and falls under the grounds for discipline set forth in Article 61(1)(3) of the Private School Act.
However, turning further to the conversation with Nonparty 1, it is difficult to deny that even a private university teacher, based on the constitutionally guaranteed principles of university autonomy and academic freedom, has a certain scope of voice in university administration through bodies such as the professors' council, and it may accordingly be considered that professors are permitted to converse individually about matters of university administration. In light of the fact that the conversation in question, as shown in the record, took place not on campus but at the house of Nonparty 1; that its content, given that the Plaintiff, as president of the professors' council of the university, had already expressed his views on the matter in the name of the said council, was not intended to spread false information; that Nonparty 1 dissuaded the Plaintiff's assertions at the time and made the matter public and controversial only about a year and six months later, and the Plaintiff had no intention at the time of spreading it externally; that at the time, Nonparty 2, having been dismissed from the presidency as a result of an audit into the incineration of admission-related documents and reckless financial management conducted by the Ministry of Education, was merely a private individual, not even a representative of the Intervenor; and further, that the statement "Nonparty 2 must be finished off," although coarse and vulgar in expression, in fact meant only that Nonparty 2's influence over the Intervenor should be entirely eliminated, and it is difficult to see how this could have externally damaged the honor of the school or the teacher—taking all these circumstances into account, this was nothing more than a private chat between professors who shared a common interest in Dankook University, and cannot be regarded as conduct undermining dignity as a teacher.
(2) Whether There Was a Deviation from or Abuse of Disciplinary Discretion
Where grounds for disciplinary action under the Private School Act exist with respect to a teacher subject to discipline, the choice of what disposition to impose is entrusted to the discretion of the disciplinary authority; however, only where it is recognized that the disciplinary disposition imposed by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of its discretion is markedly unreasonable in light of social norms, thereby constituting an abuse of the discretion entrusted to the disciplinary authority, may that disposition be deemed unlawful. In order for a disciplinary disposition against a teacher to be deemed markedly unreasonable in light of social norms, it must be objectively and clearly recognized as unjust upon comprehensive consideration, according to the specific case, of factors such as the content and nature of the misconduct that gave rise to the discipline, the purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline, and the standards for determining the severity of discipline. Even though the exercise of disciplinary authority is entrusted to the discretion of the appointing authority, such a disciplinary disposition shall be deemed unlawful as exceeding the bounds of discretion where it violates the principle of public interest that disciplinary authority must be exercised for a public purpose, or where it violates the principle of proportionality by choosing an excessively severe disciplinary disposition disproportionate to the degree of the misconduct generally taken as grounds for discipline, or where it violates the principle of equality by choosing, without reasonable cause, a disciplinary disposition inconsistent with and unfair as compared to the standards generally applied to misconduct of the same degree (see Supreme Court Judgment 98Du6951, decided November 26, 1999). In this respect, the judgment below, which held that the decision on reexamination in this case—choosing dismissal, a disciplinary disposition no different from removal from office, the most severe form of discipline, in that it results in stripping the Plaintiff of his status as a teacher, expelling him from the university, and depriving him of his status as a researcher and educator—was not unlawful, is difficult to accept, for the following reasons.
According to the record, the circumstances leading to this disciplinary action are as follows: around 1993, when a controversy arose over illegal admissions at the said university, a special audit by the Ministry of Education commenced, and the university, in response, incinerated documents related to the admissions process; the Ministry of Education then expanded the scope of the audit from the illegal admissions issue to budget management, and as a result it was revealed that the university, due to reckless expansion of facilities such as the construction of a second campus and an affiliated hospital and lax financial management, was carrying debts of approximately 170 billion won; accordingly, around August 1993, the Ministry held Nonparty 2, then president, responsible and demanded that the Intervenor dismiss him, revoked the approval of appointment of eleven directors of the Intervenor including the chairman of the board, and dispatched court-appointed directors (관선이사) to manage the school. Meanwhile, the Plaintiff was appointed on March 2, 1970 by Nonparty 2 as an administrative clerk (주사) of the said university and began working as his secretary, and thereafter, with the support of Nonparty 2, served smoothly as a teacher at the said university. However, from the latter half of 1993, the Plaintiff, while acting as president of the professors' council of the said university, continued to criticize Nonparty 2, demanding, in the name of the said professors' council around June 1994, that civil and criminal responsibility be pursued against Nonparty 2 and all others concerned, that a comprehensive investigation into the illegal admissions be conducted and disclosed, that an investigation into the school's debts be conducted and those responsible be punished, that the sale of the second campus land be opposed and the sale contract be explained, that rumors about Nonparty 2 having invested school foundation funds in a ski resort be clarified, and that, in response to Nonparty 2's own announcement that he would donate his entire fortune to the school and leave the foundation, the specific details of his assets and the status of implementation be confirmed. Just before Nonparty 2 assumed the position of chairman of the board of directors of the Intervenor on December 12, 1996, professors of the same department submitted a petition to the school authorities requesting action, stating that the Plaintiff's abusive language toward Nonparty 4 and undermining of harmony and solidarity among professors, whereupon disciplinary proceedings against the Plaintiff were commenced. It can be seen that, following a resolution of the disciplinary committee of the said university, Nonparty 2 imposed removal from office on the Plaintiff on January 9, 1997, on the grounds of the aforementioned abusive language and the sending of the letter noted in the judgment below, but when the Defendant revoked this disposition on March 17 of the same year on the ground that the disciplinary procedure had been unlawful, the disciplinary action in this case was again imposed, this time additionally including the content of the conversation with Nonparty 1 as grounds for discipline. In addition, according to the record, the abusive language directed at Nonparty 4 arose because, during the professors' meeting at issue, when the Plaintiff pointed out problems with favoritism shown to a particular individual in the thesis examination process and with the special admission procedure for the doctoral program and stated that he would request an audit by the Ministry of Education, Nonparty 4 criticized this as an act harmful to the school, and the Plaintiff, becoming excited, resorted to such conduct. There are also mitigating circumstances, in that the Plaintiff, after being appointed as a full-time lecturer on July 20, 1974 and being promoted to professor on April 1, 1986, faithfully served as a teacher for approximately 23 years, received commendations on two occasions, published four books including "Modern Local Administration Theory," and achieved academic accomplishments such as serving as an examiner for the Higher Civil Service Examination in public administration since around 1982. Considering these mitigating circumstances, together with the motive and circumstances leading to the conduct at issue in this case, the circumstances in which the disciplinary proceedings were commenced as noted above, and all other circumstances appearing in the record, it cannot but be concluded that the decision on reexamination in this case, which imposed dismissal on the Plaintiff based solely on the aforementioned grounds for discipline, exceeded the bounds of discretion or constituted an abuse of discretion in imposing the disciplinary disposition.
(3) Nevertheless, the court below determined that the decision on reexamination in this case, which included even the content of the conversation with Nonparty 1 as grounds for discipline against the Plaintiff, was justified. This constitutes an error affecting the judgment due to a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the duty to maintain dignity in conversations between private school teachers and the abuse of discretion in determining the severity of discipline. The argument pointing this out has merit.
3. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Yoon Jae-sik (Presiding Justice), Lee Don-hee, Lee Im-su (Justice in charge), Song Jin-hoon