[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Busan Ilbo Co., Ltd., Litigation Representative Attorneys Choi Seon-ho, Seo Yun-hong
[Lower Court Judgment] Daegu High Court Judgment 86Na189, decided February 5, 1987
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
We examine the grounds of appeal.
As to Ground 1,
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court found as follows: under Article 3 of the Defendant company's internal regulations (Defendant's Exhibit No. 35) in effect at the time the Plaintiff was dismissed, the Defendant company's staff are to consist of regular employees, contract employees (chotak), hired employees, and trainee employees; under Article 5, the Advertising Bureau is to have an Advertising Field Sales Division, an Advertising Division, an Advertising Business Division, and an Advertising Planning Division; under Article 13, the duties of the Advertising Field Sales Division are matters concerning advertising solicitation activities and securing advertising volume, and matters concerning the collection and remittance of field advertising fees; and under Article 22, the retirement age for members of the Advertising Field Sales Division is set at 50. The lower court also found that on July 11, 1977, when the Plaintiff was appointed as a member of the Defendant company's Advertising Field Sales Division, he signed an oath stating that during his term of employment he would faithfully perform his duties under the orders of the head of his department, and that he would accept any measures taken against him in case of violation, and thereafter entered the company; that after joining, he carried an identification card issued by the Defendant company; that the company maintained an attendance record and a personnel record card for the Plaintiff; that the Plaintiff was registered in the employee roster as a staff member of the Defendant company; that he was organized as a member of the workplace civil defense corps; that he was enrolled in medical insurance with the Defendant company as his workplace; and that, in these and other respects, advertising field sales staff such as the Plaintiff were granted the same rights, interests, and obligations as staff members of the Defendant company, no different from other employees. The lower court further found that the work of advertising field sales staff proceeded as follows: activities of the advertising field sales staff → solicitation of advertisers and requests for advertisements → in accordance with the instructions and orders of the head of the Advertising Bureau, consultation with the advertiser regarding the content, size, and price of the advertisement, etc. → report to the head of the Advertising Bureau → preparation of the advertisement design by staff of the Advertising Planning Office → presentation of the design to the advertiser → determination of the publication date → preparation of an advertising contract between the Defendant company and the advertiser → production of the printing plate → publication of the advertisement; that the advertising field sales staff member shows the advertiser the newspaper in which the advertisement was published, and the advertiser issues to the Defendant company a payment note stating by when the advertising fee will be paid, whereupon the advertising field sales staff member collects the advertising fee and remits it to the Defendant company. The lower court also found that, because the duties of advertising field sales staff such as the Plaintiff are as described above, their income depends on allowances (i.e., rebates) tied to their work performance; however, the Plaintiff, at the time he was appointed as an advertising field sales staff member, received a basic monthly allowance of 30,000 won, and at the time of his dismissal in this case, he was receiving a fixed basic monthly salary of 99,000 won, in addition to which he also received a bonus at the rate of 600 percent per annum on top of the said fixed salary.
Given that the facts are as found, the lower court's determination that advertising field sales staff of the Defendant company such as the Plaintiff are "staff" as provided in Article 3 of the Defendant company's internal regulations, and are workers in a subordinate employment relationship with the Defendant company, is justified. The mere fact that advertising field sales staff have no promotion system, no salary grades or steps, and are not subject to performance evaluation forms, or that advertising field sales staff are appointed as "chotak" (contract employees), cannot be grounds for concluding that their status is not that of staff members of the Defendant company. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is without merit.
As to Ground 2,
As the argument states, a "worker" under Article 14 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) refers to a person who, regardless of the type of occupation, provides labor to a business or workplace for the purpose of earning wages, and who is subject to the direction and supervision of the employer with respect to that labor. However, in this case, even if advertising field sales staff such as the Plaintiff are not restricted as to working hours and location, and do not receive specific instructions regarding advertisement solicitation activities, this is due to the particular nature of the duties of advertising field sales staff, and this fact alone cannot support the conclusion that they are not subject to the employer's direction and supervision, or that the relationship with the Defendant company is one of mandate (delegation) rather than employment, or that the Plaintiff is not a staff member of the Defendant company. The lower court's determination to this effect is likewise justified.
Accordingly, this ground of appeal is also without merit.
As to Ground 3,
The lower court further found that the income of advertising field sales staff such as the Plaintiff depends more on allowances—i.e., rebates—that vary according to their activity and ability, than on the fixed salary paid by the Defendant company; however, these rebates, though paid under the name of "allowance," constitute money and valuables that fall within the meaning of "wages" under Article 18 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법). The lower court further premised that, although advertising field sales staff have the duty to collect outstanding advertising fees for advertisements they have solicited, they bear no responsibility to pay or compensate for such fees themselves, and on this basis rejected the Defendant's argument that the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant company was one of mandate or subcontract. This determination of the lower court is likewise justified.
Moreover, the lower court held only that advertising field sales staff have a duty to collect unpaid advertising fees, not that they bear responsibility for such uncollected amounts; and since rebates are allowances paid according to the results of advertisement solicitation, it cannot be said to be unlawful that the lower court regarded them as having the character of wages. Whether or not to include such amounts in the calculation of average wages is unrelated to this case; what is at issue in this case is whether the Plaintiff's status is that of "staff" as provided in the Defendant company's internal regulations.
Furthermore, in light of their content and the circumstances of their preparation as found by the lower court, Defendant's Exhibits No. 8-1 and 8-3, relied upon by the Defendant, cannot be found to establish that the Plaintiff accepted the Defendant company's dismissal (disciplinary discharge). Therefore, no error can be found in the lower court's determination to this effect. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is also without merit.
As to Ground 4,
The selection and weighing of evidence and the finding of facts fall within the exclusive authority of the court of fact-finding, and unless this exceeds the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, it cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal. There is no error in the lower court's judgment such as contradiction in reasoning or insufficiency of reasoning as argued. This ground of appeal ultimately amounts to a challenge to the lower court's exclusive fact-finding authority, and is without merit.
As to Ground 5,
As the argument states, an employer may dismiss a worker when there is just cause. However, given that the Plaintiff is a staff member as provided in the Defendant company's internal regulations, and that under those regulations (Article 65), disciplinary discharge of a staff member of the Defendant company must be carried out following a resolution of the personnel committee, the Plaintiff could not be discharged without following such procedure. Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) is a provision that prohibits dismissal without just cause; it does not mean that the provisions of such internal regulations may be disregarded.
Moreover, even if the Plaintiff's conduct jeopardized the Defendant's finances and operations to a significant degree, so long as the Defendant company's internal regulations prescribe a procedure for discharge, discharge cannot be carried out without following that procedure (i.e., a resolution of the personnel committee). The purport of the aforementioned provision of the Labor Standards Act is not that, where a worker is at fault, dismissal may be carried out without the disciplinary procedure required under the rules of employment.
Accordingly, this ground of appeal is also without merit.
As to Ground 6,
The fact that the Defendant company abolished the advertising field sales system and adopted a new system with the content asserted in the argument does not necessarily mean that there was a change in the Plaintiff's status as a staff member of the Defendant company under the former system. Whether to operate the advertising staff system as a direct-management system or as a rebate system such as that at issue in this case is a matter of choice of system; and where the rebate system is adopted, whether to make the person in charge of it a staff member of the Defendant company, or to place that person in a subcontract or mandate relationship, is likewise a matter of choice of system. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Supreme Court Justices: Ahn Woo-man (Presiding), Kim Deok-ju, Bae Man-woon